Russell tries to give an account of influences that have shaped his philosophy, though there is no mention of the development of his ethical or social views. The last chapter is devoted to the replies to criticisms. As might be expected, a most readable book.--M. G.

The book, volume 42 in the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, consists principally of two interconnected essays in theoretical biology. The first, entitled "Biology of Cognition," was written in 1969 by Humberto R. Maturana, a Chilean neurophysiologist and anatomist whose earlier work included studies of vision in birds and the frog. The second essay, "Autopoiesis: the Organization of the Living," is an expansion of certain sections in the first and was written in 1972 by Maturana and Francisco J. (...) Varela, a philosophical biologist. Although Maturana alone is responsible for the introduction, the two essays are said to represent one point of view, expressed in the concept of "autopoiesis." The term, "a word without a history," was invented to convey "the central feature of the organization of the living, which is autonomy". Autopoiesis, it is claimed, enables us to say at once, through the logic of a self-referring homeostatic system, what is organic life and cognition. "Living systems are cognitive systems, and living as a process is a process of cognition". (shrink)

Hegel’s concept of Recognition is of continuing interest on several accounts. In the Hegelian system Recognition plays a key role in the development of the natural consciousness to Spirit in the Phenomenology of 1807 and in the development from Subjective to Absolute Spirit in the later Encyclopedia. But apart from its role in the system itself, Hegel’s dialectic of Recognition has seminally infused thinking on intersubjectivity and social theory in Marx, Sartre, Habermas, and others. Siep would apply it in yet (...) another way. He proposes to view Recognition as a principle of practical philosophy, indeed as making possible a renewal of practical philosophizing in the tradition of Aristotle. Through Recognition, which is Spirit as self-consciousness in the interaction of individuals and between individuals and institutions, Hegel overcomes the cleft in Kantian and Fichtean a priori philosophizing between autonomous individuality and community. Utilizing Recognition theory to derive the community and its institutions from a notion of the free self-consciousness, Hegel reconciles the Aristotelian tradition of the polis with the principle of transcendental subjectivity. Siep, in a scholarly and at the same time stimulating work, inquires whether Recognition theory can provide the principle for a contemporary practical philosophy not wedded to the Hegelian teleology of Spirit. (shrink)

Long in the making, large in scholarship and scope, this work is a worthy rival to H. W. Schneider’s A History of American Philosophy. With the possible exception of a few of the treatments of technical developments in logic, the material is accessible to the general reader. Flower and Murphey accomplish this not by any dilution of philosophical substance, but by the supplying of relevant background. This includes a statement of Aristotle’s causes, the medieval distinction between nominalism and realism, Locke’s (...) distinction between primary and secondary qualities, Berkeley’s and Hume’s critiques of Locke, and, most importantly, a detailed explanation of Scottish realism. (shrink)

Although important philosophers have questioned the moral defensibility of our treatment of animals, the topic has never had a significant place in ethical theory. By bringing together papers by authors with diverse views, this anthology focuses attention on the topic which, primarily due to the writings of Peter Singer, has received increasing study in recent years. According to Singer, the major moral theories offer arbitrary bases for giving preference to humans, and so they cannot be used to justify the widespread (...) beliefs that eating and experimenting upon animals are morally acceptable practices. Insofar as humans, regardless of rational or physical capacity, are deemed worthy of equal consideration, there is no good reason to withhold such consideration from animals. The first of the four sections into which the readings are divided describes the brutal treatment animals often receive from people. The second section provides a variety of opinions on the difference between men and animals ranging from Descartes’ claim that animals are mere automatons to Darwin’s claim that there is no fundamental difference between the mental faculties of men and higher mammals. The third section considers whether any of the supposed differences between men and animals can justify different treatment. The main conflict here is between those who contend that we have duties only to free or rational beings and those who, like Singer, contend that we have the duty to heed the interests of all sentient beings. The fourth section examines the nature of rights and whether animals have them. Some writers contend that animals have the right not only to life and happiness but also to liberty and property. Those unfamiliar with the heretofore neglected problem of our treatment of animals will find the readings in this collection valuable and provocative.—M.G. (shrink)

This booklet contains Marx's review of the writings of Dr. Bruno Bauer, a contemporary theologian and social philosopher, on "the Jewish question." Marx identifies Judaism with usury and exploitation of the masses, as do those who, according to Runes in his introduction, "find in Jew-hatred a compensative way of living out the envies of their drab existences."--M. G.

