If an experiment on a small number of animals can cure a disease that affects tens of thousands, it could be justifiable. Whether this is really the case in Professor Aziz’s experiments, about which I was asked in the BBC2 documentary Monkeys, Rats and Me: Animal Testing, is a question I have not studied sufficiently to offer an opinion about. Certainly it has been disputed. In my book Animal Liberation I propose asking experimenters who use animals if (...) they would be prepared to carry out their experiments on human beings at a similar mental level — say, those born with irreversible brain damage. (shrink)

Which animals have conscious experiences? Many different, diverse and unrelated behaviors and cognitive capacities have been proposed as tests of the presence of consciousness in an animal. It is unclear which of these tests, if any, are valid. To remedy this problem, I develop a list consisting of eight desiderata which can be used to assess putative tests of animal consciousness. These desiderata are based either on detailed analogies between consciousness-linked human behavior and non-human behavior, on theories of (...) consciousness or on methods from human consciousness science. If a test or set of tests satisfies more of these desiderata, passing it provides stronger evidence of consciousness. Moreover, one can design future tests of animal consciousness with the intention of satisfying these desiderata to ensure their evidential strength. (shrink)

Since the 1940s the Draize test had been the standard test applied to any substance that might conceivably get into a human eye. The Draize test involved immobilizing fully conscious rabbits in stocks so that they could not scratch their eyes, and then applying the substance to one eyeball of each rabbit. The eyeballs were examined at intervals of, for example, 24, 48, and 72 hours, and graded for damage such as blindness or blistering. In 1980 Henry Spira launched a (...) campaign against the Draize test. By taking out full-page ads asking Revlon why it was blinding rabbits for the sake of beauty, he persuaded that company to donate $750,000, over 3 years, to a search for alternatives to the Draize test. Other leading cosmetics corporations soon followed suit. By 1982 there were signs that progress was being made. In July of that year Revlon reported that it had established a panel to ensure that unnecessary Draize tests are not performed, and as a result it had cut back the number of rabbits it used annually in the Draize test from 2,210 in 1979 to 1,431 in 1981. Avon adopted a policy of always using local anaesthetics if there was any anticipated discomfort for the animals. Bristol-Myers said that it was using fewer animals than had been used in the classical Draize test. All three of the companies were continuing to contribute substantial sums to research programs designed to find alternatives to the Draize test. (shrink)

In systems of meaning that run on a regular setting, allegory is about filling in or identifying the blanks that disclose the “other story.” In the modern setting that Walter Benjamin tracked , allegory must turn significance out of the blank itself, working the blank as a turning point for drawing the reading onward. The work most influential on, indeed syndicated in, Walter Benjamin’s Origin of the German Mourning Play, as I’ve argued elsewhere, was Daniel Paul Schreber’s Memoirs of My (...) Nervous Illness.1 It is the text that hovers behind my own preoccupation with the science fiction genre as the “psy-fi” hub where bona fide science fictions, documentations of psychosis .. (shrink)

If a machine attains consciousness, how could we find out? In this paper, I make three related claims regarding positive tests of machine consciousness. All three claims center on the idea that an AI can be constructed “ad hoc”, that is, with the purpose of satisfying a particular test of consciousness while clearly not being conscious. First, a proposed test of machine consciousness can be legitimate, even if AI can be constructed ad hoc specifically to pass this test. This is (...) underscored by the observation that many, if not all, putative tests of machine consciousness can be passed by non-conscious machines via ad hoc means. Second, we can identify ad hoc AI by taking inspiration from the notion of an ad hoc hypothesis in philosophy of science. Third, given the first and the second claim, the most reliable tests of animal consciousness turn out to be valid and useful positive tests of machine consciousness as well. If a non-ad hoc AI exhibits clusters of cognitive capacities facilitated by consciousness in humans which can be selectively switched off by masking and if it reproduces human behavior in suitably designed double dissociation tasks, we should treat the AI as conscious. (shrink)

Alan Turing devised his famous test (TT) through a slight modificationof the parlor game in which a judge tries to ascertain the gender of twopeople who are only linguistically accessible. Stevan Harnad hasintroduced the Total TT, in which the judge can look at thecontestants in an attempt to determine which is a robot and which aperson. But what if we confront the judge with an animal, and arobot striving to pass for one, and then challenge him to peg which (...) iswhich? Now we can index TTT to a particular animal and its syntheticcorrelate. We might therefore have TTTrat, TTTcat,TTTdog, and so on. These tests, as we explain herein, are abetter barometer of artificial intelligence (AI) than Turing's originalTT, because AI seems to have ammunition sufficient only to reach thelevel of artificial animal, not artificial person. (shrink)

