Two currently much discussed views about truth, truth pluralism and truth relativism, are found in Sellars’s writings. I show that his motivations for adoping these views are interestingly different from those shared by most of their recent advocates. First, I explain how Sellars comes to embrace a version of truth pluralism. I argue that his version overcomes a difficulty confronting pluralists, albeit at a serious cost. Then I argue that Sellars’s truth pluralism isn’t motivated by his interest in domains of (...) discourse beyond the “matter-of-factual.” Rather, the key to his truth pluralism, his analysis of truth as “semantical assertibility,” is motivated by the same consideration that leads him to adopt truth relativism. This is his interest in applying semantic notions to discourse that embodies conceptual structures other than ours. Despite their common motivation, I conclude that Sellars’s relativism is independent of, and indeed stands in tension with, the analysis of truth that underlies his pluralism. (shrink)

Based on specific documentary evidence, historian Lionel Jensen reveals how 16th- and 17th-century Western missionaries used translations of the ancient RU ...

Surveys Western literature and thought to reveal the evolution of the ideals of sincerity and authenticity.

This important collection of essays includes Professor Hart's first defense of legal positivism; his discussion of the distinctive teaching of American and Scandinavian jurisprudence; an examination of theories of basic human rights and the notion of "social solidarity," and essays on Jhering, Kelsen, Holmes, and Lon Fuller.

Laborie and Hessayon bring rare prophetic and millenarian texts to an international audience by presenting sources from all over Europe (broadly defined), and across the early modern period in English for the first time.

Building on recent work, I present sequent systems for the non-classical logics LP, K3, and FDE with two main virtues. First, derivations closely resemble those in standard Gentzen-style systems. Second, the systems can be obtained by reformulating a classical system using nonstandard sequent structure and simply removing certain structural rules (relatives of exchange and contraction). I clarify two senses in which these logics count as “substructural.”.

ABSTRACT:‘Race’ has long searched for a stable, suitable idea, with no consensus on a master meaning in sight. What I call deflationary pluralism about the existence of race recognizes that various meanings may be true as far as they go but avoids murky disputes over whether there are races in some sense. Once we have rejected the notion that racial essences yield innate cognitive differences, there is little point to arguing over the race idea. In its place, I propose the (...) idea of socioancestry, which jettisons racial thinking yet recognizes the social dynamics of color. For example, Black Americans, many of whom have traceable non-African ancestry, constitute an Africa-identified, socioancestrally black subgroup. ‘Race’ talk is not needed to sustain legitimate color-conscious approaches to social identity and social justice. Long-standing fixation on the race idea has obscured the simple truth that visible continental ancestry is the root of the social reality of color consciousness. (shrink)

Development of the shapes of living organisms and their parts is a field of science in which there are no generally accepted theoretical principles. What form these principles are likely to take, when they emerge, is a subject in which there is a wide gulf of disagreement between physical scientists and experimental biologists. This book contains both an extensive philosophical commentary on this dichotomy in views and an exposition of the type of theory most favoured by physical scientists. In this (...) theory living form is a manifestation of the dynamics of chemical change and physical transport or other physics of spatial communication. The reaction-diffusion theory, as initiated by Turing in 1952 and since elaborated by Prigogine and by Gierer and Meinhardt among others, is discussed in detail at a level that requires a good knowledge of a first course in calculus, but no more than that. The great growth of molecular biology has tended to overshadow the increase in our understanding of the nature of these kinetic processes. This book seeks to reawaken interest in dynamics in the hope that a better balance between the importance of things and the importance of actions may emerge in the biology of the 21st century. (shrink)

Deflationists about truth seek to undermine debates about the nature of truth by arguing that the truth predicate is merely a device that allows us to express a certain kind of generality. I argue that a parallel approach is available in the case of logical consequence. Just as deflationism about truth offers an alternative to accounts of truth's nature in terms of correspondence or justification, deflationism about consequence promises an alternative to model-theoretic or proof-theoretic accounts of consequence's nature. I then (...) argue, against considerations put forward by Field and Beall, that Curry's paradox no more rules out deflationism about consequence than the liar paradox rules out deflationism about truth. (shrink)

