R.I.G. Hughes presents a series of eight philosophical essays on the theoretical practices of physics. The first two essays examine these practices as they appear in physicists' treatises (e.g. Newton's Principia and Opticks ) and journal articles (by Einstein, Bohm and Pines, Aharonov and Bohm). By treating these publications as texts, Hughes casts the philosopher of science in the role of critic. This premise guides the following 6 essays which deal with various concerns of philosophy of physics such as laws, (...) disunities, models and representation, computer simulation, explanation, and the discourse of physics. (shrink)

In this chapter, we examine a few potential problems when inquiring into the ethics of medieval Christian and Islamic mystical traditions: First, there are terminological and methodological worries about defining mysticism and doing comparative philosophy in general. Second, assuming that the Divine represents the highest Good in such traditions, and given the apophaticism on the part of many mystics in both religions, there is a question of whether or not such traditions can provide a coherent theory of value. Finally, the (...) antinomian tendencies and emphasis on passivity of some mystics might lead one to wonder whether their prescriptive exhortations can constitute a coherent theory of right action. We tackle each of these concerns in turn and discuss how they might be addressed, in an attempt to show how medieval mysticism, as a fundamentally practical enterprise, deserves more attention from practical and moral philosophy than it has thus far received. (shrink)

R.I.G Hughes offers the first detailed and accessible analysis of the Hilbert-space models used in quantum theory and explains why they are so successful.

We have discussed some of the activities in the field of medical ethics that have been carried out in our country within recent years.

The Nature of God explores a perennial problem in the philosophy of religion.

The growing potential of biomedical technologies has increasingly been associated with discussions surrounding the ethical aspects of the new technologies in different societies. Advances in genetics, stem cell research and organ transplantation are some of the medical issues that have raised important ethical and social issues. Special attention has been paid towards moral ethics in Islam and medical and religious professions in Iran have voiced the requirement for an emphasis on ethics. In the last decade, great strides have been made (...) in biomedical ethics, especially in the field of education, research and legislation. In this article, contemporary medical ethics in Iran, and the related moral philosophy, have been reviewed in brief and we have discussed some of the activities in the field of medical ethics that have been carried out in our country within recent years. These activities have included the establishment of the National and Regional Committees for Medical Research Ethics and the production of national codes of ethics in biomedical research in the 1990s and the introduction of a comprehensive strategic plan for medical ethics at the national level in 2002. This paper will discuss these issues, along with the production, in 2005, of the Specific National Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research. (shrink)

Recent advances in life-sustaining treatments and technologies, have given rise to newly-emerged, critical and sometimes, controversial questions regarding different aspects of end-of-life decision-making and care. Since religious values are among the most influential factors in these decisions, the present study aimed to examine the Islamic scholars' views on end-of-life care. A structured interview based on six main questions on ethical decision-making in end-of-life care was conducted with eight Shiite experts in Islamic studies, and was analyzed through deductive content analysis. Analysis (...) revealed certain points in Islamic views on the definition of death and the persons making decisions about end-of-life care. According to the participants, in addition to conventional criteria such as absence of heartbeat and respiration, the irreversible cessation of human voluntary acts are considered to be the criteria in establishing death. The participants also recognized physicians as the main authorities in verifying signs of death. Furthermore, it was emphasized that life preservation and continuation of care must be sensible, and the patient can request not to have death-prolonging procedures started or continued. In the view of participants, patient's autonomy cannot be the sole basis for all measures, but Islamic ethical and jurisprudential principles should be relied upon to make correct and sensible decisions whether to continue or stop terminal patients' care. Final decisions should be made by a team of experts, and physicians must be at the center of such a team. Finally, we suggest that a guideline in keeping with Islamic norms on human life and death, purpose of life, God's will, boundaries of man's authority, and the physician's ethical duties and obligations should be developed. (shrink)

Cognitive science is an inter-disciplinary approach that applies a set of methods to study the cognitive structures and faculties in human being’s life. These methods pursue the cognitive structures that are needed - in the light of this approach - to represent and acquire the religious concepts and the actions that institutionalize these structures. These goals are pursued through the process of change and evolution that supernatural concepts had been undergone during the historical life of mankind and also during the (...) growth of any individual. In this paper cognitive science of religion is introduced with a general report of cognitive science and considering its philosophical bases and then tries to give an broad outlook to its approach to religion through its sub-disciplines, depending on the role of each of them in constructing the cognitive science of religion; cognitive anthropology and cognitive psychology have the most importance here, comparing to the rest like cognitive neuroscience. Cognitive Science, Cognitive Anthropology of Religion, Cognitive Psychology of Religion, Philosophy of Cognitive Science. (shrink)

In this first paperback edition, a new introduction by Tom Burke establishes the ongoing importance of Sleeper's analysis of the integrity of Dewey's work and ...

