Membro do Centro de Estudos de Filosofia Patrística e Medieval de São Paulo, Attie Filho é estudioso da filosofia de língua árabe, dedicando-se especialmente à obra de Avicena, sobre a qual prepara sua tese de doutorado na Universidade de São Paulo. Em 'Falsafa - a filosofia entre os árabes', o autor apresenta - tanto para os estudiosos de filosofia quanto para o leitor culto de um modo geral - um panorama do período clássico da filosofia entre os árabes, a (...) partir do movimento de recepção e desenvolvimento da filosofia grega nas terras dominadas pelo Islão, entre os séculos VIII d.C e XIII d.C. Além disso, mostra também algumas características básicas do pensamento dos quatro pensadores de maior envergadura da falsafa - Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina e Ibn Rusd. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta uma tradução do prólogo da obra “Al-Sifa’”, escrita por Ibn Sina além de discutir elementos sobre a questão da alma e do intelecto. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Ibn Sina. Avicena. Filosofia árabe. Alma. Intelecto.

This article presents a translation of the prologue of the work “Al-Sifa’” written by Ibn Sina (980-1037.C.) and argues elements on the question of the soul and the intellect. KEY WORDS – Ibn Sina. Avicenna. Arabic Philosophy. Soul. Intellect.

Abordagens (etno)filosóficas no e do direito -- Criminologia, direito penal e direito internacional humanitário -- Educação em direitos humanos e fundamentais -- Hermanêutica jurídica e sistemas teóricos do conhecimento no direito -- Gênero na transversalidade no direito : epistemologias da marginalização do 'outro' não hegemônico.

Class, race and gender are three of the most salient factors in society. They determine to an important extent the opportunities we have, e.g. to access public.

Conversation, dialogue, reasonable disagreement, and the acquisition of knowledge through the words of others, all of this has always been at the center of philosophers’ concerns since the emergence of philosophy in Ancient Greece. It is also important to recognize that in contemporary philosophy, marked by the linguistic turn, there is a wealth of intellectual production on ethical, psycho-linguistic, logical-linguistic, and pragmatic aspects of the conversation. Despite all this, this is the first collection of texts dedicated exclusively to the strictly (...) epistemic aspects of this phenomenon which is so decisive for the very constitution of our humanity. This book brings together the contributions of fifteen leading philosophers on some of the most relevant issues of what we could call the Epistemology of Conversation. (shrink)

This article deals with two questions: why would the way in which the neopyrronicle conducts his philosophical activity be more virtuous than his dogmatic, non-pyrrhic colleague does? And why would the result he achieves be more valuable? That said, my answer to the first question is that the way the neo-Pyrrhonian investigates is more virtuous because it seeks to deliberately avoid the vices of precipitation, arrogance and mental closure. Regarding the second question, I suggest that the outcome of the neopyronic (...) investigation, whatever it may be (even if it is not the truth) is more valuable because of the way he conducts his investigation. (shrink)

When reasoning about dependence relations, philosophers often rely on gradualist assumptions, according to which abrupt changes in a phenomenon of interest can result only from abrupt changes in the low-level phenomena on which it depends. These assumptions, while strictly correct if the dependence relation in question can be expressed by continuous dynamical equations, should be handled with care: very often the descriptively relevant property of a dynamical system connecting high- and low-level phenomena is not its instantaneous behaviour but its stable (...) fixed points (those in the vicinity of which it spends most of the time, after comparatively short transitory periods), and stable fixed points can change abruptly as a result of infinitesimal changes of the low-level phenomenon. We illustrate this potential gradualist trap by showing that Chalmers’ fading qualia argument falls into it. (shrink)

This article intends to show that the defense of “understanding” as one of the major goals of science education can be grounded on an anti-reductionist perspective on testimony as a source of knowledge. To do so, we critically revisit the discussion between Harvey Siegel and Alvin Goldman about the goals of science education, especially where it involves arguments based on the epistemology of testimony. Subsequently, we come back to a discussion between Charbel N. El-Hani and Eduardo Mortimer, on the one (...) hand, and Michael Hoffmann, on the other, striving to strengthen the claim that rather than students’ belief change, understanding should have epistemic priority as a goal of science education. Based on these two lines of discussion, we conclude that the reliance on testimony as a source of knowledge is necessary to the development of a more large and comprehensive scientific understanding by science students. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss two recurring themes in Sosa’s work, reexamined in Judgment and Agency (SOSA, 2015) from a new angle, i.e. the place and importance of reflection in the cognitive economy of the epistemic agent, and epistemic value. Regarding the latter, Sosa suggests that knowing full well, which necessarily involves reflection, has value because it contributes to human flourishing. Although Sosa’s “new virtue epistemology” appears very promising in explaining different intuitions regarding epistemology and demonstrating that it is possible (...) to join reliabilist and responsibilist accounts of virtue epistemology, we believe that solving the value problem requires further clarification in order to truly explain the value of knowledge. (shrink)

