The book by professor Stanisław Kowalczyk, renowned scholar in the field of social philosophy, is, without doubt, one of the most important studies on the idea of freedom. The concept of freedom is as old as mankind. It has many meanings and has been interpreted in many different ways. For instance, we also have the word „liberty," which means „freedom or right" and is synonymous with the word freedom, which means „the condition of being free." The author indicates that (...) in our times the notion of freedom is most frequently used; however, it is often misused or deceptive. Mass media and people of all walks of life talk of liberty; everyone talks of freedom and, for many, it is the highest value. Longing for freedom is rooted in the heart of every human being, for freedom is an existential correlate and the fulfilment of the rational human being. The semantic confusion about the notion of freedom leads to many misuses of the concept. Personalism, as a philosophical concept in which a person stands in the centre of all discussion, serves as a framework for the author's delineation on the concept of freedom. He further states that the appropriate understanding of this value is possible in the context of the personalistic interpretation of a human being. This is the focus of this informative and insightful book. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest krytyczna analiza koncepcji J.H. Newmana, zgodnie z którą doświadczenie sumienia prowadzi jednostkę do wiary w Boga. Fenomenologiczna analiza doświadczenia moralnego prowadzi Newmana do wniosku, że doświadczenie to jest zrozumiałe tylko wtedy, jeśli zinterpretujemy sumienie jako głos Boga. Pokazuję – wbrew Newmanowi – że doświadczenie sumienia nie jest jednoznaczne. Nie da się wyjaśnić, dlaczego jednostka interpretuje je w kategoriach teistycznych, a nie jakichś innych. Potrzebne jest przyjęcie dodatkowych mechanizmów, które tłumaczą, dlaczego jednostka zinterpretowała swoje sumienie w kategoriach teistycznych. (...) Wskazuję, że w dziele Newmana można wyróżnić trzy takie mechanizmy. (shrink)

Artykuł analizuje problem kosztów powstałych w wyniku realizacji obowiązku udzielenia pomocy osobie znajdującej się w niebezpieczeństwie. Autorzy prezentują trzy odmienne stanowiska dotyczące tego problemu, rozważając scenariusz, w którym osoba decyduje się, z własnej woli lub przymuszona za pomocą prawa, uratować inną osobę, w sytuacji, w której taka pomoc wiąże się z naruszeniem praw trzeciej strony. Przykładowo, A ratuje tonącego B, ale w trakcie ratowania narusza prawa C. Pytanie, które stawiają autorzy brzmi: zakładając, że istnieje obowiązek udzielenia pomocy osobie znajdującej się (...) w niebezpieczeństwie, kto powinien ponieść koszty odszkodowania za naruszenie praw trzeciej strony? Autorzy rozważają następujące możliwości: koszty pomocy powinny zostać poniesione przez (a) ratującego, (b) osobę, której prawa zostały naruszone, (c) ratowanego, (d) całe społeczeństwo. (shrink)

The aim of my paper is to interpret S. Kierkegaard's concept of a leap as a metaphor for the process of moving from one conceptual scheme to another. The basis for this reading of the concept is provided by the growing recognition of Kierkegaard's philosophy as dealing with conceptual schemes, equipements or paradigms through which reality is interpreted. I use Kierkegaard's metaphor as a point of departure for the analysis of the conditions of possibility and the very process of changing (...) conteptual schemes in general. I use the story of Abraham and Isaac, as described in „Fear and Trembling”, as a source of examples illustrating more general points I make during my analysis. Firstly, I present a general understanding of what a conceptual scheme is and how it is functioning. Afterwards, I show how this functioning is impaired in case of Abraham and Isaac. Finally, I put forward a hypothesis that the problems that Abraham's scheme is encountering due to God's demand to sacrifice Isaac can all be reduced to the fact that a very deep change in meaning of certain terms within the conceptual scheme, such as "God", "good" or "duty", has occured. The adoption of new meanings would be equivalent to moving into another conceptual scheme. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to interpret and criticize the theory of theistic natural signs, formulated by Charles S. Evans. TNS are characteristic experiences or features of the world which cause the person who encounters them to form certain basic beliefs about the existence and nature of God. I propose two interpretations of how TNS work, using the categories of perception and indirect perceptual recognition. I also present two arguments against the theory of TNS. First, I point out that (...) the theory does not explain adequately why TNS are ambiguous, i.e., can be read in different ways. Second, I observe that certain experiences may be taken to be „atheistic natural signs”. Their existence gives one a reason to suspect that God is a deceiver. (shrink)