Professor Girvetz here presents an ethical position which he contends avoids the current, prevalent skepticism about moral knowledge without embracing moral dogmatism. Before this position is developed, the sources of moral skepticism and some major attempts to escape it are discussed. Cultural relativism, Freudian psychology, ideologism, the interest theory of value and emotivism, theories often held to substantiate skepticism, are deemed unsatisfactory or unsupportive of skeptical results. For example, emotivism rests on an inadequate analysis of moral language; and cultural relativism, (...) even if true, does not establish the correctness of ethical relativism. Intuitionism, Hare’s prescriptivism and Dewey’s instrumentalism, major attempts to escape skepticism, are examined and judged unsatisfactory. (shrink)

Professor Allen undertakes two tasks: first, to show that moral discriminations do not originate from a cognitive faculty; and, second, to establish that such discriminations originate from a non-cognitive faculty which determines which desires and emotions are appropriate on particular occasions. Some of his objections to cognitive ethics are that it can neither explain how knowledge can motivate action nor, since it holds that our moral obligations originate from an external source, justify moral toleration. When obligations originate from an external (...) source, toleration seems justified only when one believes that his moral convictions could be in error. Whenever our moral convictions are firm, there would be no reason to tolerate opposing ones that seem wrong or sinful. (shrink)

In discussing a variety of issues in the philosophy of education, Professor Crittenden focuses his attention on liberal education, i.e., the process of education which is principally concerned with promoting understanding and appreciation of the main forms of knowledge and with developing various skills of inquiry, expression, and performance. He believes that the defense of liberal education as a necessary feature of democracy is unsatisfactory; although citizens must have some knowledge and intellectual competence to make the choices expected of them, (...) these might not be needed to any significant degree. Liberal education can be defended only on the ground that it is crucial to the welfare of each individual: since liberal education develops those capacities needed to live a fully human life, Crittenden believes it proper to maintain that all men have a moral right to receive it. Though this right cannot, for a variety of reasons, be fully implemented; it is an ideal at which authorities should aim. (shrink)

This volume contains papers in which Hans Kelsen addresses a number of philosophical issues that are crucial to his defense of the pure theory of law. Although it includes some papers appearing in English for the first time, this collection differs little in scope or substance from an earlier one, What is Justice? Kelsen’s legal theory has raised the ire of critics because they believe it separates far too sharply law from ethics. In these papers, especially those written in recent (...) years, Kelsen contends that the separation he proposes does not eliminate the possibility of criticizing the law on moral grounds; but, since there is often no agreement on moral beliefs or any means of establishing their correctness, it is often necessary to support or validate a legal system on a nonmoral basis. Thus, many of these papers deal with Kelsen’s concept of a norm and the means by which the basic norm, the one which validates all others, can be validated. Kelsen’s much criticized contention that the basic norm can be validated by a principle of minimum effectiveness is stated in a number of papers; these various statements may help to clarify the nature of the validation that he believes to be sufficient. Moral philosophers, who have generally ignored Kelsen’s work, will discover that he has much to say on moral relativism and natural law. Kelsen’s belief in the relativity of moral value, a belief he held to be quite different from the denial of any values, is used to support both his rejection of natural law and his contention that a valid legal order need not be in accord with any particular moral order. Along with papers dealing with the validation of norms and moral relativism, there are papers dealing with causality and accountability, God and the State, and the principle of retribution. There is a brief, helpful introduction by Ota Weinberger.—M.G. (shrink)

The authors, who are lecturers at the University of Kent and conduct a seminar there on dialectical materialism, have two main aims in this book: to clarify the meaning of dialectic in Hegel and Marxism, and to urge consideration of the materialist dialectic as a living philosophy. The treatment, however, is not merely expository but also critical and exploratory. The book is a debate in five essays, two by Sayers and three by Norman, the format thereby allowing each writer to (...) develop an argument at some length. Sayers mainly confines himself to elucidating the orthodox Marxian position and defending it against what he sees as misconceptions and distortions on the part of Norman and others. Norman provides the main interest, for although he regards himself as a dialectical materialist his views break away from those of Hegel and Marx, and he probes some of the more problematic aspects of dialectical philosophizing. (shrink)

Although most contemporary utilitarians believe that their theory can be held only in a modified form, Sartorius contends that the traditional position, act-utilitarianism, is defensible. He explains the traditional position and defends it against the often made objection that it does not require sufficiently strict adherence to socially valuable legal and moral rules. Act-utilitarianism makes every useful act right, but utility sometimes is maximized if rules are adopted which disallow individually useful violations. If all useful acts are right regardless of (...) any rule they violate, then general rules become nothing more than summary rules or rules of thumb which, in appropriate circumstances, need not be followed. Act-utilitarians need not, according to Sartorius, consider general rules to be only summary ones. Once a rule is seen to be most productive of utility if no exceptions are allowed, the adoption of sanctions to enforce the rule would be justified; when enforced by sanctions, summary rules become genuine social norms because they are capable of directing behavior into desired channels. Besides his account of social norms, Sartorius discusses many other issues related to the utilitarian theory; he criticizes Rawls’ account of distributive justice, provides utilitarian analyses of the obligations to keep promises and obey the law, supports Narveson’s well-known solution to the population problem and discusses how the principle of utility can be vindicated. Because this book deals so clearly with many important issues, it should be read by all those interested in normative ethical theories.—M.G. (shrink)