Critics of animal modeling have advanced a variety of arguments against the validity of the practice. The point of one such form of argument is to establish that animal modeling is pointless and therefore immoral. In this article, critical arguments of this form are divided into three types, the pseudoscience argument, the disanalogy argument, and the predictive validity argument. I contend that none of these criticisms currently succeed, nor are they likely to. However, the connection between validity and (...) morality is important, suggesting that critical efforts would be instructive if they addressed it in a more nuanced way. (shrink)

Advances in science have led to a new vision for toxicity testing based on human cell systems that will be more predictive, have higher throughput, cost less money, and be more comparable to real‐life exposures in humans, while using many fewer animals. This vision, embraced by leading scientific and regulatory groups, is a paradigm shift from animal‐based to human‐based testing that signals a major change in focus and promotes the development of new approaches to understanding the toxicity (...) of chemicals in humans. Information gained from these new approaches will likely affect other areas of research as well, leading to less reliance on animals in the future. (shrink)

In the field of medically assisted reproduction (MAR), there is a growing emphasis on the importance of introducing new assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) only after thorough preclinical safety research, including the use of animal models. At the same time, there is international support for the three R’s (replace, reduce, refine), and the European Union even aims at the full replacement of animals for research. The apparent tension between these two trends underlines the urgency of an explicit justification of the (...) use of animals for the development and preclinical testing of new ARTs. Considering that the use of animals remains necessary for specific forms of ART research and taking account of different views on the moral importance of helping people to have a genetically related child, we argue that, in principle, the importance of safety research as part of responsible innovation outweighs the limited infringement of animal wellbeing involved in ART research. (shrink)

In our dealings with animals at least most of us see them as conscious beings. On the other hand the employment of human categories to animals seems to be problematic. Reflecting on the details of human beliefs, for example, casts serious doubt on whether the cat is able to believe anything at all. These theses try to reflect on methodological issues when investigating animal minds. Developing a theory of animal mentality seems to be a test case of the (...) interdisciplinary research programme in cognitive science. From the philosopher`s perspective the most pressing problem is how to talk about animal minds. Can we just employ the vocabulary of human psychology? If not, exploring animal minds contains the non-trivial task of introducing a terminology that allows to see the distinctness of animal minds and to see its connection to the human case. The treatment of some topic in cognitive science has to reach a reflective equilibrium between our intuitions, a phenomenological approach, philosophical conceptual analysis, various empirical approaches and model building. Reflective equilibrium means in this context that we have to reach a coherent model which incorporates as much of our intuitions concerning animal consciousness and integrates at the same time the findings of the different co-operating sciences. There can be various trade-offs in case of conflict between, say, philosophical definitions of mental terms as to be applied to animals, neurophysiology, our reflected intuitions and ethological model building based on a computational theory of animal minds. The paper gives an example of reflective equilibrium in discussing the case for awareness in vertebrates. It considers the role of evolutionary reasoning. The main focus lays on two examples of comparing our human notions with corresponding abilities in animals, and how an appropriate conceptual apparatus dealing with the abilities of animals could be introduced. (shrink)

Alan Turing devised his famous test through a slight modificationof the parlor game in which a judge tries to ascertain the gender of twopeople who are only linguistically accessible. Stevan Harnad hasintroduced the Total TT, in which the judge can look at thecontestants in an attempt to determine which is a robot and which aperson. But what if we confront the judge with an animal, and arobot striving to pass for one, and then challenge him to peg which iswhich? (...) Now we can index TTT to a particular animal and its syntheticcorrelate. We might therefore have TTTrat, TTTcat,TTTdog, and so on. These tests, as we explain herein, are abetter barometer of artificial intelligence than Turing's originalTT, because AI seems to have ammunition sufficient only to reach thelevel of artificial animal, not artificial person. (shrink)

Suddendorf & Corballis (S&C) argue that animals are not capable of mental time travel (MTT) or its components. However, new results on chimpanzees suggest that they plan for the future and possess some MTT components. Moreover, future-oriented behaviour and episodic-like memory in other animals suggest that not all animals are limited to the present. Animals' capacities should not be dismissed without testing them.