The revisionary approach to semantic paradox is commonly thought to have a somewhat uncomfortable corollary, viz. that, on pain of triviality, we cannot affirm that all valid arguments preserve truth (Beall2007, Beall2009, Field2008, Field2009). We show that the standard arguments for this conclusion all break down once (i) the structural rule of contraction is restricted and (ii) how the premises can be aggregated---so that they can be said to jointly entail a given conclusion---is appropriately understood. In addition, we briefly rehearse (...) some reasons for restricting structural contraction. (shrink)

According to commitment accounts of assertion, asserting is committing oneself to something’s being the case, where such commitment is understood in terms of norms governing a social practice. I elaborate and compare two version of such accounts, liability accounts (associated with C.S. Peirce) and dialectical norm accounts (associated with Robert Brandom), concluding that the latter are more defensible. I argue that both versions of commitment account possess a potential advantage over rival normative accounts of assertion in that they needn’t presuppose (...) any notion of an assertion’s correctness. Additionally, I show how dialectical norm accounts can explain relations between assertion and truth. After setting forth objections that have been raised against commitment accounts, I argue that responses are available on behalf of dialectical norm accounts. Finally, I propose that a liberalized dialectical norm account can illuminate phenomena sometimes seen as supporting truth relativism. (shrink)

Innocence is a notion that can prove controversial. Claims of innocence typically support not imposing burdens on the innocent when their conduct is relevantly unobjectionable. This paper examines innocence in the context of violent conflict between states or groups. Many thinkers about the morality of such violence want to establish a principle that would protect innocent civilians. Yet the common view in just war theory does not affirm the moral innocence of civilians. Similarly, the common view that soldiers have an (...) equal right to kill does not affirm their equal moral culpability. (shrink)

Can we ever experimentally disentangle phenomenal consciousness from the cognitive accessibility inherent to conscious reports? In this commentary, we suggest that (1) Block's notion of phenomenal consciousness remains intractably entangled with the need to obtain subjective reports about it; and (2) many experimental paradigms suggest that the intuitive notion of a rich but non-reportable phenomenal world is, to a large extent illusory – in a sense that requires clarification.

This introductory chapter attempts to clarify the philosophical, empirical, and theoretical bases on which a cognitive neuroscience approach to consciousness can be founded. We isolate three major empirical observations that any theory of consciousness should incorporate, namely (1) a considerable amount of processing is possible without consciousness, (2) attention is a prerequisite of consciousness, and (3) consciousness is required for some specific cognitive tasks, including those that require durable information maintenance, novel combinations of operations, or the spontaneous generation of intentional (...) behavior. We then propose a theoretical framework that synthesizes those facts: the hypothesis of a global neuronal workspace. This framework postulates that, at any given time, many modular cerebral networks are active in parallel and process information in an unconscious manner. An information becomes conscious, however, if the neural population that represents it is mobilized by top-down attentional amplification into a brain-scale state of coherent activity that involves many neurons distributed throughout the brain. The long-distance connectivity of these `workspace neurons' can, when they are active for a minimal duration, make the information available to a variety of processes including perceptual categorization, long-term memorization, evaluation, and intentional action. We postulate that this global availability of information through the workspace is what we subjectively experience as a conscious state. A complete theory of consciousness should explain why some cognitive and cerebral representations can be permanently or temporarily inaccessible to consciousness, what is the range of possible conscious contents, how they map onto specific cerebral circuits, and whether a generic neuronal mechanism underlies all of them. We confront the workspace model with those issues and identify novel experimental predictions. Neurophysiological, anatomical, and brain-imaging data strongly argue for a major role of prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, and the areas that connect to them, in creating the postulated brain-scale workspace. (shrink)

The lexicon of religion has been widely used in the context of the social and cultural transformations associated with the ‘digital revolution’, whether in metaphoric or in realistic terms. The study of digital magic/magic in digital times, the other side of the coin of the Sacred 2.0, is still in its infancy. Yet, references to magic are made frequently in reflections about the rapid development of the digitalisation of society and culture, and they deserve more in-depth study. This paper tackles (...) the issue of magic in and of new technologies, including artificial intelligence devices. After a broad outline of the presence of magic in the digital ecosystem, this paper will focus on the lexical surface and semantic references to ‘magical thinking’, explore the underlying reasons for such references and unveil the regimes of existence for magic. Finally, the paper questions the role of language in the construction of a ‘digital magic’ and the transformations of the semantic category of magic as seen through the prism of a cultural revolution, that of the digitalisation of societies. (shrink)