In this first volume of a projected two-volume commentary, Lakebrink takes as his main aim to assist the uninitiated reader toward a maximum understanding of Hegel’s Encyclopedia Logic of 1830. The best way to accomplish this aim, Lakebrink believes, is through a paragraph-by-paragraph explication of text. This is introduced by a general discussion of Hegel and Hegel interpretation, whose main themes are more or less carried over into the subsequent exposition. In view of the difficulty of Hegel’s text and the (...) paucity of close commentaries, the aim is a praiseworthy one, and the present volume gives ample promise that the completed work will provide the student of Hegel’s Logic with a useful aid. (shrink)

This volume is the first of three dealing with the subjects in the title. Although Professor Hayek has defended liberal constitutionalism in earlier books, he here provides a more elaborate analysis of it and seeks to uncover the basic misconceptions that have eroded its support. The main reason for the decreased support is the belief that institutions serve human purposes only if they have been deliberately designed for those purposes, and that a society which does not serve our purposes should (...) be redesigned to do so. In opposition to such "constructivist" views, Hayek supports an evolutionary view of society’s institutions; he believes that institutions and practices first adopted accidentally or for other purposes are preserved if experience proves them valuable. He contends that society should be allowed to evolve slowly since the vast knowledge necessary to design properly its institutions is unavailable. (shrink)

A mimeographed book on the philosophy of "Being" from Thales to Aristotle. The author states that the book has evolved out of his lectures in an introductory course on metaphysics. Almost half the pages are devoted to Platonism. The whole treatment is somewhat repetitious and is more pedagogic than scholarly, making relatively free use of terminology.--M. G.

This anthology is designed for teachers who wish a text that deals with practical, normative issues of popular interest. The selected readings, nearly all of which were first published in the last ten years, are grouped under the following seven headings: Sex, Abortion, Prejudice and Discrimination, Civil Disobedience, Punishment, War, and Suicide and Death. The selections include such popular pieces as Judith Jarvis Thomson’s "A Defense of Abortion," John Rawls’ "The Justification of Civil Disobedience," and Elizabeth Anscombe’s "War and Murder," (...) and such fresh, provocative essays as Peter Singer’s "Animal Liberation," and Richard Brandt’s "The Morality and Rationality of Suicide." Since the readings, which are philosophically interesting and, with effort, understandable by most undergraduates, present opposing views within each section, the text is not biased in favor of any particular viewpoint. One minor complaint is that some of the sections do not present sufficient material to allow for an adequate presentation of the topic; for example, the section on sex contains just two essays. A second complaint is the omission of any introductions; a clear discussion of the issues dealt with in each section might ease the problem undergraduates have in following the subtle argumentation contained in some of the papers. Despite these minor complaints, the book is one of the best of its type available.—M.G. (shrink)

Professor Haslett, who claims that he is developing ideas found in the work of C. I. Lewis, presents a method of moral justification and shows which moral principle this method justifies. Since, according to Haslett, it is rational to maximize what one values for its own sake, a moral principle which maximizes such values should be adopted. The principle that does this is a variant of rule utilitarianism labeled "ideal observer utilitarianism." This position differs from the standard versions of rule (...) utilitarianism by replacing quantitative measurement of intrinsic goodness with the preference rankings that would be made by an ideal observer and by choosing rules on the basis of the effects of their enforcement, rather than on the basis of the effects of their universal adoption. Thus, ideal observer utilitarianism consists of all the rules that an ideal observer would choose to enforce. Such an observer would choose rules that are easy to apply and simple enough to be readily learned; only such rules, which people could follow if they wanted to, could be satisfactorily enforced. Since the rules must be simple, Haslett maintains that his position is not open to the objection, frequently made against other versions of utilitarianism, that it would justify such reprehensible acts as the punishment of an innocent person or the breaking of a promise for some slight resultant good. Rules allowing for the occasional performance of such acts would be unsatisfactory because of their complexity. (shrink)

