This introduction to the philosophy of science includes six chapters, each taking up a single problem—though the last four constitute something of a package: three attempts to establish Schlesinger’s criterion of confirmability, four applies it to non-confirmable sentences in such a way as to provide an alternative to the Wittgensteinian "received view" about the meaningless of self-referring sentences; in the process Schlesinger defends a version of neo-verificationism which, in five and six, he attempts to show is nontrivial by applying it (...) to the discussion of the nature of time and of determinism. To complete the list, chapter two discusses confirmation and parsimony ; and chapter one is introductory, discussing Niced’s criterion and Hempel’s paradox in terms of "the most simple type of generalization... ‘All ravens are black'... found mainly in elementary science or commonsense, prescientific reasoning". (shrink)

This is a collection of twenty-four articles evenly divided among five topical areas: skepticism, sensory perception, memory, self-knowledge, and the foundations of empirical knowledge. With the exception of an article by Meinong, all the selections belong to the twentieth century and, except for four other articles, to the past thirty years. The selections in each of the five parts compliment one another in content and are arranged chronologically. For example, the section entitled "Contemporary Skepticism" begins with Leonard Nelson’s "The Impossibility (...) of the ‘Theory of Knowledge'," moves into Moore’s early criticism and Lehrer’s recent defense of skepticism, examines Quine’s attempt to convert epistemology into psychology, and concludes with Rozeboom’s "Why I Know So Much More Than You Do." A similar format is followed in each of the other four sections. Many of the selections have never before appeared in an anthology. For example, the valuable Reichenbach-Goodman-Lewis 1952 debate on phenomenalism and the foundations of knowledge appears in its entirety. (shrink)

Lehrer examines the conditions traditionally held to be necessary and jointly sufficient for warranting empirical knowledge claims. Chapter 1 is a summary of some of the current literature regarding knowledge claims and whether knowledge is synonymous with true justified belief. Chapters 2 and 3 respectively deal with the truth and belief conditions, with Lehrer adopting a modified version of the semantic theory. He also briefly discusses, then rejects, the correspondence theory, noting the usual problems concerning "correspondence" and "fact." He also (...) rejects the identification of a theory of truth with a theory of justification, given that justification for Lehrer is no guarantee of truth and that a justified belief may be causally independent of evidence. This is in sharp contrast with the instrumentalist definition of truth as warranted assertability. Unfortunately, there is no discussion of the pragmatic theory of truth in this book. Chapters 4-6 examine and reject the Foundation Theory, according to which there is a set of self-evident or basic statements which constitute the foundation for justifying all non-basic or inferential statements. (shrink)

The position taken in this book is that built into every epistemology is a theory concerning the origins of knowledge and the relation between cognition, perception, and action ; accordingly, the basic issues of epistemology are resolvable by the psychological/scientific study of these cognitive and perceptual processes ; such studies show the empirical inadequacy of some theories of knowledge and the validity of others. In support of Piaget refers to his many familiar studies on the conservation principle, causality, transitivity, and (...) so on. Given such studies, phenomenalism is rejected because it presupposes that sensory experience and cognitive activity are sharply distinguishable levels or stages in the knowledge process. An experimental or genetic epistemology can therefore adjudicate between rival theories of knowledge given that epistemological issues are in fact empirical issues in disguise. (shrink)

Since Doob rules out philosophical puzzles as to the nature of time, its absolute or relative character, or its universality and direction, etc., this masterful work will be of only limited interest to philosophers, even those who specialize in problems of space and time. Patterning of Time is, however, a fascinating study from the perspective of a psychologist or anthropologist. Doob, whose overwhelming knowledge has been gained as much from the library as from laboratory and field research, ranges over a (...) vast area, both in terms of literature surveyed and in terms of the variety of aspects of time perception studied. He spells out his principal thesis this way: "My principal thesis now emerges, it is hoped: we experience in the psychological present, even as we recollect the past and anticipate the future; and at any given moment, and sometimes over long periods, we renounce one of these activities as a result of one or both of the other two orientations. Temporal judgments which perforce occur in the psychological present are patterned by beliefs and attitudes which are recollected from the past and which affect future anticipations. We are always—or almost always—confronted with choices in time, and to choose we must renounce.". (shrink)

What MacKinnon offers here is a provocative and original analysis of the meaning of the word "true." His applications are in the areas of statements in general, scientific theories, and theological propositions. One reason for the interest of the book can be found in MacKinnon’s intellectual odyssey. Setting out from a starting-point of standard neo-scholastic textbook philosophy and theology, MacKinnon has come to a highly personal synthesis to which he is willing at least tentatively to apply the label, "ontological pragmatism." (...) Stages along the way—and elements in the synthesis—include Bernard Lonergan’s transcendental Thomism, Wilfrid Sellars’ neo-Kantian version of analytical epistemology, and much detailed work of MacKinnon’s own in analytical philosophy of science. The provocative character of Truth and Expression is likely to bring criticism of the author for misuse of his sources. Wittgensteinian philosophical therapists are likely to bemoan MacKinnon’s relapse into ontologism, even if he qualifies it as a "pragmatic" version. Sellars is likely to object to being lumped with Lonergan, and the latter would probably be upset with the uses to which his former student has put his insights. It may also be worthwhile here to express a demur or two with respect to MacKinnon’s use of his Thomistic sources, e.g., concerning his theory of meaning. It seems that MacKinnon has accepted too naively what might best be called "textbook Thomism." It is true that Aquinas offers a mentalist view, and true also that both Aristotle and Aquinas speak of words as signs of concepts. While this can give rise to a private-language mentalism of the kind Wittgenstein would criticize, it must be recalled that Aristotle and Aquinas were writing not only before Wittgenstein but also before Kant. Whatever can be said of Aquinas’ "mentalism," it is certainly true that in other contexts Aquinas has a social theory of learning that is, at least on the surface, incompatible with a private language theory. Again, with respect to theological truth it seems likely that MacKinnon has been misled by Thomistic manuals, at least when he claims that what Aquinas offers is "a geometrically ordered deductive system" in which "the primacy of Jesus as a revelation of God does not fit." Historical studies of the function of his Summa Theologiae in Aquinas’ scheme for theological education do not support the view of Aquinas as a theological deductive system builder. Nor is it true, as MacKinnon seems to hold, that Aquinas’ view of theological truth is more Aristotelian than biblical. Aside from these qualifications on his use of sources, MacKinnon’s book offers an abundance of critical thinking, analytical insight, and systematic ability. For instance, the reader interested in MacKinnon’s original approach to an adequate epistemology of science will here, in chapter three of Truth and Expression, find the best summary yet of his many contributions in that area. Whether or not, in the last analysis, MacKinnon’s synthesis will be historically significant remains to be seen. What seems likely now is that if it does, the ingredient elements of Lonergen, [[sic]] Sellars, Wittgenstein, Quine, etc., will be more muted, and MacKinnon’s own synthesis will stand on its own. Meanwhile, Truth and Expression will serve as the best guide, pointing in the direction we can expect MacKinnon to follow in the future.—P. T. D. (shrink)

A collection of eighteen essays by leading contemporary philosophers concerning the nature and function of philosophy in today’s world. These essays represent Ordinary Language Philosophy, Existentialism, Marxism, Idealism, Pragmatism, the Philosophy of Science, the History of Philosophy, and Philosophical Anarchism. With the exception of six papers, all were expressly written for this volume.