The alleged for-me-ness or mineness of conscious experience has been the topic of considerable debate in recent phenomenology and philosophy of mind. By considering a series of objections to the notion of for-me-ness, or to a properly robust construal of it, this paper attempts to clarify to what the notion is committed and to what it is not committed. This exercise results in the emergence of a relatively determinate and textured portrayal of for-me-ness as the authors conceive (...) of it. (shrink)

In recent debates on phenomenal consciousness, a distinction is sometimes made, after Levine (2001) and Kriegel (2009), between the “qualitative character” of an experience, i.e. the specific way it feels to the subject (e.g. blueish or sweetish or pleasant), and its “subjective character”, i.e. the fact that there is anything at all that it feels like to her. I argue that much discussion of subjective character is affected by a conflation between three different notions. I start by disentangling the three (...) notions in question, under the labels of “for-me-ness”, “me-ness” and “mineness”. Next, I argue that these notions are not equivalent; in particular, there is no conceptual implication from for-me-ness to me-ishness or mineness. Empirical considerations based on clinical cases additionally suggest that the three notions may also correspond to different properties (although the claim of conceptual non-equivalence does not depend on this further point). The aim is clarificatory, cautionary but also critical: I examine four existing arguments from subjective character that are fuelled by an undifferentiated use of the three notions, and find them to be flawed for this reason. (shrink)

It’s a familiar fact that there is something it is like to see red, eat chocolate or feel pain. More recently philosophers have insisted that in addition to this objectual phenomenology there is something it is like for me to eat chocolate, and this for-me-ness is no less there than the chocolatishness. Recognizing this subjective feature of consciousness helps shape certain theories of consciousness, introspection and the self. Though it does this heavy philosophical work, and it is supposed to (...) be relatively obvious to anyone who introspects, it is rather difficult to see just what this phenomenal me-ness is supposed to be; indeed, many philosophers deny it exists. In this paper we try to provide a clear sense of what phenomenal me-ness involves, and then then consider some arguments for the existence of phenomenal me-ness experience as well as some accounts of what gives rise to it. In the end, we argue that the plausible senses of me-ness are a good deal thinner than what often seems to be claimed. (shrink)

Recent work on consciousness has distinguished between the qualitative character of an experience (what a particular experience is like) and its subjective character or subjectivity (the for-me-ness of any experience). It is often suggested that subjectivity is a characteristic inner awareness subjects enjoy of their own occurrent experiences. A number of thinkers have also suggested that not only is each subject aware of her own experiences, but that in having these experiences she is aware of them as her own. (...) This is the subjectivity-mineness thesis: necessarily, an experience which is given to its subject is given as the subject’s own experience. I shall argue against the subjectivity-mineness thesis. While I agree that experiences are characterised by inner awareness, it is questionable whether inner awareness entails an awareness of my experiences as mine. I shall offer an alternative account of inner awareness, the impersonal account. On this account the subject of the experience is not presented in the content of inner awareness, but the mode of inner awareness is such that necessarily, this awareness is an awareness of experiences which belong to this subject. This is what makes inner awareness a characteristically first-personal form of awareness. (shrink)

The theology of the (Hebrew) Bible, as set out in the Torah’s foundational parts, answers the question “What am I?” not the question “Why is there a world?” So the principle that the Bible’s deity, God, represents, the principle of a category of being not recognized in the pagan thinking whose basic elements Greek philosophy systematizes, first enters “In the day that . . . the Lord God formed [the] man,” not “In the beginning when God created the heavens and (...) the earth.” The admonition to place God first doesn’t therefore exclude the impersonal principles of being with which the other gods are associated, only denies their adequacy to making sense of your being and of mine, of his being and of hers. (shrink)

Runaway social selection resulting from partner choice may have shaped aspects of human cooperation and complex sociality that are otherwise hard to account for. Social selection is the subtype of natural selection that results from the social behaviors of other individuals. Competition to be chosen as a social partner can, like competition to be chosen as a mate, result in runaway selection that shapes extreme traits. People prefer partners who display valuable resources and bestow them selectively on close partners. The (...) resulting phenotypic covariance between displays and preferences gives fitness advantages to both, creating runaway selection that could shape a whole suite of prosocial traits including altruism, moral capacities, empathy, and theory of mind. Even though they give a net fitness benefit, traits at the endpoint of runaway social selection can have substantial deleterious effects on other traits such as viability, ability to accumulate resources, or vulnerability to mental disorders. Social selection forces arising from self-interested partner choices may be an invisible hand that shaped capacities for commitment, altruism, and other prosocial capacities of the human social brain. (shrink)

