Knowledge from Non-Knowledge in Wittgenstein's On Certainty: A Dialogue

In Rodrigo Borges & Ian Schnee (eds.), Illuminating Errors: New Essays on Knowledge from Non-Knowledge. New York, NY: Routledge (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Remarks in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty present a view according to which all knowledge rests on commitments to things we do not know. In his usual manner, Wittgenstein does not present a clearly defined set of premises designed to support this view. Instead, the reasons emerge along with the view through a series of often cryptic remarks. But this does not prevent us from critically assessing the position (or positions) one finds in the work. This paper attempts to do that in the form of a philosophical dialogue. The challenges to Wittgenstein’s view raised here center on: the extent to which hinge commitments can plausibly be regarded as rules of a language-game rather than rationally assessable propositions, mutual support versus bottom up notions of justification, the subject and context relativity of hinge commitments, the difference between justification and persuasion, whether propositions of the form p is hinge are themselves hinge, and the general viability of Wittgenstein’s view as an alternative to epistemological skepticism and Moorean anti-skepticism.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Animal in Epistemology.Danièle Moyal-Sharrock - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):97-119.
Wittgenstein and the Practice of Philosophy.Michael Hymers - 2009 - Peterborough, CA: Broadview Press.
Later Wittgenstein on Doubt and Certainty.Mohammadsadegh Zahedi & Khadijeh Asli Bage - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations at University of Tabriz 8 (14):93-112.
Wittgenstein on Knowledge and Certainty.Danièle Moyal-Sharrock - 2017 - In Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman (eds.), A Companion to Wittgenstein. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 545–562.
Why Certainty is Not a Mansion.Elly Vintiadis - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Research 31:143-152.
Wittgenstein on knowledge: a critique.Raquel Krempel - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):723-734.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-08-10

Downloads
174 (#112,767)

6 months
93 (#50,700)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Veber
East Carolina University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Proof of An External World.George Edward Moore - 1939 - In Baldwin, Thomas, Timothy Crane & Jonathan Wolff (eds.), G. E. Moore: Selected Writings. Routledge. pp. 147–170.
Why Not Persuade the Skeptic? A Critique of Unambitious Epistemology.Michael Veber - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (4):314-338.

Add more references