Compromises are arrived at when, in spite of the efforts of those participating to mediate and defend their position in a rationally acceptable manner, each remains with his judgment while, at the same time, a decision must be made without further delay. What this means is that the parties agree to an option about which they are not, in their heart of hearts, entirely convinced. This article examines the notion of moral compromise, concentrating thereby on the case of political praxis. (...) It asks whether, in view of the complexity and multiplicity of morally relevant decisions encountered in a pluralist society, it is at all realistic to expect much else from political institutions than what Rawls dismissively refers to as a modus vivendi and whether a conception of justice that is true or reasonable only given the reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines is still a conception of justice, and not simply a compromise between the contending doctrines. (shrink)

Wir reden gelegentlich von Kompromissen, die wir mit uns selbst schließen. Aber ist diese Rede angemessen oder gar berechtigt? Schließlich lassen sich wesentliche Merkmale von Kompromissen mit anderen nicht auf das Selbstverhältnis einer Person übertragen. Dennoch kann sich die Rede unter gewissen Umständen als sinnvoll erweisen. Der Artikel gibt Kriterien dafür an und stellt sich vor allem die Frage, ob und in welcher Hinsicht solche selbstbezüglichen Kompromisse eine Gefahr für die Integrität der Person darstellen.

In 1994, the European Parliament published a resolution on the right of humanitarian intervention. Interestingly, the declaration maintains that such intervention is not in contradiction with international law, although it formulates the concept of right in a way that is translatable into the vocabulary of individual rights. I analyze some implications of the resolution for the mutual duties of states. I thereby focus my attention on two possible applications: by way of Rawls's duty of assistance and by way of the (...) cosmopolitan theory of global distributive justice. I conclude that the latter theory promises better results for protecting individuals' basic rights, but I also show that it is at the cost of a strongly interventionist structure requiring a powerful supranational institution. Finally, I envision the conditions under which such an increase of interventionism in favor of human rights can be acceptable. (shrink)

The moral dilemma at the heart of the theory of just war stems from the contradiction between two opposing duties: on the one hand, the duty to provide aid, as far as possible, to those whose lives are endangered; and, on the other hand, the duty not to endanger the lives of the innocent. The theory of just war resolves this dilemma, firstly by privileging one of these two duties over the other; and secondly, by imposing conditions on justification concerning (...) the principle of discrimination against civilian populations and the principle of proportionality. The principle of proportionality thus acts as a moral constraint on justification. Nevertheless, the notion of proportion still remains vague. The present paper examines the sense and function of this notion, and analyses the underpinnings of its ethical foundation. (shrink)

ZwangDie BegriffeGewalt (s. a. Folter, Krieg, Vergewaltigung) ‚Gewalt‘, ‚Macht‘, ‚Herrschaft‘ oder ‚Zwang‘ sind semantisch sehr eng verknüpft. Der Artikel geht auf den Ursprung des Wortes „Gewalt“ und seine Ambivalenz zurück und fragt unter anderem nach der Beziehung, die Gewalt mit Zwang im rechts- und politisch-philosophischen Sinne unterhält. Individuelle, institutionelleNötigung und strukturelle Gewalt werden auseinandergehalten und ihr Unterschied erläutert. Den Schluss bildet die Frage nach der Rechtfertigung der Gewalt.

Der Ausdruck ‚Krieg‘ kennt keine allgemein anerkannte Definition. Der Krieg ist, mit Clausewitz zu sprechen, eine gesellschaftliche Aktivität zum Zwecke der Regelung politischer Probleme durch Gewaltanwendung. Je nach Gesellschaftsstadium nimmt von daher der Krieg entwicklungsgeschichtlich sehr unterschiedliche Formen an. Nach einer begrifflichen Klärung liefert der Artikel einen Einblick in die Geschichte der Theorie des gerechten Kriegs und in die Begründungen der humanitären Intervention. Er schließt mit einem kurzen Überblick über den Pazifismus ab.