Rejecting structural contraction has been proposed as a strategy for escaping semantic paradoxes. The challenge for its advocates has been to make intuitive sense of how contraction might fail. I offer a way of doing so, based on a “naive” interpretation of the relation between structure and logical vocabulary in a sequent proof system. The naive interpretation of structure motivates the most common way of blaming Curry-style paradoxes on illicit contraction. By contrast, the naive interpretation will not as easily motivate (...) one recent noncontractive approach to the Liar paradox. (shrink)

Experiencing a stimulus in one sensory modality is often associated with an experience in another sensory modality. For instance, seeing a lemon might produce a sensation of sourness. This might indicate some kind of cross-modal correspondence between vision and gustation. The aim of the current study was to provide explore whether such cross-modal correspondences influence cross-modal integration during perceptual learning. To that end, we conducted 2 experiments. Using a speeded classification task, Experiment 1 established a cross-modal correspondence between visual lightness (...) and the frequency of an auditory tone. Using a short-term priming procedure, Experiment 2 showed that manipulation of such cross-modal correspondences led to the creation of a crossmodal unit regardless of the nature of the correspondence (i.e., congruent, Experiment 2a or incongruent, Experiment 2b). However, a comparison of priming-effects sizes suggested that cross-modal correspondences modulate cross-modal integration during learning and thus leading to new learned units that have different stability over time. We discuss the implications of our results for the relation between cross-modal correspondence and perceptual learning in the context of a Bayesian explanation of cross-modal correspondences. (shrink)

A decade in the making, the _Handbook i_s the definitive contemporary exposition of interpersonal psychoanalysis. It provides an authoritative overview of development, psychopathology, and treatment as conceptualized from the interpersonal viewpoint.

Current empirical evidence does not seem to confirm that an improvement in living conditions is the cause of the shift in the human mindset toward innovation and long-term risky investment. However, it may well be one of the conditions for greater tolerance of income inequality in exchange for a steady increase in average income.

En affirmant que "tout philosophe a deux philosophies : la sienne et celle de Spinoza", Bergson exprime avant tout que le philosophe se doit de rompre avec une pensée dogmatique qui n'a plus lieu d'être et que Spinoza incarne tout particulièrement. Le spinozisme manifeste la pente de l'intelligence lorsqu'elle suit sa logique propre sans être rectifiée par le recours à l'expérience. Or, c'est cette démarche systématique que la philosophie doit désormais abandonner. Bergson est néanmoins hanté par la pensée de Spinoza (...) et le rapport qu'il entretient avec lui, en particulier dans ses cours au Collège de France, met en évidence un lien bien plus complexe et subtil qu'un simple rapport d'opposition. Contre la tendance à la clôture et à la systématicité, Bergson va alors privilégier chez Spinoza la tendance à l'ouverture et au mysticisme. En mettant en lumière cet aspect, cet ouvrage montre la sympathie intellectuelle qui réunit ces penseurs autour des notions de joie et de liberté. C'est pourquoi la figure du Christ va constituer un modèle non seulement éthique mais ontologique. Le terme de mysticisme, chez ces deux auteurs, ne désigne ni le refus de l'expérience ni celui des sciences positives mais renvoie à un rationalisme élargi jusqu'à l'amour du réel."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