Many people believe that animals possess moral status, but human beings possess higher moral status than animals. To try to identify a theoretical basis for this view, Robert Nozick proposed Utilitarianism for Animals, Kantianism for People. The present manuscript evaluates Nozick’s proposal by identifying the tradeoffs in welfare that it permits in medical research with animals and assessing whether those tradeoffs are indeed permissible. This analysis suggests that at least some deontological side constraints apply to the treatment of sentient animals, (...) hence, Utilitarianism for Animals, Kantianism for People is mistaken. Because Nozick’s proposal represents a prominent attempt to provide a theoretical basis for the common belief that human beings possess higher moral status than animals, this conclusion is noteworthy in its own right. Moreover, by granting equal moral weight to the interests of animals, but reserving deontological side constraints for human beings, Utilitarianism for Animals, Kantianism for People offers one of the more plausible bases for the claim that there are degrees of moral status among those who matter morally. The manuscript thus ends by considering the implications of the present analysis for the possibility that moral status comes in degrees. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that there is a way to reconcile the goals of two seemingly incompatible perspectives on the subject of research involving nonhuman animals: the utilitarian position and the inherent value position. The utilitarian holds that humans generally have a higher moral status than nonhumans. The rights theorist holds that the moral status of some nonhuman animals is equivalent to that of humans in virtue of their both possessing inherent value. These two positions are in opposition (...) because the former allows promising research on nonhuman animals where the latter prohibits such research. (shrink)

Alongside in vitro studies, researchers are increasingly exploring the transplantation of human brain organoids (HBOs) into non-human animals to study brain development, disease, and repair. This paper focuses on ethical issues raised by such transplantation studies. In particular, it investigates the possibility that they might yield enhanced brain function in recipient animals (especially non-human primates), thereby fundamentally altering their moral status. I assess the critique, raised by major voices in the bioethics and science communities, according to which such concerns are (...) premature and misleading. I identify the assumptions underlying this skeptical critique, and mention some objections against them, followed by some possible replies. I proceed to argue that the skeptical position is ultimately implausible, because it presupposes an unreasonably high standard of full moral status. My argument appeals to David DeGrazia’s idea of a “borderline person”, and to the need for consistency with existing animal research regulations. I outline the practical implications of my view for the conduct of studies that might result in the development of full moral status in a transplanted animal. I also discuss some of the ethical implications of animal enhancement (particularly of rodents) below the threshold associated with full moral status. I conclude that far from being premature, further debate on these issues is urgently needed to help clarify the prospects that a neural chimera might attain full moral status in the foreseeable future, and the level of quality of life required to make it acceptable to knowingly create such a being via HBO transplantation. (shrink)

Since its original publication in 1975, this groundbreaking work has awakened millions of people to the existence of "speciesism"—our systematic disregard of nonhuman animals—inspiring a worldwide movement to transform our attitudes to animals and eliminate the cruelty we inflict on them. In Animal Liberation, author Peter Singer exposes the chilling realities of today’s "factory farms" and product-testing procedures—destroying the spurious justifications behind them, and offering alternatives to what has become a profound environmental and social as well as moral (...) issue. An important and persuasive appeal to conscience, fairness, decency, and justice, it is essential reading for the supporter and the skeptic alike. (shrink)

The current use of animals to test for potential teratogenic effects of drugs and other chemicals dates back to the thalidomide disaster of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Controversy surrounds the following questions: 1. What was known about placental transfer of drugs when thalidomide was developed? 2. Was thalidomide tested on animals for teratogenicity prior to its release? 3. Would more animal testing have prevented the thalidomide disaster? 4. What lessons should be learned from the thalidomide disaster (...) regarding animal testing for teratogenicity? We review the literature in order to address these questions. (shrink)

After 1900, the selective breeding of a few standard animals for research in the life sciences changed the way science was done. Among the pervasive changes was a transformation in scientists' assumptions about relationship between diversity and generality. Examination of the contents of two prominent physiology journals between 1885 and 1900, reveals that scientists used a diverse array of organisms in empirical research. Experimental physiologists gave many reasons for the choice of test animals, some practical and others truly comparative. But, (...) despite strong philosophical differences in the approaches they represented, the view that it was best to incorporate as many species as possible into research on physiological processes was widespread in both periodicals. Authors aimed for generality, but they treated it as a conclusion that would or would not follow from the examination of many species. After 1900, an increasing emphasis on standardization, the growth of the experimental method and the growing industrialization of the life sciences led to a decline in the number of species used in research. In this context, the selective breeding of animals for science facilitated a change in assumptions about the relationship between generality and diversity. As animals were increasingly viewed as things that were assumed to be fundamentally similar, scientific generality became an a priori assumption rather than an empirical conclusion. (shrink)

