Cultural similarities and differences in facial expressions have been a controversial issue in the field of facial communications. A key step in addressing the debate regarding the cultural dependency of emotional expression is to characterize the visual features of specific facial expressions in individual cultures. Here we developed an image analysis framework for this purpose using convolutional neural networks that through training learned visual features critical for classification. We analyzed photographs of facial expressions derived from two databases, each developed in (...) a different country, in which corresponding emotion labels were available. While the CNNs reached high rates of correct results that were far above chance after training with each database, they showed many misclassifications when they analyzed faces from the database that was not used for training. These results suggest that facial features useful for classifying facial expressions differed between the databases. The selectivity of computational units in the CNNs to action units of the face varied across the facial expressions. Importantly, the AU selectivity often differed drastically between the CNNs trained with the different databases. Similarity and dissimilarity of these tuning profiles partly explained the pattern of misclassifications, suggesting that the AUs are important for characterizing the facial features and differ between the two countries. The AU tuning profiles, especially those reduced by principal component analysis, are compact summaries useful for comparisons across different databases, and thus might advance our understanding of universality vs. specificity of facial expressions across cultures. (shrink)

The present century has seen renewed interest in characterizing cognition, the object of inquiry of the cognitive sciences. In this paper, I describe the problem of cognition—the absence of a positive characterization of cognition despite a felt need for one. It is widely recognized that the problem is motivated by decades of controversy among cognitive scientists over foundational questions, such as whether non-neural parts of the body or environment can realize cognitive processes, or whether plants and microbes have cognitive processes. (...) The dominant strategy for addressing the problem of cognition is to seek a dichotomous criterion that vindicates some set of controversial claims. However, I argue that the problem of cognition is also motivated by ongoing conceptual development in cognitive science, and I describe four benefits that a characterization of cognition could confer. Given these benefits, I recommend an alternative criterion of success, ecumenical extensional adequacy, on which the aim is to describe the variation in expert judgments rather than to correct this variation by taking sides in sectarian disputes. I argue that if we had an ecumenical solution to the problem of cognition, we would have achieved much of what we should want from a “mark of the cognitive”. (shrink)

Cognitive science is unusual in that cognitive scientists have dramatic disagreements about the extension of their object of study, cognition. This paper defends a novel analysis of the scientific concept of cognition: that cognition is the sensitive management of an agent’s behavior. This analysis is “modular,” so that its extension varies depending on how one interprets certain of its constituent terms. I argue that these variations correspond to extant disagreements between cognitive scientists. This correspondence is evidence that the proposed analysis (...) models the contemporary understanding of cognition among scientists, without artificially resolving questions that are currently considered open. (shrink)

20世紀後半アメリカを中心にしたラディカル・エコロジーの成果と、西田幾多郎・和辻哲郎の思想の比較検証を通して、仏教的な自然・環境観が明示する“今日的意義”を提起した労作。.

Cognitive science has been beset for thirty years by foundational disputes about the nature and extension of cognition—e.g. whether cognition is necessarily representational, whether cognitive processes extend outside the brain or body, and whether plants or microbes have them. Whereas previous philosophical work aimed to settle these disputes, I aim to understand what conception of cognition scientists could share given that they disagree so fundamentally. To this end, I develop a number of variations on traditional conceptual explication, and defend a (...) novel explication of cognition called the sensitive management hypothesis. -/- Since expert judgments about the extension of “cognition” vary so much, I argue that there is value in explication that accurately models the variance in judgments rather than taking sides or treating that variance as noise. I say of explications that accomplish this that they are ecumenically extensionally adequate. Thus, rather than adjudicating whether, say, plants can have cognitive processes like humans, an ecumenically adequate explication should classify these cases differently: human cognitive processes as paradigmatically cognitive, and plant processes as controversially cognitive. -/- I achieve ecumenical adequacy by articulating conceptual explications with parameters, or terms that can be assigned a number of distinct interpretations based on the background commitments of participants in a discourse. For example, an explication might require that cognition cause “behavior,” and imply that plant processes are cognitive or not depending on whether anything plants do can be considered “behavior.” Parameterization provides a unified treatment of embattled concepts by isolating topics of disagreement in a small number of parameters. -/- I incorporate these innovations into an account on which cognition is the “sensitive management of organismal behavior.” The sensitive management hypothesis is ecumenically extensionally adequate, accurately classifying a broad variety of cases as paradigmatically or controversially cognitive phenomena. I also describe an extremely permissive version of the sensitive management hypothesis, arguing that it has the potential to explain several features of cognitive scientific discourse, including various facts about the way cognitive scientists ascribe representations to cognitive systems. (shrink)

