Republicanism is an approach within political theory that seeks to secure the values of political liberty and non-domination. Yet, in historical practice, early modern republics developed empires and secured their liberty through policies that dominated others. This contradiction presents challenges for how neo-Roman theorists understand ideals of liberty and political freedom. This article argues that the historical practices of slavery and empire developed concurrently with the normative ideals of republican liberty. Republican liberty does not arise in the absence of power (...) but is inherently connected to the exercise of power. (shrink)

One of the most distinctive rituals of Roman imperial accession was the adlocutio, the speech delivered by the new emperor to a military assembly, which can be documented from the first to the fifth centuries a.d. This article seeks to explain the extraordinary endurance of this neglected genre of speech by examining its origins, setting and content. After outlining the unusual nature of the accession adlocutio when set against both earlier and contemporary Mediterranean practice, the first half of this article (...) traces its origins to the military culture of the late Roman Republic. In particular, the adlocutio is related to two other rituals which rose to new prominence in the era of the Civil Wars: the acclamation of the victorious general as imperator and the granting of military gifts. In the second part of this article, the setting for the typical adlocutio of the Imperial era is discussed using the often-problematic evidence of our ancient historical sources. The content of the speech itself is then reconstructed primarily through a close reading of our one surviving example, the brief address of Leo I preserved by Peter the Patrician. Finally, the evidence for the origins and content of the speech are brought together in an argument for the speech's survival as a useful tool for emperors seeking to establish a permanent bond with the soldiers they commanded. (shrink)

The early nineteenth century was a time between empires in German-speaking lands, following the collapse of the holy Roman empire in 1806. This was also the time at which modern concepts of nations, nationalism, and the state entered theological discourse, bound together with emerging notions of world historical progress. From this time until the First World War, the task of conceptualizing national identity and the nature of the ‘Christian state’ became a pressing theological problem. This essay seeks to locate Schleiermacher’s (...) reflections on the Christian state within this developing problematic. Schleiermacher’s philosophical and theological works closely engaged emerging ideas of the nation, state, and historical progress. However, he departed from the more totalizing affirmations of national spirit and the Christian state of many of his contemporaries, arguing for a more limited conception of the state as a point of transition in the ongoing historical development of the reign of God. (shrink)

Several recent attempts to develop models of moral reasoning have attempted to use some form of casuistry as a way to resolve the moral controversies of clinical ethics. One of the best known models of casuistry is that of Jonsen and Toulmin who attempt to transpose a particular model of casuistry, that of Roman Catholic confessional practice, to contemporary moral disputes. This attempt is flawed in that it fails to understand both the history of the model it seeks to transpose (...) and the morally pluralistic context of secular, postmodern society. The practice of casuistry which Jonsen and Toulmin wish to revive is a practice set in the context of a community with a shared set of moral values and structures of moral authority. Without a set of common moral values and rankings, and a moral authority to interpret cases the casuistry of the postmodern age will be pluralistic; that is, there will be many casuistries not just one. Keywords: casuistry, common morality, kinetics, moral authority, moral pluralism, morphology, paradigm cases, taxonomy CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Robert Coover’s Novel, The Public Buming, merges fantasy, history, and popular myth to respond to the American Cold War culture surrounding the trial of Ethal and Julius Rosenberg. While serving as a postmodern response to, and rewrite of, the Cold War ideological narratives, Coover’s novel also raises theoretical and practical questions concerning the author’s agency in the twentieth century. This article makes use of the language theories of Bruce Andrews, Mikhail Bakhtin, and Charles Peirce to consider how Coover’s fiction addresses (...) the conflict between the public and private self, authorial discourse and collective ideological discourse. Coover’s novel reflects on these tensions, foregrounding the erosion of an autonomous concept of self and a Romantic notion of autotelic creation. At the same time, it employs a range of strategies (recovery of alternative voices, dismantling of polarities, rewriting) as a form of resistance against the monologic narratives of the Cold War.Le roman de Robert Coover, The Public Buming, combine I’imaginaire, I’histoire, et le mythe populaire pour repondre ala culture de la guerre froide américaine dans laquelle baigne le procès d’Ethal et de Julius Rosenberg. Bien qu’il serve de reponse aux narrations ideologiques de la guerre froide et de réécriture de celles-ci, le roman de Coover soulève aussi des questions théoriques et pratiques relativement à I’action de I’auteur au vingtième siècle. Le présent article utilise les théories du langage de Bruce Andrews, Mikhail Bakhtin, et Charles Peirce afin d’analyser la façon dont le roman-fiction de Coover aborde le conflit entre le soi public et privé et entre le discours de I’auteur et le discours idéologique collectif. Le roman de Coover médite sur ces tensions en mettant I’accent sur I’erosion du concept autonome de soi et de la notion romantique de création autotélique. À la même occasion, il emploie un éventail de stratégies (recouvrement de contre-voix, démantèlement des polarités, réécriture) en tant que résistances aux narrations monoloqigues de la guerre froide. (shrink)

