The status of delusion in the Light of Marcu's "Revisionary proposals"

Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 28 (3):421-436 (2013)
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Abstract

La concepción de Marcus sobre las creencias se aplica al debate centrado en la cuestión: "¿Son creencias los delirios?" Dos consecuencias que se siguen de ello son: i) que la cuestión "¿Son creencias los delirios?" necesita reformularse, y ii) que la respuesta es: "No, algunos pacientes que sufren delirios no creen lo que, "prima facie", parecen creer"

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References found in this work

Inquiry.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.
Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs.Lisa Bortolotti - 2009 - Oxford University Press. Edited by K. W. M. Fulford, John Sadler, Stanghellini Z., Morris Giovanni, Bortolotti Katherine, Broome Lisa & Matthew.
Nonfactualism about epistemic modality.Seth Yalcin - 2011 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account.Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & Nora Breen - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2):133-158.

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