The term ‘functionalism’ is usually heard in connection with the philosophy of mind or cognition. The functionalism of Wilfrid Sellars, however, is in the first instance as response to the worries about the metaphysics not of mental states, but of meaning. Only late in his career did Sellars explore the possibility of extending his functionalism into an account of cognition. It has been suggested, though, that Sellars’ extension of his functionalist theory into subpersonal territory is not successful. In particular, there (...) is a worry abroad that in order to be a functionalist about cognitive states, Sellars must succumb to a special form of the Myth of the Given. In this essay I will review and elucidate what I take to be the structure of Sellars’ functionalism, defending it from this worry. I will suggest a resolution of some apparent textual contradictions based in part on the chronology of Sellars’ writing, with the assumption that later writings express Sellars’ more nuanced views. -/- Draft of 2009. (shrink)

Examining the notion of wavefunction collapse (WFC) in quantum measurements, which came again to be in question in the recent debate on the quantum Zeno effect, we remark that WFC is realized only through decoherence among branch waves by detection, after a spectral decomposition process from an initial object wavefunction to a superposition of branch waves corresponding to relevant measurement propositions. We improve the definition of the decoherence parameter, so as to be fitted to general cases, by which we can (...) quantitatively estimate the degree of WFC given by detectors. Finally, we briefly discuss whether two special detector models, with very huge and very small degrees of freedom, can provoke WFC. (shrink)

The many-Hilbert-spaces approach to the measurement problem in quantum mechanics is reviewed, and the notion of wave function collapse by measurement is formulated as a dephasing process between the two branch waves of an interfering particle. Following the approach originally proposed in Ref. 1, we introduce a “decoherence parameter,” which yields aquantitative description of the degree of coherence between the two branch waves of an interfering particle. By discussing the difference between the wave function collapse and the orthogonality of the (...) apparatus' wave functions, we analyze critically two proposals, recently appeared in the literature, (2, 3) and argue that neither one describes a dephasing process. We conclude that the concept of “wave function collapse,” according to the conventional Copenhagen interpretation, is to be replaced by that of a statisticallydefined dephasing process. (shrink)

The many-Hilbert-spaces theory of quantum measurements, which was originally proposed by S. Machida and the present author, is reviewed and developed. Dividing a typical quantum measurement in two successive steps, the first being responsible for spectral decomposition and the second for detection, we point out that the wave packet reduction by measurement takes place at the latter step, through interaction of an object system with one of the local systems of detectors. First we discuss the physics of the detection process, (...) using numerical simulations for a simple detector model, and then formulate a general theory of quantum measurements to give the wave packet reduction in an explicit form as a sort of phase transition. The derivation is based on the macroscopic nature of the local system, to be represented in a continuous direct sum of many Hilbert spaces, and on the finite-size effect of the local system, to give phase shifts proportional to size parameters. We give a definite criterion for examining any instrument as to whether it works well as a detector or not. Finally, we compare the present theory with famous measurement theories and propose a possible experimental test to discriminate it from others. A few solvable detector models are also discussed. (shrink)

I draw attention to an ambiguity of the expression ‘phenomenal consciousness’ that is an avoidable yet persistent source of conceptual confusion among consciousness scientists. The ambiguity is between what I call phenomenality and what I call conscious states, where the former denotes an abstract property and the latter denotes a phenomenon or class of its instances. Since sentences featuring these two terms have different semantic properties, it is possible to equivocate over the term ‘consciousness’. It is also possible to fail (...) to distinguish between statements that are true about conscious states in virtue of their phenomenality, and statements that are true in virtue of other properties of conscious states. I review empirically informed arguments by scientists Bernard Balleine and Anthony Dickinson, Stevan Harnad, and Jeffrey Alan Gray, arguing that each of them makes errors based on the ambiguity. I conclude with some tentative suggestions for avoiding further confusion about the ambiguity. (shrink)

Microaggressions are hypothesized to play a causal role in undesirable population effects such as racial health gaps, but the mechanisms through which this occurs are not yet well understood. I call inquiry about these mechanisms the “explanatory project.” I suggest that the explanatory project has been hindered by microaggression concepts tailored to be applicable under conditions of lived uncertainty, rather than to facilitate understanding of structural causes. I defend a pluralist, structural account of microaggressions from arguments by Regina Rini that, (...) while appropriate for ethical projects, do not apply to the explanatory project. (shrink)

Microaggressions are, roughly, acts or states of affairs that express prejudice or neglect toward members of oppressed groups in relatively subtle ways. There is an apparent consensus among both proponents and critics of the microaggression concept that microaggressions are “subjective.” We examine what subjectivity amounts to in this context and argue against this consensus. We distinguish between microaggressions as an explanatory posit and microaggressions as a hermeneutical tool, arguing that in either case there is no reason at present to regard (...) microaggressions as subjective and that microaggressions in the hermeneutical sense should be regarded as objective. (shrink)

The Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC) holds that that not all human cognition is realized inside the head. The related but distinct Hypothesis of Extended Mentality (HEM) holds that not all human mental items are realized inside the head. Clark & Chalmers distinguish between these hypotheses in their original treatment of cognitive extension, yet these two claims are often confused. I distinguish between functionalist theories on which functional roles are individuated according to computational criteria, and those on which functional roles (...) are individuated according to rational criteria. I then present an argument for a modest version of HEC from computational functionalism, based on Clark & Chalmers’ original argument. In doing so I articulate a successor to their parity principle, and review studies by Wayne Gray et al. that provide plausible evidence for actual cognitive extension. I then respond to a new criticism of HEC by Mark Sprevak using the modest account I have developed, arguing that Sprevak conflates HEC and HEM. (shrink)

Functionalism is widely regarded as the central doctrine in the philosophy of cognitive science, and is invoked by philosophers of cognitive science to settle disputes over methodology and other puzzles. I describe a recent dispute over extended cognition in which many commentators appeal to functionalism. I then raise an objection to functionalism as it figures in this dispute, targeting the assumption that generality and abstraction are tightly correlated. Finally, I argue that the new mechanist framework offers more realistic resources for (...) understanding cognitive science, and hence is a better source of appeal for resolving disagreement in philosophy of science. (shrink)

Many philosophers worry that cognitive scientists apply the concept REPRESENTATION too liberally. For example, William Ramsey argues that scientists often ascribe natural representations according to the “receptor notion,” a causal account with absurd consequences. I rehabilitate the receptor notion by augmenting it with a background condition: that natural representations are ascribed only to systems construed as organisms. This Organism-Receptor account rationalizes our existing conceptual practice, including the fact that scientists in fact reject Ramsey’s absurd consequences. The Organism-Receptor account raises some (...) worrying questions, but as a more faithful characterization of scientific practice it is a better guide to conceptual reform. (shrink)

We define and investigate a uniformly locally o-minimal structure of the second kind in this paper. All uniformly locally o-minimal structures of the second kind have local monotonicity, which is a local version of monotonicity theorem of o-minimal structures. We also demonstrate a local definable cell decomposition theorem for definably complete uniformly locally o-minimal structures of the second kind. We define dimension of a definable set and investigate its basic properties when the given structure is a locally o-minimal structure which (...) admits local definable cell decomposition. (shrink)

Consider a definably complete uniformly locally o-minimal expansion of the second kind of a densely linearly ordered abelian group. Let $f:X \rightarrow R^n$ be a definable map, where X is a definable set and R is the universe of the structure. We demonstrate the inequality $\dim ) \leq \dim $ in this paper. As a corollary, we get that the set of the points at which f is discontinuous is of dimension smaller than $\dim $. We also show that the (...) structure is definably Baire in the course of the proof of the inequality. (shrink)

Although dual-process or divided-mind models of self-control dominate the literature, they suffer from empirical and conceptual challenges. We propose an alternative approach, suggesting that self-control can be characterized by a fragmented part versus integrated whole dynamic. Whereas responses to events derived from fragmented parts of the mind undermine self-control, responses to events derived from integrated wholes enhance self-control. We review empirical evidence from psychology and related disciplines that support this model. We, moreover, discuss the implications of this work for psychology, (...) neuroscience, economics, and philosophy. In particular, we highlight how this model addresses many of the conceptual and empirical short-comings of divided-mind models. We suggest that understanding self-control as the interplay between fragmented parts versus integrated wholes, moreover, provides novel insights and testable new hypotheses. (shrink)

We consider locally o-minimal structures possessing tame topological properties shared by models of DCTC and uniformly locally o-minimal expansions of the second kind of densely linearly ordered abelian groups. We derive basic properties of dimension of a set definable in the structures including the addition property, which is the dimension equality for definable maps whose fibers are equi-dimensional. A decomposition theorem into quasi-special submanifolds is also demonstrated.

