Die differenz Von meinung und wissen

Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 35 (1):147-155 (2004)
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Abstract

The Difference between Belief and Knowledge. The assumption that knowledge can be defined in terms of belief is considered to be mistaken. Since Gettier problems are shown to be misconstrued, the question cannot arise whether his conditions for knowledge are sufficient for claiming ``knowledge is justified true belief''. Ayers' conditions for knowledge in addition with a specific stipulation proof to be instructive for elaborating the differences between knowledge and belief.

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References found in this work

The Problem of Knowledge.Alfred Jules Ayer - 1956 - New York,: Harmondsworth.
The inescapability of Gettier problems.Linda Zagzebski - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):65-73.
The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research.Robert K. Shope - 1983 - Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
The Analysis of Knowing.Robert K. Shope - 1984 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 89 (1):131-132.

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