Expanding Moral Understanding

Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (3):318-323 (2019)
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Abstract

ABSTRACT In ‘Forgiveness: An Ordered Pluralism,’ Fricker argues that the function of forgiveness is to liberate the forgiver from redundant blame-feeling. Blame is rendered redundant when it no longer serves its purpose, so to understand the function of forgiveness, we must understand the function of blame. For Fricker, the paradigmatic function of Communicative Blame is to align the moral understandings of wrongdoers and their victims, which is accomplished by wrongdoers coming to feel remorse. In this paper, I argue that Fricker should adopt a broader view of moral understanding and sever the connection between remorse and the alignment of moral understandings.

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10.1080/24740500.2020.1859236

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Hannah Tierney
University of California, Davis

Citations of this work

Letting go of blame.Luke Brunning & Per-Erik Milam - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):720-740.
Scepticism about epistemic blame.Tim Smartt - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5):1813-1828.
Guilty Confessions.Hannah Tierney - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford studies in agency and responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 182-204.

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