Em analogia com outras discriminações, como o racismo ou o sexismo, o especismo é concebido como uma forma de discriminação moral com base na espécie. Em grande medida, a discussão contemporânea sobre a importância moral dos animais surgiu e desenvolveu-se em torno da crítica e da defesa do especismo. Este artigo oferece uma visão da discussão filosófica contemporânea sobre o especismo. Após uma breve introdução, apresenta-se uma definição de especismo e caracterizam-se vários tipos de especismo, sendo o Antropocentrismo o mais (...) relevante. Depois, expõe-se um argumento proeminente contra o Antropocentrismo: o argumento dos casos marginais. Por fim, algumas posições antropocêntricas são criticamente discutidas. (shrink)

The text deals with the concept of representation in its relation to the concept and sovereignty, in Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). The work studied is Leviathan, of 1651. The research presents that sovereignty is founded through the original legal act, which establishes an artificial person to represent everyone. This artificial thing is the State. The political society, however, is different from its government, although they are functionally the same.

v. 1. Propedêutica filosófia. v. 2. Ontognoseologia juridica.

This comic, serious inquiry into the nature of art takes its technical vocabulary from Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass. It is ridiculous to think of poems, paintings, or films as distinct from other things in the world, including people. Talking about art should be contiguous with talking about other relevant matters.

pt. 1. The form of the state : on beginnings -- pt. 2. Machiavelli's theory of history : modes of encounter between action and time -- pt. 3. The event of the republic : the return to beginnings.

Tyler Burge is famous for defending primitivist naturalism about mental representations, according to which mental representations are primitive natural states. Primitivist naturalism contrasts with semantic reductionism, according to which mental representations are reducible to more fundamental natural states. Burge developed the most compelling and influential attack on semantic reductionism from a primitivist naturalist point of view. My goal in this paper is to defend semantic reduc- tionism from Burge’s attack. I assess and refute his objection to the motivations for semantic (...) reductionism and his objection to the semantic reductionist theory that he takes to be the most promising one, namely, teleosemantics. I argue that in spite of the ingenuity of Burge’s objections, they fail to show that there is no motivation for taking representational states as reducible to more fundamental natural states or that the core thesis of teleosemantics is flawed. (shrink)

Inicialmente, considera-se como as possibilidades de relações entre a psicanálise e a filosofia de Peirce têm sido objeto de trabalhos de filósofos e psicanalistas. São destacadas as noções de Winnicott sobre os objetos e fenômenos transicionais e o brincar, como uma área de particular interesse para o estudo dessas relações, dadas suas ligações com a filosofia de Peirce. É, então, indicado como Winnicott faz referência às relações da simbolização com os objetos e fenômenos transicionais e indica como um “full understanding” (...) dos processos de simbolização podem contribuir para o conhecimento desses fenômenos. Considerando essa manifestação de Winnicott, é examinado de que modo a semiótica de Peirce contém elementos que auxiliam o entendimento do que é chamado de “simbolização”, por Winnicott. Assim,, também permitindo a discriminação dos aspectos semióticos presentes nos objetos e fenômenos transicionais e no brincar, permitindo, assim, uma ampliação de algumas dimensões da significação das concepções de Winnicott. As questões referidas são examinadas amplamente nos casos clínicos de “Edmund” e “Diana”, citados por Winnicott e em outras duas situações clínicas apresentadas pelo autor. (shrink)

A presente obra trata, de forma inigualável, das preliminares ao estudo da teoria tridimensional do direito, examinando a Filosofia e a Ciência do Direito, as dimensões da experiência jurídica, a posição do tridimensionalismo jurídico concreto, a dialética de complementaridade, o personalismo e o historicismo axiológico, as estruturas e os modelos do Direito no processo cultural e a visão integral do mundo jurídico.

