I cannot here withhold the statement that optimism, where it is not merely the thoughtless talk of those who harbor nothing but words under their shallow foreheads, seems to me to be not merely an absurd, but also a really wicked, way of thinking, a bitter mockery of the unspeakable sufferings of mankind.1I am now, and always shall be, in that very sense no optimist, but a maintainer of the sterner view that life is forever tragic. In so far as (...) Schopenhauer has sought to make this plain, I follow him unhesitatingly, and honor him for his mercilessness.2Josiah Royce’s lifelong battle with the pessimism of Arthur Schopenhauer supplies valuable insight into the development of one of the central concepts of his system... (shrink)

John Dewey provides a philosophy of nature riven with questions of contexted-function, education, ecological balance, and in general an analysis of nature that understands that fixity won’t work, in the pragmatist sense of work, and consequently, that survival necessitates change. In light of the recent flood of evidence showing that epigenetic factors may have a greater role in evolution than previously thought, a re-envisioning of Dewey’s philosophy of nature is warranted. Dewey’s emphasis on the process of the moving parts, rather (...) than the identity of the parts themselves, provides a contrasting view that largely avoids many of the problems of a gene-centric viewpoint and offers an interpretation of Darwin’s evolutionary theory that emphasizes the instrumental factor of experience in a way that is compatible with the findings of epigenetics. (shrink)

John Dewey provides a philosophy of nature riven with questions of contexted-function, education, ecological balance, and in general an analysis of nature that understands that fixity won’t work, in the pragmatist sense of work, and consequently, that survival necessitates change. In light of the recent flood of evidence showing that epigenetic factors may have a greater role in evolution than previously thought, a re-envisioning of Dewey’s philosophy of nature is warranted. Dewey’s emphasis on the process of the moving parts, rather (...) than the identity of the parts themselves, provides a contrasting view that largely avoids many of the problems of a gene-centric viewpoint and offers an interpretation of Darwin’s evolutionary theory that emphasizes the instrumental factor of experience in a way that is compatible with the findings of epigenetics. (shrink)

Despite the recent upsurge in research on abstract concepts, there remain puzzles at the foundation of their empirical study. These are most evident when we consider what is required to assess a person’s abstract conceptual abilities without using language as a prompt or requiring it as a response—as in classic non-verbal categorization tasks, which are standardly considered tests of conceptual understanding. After distinguishing two divergent strands in the most common conception of what it is for a concept to be abstract, (...) we argue that neither reliably captures the kind of abstraction required to successfully categorize in non-verbal tasks. We then present a new conception of concept abstractness—termed Trial Concreteness—that is keyed to individual categorization trials. It has advantages in capturing the context-relativity of the degree of abstraction required for the application of a concept and fittingly correlates with participant success in recent experiments. (shrink)

The following paper proposes a critical reading of conventionalism in sacramental theology (“causalité-pacte”), to underline, by contrast, the theoretical merits of its main competitor, Aquinas’s instrumental causality. It shows that conventionalism, to make the sacrament truly efficient, assigns to the sacrament itself the power of convention, a power compared to the royal seal, which is naturally efficacious qua effect formally identical to its cause. This supports Aquinas’s conviction: rules are powerless, only things have powers.

Seeing is, or affords, a certain sort of awareness – visual – of one's surroundings. The obvious strategy for saying what one sees, or what would count as seeing something would be to ask what sort of sensitivity to one's surroundings – e.g. the pig before me – would so qualify. Alas, for more than three centuries – at least from Descartes to VE day – it was not so. Philosophers were moved by arguments, rarely stated which concluded that one (...) could not, or never did, see what was before his eyes. So much for the obvious strategy. It occurred to almost no one to object that this could not be right. Frege did, but no one noticed. Austin, finally, did away with that conception of good faith in philosophy which had allowed such a thing to pass, and then with those arguments themselves. Until then, philosophy was deformed. Robbed of the obvious approach, a Drang set in to gaze inward, hoping to find what it really is to see in what enabled sensitivity to pigs, or in its byproducts. Gazing inward can be science, but often merely poses as it. It can be difficult to disentangle actual science from mere preconception pretending to its rigour. Most nowadays feel rid of the grip of those barriers to the obvious approach. But, as we shall see, many so feel wrongly. The Drang still misshapes their thought. I aim here to identify the Drang at work; thereby, I hope, to rid us of it. (shrink)

