Mental Recognition of Objects via Ramsey Sentences

Journal of Neurophilosophy 2 (2) (2023)
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Abstract

Dogs display vast phenotypic diversity, including differences in height, skull shape, tail, etc. Yet, humans are almost always able to quickly recognize a dog, despite no single feature or group of features are critical to distinguish dogs from other objects/animals. In search of the mental activities leading human individuals to state “I see a dog”, we hypothesize that the brain might extract meaningful information from the environment using Ramsey sentences-like procedures. To turn the proposition “I see a dog” in a Ramsey sentence, the term dog must be replaced by a long and complex assertion consisting only of observational terms, existential quantifiers and operational rules. The Ramsey sentence for “I see a dog” sounds: “There is at least an entity called dog which satisfies the following conditions: it is an animal, it has four legs, …, etc, …, and is something that I have in my sight”. We discuss the biological plausibility and the putative neural correlates of a Ramsey-like mechanism in the central nervous system. We accomplish a brain-inspired, theoretical neural architecture consisting of a parallel network that requires virtually no memory, is devoid of probabilistic choices and can analyze huge but finite amounts of unique visual details, combining them into a single conceptual output. In sum, Ramsey sentence stands for a versatile tool that can be used not just as a methodological device to cope with biophysical affairs, but also for a model to describe the real functioning of cognitive operations such as sensation and perception.

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