Robert Coover’s Novel, The Public Buming, merges fantasy, history, and popular myth to respond to the American Cold War culture surrounding the trial of Ethal and Julius Rosenberg. While serving as a postmodern response to, and rewrite of, the Cold War ideological narratives, Coover’s novel also raises theoretical and practical questions concerning the author’s agency in the twentieth century. This article makes use of the language theories of Bruce Andrews, Mikhail Bakhtin, and Charles Peirce to consider how Coover’s fiction addresses (...) the conflict between the public and private self, authorial discourse and collective ideological discourse. Coover’s novel reflects on these tensions, foregrounding the erosion of an autonomous concept of self and a Romantic notion of autotelic creation. At the same time, it employs a range of strategies (recovery of alternative voices, dismantling of polarities, rewriting) as a form of resistance against the monologic narratives of the Cold War.Le roman de Robert Coover, The Public Buming, combine I’imaginaire, I’histoire, et le mythe populaire pour repondre ala culture de la guerre froide américaine dans laquelle baigne le procès d’Ethal et de Julius Rosenberg. Bien qu’il serve de reponse aux narrations ideologiques de la guerre froide et de réécriture de celles-ci, le roman de Coover soulève aussi des questions théoriques et pratiques relativement à I’action de I’auteur au vingtième siècle. Le présent article utilise les théories du langage de Bruce Andrews, Mikhail Bakhtin, et Charles Peirce afin d’analyser la façon dont le roman-fiction de Coover aborde le conflit entre le soi public et privé et entre le discours de I’auteur et le discours idéologique collectif. Le roman de Coover médite sur ces tensions en mettant I’accent sur I’erosion du concept autonome de soi et de la notion romantique de création autotélique. À la même occasion, il emploie un éventail de stratégies (recouvrement de contre-voix, démantèlement des polarités, réécriture) en tant que résistances aux narrations monoloqigues de la guerre froide. (shrink)

Written by a Roman Catholic theologian, these essays cover how pastoral ministry should be done in today's society, including how to handle church law and build a collaborative church as well as specific issues such as euthanasia and embryo research.