Nurses who attend patients with psychiatric disorders often encounter ethical dilemmas and experience difficulties in making the right decision. The present study aimed to evaluate the decisions of psychiatric nurses regarding their duty to warn third parties about the dangerousness of the patient, the need for compulsory hospitalization, and the competence of patients. In total, 111 nurses working in the field of psychiatry in Turkey completed a questionnaire form consisting of 33 questions. The nurses generally assessed the decision-making competency of (...) the patient correctly. However, their decisions regarding whether the patient should be compulsorily hospitalized and their understanding of their duty to warn/protect were less consistent. A significant relationship was found between the decisions of the psychiatric nurses and their work experience, them having children, and them having postgraduate education in psychiatric nursing. The nurses stated their desire to be part of the team that decided on ethical problems in psychiatry. (shrink)

Emotions can be explained as specialized states, shaped by natural selection, that increase fitness in specific situations. The physiological, psychological, and behavioral characteristics of a specific emotion can be analyzed as possible design features that increase the ability to cope with the threats and opportunities present in the corresponding situation. This approach to understanding the evolutionary functions of emotions is illustrated by the correspondence between (a) the subtypes of fear and the different kinds of threat; (b) the attributes of happiness (...) and sadness and the changes that would be advantageous in propitious and unpropitious situations; and (c) the social emotions and the adaptive challenges of reciprocity relationships. In addition to addressing a core theoretical problem shared by evolutionary and cognitive psychology, explicit formulations of the evolutionary functions of specific emotions are of practical importance for understanding and treating emotional disorders. (shrink)

Early Childhood and Neuroscience is a practical guide to understanding the complex and challenging subject of neuroscience and its use (and misapplication) in early childhood policy and practice. The 2nd edition has been updated throughout and includes three new chapters on: - the effects of childhood trauma - school readiness - neurodiversity It also includes a new Foreword by Laura Jana (Penn State University, USA). The book provides a balanced overview of the debates by weaving discussion on the opportunities of (...) using neuroscience in early childhood practice with examination of the limitations and ethical implications throughout the chapters. This enables students to inform their own opinions about the discipline and its use in their future practice. Clear explanations of the main terms and theories are complemented with illustrative case studies of cutting-edge research from around the world, a glossary of key terms and suggestions for further reading. Reflective discussion questions give students the chance to apply their theoretical knowledge to real-world contexts. (shrink)

Having a good grasp of theories of child development and what these look like in practice, can make a positive difference to how you understand babies and children and the ways in which they learn. This guide offers easy access to a wide range of concepts, as well as traditional and current theories, of how babies and children learn. Each chapter offers clear guidance on how to recognise the theory in action within the setting and suggests ways to test these (...) ideas out in early years' settings, supporting the development of reflective practice. Case studies are included throughout, along with questions to guide thinking and encourage readers to develop their practice. Summaries conclude each chapter offering a quick reference of the theory examined and the benefits of applying it to practice. An essential guide for those looking to develop their practice in supporting child development within the Early Years. (shrink)

This article develops a detailed, empirically driven analysis of the nature of the transition costs incurred in becoming disabled. Our analysis of the complex nature of these costs supports the claim that it can be wrong to cause disability, even if disability is just one way of being different. We also argue that close attention to the nature of transition costs gives us reason to doubt that well-being, including transitory impacts on well-being, is the only thing that should determine the (...) wrongness of causing or removing disability. Non-welfare considerations also defeat the claim that it is always wrong to cause disability. The upshot of these conclusions is that closer attention to the nature of transition costs supports disabled people who strenuously contest the assumption that their well-being is lower than nondisabled people. It also suggests that, in addition, disabled people should contest their opponents’ narrow account of how we should make ethical decisions regarding causing or failing to prevent disability. (shrink)

