What’s Wrong with Relaxing?

Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (6):725-742 (2019)
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Abstract

In his new book Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer argues that there is no way around the result that all metaethical views other than the error theory either fail for the same reasons as metaphysical normative realism, or for the same reasons as expressivism. In this contribution, I seek to show that this is false: We can eschew this result by ‘relaxing’ about normative truths. Even if Streumer were right about the fate of metaphysical normative realism and expressivism, then, relaxed realists can avoid the problems he raises.

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Christine Tiefensee
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management

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