The Messenger is relating how Menelaus and Helen escape from Egypt in a royal Egyptian ship, under pretext that they are going to carry out a ritual ‘sea burial’ of the supposedly drowned Menelaus. Helen's husband, whose identity was as yet unknown to the Egyptian crew, induced them to let his own shipwrecked crew come on board, and as the bull intended for sacrifice resisted being embarked he here cries to his men to manhandle it—in fact to carry it—on (...) board. (shrink)

John Cassidy, born in Ireland and trained as a sculptor at the Manchester School of Art, was a popular figure in the Manchester area during his long career. From 1887, when he spent the summer modelling for visitors at the Royal Jubilee Exhibition, to the 1930s he was a frequent choice for portrait busts, statues and relief medallions. Elected to the Manchester Academy of Fine Arts, he also created imaginative works in all sorts of materials, many of which appeared (...) at the Academys annual exhibitions. He gained public commissions from other towns and cities around Britain, and after World War I created several war memorials. This essay examines his life and work in Manchester, with particular reference to two major patrons, Mrs Enriqueta Rylands and James Gresham. A list of public works still to be seen in Greater Manchester is included. (shrink)

‘Hostility to psychologism’, John McDowell writes, 'is not hostility to the psychological. ‘Psychologism’ is an accusation. But it may be either of several. The psychologism McDowell is master of detecting is, as he sometimes puts it, a form of scientism. It is a priori psychology where, at best, only substantive empirical psychology would do. It often represents itself as describing the way any thinker must be; as describing requirements on being a thinker at all. But it misses viable alternatives. It (...) is just speculation as to how we are. (shrink)

George Biddell Airy invented the first successful mechanical system of compass correction in 1838, at a time when iron ship-building, especially for steam-driven vessels, had become firmly established. One serious drawback to iron ships was the difficulty in the management of the magnetic compass on board due to the magnetic condition of the ship. The introduction to this paper, which outlines the early history of ship magnetism, is followed by a brief account of Airy's mechanical system. The main purpose of (...) the paper, however, is to comment on the detailed correspondence relating to the adjustment of the compass, by the Astronomer Royal himself, of the first iron sailing vessel, the Ironside, in November 1838; and to consider the degree of success, at least for the Ironside, of the new plan which was readily adopted for ships of the Mercantile Marine. (shrink)

Christopher Columbus did not know, on October 12, 1492, that he had reached a new world. Rather he believed, along with his crew, that he had crossed the ocean separating western Europe from east Asia; or, at the very least, that they were nearing the rich lands described by Marco Polo, which the Genoan had read about and his crew knew of, at least by reputation. In short, Columbus's ideas about the land he had just reached were considerably more inexact (...) than those that Fernão d'Ulmo - that is to say, the Flemish explorer Ferdinand Van Olmen, Commander-Grantee in the service of João II, who presided at Terceira des Açores - had flaunted before the King. Indeed d'Ulmo was to play a more important role in the history of Portuguese discoveries than did Prince Henry the Navigator himself. In 1487, the year in which the great Portuguese sovereign was deciding between three possible routes to the Indies, d'Ulmo (as he is named in a royal diploma, dated July 24, 1486), or de Olmos as he is called in Las Casas's Historia de Indias, had proposed to the King that he “dar achada huûa grande ylha ou ylhas o terra firme per costa que se presume ser a ylha das Sete Cidades.” His proposal was thus to undertake a voyage to the Antilles, where the cartographers of that time placed the Isle of the Seven Cities, and where d'Ulmo conjectured that a neighboring continent (terra firme) might be located. Columbus himself returned from his voyage five years later. In the meantime, d'Ulmo had perished, perhaps having reached this continent whose existence he - but not Columbus - had foreseen. As to the history of the discovery of America: even if we don't know whether d'Ulmo reached it, we do know that Columbus was unaware that he himself had. (shrink)