In the third century AD, under the pressure of plagues, external invasion, rising army costs, and usurpation, the Roman emperors incrementally debased the silver coinage that was produced at their imperial mints and incrementally took over civic mints. The debasement, from 2.7 g of silver to 0.04 g of silver in the equivalent of a denarius from 160–274 ad, was accompanied by worries from emperors, mint-workers, and bankers about the value of the currency; however, the total loss of purchasing power (...) of the Roman coinage from the same era was 50–70 %, far less than would be expected from the change in metallic content, if it were the primary source of value. The currency reform of Aurelian in 274 ad, despite raising metallic values of coins, was followed by at least a 90 % reduction in the purchasing power of the silver coinage from 274–301 ad, the year of Diocletian’s Edict on Maximum Prices, showing a paradoxically inverse relationship between metallic value and purchasing power. Based on this quandary, I argue that the Roman silver coinage of the third century CE became a fiat currency in some respects, deriving its guarantee from imperial iconography and assurances rather than from bullion value. The fiat nature of the silver coinage was largely present in usage as a medium of exchange for those without as much long-term interest in maintaining liquid stores of value; this is indicated by the differential debasement of the denarius and aureus; imperial actions and hoarding practices indicate the extent to which the currency was accepted at nominal value. I examine the reactions of different social groups in order to determine the perceived value of the Roman coinage during this time, and in order to understand the paradoxical collapse in the currency’s value in the late third century. To demonstrate this, I will present the applicable elements of the modern concept of “fiat” to this context through portrayal of emperors and usurpers on coins, use coin hoard data to determine the effect of Gresham’s Law, and examine historical and papyrological accounts of currency reforms. I will also use evidence of the expansion of taxes in kind and the rejection of nominal value by both emperor and subjects to argue that the inflation following Aurelian’s reform resulted from an invalidation of the trust in imperial fiat. (shrink)

Beginning with the complexities involved in the definition of the modern European Community identity, the author proceeds to examine the historical dimensions of the development of Europe as a continent. The Roman and Greek antecedents are recognised and the emergence of Constantinople as a pivotal consideration is discussed. By the early 16th century, what Europe meant is explained in more comprehensive terms than those that prevail today. The unity of Christendom under the papacy is identified as germane to the political (...) unity of Europe as a continent. The Reformation unleashed a process of disintegration and division into national and religious states that has taken centuries to begin to heal. Recognising the failure of modern European structures to secure cohesion among its member countries, the article recognises an attempt to develop unity in diversity: based on the notion of economic collaboration berween trading cities. This notion was very much a feature of the Hanseatic League of the middle-ages, and indeed a founding principle of the Greek city confederacy. History remains a potent and pertinent dimension in our understanding of Europe as a continental concept. (shrink)

In the last 25 years, Roman Catholic moral theology has debated issues ranging from the sources of moral theology to the role of ecclesiastical authority in moral theology. In 1993, Pope John Paul II issued his encyclical letter Veritatis Splendor, which addresses issues in fundamental moral theology. The encyclical must be understood against the background of ongoing debates since Pope Paul VI's 1968 encyclical on birth control (Humanae Vitae). It is not clear what the impact of Veritatis Splendor will be. (...) However, it seems safe to say that it will be deployed in debates about issues such as birth control, artificial reproduction, sterilization, and abortion. (shrink)

An examination of traditional sources for the Roman Catholic under-standing of marriage reveals that the ends of marriage might be ordered differently, given different contexts. This permits one working within that tradition to see marriage as a political and cultural entity existing independently of the individuals who participate in it. Marriage is also the standard with respect to which sexual activity is judged to be proper or not, a standard that applies to all human beings by virtue of their rational (...) nature. Understanding this allows one to understand how some people, including some of the mentally handicapped, might legitimately be prevented from marrying and even from engaging in genital sexual activity. It also allows one to solve some theoretical difficulties regarding contraception and homosexuality and connected with the fact that sterile couples cannot procreate and yet are permitted to marry. (shrink)

