David Lewis’s Neglected Challenge: It’s Me or God

Perspectives: International Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):55-72 (2010)
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Abstract

I begin by sketching a dialectic typical of modern discussions of the ontological argument and explain the underlying modal principles. I will not pursue this well-worn dialectic. Instead I will explicate David Lewis’s valid reconstruction of St Anselm’s argument in Proslogion-II. Lewis’s objections to this argument are based on his idiosyncratic views about modality. Implicitly, Lewis presents a challenge: either I am right about modality, or there is a sound version of the ontological argument. More specifically, Lewis claims there is no good reason to supposethere is anything special about the actual world. I suggest there is good reason to think that must be incorrect. Thus we are left with a formal version of the ontological argument for God’s existence that for all we have seen here looks eminently viable.

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Andrew Stephenson
University of Southampton

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