Negativities are limitations or deprivations of life or some other condition highly valued by human beings. Death, suicide, abortion, war, crime, punishment, illness, perversion, inequality, and waste are negativities to which Professor Margolis devotes separate chapters. Although Margolis believes that moral judgments on these negativities must satisfy certain conceptual constraints to be rationally coherent, he denies that any one judgment can be deemed solely correct because conflicting ones, arising from different coherent ideologies, can equally satisfy these constraints. The moral philosopher’s (...) task is not to search for correct solutions, but to discover the constraints that govern a particular issue and, thereby, provide a criterion of minimum rationality which every conviction on the issue must satisfy. In each chapter, Margolis illustrates how the demand that moral convictions satisfy certain conceptual requirements can eliminate untenable convictions without ending all disputes on an issue. In discussing inequality, for example, Margolis argues that some types of preferential treatment are indefensible, but others are immune to attack; inequalities supported by a particular ideology can be attacked only from the vantage point of a competing ideology. Similarly, Margolis stresses that certain moral views on abortion stem from antecedent, culturally based commitments. He argues that it is impossible to determine on objective grounds whether a fetus that will be born with permanent crippling defects should be aborted; different convictions on the issue reflect different ideological commitments. Both Margolis’ analyses of particular moral issues and his conception of the proper task of ethical theory are original and merit serious attention.—M.G. (shrink)

Distinguishing between proving and grounding moral judgments is an important first step in Professor Becker’s attempt to refute moral skepticism. He claims that proving judgments, which involves offering sufficient reasons to establish their correctness, is not possible, but that grounding, which requires only a nonarbitrary stopping point to reason giving, is. Judgments based on goals or values acknowledged by all "normally-formed" people are deemed grounded if no reasoned criticism can be made against them. Examples of universal goals and values which (...) provide the basis for grounding judgments are purposiveness, a conception of self which will not tolerate certain incursions and a desire for pleasure and equilibrium. Unfortunately, Becker does not convincingly show how these goals and values can ground anything other than a plethora of conflicting judgments and principles. He asserts that all people’s goals and interests should be weighed in reaching our judgments, but he does not establish that a concern with everyone’s goals and interests is common to all normally-formed people. (shrink)

The eight papers in this collection, which were delivered at the Fourth Annual Conference in Philosophy at the University of Georgia in February, 1971, deal with a variety of topics related to the current controversy about man’s use of his environment. The contributors, Eugene P. Odum, William T. Blackstone, Joel Feinberg, Charles Hartshorne, Walter O’Briant, Nicholas Rescher, Robert G. Burton, and Pete A. Y. Gunter, discuss such issues as overpopulation, man’s relation to nature, man’s attitude toward his environment, and the (...) proper role of technology in industrialized societies. Two especially interesting papers are Rescher’s "The Environmental Crisis and the Quality of Life" and Feinberg’s "The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations." Rescher believes that Americans can avoid bitter disappointment only by realizing that no significant improvement in the quality of their environment is possible. He is aware that this realization will be painful because it involves surrendering the deeply held convictions that the quality of our life will continually improve and that our technology can overcome any physical obstacles. Feinberg discusses some of the complex issues involved in deciding whether people are obligated to leave a satisfactory environment for those who will come in the future. He contends that there is no obligation to add additional people; but, insofar as it is known that there will be future generations, we are obligated to consider their interests. The book has a helpful introduction by the editor which summarizes the position and arguments of each contributor.—M.G. (shrink)

As the crime rate rises and attempts to rehabilitate criminals prove unsuccessful, attacks upon recent reforms in our handling of crime increase. In this book van den Haag offers both a theory of punishment which supports traditional penal policies and factual data which show the failure of recent reforms. van den Haag claims that the main purpose of a legal system is to preserve order but that not every system that does this is acceptable. Along with preserving order, a legal (...) system should also be retributively just, i.e., punish those and only those who deserve it, because only such a system will gain public support. Although van den Haag does not present an original thesis on the moral justification of punishment, he covers many important issues in a lucid fashion, argues forcefully for his views, and presents some new arguments. In his discussion of our legal system’s exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, he argues that such evidence should be admissible in court since the misconduct of the police is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the police obtain evidence illegally, then they should be punished rather than society harmed by allowing the guilty to go free. In defending the death penalty, van den Haag contends that it is the opponents of the penalty’s effectiveness as a deterrent who have the burden of proof. Since, other things being equal, increasing the severity of the penalty decreases the incidence of various crimes, it must be assumed that the incidence of any crime can be decreased by increasing the severity of the punishment. Thus, without clear evidence to the contrary, the death penalty would have to be deemed likely to have a deterrent effect. The factual data presented by van den Haag is interesting and one recent experiment he discusses has produced particularly surprising results. This experiment on student cheating showed that the threat of punishment was effective in producing the desired behavior, but that exhortations to be honest were counterproductive.—M.G. (shrink)