Against the background of some positions taken up in a recent document of the Pontifical Biblical Commission, the article studies Raymond Brown’s attempt to combine mainstream historical‐critical exegesis of the Bible with a Roman Catholic theological pre‐understanding. Particular reference is made to his handling of issues connected with the virginal conception of Jesus. Some of his religious presuppositions such as those concerning the relation between faith and reason, and the development of doctrine, are presented. Biblical criticism in Brown’s understanding is (...) an essentially historical discipline which has as its principal object the literal sense of the text, that is, what the text meant when it was written. His religious presuppositions make the practice of the discipline ineliminable in an integral hermeneutic. From an analysis of his treatment of the virginal conception, it is argued that Catholic pre‐understanding and historical criticism, when combined, inevitably result in a two‐stage hermeneutic. In a first stage appeal is made to presuppostions common to all practitioners of historical criticism. In a second stage religious presuppostions come into play. The distinction between these two stages is seen as more fundamental than Brown’s better known distinction between the literal and more‐than‐literal senses of the text. It is argued that the relation between the two stages is to be understood in chalcedonian terms as exemplifying the dialectic of faith and reason: they must be distinguished, but cannot be separated. Brown’s grasp of an incarnational economy of salvation is presented in terms of David H. Kelsy’s concept of a discrimen, and emerges as fundamental for an ecclesial hermeneutic of the Bible. Questions about the place of the historical‐critical method, the promise of alternative approaches and the role of hermeneutical theory can only be adequately addressed in terms of it. (shrink)

In the last 25 years, Roman Catholic moral theology has debated issues ranging from the sources of moral theology to the role of ecclesiastical authority in moral theology. In 1993, Pope John Paul II issued his encyclical letter Veritatis Splendor, which addresses issues in fundamental moral theology. The encyclical must be understood against the background of ongoing debates since Pope Paul VI's 1968 encyclical on birth control (Humanae Vitae). It is not clear what the impact of Veritatis Splendor will be. (...) However, it seems safe to say that it will be deployed in debates about issues such as birth control, artificial reproduction, sterilization, and abortion. (shrink)

El artículo reflexiona sobre las políticas de la memoria que deberían desarrollarse en sociedades donde han ocurrido masivas violaciones de derechos humanos, y cuyos procesos se guían por los principios normativos de la justicia transicional. Se analizan primero los conceptos de memoria e historia, y la forma como el Holocausto transformó sus tareas en el siglo xx; luego se examinan dos modelos de responsabilidad propuestos por Iris Marion Young, y se propone cómo usarlos en la justicia transicional. Finalmente, se explican (...) las tareas de la política de la memoria en estos contextos. (shrink)

Predictable polarization is everywhere: we can often predict how people’s opinions, including our own, will shift over time. Extant theories either neglect the fact that we can predict our own polarization, or explain it through irrational mechanisms. They needn’t. Empirical studies suggest that polarization is predictable when evidence is ambiguous, that is, when the rational response is not obvious. I show how Bayesians should model such ambiguity and then prove that—assuming rational updates are those which obey the value of evidence—ambiguity (...) is necessary and sufficient for the rationality of predictable polarization. The main theoretical result is that there can be a series of such updates, each of which is individually expected to make you more accurate, but which together will predictably polarize you. Polarization results from asymmetric increases in accuracy. This mechanism is not only theoretically possible, but empirically plausible. I argue that cognitive search—searching a cognitively accessible space for a particular item—often yields asymmetrically ambiguous evidence, I present an experiment supporting its polarizing effects, and I use simulations to show how it can explain two of the core causes of polarization: confirmation bias and the group polarization effect. (shrink)

Daniel, Michael E Review of: Continental ambitions: Roman catholics in North America: The colonial experience, by Kevin Starr, pp. 605, hardback, $59.99.

The Lewis-Sider argument from vagueness is one of the most powerful objections against restricted composition. Many have resisted the argument by rejecting its key premise, namely that existence is not vague. In this paper, I argue that this strategy is ineffective as a response to vagueness-based objections against restricted composition. To that end, I formulate a new argument against restricted composition: the argument from determinate vagueness. Unlike the Lewis-Sider argument, my argument doesn’t require accepting that existence is not vague, but (...) only that it is not vague in a specific way, which, I argue, is entailed by restricted composition. I show that the rejection of this species of vague existence follows from assumptions even friends of vague existence should be happy to accept. (shrink)

This paper investigates the semantics of implicit comparatives (Alice is tall compared to Bob) and its connections to the semantics of explicit comparatives (Alice is taller than Bob) and sentences with adjectives in plain positive form (Alice is tall). We consider evidence from two experiments that tested judgments about these three kinds of sentence, and provide a semantics for implicit comparatives from the perspective of degree semantics.

