Dappled theories in a uniform world

Philosophy of Science 70 (2):424-441 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It has been argued, most trenchantly by Nancy Cartwright, that the diversity of the concepts and regularities we actually use to describe nature and predict and explain its behavior leaves us with no reason to believe that our foundational physical theories actually "apply" outside of delicately contrived systems within the laboratory. This paper argues that, diversity of method notwithstanding, there is indeed good reason to think that the foundational laws of physics are universal in their scope.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,261

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

How we dapple the world.Paul Teller - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4):425-447.
Capacities, explanation and the possibility of disunity.Jakob Hohwy - 2003 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (2):179 – 190.
For fundamentalism.Carl Hoefer - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1401--1412.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
217 (#93,701)

6 months
42 (#95,987)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Larry Sklar
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references