The Human Genome Project showed that there is signifcant genetic variation within the population. Current research is accumulating large databases that may reveal genetic variations associated with disease or health risks, even if not intended as part of the study design. These incidental fnd-ings create legal, ethical, and fnancial challenges for researchers. Current federal and international guidelines are not adequate. Plans for dealing with incidental fndings need to be established in the study design and reviewed and approved by the Institutional (...) Review Board. (shrink)

Medical practice is poised to incorporate genomescale testing into treatment decisions. However, broad genome testing in laboratories may lead to discoveries not anticipated, yet highly significant to the health of the patient. Understanding the complexity of our genome and its relationship to our health is an overwhelming task. Currently, much of the effort to unravel this complexity is in the realm of research. However, researchers are often neither qualified nor prepared to deal with incidental findings of genetic abnormalities that influence (...) health and disease. These incidental observations, referred to recently by Issac Kohane et al. as the “incidentalome,” may lead to complex legal, ethical, and financial problems that may seriously complicate the role of the research community in medical genomics. Currently, most genetics researchers, while aware of the potential for incidental findings, simply do not want to deal with them. (shrink)

Recent studies indicate that the processing of an unexpected word is costly when the initial, disconfirmed prediction was strong. This penalty was suggested to stem from commitment to the strongly predicted word, requiring its inhibition when disconfirmed. Additional studies show that comprehenders rationally adapt their predictions in different situations. In the current study, we hypothesized that since the disconfirmation of strong predictions incurs costs, it would also trigger adaptation mechanisms influencing the processing of subsequent strong predictions. In two experiments, participants (...) made speeded congruency judgments on two-word phrases in which the first word was either highly constraining or not. We manipulated the proportion of disconfirmed predictions in highly constraining contexts between participants. The results provide additional evidence of the costs associated with the disconfirmation of strong predictions. Moreover, they show a reduction in these costs when participants experience a high proportion of disconfirmed strong predictions throughout the experiment, indicating that participants adjust the strength of their predictions when strong prediction is discouraged. We formulate a Bayesian adaptation model whereby prediction failure cost is weighted by the participant’s belief about the likelihood of encountering the expected word, and show that it accounts for the trial-by-trial data. (shrink)

An established ethical principle of biomedical research involving human subjects stipulates that risk to subjects should be proportionate to an experiment’s potential benefits. Sometimes this principle is imprecisely stated as a requirement that ‘risks and benefits’ be balanced. First, it is noted why this language is imprecise. Second, the persistence of such language is attributed to how it functions as a rhetorical trope. Finally, an argument is made that such a trope is infelicitous because it may not achieve its intended (...) persuasive purposes. More importantly, it should be avoided because it masks the important role that chance plays in clinical research. Risk is the possibility of harm. As a precondition of harm it is unintended and undesirable in projects of biomedical research. It requires ethical vigilance. As a vehicle of chance, however, it is both intended and desirable. It requires methodological appreciation. (shrink)

During the mid-1970s the extraordinarily dangerous style of free solo climbing emerged in the collective practice of a small community of “Stonemaster” climbers actively developing new climbing routes and the new “free” style of roped climbing in what is now Joshua Tree National Park, California. While its emergence might be interpreted as an affectively-driven, macho embodied social semiotic or ethnomotricity, in actuality the evolution of free soloing in the case of Stonemaster-era climbing at Joshua Tree may be more accurately understood (...) as the logical consequence of an intensive regime of practice in which climbers developed a near absolute bodily familiarity with certain climbing routes. Eventually, the reasonableness of climbing with little and even no protection on a subset of these routes became self-evident and conventional. Free soloing, in the semiotic perspective of the later Peirce, manifested as a Normal Logical Interpretant in the Joshua Tree landscape. It embodied the living definition of self-controlled conduct, and the Symbols it cultivated testified persuasively to the growth of a creative corporeal intelligence actualizing near absolute degrees of free will. (shrink)

Most attempts to craft a definition of disease seem to have tackled two tasks simultaneously: 1) trying to create a series of inclusion and exclusion criteria that correspond to medical usage of the word disease and 2) using this definition to understand the essence of what disease is. The first task has been somewhat accomplished, but cannot reach closure because the concept of “disease” is based on a prototype, not a logical category. The second task cannot be accomplished by deduction, (...) but only by understanding how the body works and what each component is for, in evolutionary detail. An evolutionary view of the origins of the body and its vulnerabilities that result in disease provides an objective foundation for recognizing pathology. Our social definition of disease will remain contentious, however, because values vary, and because the label “disease” changes judgments about the moral status of people with various conditions, and their rights to medical and social resources. (shrink)

The first ever description of how evolutionary principles can be applied to questions of health and sickness.