Reinhard Löw, a young German philosopher who has written on the natural sciences and life, offers a critical exposition of Kant’s philosophy of organism that seeks at once to view the philosopher’s thinking in a new light and to contribute to present-day philosophy of organism in particular and nature in general. Löw offers his own historical and theoretical development of the issues and draws upon the insights of present-day thinkers on life, such as Jonas and Uexküll. Rejecting a causal-mechanical Erklären (...) in favor of a Verstehen of nature deriving from "the ends of life," Löw puts forward the concept of a Leib-Apriori within the broader notion of a psychophysical subjectivity as ground of a new teleological thinking. (shrink)

Although a number of anthologies on the philosophy of punishment have been published in recent years, the inclusion of a number of important but rarely reprinted articles makes this volume a valuable addition to the field. Included are such historically important figures as Plato, Thomas Hobbes, and St. Thomas Aquinas; such rarely included figures as G. B. Shaw, Samuel Butler and Karl Marx; the important but ignored Mill-Gilpin controversy on capital punishment; and the hitherto nearly inaccessible paper by Richard Wasserstrom, (...) "Why Punish the Guilty?" Along with these fresh selections are numerous influential, widely-reprinted classical and contemporary essays. The selections are grouped into five sections, the largest of which, constituting nearly half the text, deals with the justification of punishment. The various justificatory theories are classified as teleological, retributivist, and teleological retributivist. The latter theory, not clearly defined by the editor, is represented by W. D. Ross, H. L. A. Hart, J. D. Mabbott, and K. G. Armstrong, who relate the teleological and retributivist elements in their theories in quite different ways. A section entitled "Alternatives to Punishment" provides selections which question the justice of punishment, its deterrent effect and the success of our present penal system. The other sections deal with the strict liability issue, the concept of punishment and the death penalty. Although containing good selections, the sections dealing with the latter two topics, including four and three articles respectively, are quite short. There are long bibliographies for each section and an introductory article by Professor Ezorsky examining the various justifications offered for punishment and arguing for a teleological retributivist theory.—M.G. (shrink)

Religion and Morality seeks to answer two fundamental questions regarding the relation between religion and morality. The first is the puzzle posed by Socrates, the so-called ' Euthyphro dilemma', which asks: is morality valuable by virtue of its intrinsic importance and worth, or is morality valuable because, and only because, God approves it and commands us to follow its dictates? The second question is raised by Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling. He asks: Is a conflict between religion and morality possible? (...) Does God ever demand that we neglect our moral commitments? The discussion on these questions is divided into three parts. In the first two parts, we discuss the idea that morality depends on religion. The authors distinguish two types of dependence: strong dependence, according to which the very existence, or validity, of moral obligations depends on God's command, and weak dependence, according to which though morality itself is independent of God, God is necessary to enable human beings to know their moral duties and to carry them out. The authors reject the strong dependence thesis, as well as most versions of the weak dependence. The third part of the book discusses different versions of the view that religion might conflict with morality. The authors reject this view, and show that very few religious thinkers would follow it all the way through to its ultimate consequences. The book has implications for the philosophy of religion, in its emphasis on the centrality of the moral element in religion, and for moral philosophy, in its highlighting, among other things, of the nature of moral judgments. (shrink)

This volume, designed to bring together new analyses of moral skepticism, consists of papers by Professors William Frankena, Marcus Singer and Antony Flew and a long introduction by the editor which describes the central issues and discusses each of the papers. In his paper, "The Principles of Morality," Frankena contends that underlying many of our ordinary moral expressions is the implicit belief in an absolute moral action-guide, i.e., an action-guide which all those who are fully rational within the moral point (...) of view would acknowledge. Although Frankena does not discuss in this paper the crucial and perplexing problems of whether all those taking the moral point of view must accept the same principles and whether there is an irreducible plurality of moral points of view, he does discuss at length H. D. Aiken’s rejection of moral absolutism in favor of moral autonomy and the differences between his theory and R. Firth’s Ideal Observer Theory. In "Moral Skepticism," Singer carefully defines his topic and classifies its major variants, three of which—personal subjectivism, social subjectivism and emotivism—he criticizes in detail. Although Singer does not present new arguments against the various forms of moral skepticism, he provides the valuable service of organizing clearly and stating precisely the major difficulties. The concluding paper by Flew, "Must Morality Pay? or What Socrates Should Have Said to Thrasymachus," seems out of place in this collection since it neither defends an absolute position nor attacks a variety of skepticism. Flew argues that Socrates’ attempt to prove that the life of justice is always in one’s interest is misguided, since, in the real world, morality often demands that an individual sacrifice his good for the good of others. What Socrates should have argued, according to Flew, is that the choice of the moral life rather than the prudent one cannot be deemed to be either rational or irrational because for such a choice, the issue of rationality arises only in connection with the coherence of our plans and purposes or the internal consistency of our preferences.—M. G. (shrink)

