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The paradox of the knower without epistemic closure?
Mind 113 (449):95-107 (2004)
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Citations of this work
Solutions to the Knower Paradox in the Light of Haack’s Criteria.Mirjam de Vos, Rineke Verbrugge & Barteld Kooi - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (4):1101-1132.
Non‐Classical Knowledge.Ethan Jerzak - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):190-220.
The knower paradox in the light of provability interpretations of modal logic.Paul Égré - 2004 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 14 (1):13-48.
Knowledge Closure and Knowledge Openness: A Study of Epistemic Closure Principles.Levi Spectre - 2009 - Stockholm: Stockholm University.
The Paradox of the Knower without Epistemic Closure -- Corrected.C. B. Cross - 2012 - Mind 121 (482):457-466.
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