Der Begriff ‚Kompromiss‘ hat seine Wurzeln im lateinischen Kompositum compromissum, compromittere („sich gegenseitig versprechen, eine Entscheidung dem Schiedsrichter zu überlassen“). Spätestens Anfang des 17. Jahrhunderts ist der Kompromiss nicht mehr an den Schiedsspruch eines Dritten gebunden. An dessen Stelle tritt eine pragmatische Vereinbarung zwischen streitenden Parteien. Was die Merkmale des Kompromisses sind und welches sein Verhältnis zu ähnlichen Begriffen wie Schmutzige Hände oder Modus Vivendi ist, wird im Artikel geklärt.

When individual rights, especially constitutional rights, compete with other rights or with a public good, judges and politicians involved in the legislative process or jurisdictional process are expected to balance their decision in such a way that the gain from achieving the goal mitigates the costs of the resulting loss for the parties. Jurists speak of the doctrine of proportionality in connection with this process of balancing. In the proportionality calculus, judges have to evaluate whether the impact on individual rights (...) outweighs the public purpose pursued through a state’s legal activity. I will argue that the procedure of proportionality is similar to the procedure of reaching a compromise. More precisely, I will defend that compromise is a special case of the principle of proportionality, for it applies when claims cannot be balanced or in the absence of an overarching principle on which all the parties agree. With this, I aim to show the connection between the principle of proportionality and compromises without conflating these two concepts, and to offer new perspectives on the discussion of proportionality as it is used in the legal context. (shrink)

In this article, I criticize Véronique Zanetti on the topic of moral compromise. As I understand Zanetti, a compromise could only be called a “moral compromise” if (i) it does not originate under coercive conditions, (ii) it involves conflict whose subject matter is moral, and (iii) “the parties support the solution found for what they take to be moral reasons rather than strategic interests.” I offer three criticisms of Zanetti. First, Zanetti ignores how some parties may (...) not have reason to seek social peace at all. Zanetti’s claim that there is consensus on the aim of social peace can involve idealising away from disagreement in a manner that Zanetti accuses Rawls of. Second, even if there is consensus on the aim of seeking social peace, this leaves open the possibility of disagreement about which society different people should belong to. This idealises away from real world conflict concerning borders. Indeed, Zanetti does not mention that her ‘central example’ of moral disagreement, the German Abortion compromise, was enacted in the wake of German reunification. Third, there are at least two things that can be called the ‘German Abortion compromise.’ The compromise that Zanetti speaks of was imposed by the German Federal Constitutional Court. The court declared unconstitutional a law passed in 1992 that had been negotiated in parliament. Zanetti does not dwell on this lack of democratic credentials. Even the substance of the court-imposed solution is itself a dubious example of a moral compromise between parties based on what is acceptable to their reason. -/- (penultimate version - If you would like the .pdf of the final version for personal scholarly use, please contact me through the email address on my profile or my CV.). (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to review and critically discuss the philosophical aspects of probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA). Given that estimates of seismic hazard are typically riddled with uncertainty, diferent epistemic values (related to the pursuit of scientifc knowledge) compete in the selection of seismic hazard models, in a context infuenced by non-epistemic values (related to practical goals and aims) as well. We frst distinguish between the diferent types of uncertainty in PSHA. We claim that epistemic and nonepistemic (...) considerations are closely related in the selection of the appropriate estimate of seismic hazard by the experts. Finally, we argue that the division of scientifc responsibility among the experts can lead to responsibility gaps. This raises a problem for the ownership of the results (“no one’s model” problem) similar to the “problem of many hands” in the ethics of technology. We conclude with a plea for a close collaboration between philosophy and engineering. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to clarify under what conditions a philosophical problem arises. I will describe two ways in which we might perceive a question as a problem. First, when we fnd ourselves inclined to believe in propositions that appear incompatible with each other. Second, when we fnd ourselves inclined to believe in propositions that seem incompatible with our desires. I will discuss both of these cases and articulate a didactic strategy – the Clash Strategy – which can (...) be used in order to plan and facilitate dialogic inquiry in the classroom. This strategy suggests introducing stimuli that will help students appreciate the clash that drives the philosophical question to be explored during the dialogue. In summary, this paper aims to ofer insights to all teachers interested in promoting dialogic inquiry, whether philosophical or otherwise, in education. (shrink)

This study is focused on an original conception of freedom essentially derived from the Stoics and St Paul: freedom as a use of the world. How Fénelon, when he quotes Paul’s phrase « those who use the things of the world, as if not engrossed in them », associate it with the doctrine of pure love? His desire to interpret the Pauline idea in a mystical perspective threatens the possibility of answering it.