This book examines some of the main problems involved in defining morality. Smith concedes that he cannot provide a fully satisfactory definition, but he believes that he can provide both a partial delimitation of the concept and a refutation of several related popular definitions. Since morality has a variety of meanings in ordinary usage, Smith offers a stipulative definition based on characteristics that he believes to be conceptually the most central. He states, "My focus will not be wholly arbitrary; I (...) will be guided partially by usage in the social sciences and partially by usage that is quite prevalent in good ordinary discourse." The stipulative definition that Smith offers in the first half of his book is of little value, however, because it places almost every code of conduct, including personal ethical egoism, within the sphere of morality. In the second half of the book, Smith attacks the view that reference to social harmony or welfare is necessary in any adequate definition of morality. After tracing the main reasons why morality is so often considered a device for promoting social welfare, Smith distinguishes several variants of the social welfare definition and presents a battery of clearly stated arguments against each. Even though Smith has provided only a partial analysis of the concept of morality, his clarification of the issues involved in formulating a satisfactory definition and his attack on the contention that morality is necessarily concerned with the welfare of others are useful.—M.G. (shrink)

An interesting book by a theoretical physicist. M. Mercier is on the whole a neo-platonist with his postulation that "Being" is fundamentally transcendent and infinite. The book also contains very illuminating insights on knowledge and the relation of knowledge to "Being."--M. G.

This short book is designed to introduce the reader to normative ethics and to argue that a modified version of Ross’s theory is the most defensible moral position. As an introductory text, it has the virtue of being entertainingly written and of providing analyses of such popular topics as sexual morality, racial discrimination, and the sanctity of life. In some sections, however, the material is presented so concisely that students will have difficulty understanding it. For example, the ten pages devoted (...) to explaining and refuting several variants of utilitarianism are insufficient to provide an adequate grasp of the issues. Despite its brevity and introductory character, the book provides some fresh arguments that should interest philosophers. One such argument is the defense of Revised Ranked Ross Rules, a position which the author contends is closest to our common moral convictions. This modification of Ross’s position ranks various rules in the order of their importance and, as a result, supposedly is a better moral guide than Ross’s non-ordered set of rules. One criticism often raised against Ross’s position, which seems equally appropriate to Purtill’s, is that the application of the rules requires intuitive moral appraisals; although Purtill’s rules have an initial ranking, no mechanical application of them is possible since an act called for by the highest ranked rule might not produce the most good. Purtill acknowledges that his initial ranking does not preclude the need to decide which rule should be followed in a particular situation, but he denies that this type of decision requires any form of intuition. In a discussion that should be developed in some future work, he claims that basic human wants and interests provide an objective basis for those decisions.—M.G. (shrink)

The views of three prominent eighteenth-century moral philosophers, Francis Hutcheson, Bishop Butler, and David Hume, are critically examined in this book. Professor Roberts believes that a careful analysis of these empiricist philosophers’ views can serve as a prolegomenon to an adequate understanding of benevolence. The nature of benevolence and its role in motivating moral actions was a crucial issue in eighteenth-century moral philosophy. Some philosophers who preceded Hutcheson denied that only feelings motivated actions; and others, who defended the efficacy of (...) feelings, claimed that, since benevolent actions ultimately derived from self-interested motives, morality rested on self-interest. Though differing on important points, Hutcheson and Hume both held that feelings motivate actions and that benevolence, not self-interest, is the source of morality. Because Butler’s position on these issues is unclear, Roberts presents the conflicting presentations of Butler’s major expositors along with his own interpretation. He argues that Butler, unlike Hutcheson and Hume, believed that the mere recognition of one’s duty could motivate one to do it. In discussing Hume, Roberts asserts that despite the oft-quoted statement that "reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions," Hume emphasizes the use of reason in the role that imagination plays in the operation of sympathy. In the concluding section, Roberts points out the similarities, weaknesses and metaphysical presuppositions of the three philosophers. This book is clearly written and presents a valuable analysis of both the difficulties and strengths in the eighteenth-century accounts of benevolence.—M.G. (shrink)

Professor Nathan’s goals in this short work are to describe the various senses of "just," to classify the ways in which the moral assessments of actions depend on conception of justice, to explain the logical and psychological factors which affect the popularity of various views of justice, and to explore the political implications of egalitarianism. He contends that there can be as many senses of "just" as there are standards which can be intelligibly used for deciding what makes one state (...) of affairs more valuable than another. For example, in deciding which punishment is appropriate for a crime, an indefinite number of criteria can be used, and, so, a punishment may be just in some senses and unjust in others. The moralist’s task is to establish the sense of justice that is proper to use in a given circumstance. Although Nathan does not defend any view of justice, he does criticize several historically important views. He contends that retributive or desert-dependent views of justice lead to inconsistent results or attach importance to emotionally irrelevant considerations. The final chapter distinguishes various egalitarian views and traces some of the implications of these views for a moral assessment of capitalism. An appendix, which was written prior to the publication of John Rawls’ recent influential book, provides a short analysis of Rawls’ theory of justice. Although Professor Nathan makes a number of valuable distinctions, his book is far too concise and would have benefited from the use of more examples and the elimination of some of his specially devised jargon.—M.G. (shrink)

