Abstract

The doctrine of the inchoatio formae is an important feature of Albert the Great’s metaphysics and natural philosophy, as modern scholars, starting at least with Bruno Nardi’s pioneering study, have recognised. Nevertheless, the notion of the inchoatio formae as employed by Albert is usually understood to refer exclusively to the relationship between matter and substantial forms. On the contrary, in his commentary on Aristotle’s De sensu et sensato, and specifically in the context of a discussion of the so-called issue of minima sensibilia, i.e., the limits to the persistence of the accidental forms of sensible qualities according to the potential infinite divisibility of the matter with which they are united (cf. De sensu 6, 445b3-446a20), Albert talks explicitly of the inchoatio formarum sensibilium (possibly a hapax legomenon in the entire corpus of his writings), therefore applying the notion of the inchoatio formae to the accidental forms of sensible qualities themselves. This article reconstructs the precise meaning and the key features of the inchoatio formarum sensibilium in the context of Albert’s De sensu commentary and of his discussion of minima sensibilia and compares it with the notion of the inchoatio formae as applied to substantial forms, showing both the important similarities and the crucial differences between them. In this way, it becomes possible not only to better understand the intrinsic richness and complexity of the concept of the inchoatio formae in Albert’s writings, but also to do justice to the variety of functions it serves throughout Albert’s metaphysics and natural philosophy.