Wenn eine Kultur etwas als Erfindung akzeptiert, dann hat dieses Etwas bereits den Status einer Tatsache erhalten, die vorhanden ist und auf ihren Nutzen oder auf ihre Funktion hin befragt werden kann. Was aber geschieht davor? Wie gewinnt das Erfundene Wirklichkeit? Wie in der Kunst, wie im Theater, wie in der Literatur und Musik, wie in der Wissenschaft? Und mit welchen Folgen? Die Beiträge in diesem Band beschäftigen sich alle mit einem Moment oder einem bestimmten Modell der Invention. Ausgehend von (...) den jeweils involvierten Medien wird der Versuch unternommen, diese Momente und Modelle zu rekonstruieren. Um etwas über die entsprechenden Inventionen in Erfahrung bringen zu können, werden diese als Ergebnisse oder Effekte von Improvisationsprozessen begriffen: Improvisationen in dem Sinne, dass von einem grundsätzlich offenen Zukunftsspielraum ausgegangen wird, gleichzeitig aber auch davon, dass es ein Umgebungs- und Verfahrenswissen gibt, das im Einzelfall beschrieben werden kann. (shrink)

Human adults are thought to possess two dissociable systems to represent numbers: an approximate quantity system akin to a mental number line, and a verbal system capable of representing numbers exactly. Here, we study the interface between these two systems using an estimation task. Observers were asked to estimate the approximate numerosity of dot arrays. We show that, in the absence of calibration, estimates are largely inaccurate: responses increase monotonically with numerosity, but underestimate the actual numerosity. However, insertion of a (...) few inducer trials, in which participants are explicitly (and sometimes misleadingly) told that a given display contains 30 dots, is sufficient to calibrate their estimates on the whole range of stimuli. Based on these empirical results, we develop a model of the mapping between the numerical symbols and the representations of numerosity on the number line. (shrink)

This paper aims to study the perception of color (representations, synesthesia, denominations, uses and classification) in specific writings such as recipe treatises written from 1520 to 1689. These treatises deal with the manufacture and stages of color in various objects (remedies, blushes and mainly gems). They reveals that color is not only an apparent surface but also a sensitive substance, in particular white and red colors. Although color is a principle of unity for diverse materials, it sometimes becomes contradictory when (...) it is associated with variable signified and signifiers, so that color also offers a play on naming: meaning is sometimes clear, sometimes obscure, and in any case mobile (azure, vermilion). The contemporary reader does not perceive color in the same way as the Renaissance craftsman. Finally, as a principle of classification, it shows an imbalance and hierarchy of colors which, while providing structure to recipes: it gives mainly a place of choice to red and its shades. (shrink)

Humans possess two nonverbal systems capable of representing numbers, both limited in their representational power: the first one represents numbers in an approximate fashion, and the second one conveys information about small numbers only. Conception of exact large numbers has therefore been thought to arise from the manipulation of exact numerical symbols. Here, we focus on two fundamental properties of the exact numbers as prerequisites to the concept of EXACT NUMBERS : the fact that all numbers can be generated by (...) a successor function and the fact that equality between numbers can be defined in an exact fashion. We discuss some recent findings assessing how speakers of Munduruc (an Amazonian language), and young Western children (3-4 years old) understand these fundamental properties of numbers. (shrink)

Hume’s Principle states that the cardinal number of the concept F is identical with the cardinal number of G if and only if F and G can be put into one-to-one correspondence. The Schwartzkopff-Rosen Principle is a modification of HP in terms of metaphysical grounding: it states that if the number of F is identical with the number of G, then this identity is grounded by the fact that F and G can be paired one-to-one, 353–373, 2011, 362). HP is (...) central to the neo-logicist program in the philosophy of mathematics ; in this paper we submit that, even if the neo-logicists wish to venture into the metaphysics of grounding, they can avoid the SR Principle. In Section 1 we introduce neo-logicism. In Sections 2 and 3 we examine the SR Principle. We then formulate an account of arithmetical facts which does not rest on the SR Principle; we finally argue that the neo-logicists should avoid the SR Principle in favour of this alternative proposal. (shrink)