This article discusses the notion of rationality and agency in Fernando Broncano's Racionalidad, Acción y Opacidad (2017). In this book, contradicting the apriorist normative theses or simple naturalistic descriptivism, Broncano argues that rationality is something that is directly associated with our ordinary practices of evaluating the judgments, actions and decisions of others. “Rationality” should be considered as a term we use as an intellectual qualifier or as a virtue we bestow on people who can make theoretical and practical decisions autonomously. (...) Thus, rationality would not be an a priori condition for someone to become a person or a capacity to eliminate the turbulence of human cognitive and moral precariousness, but a form of involvement in the world that positively qualifies the organism that relates thought and action, judgment and choice in the search for lucidity in an uncertain world. With this, rationality and agency would be products of the social interdependence that one has in relation to the other, since we learn it and teach it in the context of natural life. This article is organized in three sections: in the first section I make a very brief presentation of one of the aspects of the problem that has motivated the philosophical discussion on rationality and agency; in the second section, I present my understanding of the themes developed in Racionalidad, Acción y Opacidad, their internal structure and, of course, their central thesis; in the third section, I specifically discuss the theme that the normativity of rationality arises from our dialectical encounter with other people and make personal considerations on the value and scope of the arguments constructed in this book. (shrink)

Explaining agency is a significant challenge for those who are interested in the sciences of the mind, and non-representationalists are no exception to this. Even though both ecological psychologists and enactivists agree that agency is to be explained by focusing on the relation between the organism and the environment, they have approached it by focusing on different aspects of the organism-environment relation. In this paper, I offer a suggestion for a radical embodied account of agency that combines ecological psychology with (...) recent trends in enactive cognitive science. According to this proposal, while enactivism focuses primarily on describing how our acquired sensorimotor schemes and habits mutually equilibrate, affecting our tendency to act upon some affordances instead of others, ecological psychology focuses on studying how perceptual information contributes to the actualization of the sensorimotor schemes and habits without mediating representations, inferences, and computations. The paper concludes by briefly exploring how this ecological-enactive theory of agency can account for how socio-cultural norms shape human agency. (shrink)

En Los Cuatro Acuerdos, un éxito de ventas en todo el mundo, don Miguel Ruiz revelaba cómo el proceso de educación, o «domesticación», nos hace olvidar nuestra sabiduría innata. A lo largo de la vida establecemos muchos acuerdos que van en nuestra contra y nos causan un sufrimiento innecesario. Los Cuatro Acuerdos nos ayudan a romper estos acuerdos limitadores y a substituirlos por otros que nos aportan libertad, felicidad y amor. Ahora don Miguel Ruiz, junto con su hijo (...) don Jose Ruiz, nos ofrece una nueva perspectiva de Los Cuatro Acuerdos y un acuerdo nuevo y poderoso para transformar nuestra vida en nuestro cielo personal: el quinto acuerdo. El Quinto Acuerdo nos permite adquirir una conciencia más profunda del poder del yo verdadero y recuperar la autenticidad con la que nacimos. En esta absorbente continuación del libro que ha cambiado la vida de millones de personas de todo el mundo, se nos recuerda el mejor regalo que podemos hacernos: la libertad de ser quienes realmente somos. Más sobre el libro Imagínate llevando una vida totalmente nueva: una vida en la que eres libre de ser quien realmente eres. Ya no te riges por lo que los demás piensan de ti. Imagínate viviendo sin juzgarte a ti mismo ni juzgar a los demás, sin temer ser juzgado. Te aceptas tal como eres y aceptas a los demás tal como son. Imagínate viviendo sin estar en conflicto contigo ni con la gente. Te respetas a ti mismo y a los demás, y a cambio ellos te respetan a ti. Imagínate viviendo sin miedo a expresarte ni a explorar la vida. Vives sin temor, sin culparte, sin avergonzarte, sin arrepentirte. Imagínate que te encanta ser como eres. Te gusta tu cuerpo tal como es, te gustan tus emociones tal como son. Imagínate siendo tú mismo. Eres feliz y disfrutas verdaderamente de tu vida. ¡Imagínate viviendo con esta clase de libertad personal! Esta manera de vivir es completamente posible. Otros lo han conseguido y tú también lo harás. Sólo necesitas hacer de los Cinco Acuerdos tu estilo de vida y pronto vivirás tu sueño personal del cielo. (shrink)

Representations are not only used in our folk-psychological explanations of behaviour, but are also fruitfully postulated, for example, in cognitive science. The mainstream view in cognitive science maintains that our mind is a representational system. This popular view requires an understanding of the nature of the entities they are postulating. Teleosemantic theories face this challenge, unpacking the normativity in the relation of representation by appealing to the teleological function of the representing state. It has been argued that, if intentionality is (...) to be explained in teleological terms, then the function of a state cannot depend on its phylogenetical history, given the metaphysical possibility of a duplicate of an intentional being that lacks an evolutionary history. In this paper, I present a method to produce, according to our current knowledge in genetic engineering, human-like individuals who are not the product of natural selection in the required sense. This variation will be used to shed light on the main replies that have been offered in the literature to the Swampman thought experiment. I argue that these replies are not satisfactory: representations should better not depend on natural selection. I conclude that a non-etiological notion of function is to be preferred for characterizing the relation of representation. (shrink)

Este texto pretende desenvolver a tese de que o principal interlocutor de Sócrates em A República, Glauco, irmão de Platão, revela qualidades semelhantes àquelas que serão exigidas dos guardiões e do futuro filósofo e governante da cidade construída na argumentação de Sócrates e seus interlocutores. Procura-se mostrar que isso pode ser encontrado em diversos momentos do diálogo. Pretende-se também extrair algumas consequências para a própria compreensão desse diálogo e da filosofia platônica como um todo.

