Monkeys, typewriters, and objective consequentialism

Ratio 18 (3):352–360 (2005)
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Abstract

There have been several recent attempts to refute objective consequentialism on the grounds that it implies the absurd conclusion that even the best of us act wrongly. Some have argued that we act wrongly from time to time; others have argued that we act wrongly regularly. Here I seek to strengthen reductio arguments against objective consequentialism by showing that objective consequentialism implies that we almost never act rightly. I show that no matter what you do, there is almost certainly something else you could do that would have even better consequences. If objective consequentialism is true, the ratio of the number of your right actions to the number of your wrong actions is very close to zero.

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Eric Wiland
University of Missouri, St. Louis

References found in this work

Consequentialism and Cluelessness.James Lenman - 2000 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (4):342-370.
Utilitarianism: Two difficulties.H. J. McCloskey - 1973 - Philosophical Studies 24 (1):62 - 63.

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