L’objectif, éminemment politique, de cet ouvrage est de proposer pour 2012 une alternative aux programmes court-termistes et consensuels qui pourraient être développés par les candidats lors de la campagne officielle pour les élections présidentielles. Il vise à offrir une perspective de long terme de ce à quoi la société pourrait ressembler d’ici trente à cinquante ans si nous prenons un véritable virage écologique et humain et si nous opérons un changement concret de paradigme. Si, ces dernières années, un grand nombre (...) d’ouvrages et de films ont dénoncé les pires crises que traverse l’humanité, si d’autres se sont évertués à mettre en lumière des alternatives, force est de constater que très peu se sont attelés à la tâche d’offrir une vision articulée, écologique et positive de l’avenir. Loin des “yaka-fokon” et des déclarations d’intention pleines de bonne volonté, cet ouvrage met en lumière des solutions qui ont fait leur preuve, à petite comme à grande échelle, dans la plupart des domaines de la société. Pour chaque thématique, une personnalité “experte”, ayant développé une vision du sujet - voire souvent conduit ou observé une expérimentation -, propose en quelques pages des voies de transition concrètes, ainsi que les moyens à disposition de tous, qu’ils soient citoyens, élus ou entrepreneurs, pour les mettre en action. Chacune de ces propositions s’appuie sur un “cas pratique” : un exemple concluant mené à l’échelle d’un territoire européen (canton, département, région...). Au-delà d’une simple compilation, ces propositions sont mises en relation comme un véritable projet de société. (shrink)

The advent and expanding role of jurilinguistics as part of the federal legislative process are closely associated with the gradual recognition of the equal authority of the two linguistic versions of federal legislation, as well as the implementation of co-drafting as the most effective method of taking into account the equal authority of the two official languages of the country. Jurilinguistics gradually made its way into the federal legislative process starting in the mid 70s and quickly resulted in the establishment (...) of a formal group dealing with French jurilinguistics, comprised of Francophone drafters and jurilinguists. Jurilinguists played a key role in the development of drafting standards for the drafting of a truly authentic French version of federal legislation. In the late 90s, Anglophone jurilinguists were also hired to ensure the highest quality possible for the English version of the federal laws and, along with their Francophone counterparts, to ensure the functional equivalence of the two language versions. The implementation of the departmental policy on legislative bijuralism constituted an additional challenge for the drafter who, fortunately, can rely on comparative law experts, as well as the sound advice of the jurilinguists, to produce legislative texts that are consistent with the principles of clarity in drafting legal documents. (shrink)

This paper compares two ways of holding that logic is special among the sciences in that it has no restricted class of entities as its subject matter, but instead concerns all entities alike. One way is Williamson’s explanation of how inquiry into logical consequence and logical truth only superficially concerns the linguistic or conceptual entities that bear these properties. Williamson draws on ideas familiar from deflationism about truth, and his account has been called “deflationary.” I argue that the analogy is (...) misleading. While there’s a broad sense in which Williamson offers a deflationary account of logical inquiry, his view differs from deflationism about truth in being best understood as a form of instrumentalism. By contrast, I elaborate a deflationism about logical properties modeled on deflationism about truth. I defend this expressive device deflationism as an explanation of our use of logical predicates. (shrink)

This article discusses various metaphorical texts where the authors construct or ‘make up’ their own sources. Such data contrast with the kinds of examples usually found in studies of metaphor, where the source is typically one that is ‘pre-given’. From a discourse perspective, it becomes interesting to ask under what circumstances a speaker/writer would attempt to create a brand new source instead of simply drawing upon pre-existing entities and events. The article shows that constructed sources tend to be used when (...) the goal is the clarification of complex concepts. The complexity of the target concepts means that existing events and entities often lack the right structure that can easily be mapped onto the target, whereas the construction of their own sources allows the authors to have structures that are homologous with that of the target. (shrink)

The general attributes of ecosystems are examined and a naturally occurring reference ecosystem is established, comparable with the isolated system of classical thermodynamics. Such an autonomous system with a stable, periodic input of energy is shown to assume certain structural characteristics that have an identifiable thermodynamic basis. Individual species tend to assume a state of least dissipation; this is most clearly evident in the dominant species (the species with the best integration of energy acquisition and conservation). It is concluded that (...) ecosystem structure results from the antagonistic interaction of two nearly equal forces. These forces have their origin in the Principle of Most Action (least dissipation or least entropy production) and the universal Principle of Least Action. Most action is contingent on the equipartitioning of the energy available, through uniform interaction of similar individuals. The trend to Least action is contingent on increased dissipation attained through increasing diversity and increasing complexity. These principles exhibit a basic asymmetry. Given the operation of these opposing principles over evolutionary time, it is argued that ecosystems originated in the vicinity of thermodynamic equilibrium through the resonant amplification of reversible fluctuations. On account of the basic asymmetry the system was able to evolve away from thermodynamic equilibrium provided that it remained within the vicinity of ergodynamic equilibrium (equilibrium maintained by internal work, where the opposing forces are equal and opposite).At the highest level of generalization there appear to be three principles operating: i) maximum association of free-energy and materials; ii) energy conservation (deceleration of the energy flow) through symmetric interaction and increased homogeneity; and iii) the principle of least action which induces acceleration of the energy flow through asymmetrical interaction. The opposition and asymmetry of the two forces give rise to natural selection and evolution. (shrink)