While Hermann Levin Goldschmidt didn’t read Yiddish anarchists, there seems to have been a convergent evolution in their thinking. Goldschmidt’s looking up to Jewish lore as a source of liberating creativity is commonly encountered in Yiddish anarchist texts. His view of action as a constant response to internal and external challenges in the struggle for an open future is developed by Isaac Nachman Steinberg on the basis of nineteenth-century vitalism. Goldschmidt’s theory of anarchist individualism as willed self-limiting solidarity has a (...) compelling parallel in Hillel Solotaroff’s view of history. His use of impressionism and photography to eternalize the immediacy of human actuality is akin to Rudolf Rocker’s championing of decadent literature. In both cases, the goal of anarchism is not a dictatorship of the former downtrodden, but a continuous and contradictory evolution of freedom in ever-changing contexts. (shrink)

A definition of emotion common to the affective sciences is an urgent desideratum. Lack of such a definition is a constant source of numerous misunderstandings and a series of mostly fruitless debates. There is little hope that there ever will be agreement on a common definition of emotion, given the sacred traditions of the disciplines involved and the egos of the scholars working in these disciplines. Our aim here is more modest. We propose a list of elements for a working (...) definition of emotion and discuss the justification for the inclusion of elements from our respective perspectives (philosophy and psychology). This working partial definition may at least serve as a litmus test to examine theories of emotion, old and new, across disciplinary boundaries. (shrink)

We provide two programmatic frameworks for integrating philosophical research on understanding with complementary work in computer science, psychology, and neuroscience. First, philosophical theories of understanding have consequences about how agents should reason if they are to understand that can then be evaluated empirically by their concordance with findings in scientific studies of reasoning. Second, these studies use a multitude of explanations, and a philosophical theory of understanding is well suited to integrating these explanations in illuminating ways.

The potential for financial conflicts of interest (COIs) to damage the credibility of scientific research has become a significant social concern, especially in the wake of high-profile incidents involving the pharmaceutical, tobacco, fossil-fuel, and chemical industries. Scientists and policy makers have debated whether the presence of financial COIs should count as a reason for treating research with suspicion or whether research should instead be evaluated solely based on its scientific quality. This paper examines a recent proposal to develop criteria for (...) evaluating the credibility of research without considering its source of funding. It concludes that proposals of this sort are likely to be either ineffective or impractical in many cases. Nevertheless, this does not imply that all research funded by those with an interest in the outcome must be placed under a cloud of suspicion; there are conditions under which research is at much more serious risk of being corrupted than in other cases, and attention to these conditions can guide productive responses to financial COIs. (shrink)

We argue that explainable artificial intelligence (XAI), specifically reason-giving XAI, often constitutes the most suitable way of ensuring that someone can properly be held responsible for decisions that are based on the outputs of artificial intelligent (AI) systems. We first show that, to close moral responsibility gaps (Matthias 2004), often a human in the loop is needed who is directly responsible for particular AI-supported decisions. Second, we appeal to the epistemic condition on moral responsibility to argue that, in order to (...) be responsible for her decision, the human in the loop has to have an explanation available of the system’s recommendation. Reason explanations are especially well-suited to this end and we examine whether – and how – it might be possible to make such explanations fit with AI systems. We support our claims by focusing on a case of disagreement between human in the loop and AI system. (shrink)

La "posición original" es un aspecto fundamental de la teoría de la justicia de John Rawls, así como el concepto del "velo de ignorancia". El análisis se divide en tres momentos: en el primero, se expone la posición original de Rawls, en el segundo se contrasta la teoría de la razonabilidad de Scanlon con el papel que tiene la razonabilidad en la teoría de Rawls y en el tercero se exploran los señalamientos de Habermas y Benhabib al velo de ignorancia.