Normal 0 21 This text develops some philosophical analyses on the complex and rich relationship between skepticism and dogmatism, and has as its starting point Plínio Smith's view expressed in his paper "Dogmatic Skepticism and Dogmatism without Dogmas", which critically discussed some texts I wrote on that subject. My main aim he re is to reconsider a problem noted by him in his paper, and, based on this, to advance some new ideas for a critical position on skepticism.

Presents advice on how to gain personal freedom by following the wisdom of the Toltecs.

The traditional approach in cognitive sciences holds that cognition is a matter of manipulating abstract symbols followingcertain rules. According to this view, the body is merely an input/output device, which allows the computationalsystem—the brain—to acquire new input data by means of the senses and to act in the environment following its com-mands. In opposition to this classical view, defenders of embodied cognition (EC) stress the relevance of the body inwhich the cognitive agent is embedded in their explanation of cognitive processes. (...) From a representationalist frameworkregarding our conscious experience, in this article, I will offer a novel argument in favor of EC and show that cognitionconstitutively—and no merely causally—depends upon body activity beyond that in the brain. In particular, I will arguethat in order to solve the problem derived from the empirical evidence in favor of the possibility of shifted spectrum,representationalist should endorse the view that experiences concern its subject: the content of experience isde se.Ishow that this claim perfectly matches the phenomenological observation and helps explaining the subjective characterof the experience. Furthermore, I argue that entertaining this kind of representation constitutively depends on bodilyactivity. Consequently, insofar as cognition depends on consciousness, it is embodied. (shrink)

The well-known distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness has moved away from the conceptual domain into the empirical one, and the debate now is focused on whether the neural mechanisms of cognitive access are constitutive of the neural correlate of phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I want to analyze the consequences that a negative reply to this question has for the cognitive phenomenology thesis – roughly the claim that there is a “proprietary” phenomenology of thoughts. If the mechanisms responsible (...) for cognitive access can be disentangled from the mechanisms that give rise to phenomenology in the case of perception and emotion, then the same disentanglement is to be expected in the case of thoughts. This, in turn, presents, as I argue, a challenge to the cognitive phenomenology thesis: either there are thoughts with cognitive phenomenology we lack cognitive access to or there are good reasons to doubt that there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenology. I discuss a... (shrink)

Une théorie qui veut établir les principes d'une science du droit, mais dont les fondements épistémologiques remontent aux premières années du XXe siècle, peut-elle garder sa validité de nos jours ?

Neste artigo pretendo discutir o tema do conhecimento como um problema filosófico no pensamento de Ludwig Feuerbach, tomando por fundamento as formulações desenvolvidas pelo pensador no escrito Princípios da filosofia do futuro. Nele comparece o interesse de Feuerbach por estabelecer a importância de uma filosofia cuja base é a realidade concreta e o reconhecimento da sensibilidade, a que nomeia “nova filosofia”. Por discutir a importância da concretude material para tematização do conhecimento, Feuerbach pressupõe a admissão de certa concepção ontológica, de (...) modo que foi preciso passar por uma breve demarcação da ontologia materialista da qual a nova filosofia parte. (shrink)

Despite the emergence of computer games as a dominant cultural industry, we know little or nothing about the ethics of computer games. Considerations of the morality of computer games seldom go beyond intermittent portrayals of them in the mass media as training devices for teenage serial killers. In this first scholarly exploration of the subject, Miguel Sicart addresses broader issues about the ethics of games, the ethics of playing the games, and the ethical responsibilities of game designers. He argues (...) that computer games are ethical objects, that computer game players are ethical agents, and that the ethics of computer games should be seen as a complex network of responsibilities and moral duties. Players should not be considered passive amoral creatures; they reflect, relate, and create with ethical minds. The games they play are ethical systems, with rules that create gameworlds with values at play. Drawing on concepts from philosophy and game studies, Sicart proposes a framework for analyzing the ethics of computer games as both designed objects and player experiences. After presenting his core theoretical arguments and offering a general theory for understanding computer game ethics, Sicart offers case studies examining single-player games, multiplayer games, and online gameworlds from an ethical perspective. He explores issues raised by unethical content in computer games and its possible effect on players and offers a synthesis of design theory and ethics that could be used as both analytical tool and inspiration in the creation of ethical gameplay. (shrink)