Abstract
In his "Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit," which includes his 1930-31 lectures on the "Phenomenology of Spirit," Heidegger states not only that Hegelian phenomenology “begins absolutely with the absolute,” but also that this phenomenological beginning is a necessary beginning of Hegel’s “system of science.” Although Heidegger acknowledges that the “proper” or “appropriate” beginning or “ground” of this system is the logical beginning (the beginning posited by Hegelian logic), he insists not only that there is also a second beginning of the system, namely the one provided by the "Phenomenology of Spirit," but also that this beginning is necessary. Thus, Heidegger subscribes to the paradoxically-sounding thesis that Hegel’s system of science must have two beginnings. The present paper attempts, first, to flesh out this thesis (§§2-4), and, second, to uncover Heidegger’s argument for (or justification of) the claim that the phenomenological beginning is necessary to the Hegelian system of science (§§5-6).