Reflections on Mirror Man

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Philosophical Studies 178 (12):4227-4237 (2021)
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Abstract

Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne have recently presented a thought experiment—Mirror Man—designed to refute internalist theories of belief and content. We distinguish five ways in which the case can be interpreted and argue that on none does it refute internalism.

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10.1007/s11098-021-01645-w

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Author Profiles

Frank Jackson
Australian National University
Daniel Stoljar
Australian National University

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References found in this work

Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Reduction of mind.David K. Lewis - 1994 - In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 412-431.
Narrow Content.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & John Hawthorne - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Hawthorne.
What's the Meaning of "This"?Thomas Baldwin & David Austin - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (162):111.

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