Abstract
My topic is the skeptical challenges that are posed by Hume and Berkeley. Can one show, contrary to what Hume claimed, that one is justified in projecting regularities that have held in the past into the future? Can one show that induction is justified?
Or can one show, contrary to what Berkeley claimed, not only that the hypothesis that there is an external, physical world expresses a coherent proposition, but also one that is extremely likely to be true?
The basic theses concerning skepticism that I believe can be proved are as follows:
(1) Skepticism about induction can be refuted.
(2) Skepticism about the existence of an external, physical world can be refuted.
Will I actually prove that these things are so? Well, as you might have guessed, not quite! Still, my goals are not completely devoid of ambition. First of all, I shall be alluding to mathematical proofs that make it very plausible that whether induction can be justified depends upon a certain metaphysical issue.
You may now be thinking, “Wow, that sounds like bad news! A philosophical result in epistemology that depends upon metaphysics. I was hoping that this would be an upbeat talk.”
But the answer is that the dependence upon an issue in metaphysics is not as troubling as one might initially suppose. The reason is that the metaphysical issue in question is whether something is logically possible, and so whether it is so or not is a necessary truth. In any case, I shall begin by explaining what the metaphysical issue in question is.