Computational Models in the Philosophy of Science

PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:329 - 335 (1986)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Computational models can aid in the development of philosophical views concerning the structure and growth of scientific knowledge. In cognitive psychology, computational models have proved valuable for describing the structures and processes of thought and for testing these models by writing and running computer programs using the techniques of artificial intelligence. Similarly, in the philosophy of science models can be developed that shed light on the structure, discovery, and justification of scientific theories. This paper briefly describes a computational model of problem solving and learning that has been used to simulate several kinds of scientific reasoning.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,197

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Computation and the philosophy of science.Paul Thagard - 1998 - In T. W. Bynum & J. Moor (eds.), The Digital Phoenix. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Artificial Intelligence, Psychology, and the Philosophy of Discovery.Paul Thagard - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:166 - 175.
Shedding computational light on human creativity.Subrata Dasgupta - 2008 - Perspectives on Science 16 (2):pp. 121-136.
Bayesian models and simulations in cognitive science.Giuseppe Boccignone & Roberto Cordeschi - 2007 - Workshop Models and Simulations 2, Tillburg, NL.
The Cambridge handbook of computational psychology.Ron Sun (ed.) - 2008 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-05-29

Downloads
54 (#297,061)

6 months
6 (#529,161)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Paul Thagard
University of Waterloo

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references