My initial task in this essay is to identify precisely the original philosophical import of philosophical renections about religion. Next I outline their changing natures and interrelations in the works of exemplary figures from the history of Western religious thought. Finally I argue that the relative desuetude of the traditional forms of apology and speculalion is emblemalic of the present faring of philosophy as a form of cultural discourse.

My initial task in this essay is to identify precisely the original philosophical import of philosophical renections about religion. Next I outline their changing natures and interrelations in the works of exemplary figures from the history of Western religious thought. Finally I argue that the relative desuetude of the traditional forms of apology and speculalion is emblemalic of the present faring of philosophy as a form of cultural discourse.

Some philosophers argue that a commitment to religious pluralism precludes the affirmation and encouragement of religious conversions on the grounds that decisions to convert are rationally unwarranted and, thus, their encouragement is ethically suspect. I challenge this view; furthermore, I contend that a proper understanding of religious conversion from a Christian and pluralistic point of view requires instead the identification of pluralism’s multiple meanings, i.e., as a descriptive category, a philosophical position, and an ideological construct.

Some philosophers argue that a commitment to religious pluralism precludes the affirmation and encouragement of religious conversions on the grounds that decisions to convert are rationally unwarranted and, thus, their encouragement is ethically suspect. I challenge this view; furthermore, I contend that a proper understanding of religious conversion from a Christian and pluralistic point of view requires instead the identification of pluralism’s multiple meanings, i.e., as a descriptive category, a philosophical position, and an ideological construct.

Nurses who attend patients with psychiatric disorders often encounter ethical dilemmas and experience difficulties in making the right decision. The present study aimed to evaluate the decisions of psychiatric nurses regarding their duty to warn third parties about the dangerousness of the patient, the need for compulsory hospitalization, and the competence of patients. In total, 111 nurses working in the field of psychiatry in Turkey completed a questionnaire form consisting of 33 questions. The nurses generally assessed the decision-making competency of (...) the patient correctly. However, their decisions regarding whether the patient should be compulsorily hospitalized and their understanding of their duty to warn/protect were less consistent. A significant relationship was found between the decisions of the psychiatric nurses and their work experience, them having children, and them having postgraduate education in psychiatric nursing. The nurses stated their desire to be part of the team that decided on ethical problems in psychiatry. (shrink)

Progress in emotions research requires understanding why debate about the general nature of emotions remains intractable. Much confusion arises from proposals that offer one of the four different kinds of biological explanation, without recognizing the need for other three. More arises from tacitly thinking of emotions as products of design, when they are actually organically complex products of natural selection. Finally, debate persists because of categorizing emotions by functions, instead of recognizing that each emotion was shaped by the adaptive challenges (...) posed by a recurring situation. No general explanation of the kind usually sought for emotions exists, however progress is possible if we study emotions as organically complex partially differentiated constellations of changes that have been useful in certain situations. (shrink)

This paper proposes an agent community based information retrieval method, which uses agent communities to manage and look up information related to users. An agent works as a delegate of its user and searches for information that the user wants by communicating with other agents. The communication between agents is carried out in a peer-to-peer computing architecture. In order to retrieve information related to a user query, an agent uses two histories : a query/retrieved document history(Q/RDH) and a query/sender agent (...) history(Q/SAH). The former is a list of pairs of a query and retrieved documents, where the queries were sent by the agent itself. The latter is a list of pairs of a query and sender agents and shows ``who sent what query to the agent''. This is useful to find a new information source. Making use of the Q/SAH is expected to cause a collaborative filtering effect, which gradually creates virtual agent communities, where agents with the same interests stay together. Our hypothesis is that a virtual agent community reduces communication loads to perform a search. As an agent receives more queries, then more links to new knowledge are achieved. From this behavior, a ``give and take''(or positive feedback) effect for agents seems to emerge. We implemented this method with Multi-Agents Kodama which has been developed in our laboratory, and conducted preliminary experiments to test the hypothesis. The empirical results showed that the method was much more efficient than a naive method employing 'broadcast' techniques only to look up a target agent. (shrink)