This paper contrasts two versions of a pragmatist critique of deflationism about truth. According to the critique, understanding the practice of factual discourse requires understanding a role played in that practice by speakers’ use of the concept of truth. Huw Price takes this role to lie in the expression of attitudes of approval and disapproval toward other speakers’ assertions. Proceeding from Robert Brandom’s analysis of assertion, I defend an alternative account of truth’s role in terms of the acknowledgement and disacknowledgement (...) of communicative authority. I explain why this account fails to yield Price’s key anti-deflationary conclusion, namely that engaging in factual discourse requires holding that false assertion are ipso facto normatively incorrect. (shrink)

This paper aims to call into question the customary division of logically revisionary responses to the truth-theoretic paradoxes into those that are “substructural” and those that are “ structural.” I proceed by examining, as a case study, Beall’s recent proposal based on the paraconsistent logic LP. Beall formulates his response to paradox in terms of a consequence relation that obeys all standard structural rules, though at the price of the language’s lacking a detaching conditional. I argue that the same response (...) to paradox can be given using a consequence relation that preserves detachment rules for a conditional, though at the price of restricting structural rules. The question “Is paradox being blocked by invoking a substructural consequence relation?” is thus ill-posed. The lesson of this example, I conclude, is that there is no useful explication of the idea of a substructural approach to paradox. (shrink)

An updated and extended second edition supporting the findings of its well-known predecessor which claimed that courts employ common-sense notions of causation in determining legal responsibility.

English summary: Fynn Ole Engler investigates the two main positions in the modern philosophy of science from an historical and a systematic point of view, thereby separating the realistic and the naturalistic program from each other.

Are automated vehicles really safer than manually driven vehicles? If so, how would we know? Answering this question has spurred a contentious debate. Unfortunately, several issues make answering this question difficult for the foreseeable future. First, how do we measure safety? Second, how can we keep track of automated vehicle safety? Finally, how do we determine what is or what is not an AV? Until these questions are addressed, it will continue to be difficult to determine whether or when AVs (...) might really be safer than manually driven vehicles. (shrink)

El método de la “libre investigación científica del derecho” propuesto por François Gény ha marcado toda una generación de juristas. Tratado con detenimiento a lo largo de su extensa y compleja obra, la libre investigación científica se presenta como un método completo destinado a orientar al jurista en la creación, interpretación y aplicación del derecho positivo. Por desventura, el clima ambiente en el que nació su obra y en el que tuvo que desenvolverse con posterioridad, dominado por la escuela de (...) la exégesis, no ha sabido extraer de la obra de Gény más que elementos dispares no haciendo justicia a su método. En la actualidad, el redescubrimiento de su método de la libre investigación científica permitirá combatir el anquilosamiento dogmático, evitar los excesos formalistas, y aportar elementos de interés para la investigación iusfilosófica de nuestro tiempo. El método de la “libre investigación científica del derecho” propuesto por François Gény ha marcado toda una generación de juristas. Tratado con detenimiento a lo largo de su extensa y compleja obra, la libre investigación científica se presenta como un método completo destinado a orientar al jurista en la creación, interpretación y aplicación del derecho positivo. Por desventura, el clima ambiente en el que nació su obra y en el que tuvo que desenvolverse con posterioridad, dominado por la escuela de la exégesis, no ha sabido extraer de la obra de Gény más que elementos dispares no haciendo justicia a su método. En la actualidad, el redescubrimiento de su método de la libre investigación científica permitirá combatir el anquilosamiento dogmático, evitar los excesos formalistas, y aportar elementos de interés para la investigación iusfilosófica de nuestro tiempo. (shrink)