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The Ideal of Orthonomous Action, or the How and Why of Buck-Passing
In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking about reasons: themes from the philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 50 (2013)
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Citations of this work
All Reasons are Fundamentally for Attitudes.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (2).
Why Plan-Expressivists Can't Pick Up the Moral Slack.Margaret Shea - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
On The Intellectual Conditions for Responsibility: Acting for the Right Reasons, Conceptualization, and Credit.Errol Lord - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):436-464.
Two Thesis about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In C. McHugh, J. Way & D. Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 221-240.
What Is Evaluable for Fit?Oded Na'aman - 2023 - In Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. OUP.
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