In its formative period the state welds together groups of kindred language, religion and customs. A nation bereft of a state structure has a small prospect of survival, since it is weaker than nations which possess their own apparatus of force. The former is constantly endangered and is often helpless before the latter. The struggle for statehood is hence the most conscious expression of the effort to maintain national distinctness. Moreover, a nation deprived of statehood enjoys small prestige among its (...) own group members, nor can it create an image which arouses the respect of other nations.A striking phenomenon in the investigation of the state and the nation is the parallelism in the condition of their origin.The nation thus arises as a result of an extended processes of integration ; white the consolidating nature of national awareness makes it analogue of the state organization as a universa[ organization.It is possible to distinguish three types of nation-building processes :a) within the framework of native state organization which arises directly as a result of an external threat,b) within the bouddaries of farmer colonies which are accepted as the national state borders,c) the shaping of national entities of the foundation of federated forms of the state.An analysis of the different variants of historica[ experience suggests certain general propositions :1. The emergence of the state, or at least of a state organism, as a rule precedes the formation of the nation ;2. because of its general all-embracing character the state organization is the decisive factor of the nation-building process.The author deals also with the problem of the federal state and the national question. The different types of federations influence the national problem in different ways. (shrink)

The Cognitive Science of Religion represents a contemporary attempt at a naturalistic explanation of religion. There is debate as to whether its account of how religious beliefs arise is reconcilable with the religious account, which holds that religious beliefs are caused by God. In my paper, I argue that these two accounts cannot be reconciled when it comes to the specific question of how Christian religious beliefs arise if one accepts an important theological doctrine of the supernaturality of Christian belief. (...) This doctrine implies that there can be no natural explanation for how Christian beliefs arise because they are a gift of divine grace. This leads to a conundrum for Christian theists: they can either reject the CSR account of how their religious beliefs arise, or they can reject the supernaturality of Christian belief. I argue that the latter is preferable. I then draw on the work of the theologian Denis Edwards to illustrate how one can drop this doctrine without abandoning some other fundamental tenets of Christian theology. (shrink)

The article reviews the book Philosophia Vitam Alere. Prace dedykowane Profesorowi Romanowi Darowskiemu SJ z okazji 70-lecia urodzin, edited by Stanisław Ziemiański S.J.

In his book Między ukryciem a jawnością [Between Hiddenness and Openness] (2023), Professor Jacek Wojtysiak argues that on the assumption of atheistic naturalism, no convincing explanation can be given for the ‘great fact of faith,’ that is, the phenomenon of the historical persistence and universality of the belief in the existence of God. The purpose of this paper is to challenge this thesis. Drawing on selected theories from the field of the Cognitive Science of Religion, I sketch a naturalistic explanation (...) of how religious belief arises. (shrink)

Historically, Ehrenfest’s theorem is the first one which shows that classical physics can emerge from quantum physics as a kind of approximation. We recall the theorem in its original form, and we highlight its generalizations to the relativistic Dirac particle and to a particle with spin and izospin. We argue that apparent classicality of the macroscopic world can probably be explained within the framework of standard quantum mechanics.

We show that for every enumeration degree $a there exists an e-degree c such that $a \leq c , and all degrees b, with $c \leq b , are properly Σ 0 2.

The purpose of the essay is to critically analyze the influence of J. Derrida’s deconstruction on David J. Gunkel’s book Deconstruction (MIT Press 2021). Gunkel’s handbook is aimed at making deconstruction a tool of critical thinking accessible to non-professionals. It turns out that accomplishing this task comes at the expense of precisely the critical potential of deconstruction itself. Gunkel is well aware that his arguments are sometimes superficial and overlook deeper problems that should be addressed. Such a failure takes the (...) form of a fetishistic denial, which in psychoanalysis is summarized by the formula “I know well, but all the same.” In turn, deconstruction itself, insofar as it is separated from Kant’s transcendental philosophy and Hegel’s dialectics, becomes an academic ideology. Restoring its proper subversive potential can only be done by returning to a philosophy of reflection, in which the thinker himself must ultimately consider his own position as an author and bring it under criticism. This is the path that Gunkel avoids, because he could then no longer be the author of a handbook on deconstruction, rather than someone who practices deconstruction. -------------------------- Received: 4/11/2022. Reviewed: 13/12/2022. Accepted: 20/12/2022. (shrink)

We show that for every enumeration degree $a < 0'_e$ there exists an e-degree c such that $a \leq c < 0'_e$, and all degrees b, with $c \leq b < 0'_e$, are properly $\Sigma^0_2$.

Cognitive science of religion is sometimes portrayed as having no bearing on the theological doctrines of particular religious traditions, such as Christianity. In this paper, I argue that the naturalistic account of the etiology of religious beliefs offered by the cognitive science of religion undermines the important Christian doctrine of the grace of faith, which teaches that the special gift of divine grace is a necessary precondition for coming to faith. This has some far-reaching ramifications for Christian theology. -/- .