A brain emulation would be a one‐to‐one simulation where every causal process in the brain is represented, behaving in the same way as the original. Opponents of animal testing often argue that much of it is unnecessary and could be replaced with simulations. Personal identity is going to be a major issue with brain emulations, both because of the transition from an original unproblematic single human identity to successor identity/identities that might or might not be the same, and (...) because software minds can potentially have multiple realizability. The process might produce distressed minds that have rights yet have an existence not worth living, or that lack the capacity to form or express their wishes. Emulations will experience and behave on a timescale set by the speed of their software. Brain emulations would not be self‐contained, and their survival would depend upon hardware over which they might not have any control. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a heated debate about how to interpret findings that seem to show that humans rapidly and automatically calculate the visual perspectives of others. In the current study, we investigated the question of whether automatic interference effects found in the dot-perspective task (Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010) are the product of domain-specific perspective-taking processes or of domain-general “submentalizing” processes (Heyes, 2014). Previous attempts to address this question have done so by implementing inanimate (...) controls, such as arrows, as stimuli. The rationale for this is that submentalizing processes that respond to directionality should be engaged by such stimuli, whereas domain-specific perspective-taking mechanisms, if they exist, should not. These previous attempts have been limited, however, by the implied intentionality of the stimuli they have used (e.g. arrows), which may have invited participants to imbue them with perspectival agency. Drawing inspiration from “novel entity” paradigms from infant gaze-following research, we designed a version of the dot-perspective task that allowed us to precisely control whether a central stimulus was viewed as animate or inanimate. Across four experiments, we found no evidence that automatic “perspective-taking” effects in the dot-perspective task are modulated by beliefs about the animacy of the central stimulus. Our results also suggest that these effects may be due to the task-switching elements of the dot-perspective paradigm, rather than automatic directional orienting. Together, these results indicate that neither the perspective-taking nor the standard submentalizing interpretations of the dot-perspective task are fully correct. (shrink)

Since its original publication in 1975, this groundbreaking work has awakened millions of concerned men and women to the shocking abuse of animals everywhere--inspiring a worldwide movement to eliminate much of the cruel and unnecessary laboratory animal experimentation of years past. In this newly revised and expanded edition, author Peter Singer exposes the chilling realities of today's "factory farms" and product-testing procedures--offering sound, humane solutions to what has become a profound environmental and social as well as moral issue. (...) An important and persuasive appeal to conscience, fairness, decency and justice, Animal Liberation is essential reading for the supporter and the skeptic alike.--From publisher description. (shrink)

Even after several decades of human drug development, there remains an absence of published, substantial, comprehensive data to validate the use of animals in preclinical drug testing, and to point to their pr...

We emphasize the feature of Webb's presentation that bears most directly on contemporary research with real animals. Many neuroscience modelers erroneously conclude that a model that performs like an animal must have achieved this goal through processes analogous with those used by the animal. A simulation failure justifies rejecting a model, but success does not justify acceptance. However, an important benefit of models, successful or otherwise, is to stimulate new research.

Bioethics tends to be dominated by discourses concerned with the ethical dimension of medical practice, the organization of medical care, and the integrity of biomedical research involving human subjects and animal testing. Jacques Derrida has explored the fundamental question of the “limit” that identifies and differentiates the human animal from the nonhuman animal. However, to date his work has not received any reception in the field of biomedical ethics. In this paper, I examine what Derrida’s thought (...) about this limit might mean for the use/misuse/abuse of animals in contemporary biomedical research. For this, I review Derrida’s analysis and examine what it implies for scientific responsibility, introducing what I have coined the “Incompleteness Theorem of Bioethics.”. (shrink)

The writings in this anthology have been selected to introduce the reader to the broadest possible spectrum of viewpoints on the animal rights debate. A question-and-response format prompts students to examine complex issues associated with animal rights from different views. By evaluating and understanding contrasting opinions, readers can attain an inclusive knowledge of the topic. Fact boxes are included to summarize important information for researchers. Readers will take a deep dive into topics such as whether animal (...) class='Hi'>testing is necessary for medical advancement in areas like cancer and pain treatment. (shrink)

Which systems/organisms are conscious? New tests for consciousness (‘C-tests’) are urgently needed. There is persisting uncertainty about when consciousness arises in human development, when it is lost due to neurological disorders and brain injury, and how it is distributed in nonhuman species. This need is amplified by recent and rapid developments in artificial intelligence (AI), neural organoids, and xenobot technology. Although a number of C-tests have been proposed in recent years, most are of limited use, and currently we have no (...) C-tests for many of the populations for which they are most critical. Here, we identify challenges facing any attempt to develop C-tests, propose a multidimensional classification of such tests, and identify strategies that might be used to validate them. (shrink)