This book is not a study of Plato's philosophy, but a contribution to the literary interpretation of the dialogues, through analysis of their formal structure, ...

Many philosophers believe that there is a causal condition on perception, and that this condition is a conceptual truth about perception. A highly influential argument for this claim is based on intuitive responses to Gricean style thought experiments. Do the folk share the intuitions of philosophers? Roberts et al. (2016) presented participants with two kinds of cases: Blocker cases (similar to Grice’s case involving a mirror and a pillar) and Non-Blocker cases (similar to Grice’s case involving a clock and brain (...) stimulation). They found that a substantial minority agreed that seeing occurs in the Non-Blocker cases, and that in the Blocker cases significantly less agreed that seeing occurs. They thus hypothesized that folk intuitions better align with a no blocker condition than with a causal condition. This paper continues this line of enquiry with two new experiments. The paper investigates the generality and robustness of Roberts et al.’s findings by expanding the sense modalities tested from only vision to audition and olfaction as well. The paper also uses Gricean style thought experiments as a case study for investigating the “reflection defense” against the negative project in experimental philosophy. Our results replicate and extend Roberts et al.’s study and support their hypothesis that folk intuitions better align with a no blocker condition. They also provide an empirical reason to doubt the reflection defense. (shrink)

The author demonstrates that certain forms of irrationality - incontinent action and self-deception - which many philosophers have rejected as being logically or psychologically impossible, are indeed possible.

While it might seem prima facie plausible that divine foreknowledge is all that is needed for prophecy, this seems incorrect. To issue a prophecy, God hasto know not just how someone will act, but how someone would act were the prophecy issued. This makes some think that Middle Knowledge is required.I argue that Thomas Flint’s two Middle Knowledge based accounts of prophecy are unsatisfactory, but one of them can be repaired. However the resources needed for repair also yield a sketch (...) of a foreknowledge-only account of prophecy. (shrink)

Determining what has gone wrong in a malfunctioning body and proposing an effective treatment requires expertise. Since antiquity, philosophers and doctors have wondered what sort of knowledge this expertise involves, and whether and how it can warrant its conclusions. Few people were as qualified to deal with these questions as Galen of Pergamum. A practising doctor with a keen interest in logic and natural science, he devoted much of his enormous literary output to the task of putting medicine on firm (...) methodological grounds. At the same time he reflected on philosophical issues entailed by this project, such as the nature of experience, its relation to reason, the criteria of truth, and the methods of justification. This volume explores Galen's contributions to epistemology, as they arise in the specific inquiries and polemics of his works, as well as their legacy in the Islamic world. (shrink)

The Hellenistic philosophers and schools of philosophy are emerging from the shadow of Plato and Aristotle and are increasingly studied for their intrinsic philosophical value. They are not only interesting in their own right, but also form the intellectual background of the late Roman Republic. This study gives a comprehensive and readable account of the principal doctrines of the Stoics, Epicureans and various sceptical traditions from the death of Alexander the Great in 323 B.C. to around 200 A.D. Discussions are (...) arranged topically in order to address underlying issues and to make clear what the different schools have in common and how they differ. At the same time the coherence of each system as a whole is emphasized. (shrink)

In this paper, aspects of observable and non-observable based models are discussed. A survey of recent literature was done to show how using non-observable-based language carelessly may cause disagreement, even in professional research programs and incorrect assertions, even in prestigious journals. The relation between physical measurements and observables is discussed and it is shown that, in contrast to general belief, this relation may be complicated and not always straightforward. The decomposition of the system into basic subsystems (physical or conceptual) is (...) traced as the origin of non-observable-based languages. The possibility of defining new quantum mechanical observables for open quantum subsystems and of replacing them with non-observable-based concepts has been mentioned and the AIM theory is explained as an example. An account of some current non-observable-based models for molecular geometry is discussed and it is shown that not all non-observable-based languages possess the same effectiveness. In the end, the need to develop a clear chemical language is stressed. (shrink)