Apresentação do n.1 da Revista Filosfia e Educação, dedicado à temática Educação e epistemologias. A organização deste número temático contou com a colaboração do Prof. Dr. Marcelo Donizete da Silva da |Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto. A seleção de trabalhos inclui nove artigos diretamente relacionados com a temática proposta e que compõem a seção do dossiê e seis artigos da seção de fluxo contínuo da revista Filosofia e Educação.

Issues of institutional identity and integrity in Roman Catholic health care institutions have been addressed at the level of individual institutions as well as by organizations of Catholic health care providers and at various levels in the Church hierarchy. The papers by Carol Taylor, C.S.F.N, Thomas Shannon, Kevin O’Rourke, O.P., Gerard Magill in this volume provide a significant contribution to concerns of Roman Catholic health care institutions as they face the challenges of providing health care in a secular, pluralistic, (...) market-driven economy. One way to understand institutional integrity is as a measure of the coherence between what an institution identifies as its commitments (its stated moral character), what an institution does (its manifest moral character) and an institution’s fundamental moral commitments (its deep moral character). The essays in this volume support this model of integrity. Although it is not their explicit focus, the four essays together provide a vision of institutional integrity for Catholic health care institutions. Each author focuses on one of the three central aspects of integrity: what one identifies as one’s commitments (Taylor), how one's actions reflect one’s values (Shannon and Magill), and what one is or what one values at a deep level (O’Rourke). I will offer a brief overview of the ways in which the integrity of Catholic health care institutions has been addressed. Then I will consider the four essays and show how each offers an analysis of one of the three critical elements of integrity. (shrink)

Husserl seems to have devoted roughly equal amounts of energy and pages to the description of perception, judgement, and imagination. By “description,” he meant the analysis of the traits and components of mental states or acts and their objects. As his views changed over the years about the nature of intentionality and philosophy, the descriptive psychology of the Logical Investigations (1900/01) gave way to descriptive programmes in which the objects of perception and of judgement were conceived of in terms of (...) a new, analytic framework; in particular Husserl lost interest in describing the things and processes in the real world that are the objects of perception and judgement and so too in describing their relations to these acts. His new analytic framework, particularly as it applies to perception, has been thoroughly expounded and discussed in the literature. My aim here is to expound Husserl's first descriptions of perception within the framework of the Investigations and to incorporate as far as possible his later descriptive results to the extent that these are separable from his later turn to idealism. (shrink)

There are many things—call them ‘experts’—that you should defer to in forming your opinions. The trouble is, many experts are modest: they’re less than certain that they are worthy of deference. When this happens, the standard theories of deference break down: the most popular (“Reflection”-style) principles collapse to inconsistency, while their most popular (“New-Reflection”-style) variants allow you to defer to someone while regarding them as an anti-expert. We propose a middle way: deferring to someone involves preferring to make any decision (...) using their opinions instead of your own. In a slogan, deferring opinions is deferring decisions. Generalizing the proposal of Dorst (2020a), we first formulate a new principle that shows exactly how your opinions must relate to an expert’s for this to be so. We then build off the results of Levinstein (2019) and Campbell-Moore (2020) to show that this principle is also equivalent to the constraint that you must always expect the expert’s estimates to be more accurate than your own. Finally, we characterize the conditions an expert’s opinions must meet to be worthy of deference in this sense, showing how they sit naturally between the too-strong constraints of Reflection and the too-weak constraints of New Reflection. (shrink)

