An Irrelevant Consideration: Killing Versus Letting Die (2nd edition)

In Bonnie Steinbock & Alastair Norcross (eds.), Killing and letting die. New York: Fordham University Press. pp. 103–111 (1994)
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Abstract

Many people hold that there is an important moral distinction between passive euthanasia and active euthanasia. Thus, while the AMA maintains that people have a right quote to die with dignity, quote so that it is morally permissible for a doctor to allow someone to die if that person wants to and is suffering from an incurable illness causing pain that cannot be sufficiently alleviated, the MA is unwilling to countenance active euthanasia for a person who is in similar straits, but who has the misfortune not to be suffering from an illness that will result in a speedy death. A similar distinction with respect to infanticide has become a commonplace of medical thinking and practice. If an infant is a mongoloid or a microcephalic, and happens also to have some other defect requiring corrective surgery if the infant is to live, many doctors and hospitals believe that the parents have the right to decide whether the surgery will be performed, and thus whether the infant will survive. But if the child does not have any other defect, it is believed that the parents do not have the right to terminate its life. The rationale underlying these distinctions between active and passive euthanasia, and between active and passive infanticide, is the same: the idea that there is a crucial moral difference between intentionally killing and intentionally letting die. This idea is admittedly very common. But I believe that it can be shown to reflect either confused thinking or a moral point of view unrelated to the interests of individuals.

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Michael Tooley
University of Colorado, Boulder

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