This volume is the second part of the Gifford Lectures devoted to the topic, "The Phenomenon of Mind." Like the first part, entitled The Nature of Mind, this part consists of two papers by each of the four authors, discussions of each paper by the authors, and answers to questions from the audience. Since frequent references are made to papers published in the first part, this volume is best read after the prior one. The authors begin this part by acknowledging (...) their differing views about the meaning of the term "mind;" these views are that "mind" refers to the ability to speak and understand a natural language, rationality and moral autonomy, the ability to select and modify goals, and the ability to devise plans and carry out certain intellectual procedures. Because of their different views on the nature of mind, the papers in this volume, which are devoted to the development of mind in the individual and the species, tend to lack cohesion. Despite this lack, the papers raise a number of interesting points on such issues as the development of the mind in the process of evolution the significance of Chomsky’s views of language for our concept of mind, the difference between the computer’s capacities and man’s, and the significance of having a mind for certain theological views. The inclusion in the text of the discussion sessions following each paper and the sessions devoted entirely to answering questions from the audience is valuable because it helps the reader to recognize and focus upon those issues on which the authors disagree.—M.G. (shrink)

The papers in this collection, which were presented at the Third Conference of University Centers for Rational Alternatives, deal with the challenges to academic freedom resulting from the demand that universities take public stands on controversial social and political issues. The papers are grouped under three headings: "Objectivity and Indoctrination," "Ethics of Teaching," and "Ethics of Research." The first group of papers discusses the current trends toward the politicalization of the university and the use of the educational process to indoctrinate (...) rather than to seek and present the truth. The central issue in this discussion is whether teachers should temper their views to avoid clashes with society’s most cherished beliefs. Most of the contributors maintain that teachers can function effectively only if they pursue truth without compromise. The second group of papers deals with such disparate topics as the value of academic freedom, the need to have a detailed legal code for the university and the importance of teaching ethics in law schools. The main dispute in this section concerns the value of codifying the university’s common law. Robert Rosenzweig maintains that attempts at codification will waste large amounts of faculty time because the end product is unlikely to be sufficiently clear to avoid many of the disputes that would have arisen without the code. William Van Alstyne argues that attempts to codify a university’s rules might bring out latent differences of opinion that need to be confronted and, if possible, resolved. The papers in the third section consider whether any limitation should be placed on scientific research that could adversely affect the lives of individuals or groups. Most of the papers support the view that moral considerations limit what scientists should do in their search for knowledge. The papers in this collection, which are mostly three to six pages long, are too brief to allow detailed or probing analyses. Nonetheless, the arguments they contain, which deal with important, current issues, make some interesting and valuable points.—M.G. (shrink)

This work, originally published in 1952 and now given its first English translation, is based on Brentano’s notes for his lectures given at the University of Vienna from 1876 to 1894. Despite originating from notes, the book is clearly and forcefully written and develops Brentano’s views in an orderly, coherent manner. Although influencing such important philosophers as Edmund Husserl, Alexius Meinong and Nicolai Hartmann, Brentano’s ethical views have been generally ignored by British and American philosophers, a surprising fact in light (...) of the lavish praise they received from G. E. Moore. In reviewing a short collection of Brentano’s essays on ethics, The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, Moore said, "This is a far better discussion of the most fundamental principles of Ethics than any others with which I am acquainted.... In almost all points in which he differs from any of the great historical systems, he is right; and he differs with regard to the most fundamental points of Moral Philosophy. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this work.". (shrink)

Most present-day philosophers know William Paley primarily as a defender of the argument from design and the author of the famous watch analogy. Professor LeMahieu argues that Paley’s philosophical and theological writings deserve more than the scant attention they now receive. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Paley’s books were held in such high esteem that several were required reading by students at Oxford and Cambridge; the Evidences of Christianity was kept on the Cambridge University examination list until 1920. His (...) books were deemed important not only because they presented forceful arguments in a lucid style, but also because they presented a unified and comprehensive philosophy that embodied many of the main beliefs of the Enlightenment in England. The cornerstone of Paley’s philosophy was the contention that scientific reasoning, i.e., inductive and analogical arguments, could be used to demonstrate God’s existence and nature. In Natural Theology, Paley offered inductive arguments for God’s existence; and in Evidences of Christianity, arguments of the same type were used to support revealed religion. Paley’s argument in support of Christianity was directed primarily at refuting Hume’s contention that those who claimed to have seen the biblical miracles were unreliable witnesses. In Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Paley again relied on inductive arguments along with his inductive proofs of God’s existence and nature to support a utilitarian moral position. Although LeMahieu presents a full account of Paley’s philosophy and its influence on subsequent nineteenth century thinkers, he does not neglect to point out some of that philosophy’s questionable arguments and assumptions. Despite many possible deficiencies in his arguments, however, Paley is one of the ablest defenders of religion and, at times, a shrewd philosopher. By presenting a coherent statement of Paley’s philosophy, LeMahieu has performed a worthwhile task. His book should inspire other philosophers to examine carefully Paley’s neglected treatises.—M.G. (shrink)