Phenomenal Conservatism (the view that an appearance that p gives one prima facie justification for believing that p) is a promising, and popular, internalist theory of epistemic justification. Despite its popularity, it faces numerous objections and challenges. For instance, epistemologists have argued that Phenomenal Conservatism is incompatible with Bayesianism, is afflicted by bootstrapping and cognitive penetration problems, does not guarantee that epistemic justification is a stable property, does not provide an account of defeat, and is not a complete theory of (...) epistemic justification. This book shows that Phenomenal Conservatism is actually immune to some of these problems, though not all of them. Accordingly, it explores the prospects of integrating Phenomenal Conservatism with Explanationism (the view that epistemic justification is a matter of explanatory relations between one’s evidence and propositions supported by that evidence). The resulting theory, Phenomenal Explanationism, has advantages over Phenomenal Conservatism and Explanationism taken on their own. Phenomenal Explanationism is a highly unified, comprehensive internalist theory of epistemic justification that delivers on the promises of Phenomenal Conservatism while avoiding its pitfalls. (shrink)

An important and engaging book on a key argument in contemporary debates about free will and moral responsibility.

In 2022, students at North American universities with third-dose COVID-19 vaccine mandates risk disenrolment if unvaccinated. To assess the appropriateness of booster mandates in this age group, we combine empirical risk-benefit assessment and ethical analysis. To prevent one COVID-19 hospitalisation over a 6-month period, we estimate that 31 207–42 836 young adults aged 18–29 years must receive a third mRNA vaccine. Booster mandates in young adults are expected to cause a net harm: per COVID-19 hospitalisation prevented, we anticipate at least (...) 18.5 serious adverse events from mRNA vaccines, including 1.5–4.6 booster-associated myopericarditis cases in males (typically requiring hospitalisation). We also anticipate 1430–4626 cases of grade ≥3 reactogenicity interfering with daily activities (although typically not requiring hospitalisation). University booster mandates are unethical because they: (1) are not based on an updated (Omicron era) stratified risk-benefit assessment for this age group; (2) may result in a net harm to healthy young adults; (3) are not proportionate: expected harms are not outweighed by public health benefits given modest and transient effectiveness of vaccines against transmission; (4) violate the reciprocity principle because serious vaccine-related harms are not reliably compensated due to gaps in vaccine injury schemes; and (5) may result in wider social harms. We consider counterarguments including efforts to increase safety on campus but find these are fraught with limitations and little scientific support. Finally, we discuss the policy relevance of our analysis for primary series COVID-19 vaccine mandates. (shrink)

Para Ockham, todo animal posee un alma sensitiva, en virtud de la cual, puede tener deseos sensitivos, cogniciones intuitivas sensitivas y cogniciones abstractivas sensitivas. Entre estas últimas, tenemos representaciones sensibles, actos del sentido común y recuerdos. El objetivo de este artículo es el de reconstruir la teoría de Ockham sobre la cognición animal sensitiva. Esta reconstrucción muestra que Ockham adscribe a los animales, en general, una capacidad de representar diferentes propiedades de las cosas singulares, una memoria episódica, una memoria procedimental (...) y cierto tipo de ilusiones. Debido a que ciertas representaciones sensibles son equivalentes a proposiciones mentales, según Ockham, los animales no-humanos pueden juzgar y formar silogismos. (shrink)

Balanço da produção científica em Educação Física em Estados do Nordeste, visando a identificar tendências, perspectivas e desafios que se apresentam à consolidação dessa produção. O estudo integra a pesquisa matricial do grupo LEPEL/UFBA.

Much of the boom that the emotions have experienced at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries may be due to the informative literature from the 1990s that proclaimed the concept of “emotional intelligence.” New developments in this field cannot ignore this fact, but it is necessary to specify that the terms emotional intelligence and intelligence of emotions are not synonymous.

A presente edição de Filosofia e Educação, a primeira de 2018, apresenta algumas novidades com relação às anteriores. A primeira delas é a mudança de datas na organização dos três números que correspondem a 2018, mantendo sua periodização quadrimestral. Esta edição que na sequência anterior correspondia aos meses de outubro-janeiro sofre um ajuste neste 1º número do décimo volume. Assim, a atual edição corresponde aos quatro primeiros meses de 2018. Na sequência, a 2ª edição deve corresponder aos meses de maio-agosto (...) e a 3ª aos meses de setembro-dezembro. (shrink)