The brief life of the Accademia del Cimento (1657–1667), the first known society with a purely experimental programme,1 is entangled with the most surprising advancements in the history of scientific instruments of that century, from the telescope to the microscope, the thermometer to the barometer, the hygrometer to the pendulum as a time-regulator, and more. The making of instruments at the Florentine court shows the interaction of princely, scholarly and artisanal actors. This paper explores this collaboration and shows how the (...) supposed “invisibility’ of artisans depended on their proximity to the academicians and princes, who mainly communicated verbally with them, directly or through middlemen. The visibility of artisans increases proportionally to their physical distance from the Court. In this essay I unveil the identity of the artisans of the Cimento and, finally, attempt to attribute five instruments (some lost and others still extant) to specific makers, shedding light also on relations between the artisan and his patron. (shrink)

Bras armés de la mondialisation néo-libérale, la communication, l'information et les médias sont aussi un levier puissant des mouvements qui tentent de promouvoir des alternatives aux logiques dominantes. Dans le cadre des Forum sociaux mondiaux, des alternatives aux pratiques hégémoniques des médias traditionnels sont portées par des médias communautaires, alternatifs et activistes, et par les mouvements de l'Internet solidaire et du logiciel libre. Ces mouvements défendent les droits à la communication et entendent faire reconnaître que l'information est un bien commun (...) qui doit être accessible à tous.Armed wing of the neo-liberal globalization, communication, information and media is also a powerful movement trying to promote alternatives to the dominant logics. Within the framework of the World Social Forum, alternatives to the hegemonic practices of traditional media are supported by community media, alternative and activists, and movements of solidarity Internet and free software. These movements to defend human communication and intend to recognize that information is a public good that should be accessible to all. (shrink)

Geometry defines entities that can be physically realized in space, and our knowledge of abstract geometry may therefore stem from our representations of the physical world. Here, we focus on Euclidean geometry, the geometry historically regarded as “natural”. We examine whether humans possess representations describing visual forms in the same way as Euclidean geometry – i.e., in terms of their shape and size. One hundred and twelve participants from the U.S. (age 3–34 years), and 25 participants from the Amazon (age (...) 5–67 years) were asked to locate geometric deviants in panels of 6 forms of variable orientation. Participants of all ages and from both cultures detected deviant forms defined in terms of shape or size, while only U.S. adults drew distinctions between mirror images (i.e. forms differing in “sense”). Moreover, irrelevant variations of sense did not disrupt the detection of a shape or size deviant, while irrelevant variations of shape or size did. At all ages and in both cultures, participants thus retained the same properties as Euclidean geometry in their analysis of visual forms, even in the absence of formal instruction in geometry. These findings show that representations of planar visual forms provide core intuitions on which humans’ knowledge in Euclidean geometry could possibly be grounded. (shrink)

Gallagher hardly refers to the central issue of the phenomenological reduction, and he perpetuates the historical blunder of Chisholm, misinterpreting Husserlian intentionality as linguistic intensionality. This misunderstanding opens the way to a “naturalization” of phenomenology, which misses the very method of the phenomenological reduction as well as the essential dimension of subjective lived experience.

L’article étudie comment l’humain peut être défini dans les rapports créés dans l’imaginaire entre le corps et l’alimentation. En s’appuyant sur des traités de médecine et de cuisine du Moyen Âge au xviie siècle, des essais d’humanistes et les travaux d’anthropologues, d’historiens et de sociologues contemporains, on découvre comment l’acte même de manger permet de définir et construire les frontières du corps humain et un imaginaire de l’alimentation : la nomination de l’aliment et la charge sémantique des métaphores empruntés à (...) l’alimentation définissent une éthique de l’humain et sa vision du corps humain et animal. Une approche médicale complète cette étude linguistique et montre que le fonctionnement des limites extérieures et internes du corps humain se modèle sur la représentation de l’aliment et de ses effets paradoxaux, bénéfiques et pathologiques. Enfin, le corps social du mangeur est délimité par la distance qui le sépare de l’aliment et le lieu assigné à l’animal destiné à être mangé. (shrink)