In several great religions God is thought of as an agent or active individual exalted in principle above other agents, the supreme creative and controlling power. But, however exalted, the deity is still, in spite of what Tillich and others say, an individual being, somehow analogous to a human person. Indeed, man is said to be created in the divine image. Without this analogy religion loses an essential trait. Not only in faiths derived from Judaism, but also in Zoroastrianism, and (...) even in much Hinduism and some Buddhism, the analogy plays a central role. (shrink)

Borrowing from the title and some of the content of Karl Popper's The Open Society and its Enemies, it is argued that museums have great value as sites for what may be called a philosophical culture. A philosophical culture is one in which members or citizens engage in fair-minded debate and shared reflection, presenting and evaluating reasons for different positions particularly as these have relevance for matters of governance. In a philosophical culture, persuasion is almost always a matter of seeking (...) to provide reasonable grounds for adopting some position without resorting to violence or physical force.A philosophical culture is, in turn, an important foundation for a democratic culture and republic. A philosophy of museums emerges, a model we shall call the Philosophical Culture Museum Model. This concept is stipulative and ideal in the sense that it presents a paradigm of a museum with great virtue and promise. It must be confessed, however, that, historically, this is an emerging concept of the role of museums and one not evident in many of the museums in the early modern era or today. Reasons are offered as to why the time may be right to recognize the philosophy of museums as a particular sub-field in the overall practice of philosophy. (shrink)

In several great religions God is thought of as an agent or active individual exalted in principle above other agents, the supreme creative and controlling power. But, however exalted, the deity is still, in spite of what Tillich and others say, an individual being, somehow analogous to a human person. Indeed, man is said to be created in the divine image. Without this analogy religion loses an essential trait. Not only in faiths derived from Judaism, but also in Zoroastrianism, and (...) even in much Hinduism and some Buddhism, the analogy plays a central role. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers have not, at least until very recently, been much concerned with the study of the emotions. It was not always so. The Stoics thought deeply about this topic. Although they were divided on points of detail, they agreed on the broad outline of an account. In itemotions are valuational judgments and resulting affective states.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Three Odes HORACE (Translated by Charles Martin) To Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa No fears, Agrippa: your exploits will be Saluted by a bard who will eclipse Homer in singing your command of ships, Your winning use of cavalry. It won’t be us. Gifts far surpassing mine Are to be found in Varius, who sings Achilles’ spleen, Ulysses’ wanderings At sea, or Pelops’ nasty line. Of loftiness, we have (...) a deficit, And so our Muse forbids us to pursue Praising your glory and our Caesar’s too, Lest, overwrought, we lessen it. Varius is fit to sing of Mars arrayed In armor, of Meriones in dust, Or of those gods that Diomedes thrust His lance through, with Athena’s aid. Ours, the wine bar and the local fray, The bachelorettes whose nails leave livid traces We later notice on their boyfriends’ faces And lightly sing of, in our way. (Odes i.6) arion 28.3 winter 2021 74 threee odes To Leuconoe Stop seeking what the gods prohibit us from apprehending, Leuconoe—the date on which it all comes to an ending. Better to toss the Dream Book and accept whatever comes, Whether Jove sends more winters, or the last we’ll know now drums The Tuscan Sea into submission on opposing cliffs. Be wise—decant this evening’s wine, curtail your hopeful ifs: Live in the moment: as we speak, now is becoming then; And insofar as possible, ignore tomorrow’s, “When….” (Odes i.11) To Iccius Iccius, are you hot for Arabian Loot now, devising tactics to subjugate The previously undefeated Kings of Sabaea? Forging new fetters For the ferocious Medes while previsioning Your oriental sex-slave, unguarded by The boyfriend whom you’ve slain in battle? What perfumed page from some royal palace, Whose father taught him Sinoform archery, Will be your Ganymede? Oh, deny falling Rivers the right to scale steep mountains, Tell us the Tiber can’t flow back upstream, When you—who were once so very promising, Rush to exchange your Works of Panaetius AND those Platonic scrolls you scoured bookstalls in search of—for Spanish armor! (Odes i.29)... (shrink)

