Contraction and revision

Australasian Journal of Logic 13 (3):58-77 (2016)
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Abstract

An important question for proponents of non-contractive approaches to paradox is why contraction fails. Zardini offers an answer, namely that paradoxical sentences exhibit a kind of instability. I elaborate this idea using revision theory, and I argue that while instability does motivate failures of contraction, it equally motivates failure of many principles that non-contractive theorists want to maintain.

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Shawn Standefer
National Taiwan University

Citations of this work

Instability and Contraction: Méditations hégéliennes I.Elia Zardini - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):155-188.
Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):1-9.
The revision theory of truth.Philip Kremer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Infinitary Contraction‐Free Revenge.Andreas Fjellstad - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):179-189.

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References found in this work

Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Spandrels of truth.J. C. Beall - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Recent essays on truth and the liar paradox.Robert Lazarus Martin (ed.) - 1984 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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