The renowned philosopher John Searle reveals the fundamental nature of social reality. What kinds of things are money, property, governments, nations, marriages, cocktail parties, and football games? Searle explains the key role played by language in the creation, constitution, and maintenance of social reality. We make statements about social facts that are completely objective, for example: Barack Obama is President of the United States, the piece of paper in my hand is a twenty-dollar bill, I got married in London, etc. (...) And yet these facts only exist because we think they exist. How is it possible that we can have factual objective knowledge of a reality that is created by subjective opinions? This is part of a much larger question: How can we give an account of ourselves, with our peculiar human traits DS mind, reason, freedom, society - in a world that we know independently consists of mindless, meaningless particles? How can we account for our social and mental existence in a realm of brute physical facts? In answering this question, Searle avoids postulating different realms of being, a mental and a physical, or worse yet, a mental, a physical, and a social. There is just one reality: Searle shows how the human reality fits into that one reality. Mind, language, and civilization are natural products of the basic facts of the physical world described by physics, chemistry and biology. Searle explains how language creates and maintains the elaborate structures of human social institutions. These institutions serve to create and distribute power relations that are pervasive and often invisible. These power relations motivate human actions in a way that provides the glue that holds human civilization together. Searle shows how this account illuminates human rationality, free will, political power, and human rights. Our social world is a world created and maintained by language. (shrink)

R. G. Swinburne; XIII*—Personal Identity, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 74, Issue 1, 1 June 1974, Pages 231–247, https://doi.org/10.1093/arist.

Shoemaker (1996) presenteda prioriarguments against the possibility of ‘self‐blindness’, or the inability of someone, otherwise intelligent and possessed of mental concepts, to introspect any of her concurrent attitude states. Ironically enough, this seems to be a position that Gopnik (1993) and Carruthers (2006, 2008, 2009a,b) have proposed as not only possible, but as the actual human condition generally! According to this ‘Objectivist’ view, supposed introspection of one's attitudes is not ‘direct’, but an ‘inference’ of precisely the sort we make about (...) the attitudes of others, an inference that has the advantage in our own case ofonlyour own sensory data and memories, our behavior, and of the context we are in; i.e. we are all substantially self‐ blind. After sorting out a number of methodological and verbal issues, I argue, first, that thea prioriarguments against Objectivism don't succeed, and that Gopnik and Carruthers are right to regard the issue as an empirical one. On the other hand, I think they seriously underestimate the difficulty of establishing Objectivism. It is unlikely there is an inferential procedure from the data of pure sensation, behavior and context to the relevant self‐attributions that would be as spectacularly reliable as people manifestly seem to be. Moreover, there is a simpler model: the mind very likely consists of a panoply of sub‐routines some of whose outputs are ‘tagged’ for their having been so processed, rather in the way that software ‘documents’ are on standard computers. Introspection plausibly consists in a person's simply attending to distinctive constellations of these tags, even though they may lack phenomenal feels. This draws attention to an important independent fact: that much of phenomenology (or ‘what it's like’ to be in a certain state) may be constituted by facts that are not phenomenal. (shrink)

"The philosophy of mind is unique among contemporary philosophical subjects," writes John Searle, "in that all of the most famous and influential theories are false." In Mind, Searle dismantles these famous and influential theories as he presents a vividly written, comprehensive introduction to the mind. Here readers will find one of the world's most eminent thinkers shedding light on the central concern of modern philosophy. Searle begins with a look at the twelve problems of philosophy of mind--which he calls "Descartes (...) and Other Disasters"--problems which he returns to throughout the volume, as he illuminates such topics as the freedom of the will, the actual operation of mental causation, the nature and functioning of the unconscious, the analysis of perception, and the concept of the self. One of the key chapters is on the mind-body problem, which Searle analyzes brilliantly. He argues that all forms of consciousness--from feeling thirsty to wondering how to translate Mallarme--are caused by the behavior of neurons and are realized in the brain system, which is itself composed of neurons. But this does not mean that consciousness is nothing but neuronal behavior. The main point of having the concept of consciousness, Searle points out, is to capture the first person subjective features of the phenomenon and this point is lost if we redefine consciousness in third person objective terms. Described as a "dragonslayer by temperament," John Searle offers here a refreshingly direct and open discussion of philosophy, one that skewers accepted wisdom even as it offers striking new insights into the nature of consciousness and the mind. (shrink)

Opstellen eerder verschenen in het Nederlands Tijdschrift voor rechtsfilosofie en rechtstheorie en in andere periodieken.