Democracy - hope or illusion? Blooming, failing or declining? Our doubts and hesitation make part of unbending efforts to endorse and explain democracy. Who is right - the custodians of promise or the prophets of decline? The book concentrates on doubts. The author tries to explore «the other side of the moon», emphasizing the role of critical thinking, opposing a main-current optimism. Defending democracy we want to generate hope, but hoping may be a dangerous craft. Protecting our hope we are (...) prone to believe that democracy - even if it is not a full success story - is justified in its nature and out of question. How much do we have to forget to sanction this view? This is, in fact, the main question the book raises. It gives voice to those who never, in their writing on democracy, used a flattering tone. Starting with Greek giants - Plato and Aristotle - up to modern and most recent times, going through a broad field of revealing criticism, leaving us with an unsettling feeling that democracy is rather something to be explained than something to be celebrated. Living in democracy, lamenting its underperformances, we must not overlook a fundamental question - in what part do our disappointments reflect the «art of forgetting», allowing us to cast into oblivion all serious doubts originating in a critical discourse on modernity and democracy? (shrink)

What is the meaning of the “Europe” and the idea of unity? For when did a “united” Europe exist? Back when German emperors ineffectively tried to enforce their rule on a territory which was none too large anyway? Or when they were entangled in a dispute with the papacy? Or during the crusades against the Catharists? Or maybe during the Reformation or during the French Revolution when new coalitions of opponents arose? During the Napoleonic Wars which in themselves pay testimony (...) to ruptures and conflicts? The 20th century alone brought two wars. The first already signified, as Jan Patocka once declared, the suicide of Europe. Perhaps, then, Europe does not exist at all anymore? Maybe the politicians’ visions are less than credible? There is no doubt that the idea of a united Europe is a project which affirms the great, creative power of the imagination. Modernity has given birth to very strong temptations which glorify the imagination. (shrink)

Demokracja i erozja tradycji Oświecenia -- Mit, polityka, popkultura -- Przyjaźń i mizantropia : czego uczy nas liberalizm?

On trouve reunies dans ce volume les communications faites au Colloque international de Nancy, les 15-16 octobre 2010, portant sur La philosophie de l'histoire des XIXe et XXe siecles. Le colloque organise par le Centre de Recherche sur les Cultures Litteraires Europeennes (CERCLE) a eu vocation a rapprocher les historiosophies polonaises et russes dans le contexte de la pensee philosophique europeenne en commencant par le slavophilisme et l'occidentalisme, en passant par les theories de progres et les conceptions eschatologiques, et en (...) finissant par les courants dissidents du XXe siecle opposes a l'ideologie communiste dominante. Il s'agissait d'une part d'etudier les ressemblances et les differences entre la reflexion metahistorique des deux peuples qui ont evolue dans les circonstances historiques parfois tres differentes, mais dont les histoires sont etroitement liees. D'autre part, tout en essayant de cerner les relations entre les philosophies de l'histoire et la realite politique, sociale et culturelle de l'epoque, on cherchait a elucider la facon dont les Polonais et les Russes se definissent a la fois les uns par rapport aux autres, par rapport a l'Occident et au monde. Une attention particuliere a cette derniere question peut nous permettre de repenser la pertinence des historiosophies polonaise et russe dans le monde contemporain, ainsi que leur apport a la pensee universelle. (shrink)

Aspect-perception is a phenomenon described in detail by L. Wittgenstein in part XI of Philosophical Investigations. The most famous example is the duck-rabbit figure, which can be viewed either as a duck or a rabbit, but the phenomenon extends well beyond visual Gestalt pictures and permeates various fields of human life, including aesthetic, moral and linguistic experience. Recently there have been attempts to apply the notion of aspect-perception to religious faith. It has often been observed that religious faith involves a (...) particular way of ‘seeing’ different objects and events (recall the famous phrase from the hymn Amazing Grace, ‘I once was lost, but now am found; Was blind, but now I see’). For this reason, the attempt to use the category of aspect-seeing to analyze religious faith may appear promising. My aim in this paper to analyze critically one such attempt, made by N. K. Verbin in ‘Religious Belief and Aspect seeing’ and ‘Can Faith be Justified?’. In these papers Verbin argues for two closely related theses regarding religious belief. The first is conceptual; she proposes that we should understand ‘certain kinds of religious beliefs which we view as central to a person having a living faith’ as ‘a type of aspect-seeing’. The second follows from the first: we should modify accordingly the way we construe justification for religious belief. In what follows I expound Verbin’s conceptual claim and present arguments against equating religious belief with seeing religious aspects. Basing myself on examples of people who see religious aspects but do not reach religious belief, I conclude that the two categories should not be conflated. Although I reject Verbin’s overall claim, however, I concede that aspect-seeing does play a significant role in justifying religious belief, although not in the way Verbin proposes. (shrink)

Alvin Plantinga's notion of sensus divinitatis ("sense of divinity") refers to a human cognitive faculty designed to produce theistic beliefs that have warrant (positive epistemic status). While most of Plantinga's commentators focus on whether introducing this notion really helps to defend the rationality of theistic beliefs, the genetic aspect of the operation of the sensus divinitatis is often overlooked. This paper is devoted to fill this gap. On the basis of Plantinga's opus magnum titled Warranted Christian Belief, I distinguish three (...) different interpretations of how sensus divinitatis creates theistic beliefs. I also analyse the ways in which human sin impairs the proper functioning of this sense of divinity in each of these interpretations. (shrink)