La question de l’union entre sagesse et bonheur se situe au cœur même de la tradition morale. Dans la perspective la plus traditionnelle, croître en sagesse revient automatiquement à augmenter son bonheur. La philosophie est ainsi la voie royale pour parvenir à un bonheur plus durable que dans la conception vulgaire, en détachant l’esprit des choses inessentielles et en l’amenant à connaître les vérités qui lui fourniront l’aliment le plus approprié à sa nature réelle. Néanmoins, le lien analytique entre sagesse (...) et bonheur a également été critiqué par la démonstration que l’effondrement de l’un des deux termes n’entraînait pas nécessairement l’effondrement de l’autre. Au premier chef de ces critiques se situent les sceptiques, qui de l’Antiquité à la période moderne s’accordent à nier la possibilité d’une connaissance réelle, tout en maintenant généralement la possibilité d’être heureux. Inversement, cette accessibilité du bonheur a pu être critiquée sans que soit remise en question la connaissance elle-même : c’est ce que révèlent les philosophies tragiques, qui assimilent plutôt sagesse et souffrance. Par la diversité des contributions, qui puisent principalement dans les traditions ancienne et moderne, mais offrent également quelques perspectives contemporaines et non euro-centrées, le présent volume illustre l’affrontement de ces deux grands courants dans l’histoire de la philosophie, et permet de penser à nouveaux frais ce problème essentiel à la morale qu’est l’utilité ou l’inutilité de la connaissance pour être heureux. Sigmund Freud, et surtout Jacques Lacan, m’ont apporté l’éclairage théorique nécessaire. (shrink)

Philosophers and Buddhist scholars have noted the affinities between David Hume's empiricism and the Buddhist philosophical tradition. I show that it was possible for Hume to have had contact with Buddhist philosophical views. The link to Buddhism comes through the Jesuit scholars at the Royal College of La Fleche. Charles Francois Dolu was a Jesuit missionary who lived at the Royal College from 1723-1740, overlapping with Hume's stay. He had extensive knowledge both of other religions and cultures (...) and of scientific ideas. Dolu had had first-hand experience with Theravada Buddhism as part of the second French embassy to Siam in 1687-1688. In 1727, Dolu also had talked with Ippolito Desideri, a Jesuit missionary who visited Tibet and made an extensive study of Tibetan Buddhism from 1716-1721. It is at least possible that Hume heard about Buddhist ideas through Dolu. (shrink)

Discusses the translation of Hobbes's De cive, which was published in England in 1651 under the title Philosophicall Rudiments. A few surviving copies include a dedicatory epistle by the translator, signed ‘C. C.’ In this essay, evidence is presented for identifying this translator with the young poet Charles Cotton. His indirect connections with both Hobbes and Lady Fane are explored, and attention is paid to the way in which Hobbes's text was assimilated to a moral and political position that (...) combined quasi‐Stoic moralism with fervent Royalism. (shrink)

The President, Council and Fellows of the Royal Society of London for Improving Natural Knowledge, the so-called Royal Society, was founded in 1660. Charles II granted a royal charter in 1662 const...

"Charles Taylor presents a fundamental challenge to neoliberal apologists for the new world order--but not only to them.

The place of religion in society has changed profoundly in the last few centuries, particularly in the West. In what will be a defining book for our time, Taylor takes up the question of what these changes mean, and what, precisely, happens when a society becomes one in which faith is only one human possibility among others.

Multi-volume work with 4 of the 5 volumes published. -/- -- 1. Medieval Authors (in two books) -- 2. Renaissance authors -- 3. Index initorum-index finium -- 5. Bibliography of secondary literature.