In this book, Professor Ross attempts both to establish the compatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility and to explain the justificatory grounds for blame and punishment. Assuming that all actions have causal antecedents, he contends that traditional attempts to find a basis for ascribing responsibility to some men but not others is misguided. All men, regardless of the cause of their behavior, should be deemed responsible moral agents; and criteria should be developed for deciding which such agents should be (...) held accountable and condemned and which should be excused. Ross disposes of "the theoretical problem of the relationship between freedom and responsibility by holding everyone pervasively responsible without limit, but not necessarily censurable for those acts that are either too far beyond the agents capacities or entail too great a risk of an opposing value." The contention that all men are responsible leads Ross to deny the dictum that "ought implies can," since men can be responsible for acts they could not perform. The fact that one has failed to do what is objectively right, however, does not make condemnation obligatory. Decisions to condemn someone rests on his abilities to do the right act and the educational or social value of the condemnation. (shrink)

The five essays reprinted here from Philosophy and Public Affairs deal with some of the central issues involved in the debate about the morality of abortion. Over half the text consists of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s widely discussed "A Defense of Abortion," a criticism of her essay by John Finnis and Thomson’s reply to this criticism. In her controversial essay, Thomson argues that even if a fetus were a human being from the moment of conception, abortion would still be morally permissible (...) in many cases. Women, having the right to use their bodies as they choose, need not allow a fetus to use it. Although it needs a mother’s body, the fetus’ use of it depends upon the mother’s good will. In "Rights and Wrongs of Abortion," Finnis contends that Thomson ignores the morally significant difference between direct and indirect killing of the innocent; abortion involves the first type of killing but the examples Thomson uses in arguing her case involve only the latter. In "Rights and Deaths." Thomson argues that the distinction between direct and indirect killing does not make the moral difference that Finnis claims. She offers some fascinating examples where direct killing of the innocent seems as justifiable as indirect killing. (shrink)

Contemporary moral philosophers generally claim that there is both a moral and a nonmoral sense of such key terms as "ought" and "right." Professor Wertheimer attempts to disprove this claim as well as the significance of contemporary metaethical investigations by establishing that such terms, especially the modal auxiliary verb "ought," are univocal, and, as a result, that a proper understanding of them will reveal nothing about the nature of morality. Wertheimer defines "n ought to v" as a conjunction of the (...) following clauses: 1) There exists an adequate relevant System y; 2) there exists a property F such that "Fn" is true; and 3) according to y, F is such that if "Fn" is true, and C obtains then "nv" is true. A crucial point about this definition is that the truth of "ought" statements is always defended by an implicit reference to the existence of an adequate relevant system; "ought" statements in science are based on an adequate scientific system, moral "ought" statements on an adequate moral system. Thus, a decision about the truth of such statements is not a semantic issue, but one of assessing the adequacy of the system appealed to. This view of "ought" statements along with a similar one of other moral terms is the basis of Wertheimer’s provocative contention that metaethics, which has received the major share of moral philosophers’ attention in the twentieth century, is bound to be unproductive. (shrink)

This volume brings together eight essays on the morality of warfare that originally appeared in Philosophy and Public Affairs. The essays comprising Part I are primarily concerned with the kinds of restrictions on military action that are morally required. As a means of avoiding the unacceptable acts that he believes utilitarianism justifies, Thomas Nagel argues that various moral intuitions should be considered sacrosanct. Richard Brandt criticizes Nagel for defending on intuitive grounds views that do not at all appear self-evident and (...) for failing to explain the crucial distinction between what one does to people and what happens to people as a result of what one does. Brandt contends that although rule-utilitarianism, the position he defends, cannot eliminate the possibility of justifying such generally condemned acts as obliteration bombing, the theory would provide significant and proper restrictions on the actions of belligerents. R. M. Hare argues that the only way to salvage anything of Nagel’s absolutist position is to consider his intuitive principles as practical guides to action but not as principles which can never be overridden by other moral concerns. (shrink)