Abstract
Curating is a confounding concept—highly specialized in its technical meaning but wildly ecumenical in colloquial usage. This makes it a good candidate for philosophical attention. Considering how often the boundaries of curating have been redrawn since the 1960s, it is encouraging to see philosophers finally turning their lens on it in the last decade. This is also partly what makes Sue Spaid’s The philosophy of curatorial practice: between work and world a welcome contribution. The book might fall short of a definitive philosophical account of curating, but it charts helpful vectors of interest for future scholarship. On a personal note, as someone who has had the opportunity to debate Spaid on the subject of curating, both at live events and in print, I consider her book a meaningful addition to the conversational momentum the topic has been enjoying.
In what follows, I start with some general remarks and then focus on two constitutive aspects of Spaid’s book—her account of what curating is and her description of what curated exhibitions do. These are also two of the central questions philosophy has traditionally asked of art. In this sense, Spaid’s study traverses familiar methodological and thematic terrain. What she adds to the existing scholarship on perennial issues of intentionality, authorship, spectatorship, interpretation, etc. is her keen curiosity about the increasingly rich contributions curated exhibitions make to the life of art.