The laser chaos decision maker has been demonstrated to enable ultra-high-speed solutions of multiarmed bandit problems or decision-making in the GHz order. However, the underlying mechanisms are not well understood. In this paper, we analyze the chaotic dynamics inherent in experimentally observed laser chaos time series via surrogate data and further accelerate the decision-making performance via parameter optimization. We first evaluate the negative autocorrelation in a chaotic time series and its impact on decision-making detail. Then, we analyze the decision-making ability (...) using three different surrogate chaos time series to examine the underlying mechanism. We clarify that the negative autocorrelation of laser chaos improves decision-making and that the amplitude distribution of the original laser chaos time series is not optimal. Hence, we introduce a new parameter for adjusting the amplitude distribution of the laser chaos to enhance the decision-making performance. This study provides a new insight into exploiting the supremacy of chaotic dynamics in artificially constructed intelligent systems. (shrink)

We first show that the projection image of a discrete definable set is again discrete for an arbitrary definably complete locally o‐minimal structure. This fact together with the results in a previous paper implies a tame dimension theory and a decomposition theorem into good‐shaped definable subsets called quasi‐special submanifolds. Using this fact, we investigate definably complete locally o‐minimal expansions of ordered groups when the restriction of multiplication to an arbitrary bounded open box is definable. Similarly to o‐minimal expansions of ordered (...) fields, Łojasiewicz's inequality, Tietze's extension theorem and affiness of pseudo‐definable spaces hold true for such structures under the extra assumption that the domains of definition and the pseudo‐definable spaces are definably compact. Here, a pseudo‐definable space is a topological space having finite definable atlases. We also demonstrate Michael's selection theorem for definable set‐valued functions with definably compact domains of definition. (shrink)

If no property of a system of many particles discriminates among the particles, they are said to be indistinguishable. This indistinguishability is equivalent to the requirement that the many-particle distribution function and all of the dynamic functions for the system be symmetric. The indistinguishability defined in terms of the discrete symmetry of many-particle functions cannot change in the continuous classical statistical limit in which the number density n and the reciprocal temperature β become small. Thus, microscopic particles like electrons must (...) remain indistinguishable in the classical statistical limit although their behavior can be calculated as if they move following the classical laws of motion. In the classical mechanical limit in which quantum cells of volume (2πħ)3 are reduced to points in the phase space, the partition functionTr{exp(−βĤ) for N identical bosons (fermions) approaches (2πħ)−3N(N!) ∫ ... ∫ d3r1 d3p1 ... d3rN d3pN exp(−βH). The two factors, (2πħ)−3N and (N!)−1, which are often added in anad hoc manner in many books on statistical mechanics, are thus derived from the first principles. The criterion of the classical statistical approximation is that the thermal de Broglie wavelength be much shorter than the interparticle distance irrespective of any translation-invariant interparticle interaction. A new derivation of the Maxwell velocity distribution from Boltzmann's principle is given with the assumption of indistinguishable classical particles. (shrink)

This paper gives new confluence proofs for several lambda calculi with permutation-like reduction, including lambda calculi corresponding to intuitionistic and classical natural deduction with disjunction and permutative conversions, and a lambda calculus with explicit substitutions. For lambda calculi with permutative conversion, naïve parallel reduction technique does not work, and traditional notion of residuals is required as Ando pointed out. This paper shows that the difficulties can be avoided by extending the technique proposed by Dehornoy and van Oostrom, called the Z (...) theorem: existence of a mapping on terms with the Z property concludes the confluence. Since it is still hard to directly define a mapping with the Z property for the lambda calculi with permutative conversions, this paper extends the Z theorem to compositional functions, called compositional Z, and shows that we can adopt it to the calculi. (shrink)

Dans 'les Deux sources de la morale et de la religion', Bergson évoque rarement le Japon. Et pourtant dans le quatrième chapitre du même texte, intitulé Remarques finales 'Mécanique et mystique', c'était lui qui a bien prévu Hiroshima avec ces mots testamentaires: ' Il faut que tous se battent contre tous, comme firent les hordes des premiers temps. Seulement on se bat avec les armes forgées par notre civilisation, et les massacres sont d'une horreur que les anciens n'auraient même pas (...) imaginée. Au train dont va la science, le jour approche où l'un des adversaires, possesseur d'un secret qu'il tenait en réserve, aura le moyen de supprimer l'autre'. Ainsi se pose la question de savoir comment envisager les Deux Sources, à travers les relations assez particulières de ce philosophe avec le Japon. À partir de cette interrogation, PBJ (Projet Bergson au Japon) a organisé, aux 5-8 novembre 2013, à Paris, un colloque qui s'intitule Remarques finales : autour des Deux sources de la morale et de la religion de Bergson. Le présent volume présente les actes de ce colloque ellipsoïdal dont les centres étaient Bergson et le Japon"--Back cover. (shrink)

The provability problem in intuitionistic propositional second-order logic with existential quantifier and implication (∃,→) is proved to be undecidable in presence of free type variables (constants). This contrasts with the result that inutitionistic propositional second-order logic with existential quantifier, conjunction and negation is decidable.