Learn all about animal rights activism, from ending animal testing to veganism. Get a global look at the history of the movement, meet the activists involved, and celebrate some of the legal victories! Each chapters end with a call to action, so kids can feel inspired to get involved in their own communities. This high-interest book is written at a lower reading level for struggling readers. Considerate text and engaging art and photographs are sure to grab even (...) the most reluctant readers. Series includes a table of contents, sidebars, bibliography, glossary, index, and author biography. (shrink)

Research with human–animal chimera raises a number of ethical concerns, especially when neural stem cells are transplanted into the brains of non-human primates . Besides animal welfare concerns and ethical issues associated with the use of embryonic stem cells, the research is also regarded as controversial from the standpoint of NHPs developing cognitive or behavioural capabilities that are regarded as “unique” to humans. However, scientists are urging to test new therapeutic approaches for neurological diseases in primate models as (...) they better mimic human physiology than all current animal models. As a response, various countries have issued reports on the topic. Our paper summarizes the ethical issues raised by research with human–animal brain chimeras and compares the relevant regulatory instruments and different recommendations issued in national reports from three important European research nations: Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. We assess and discuss the focus and priorities set by the different reports, review various reasons for and perspectives on the importance of the brain in chimera research, and identify critical points in the reports that warrant further specification and debate. (shrink)

The marker approach is taken as best practice for answering the distribution question: Which animals are conscious? However, the methodology can be used to increase confidence in animals many presume to be unconscious, including C. elegans, leading to a trilemma: accept the worms as conscious; reject the specific markers; or reject the marker methodology for answering the distribution question. I defend the third option and argue that answering the distribution question requires a secure theory of consciousness. Accepting the hypothesis all (...) animals are conscious will promote research leading to secure theory, which is needed to create reliable consciousness tests for animals and AIs. Rather than asking the distribution question, we should shift to the dimensions question: How are animals conscious? (shrink)

Often, the behavior of animals can be better explained and predicted, it seems, if we ascribe the capacity to have beliefs, intentions, and concepts to them. Whether we really can do so, however, is a debated issue. Particularly, Donald Davidson maintains that there is no basis in fact for ascribing propositional attitudes or concepts to animals. I will consider his and rival views, such as Colin Allen's three-part approach, for determining whether animals possess concepts. To avoid pure theoretical debate, however, (...) I will test these criteria using characteristic examples from ethology that depict a broad range of animal behavior. This will allow us to detect a series of gradations in animals' capacities, in the course of which we can think over what would count for or against an attribution of concepts and propositional attitudes to them in each single case. Self-conceit is our natural hereditary disease. Of all creatures man is the most wretched and fragile, and at once the most supercilious. ... It is by this conceit that man arrogates to himself ... divine properties, that he segregates himself from the mass of other creatures and raises himself above them .. (shrink)

The contemporary animal rights movement encompasses a wide range of sometimes-competing agendas from vegetarianism to animal liberation. For people for whom pets are family members—animal lovers outside the fray—extremist positions in which all human–animal interaction is suspect often discourage involvement in the movement to end cruelty to other beings. In _Loving Animals_, Kathy Rudy argues that in order to achieve such goals as ending animal testing and factory farming, activists need to be better attuned (...) to the profound emotional, even spiritual, attachment that many people have with the animals in their lives. Offering an alternative to both the acceptance of animal exploitation and radical animal liberation, Rudy shows that a deeper understanding of the nature of our feelings for and about animals can redefine the human–animal relationship in a positive way. Through extended interviews with people whose lives are intertwined with animals, analysis of the cultural representation of animals, and engaging personal accounts, she explores five realms in which humans use animals: as pets, for food, in entertainment, in scientific research, and for clothing. In each case she presents new methods of animal advocacy to reach a more balanced and sustainable relationship association built on reciprocity and connection. Using this intense emotional bond as her foundation, Rudy suggests that the nearly universal stories we tell of living with and loving animals will both broaden the support for animal advocacy and inspire the societal changes that will improve the lives of animals—and humans—everywhere. (shrink)

In this paper, I reject that animal reasoning, negation in particular, necessarily involves the representation of absences, as suggested by Bermúdez (2003, 2006, 2007), since this would still work as a logical negation (unavailable for non-linguistic creatures). False belief, pretense, and communication experiments show that non-human animals (at least some primates) have difficulties representing absent entities or properties. I offer an alternative account resorting to the sub-symbolic similarity judgments proposed by Vigo & Allen (2009) and expectations: animal proto-negation (...) takes place through the incompatibility between an expected and the actual representation. Finally, I propose that the expectation paradigm be extrapolated to other experi-ments in cognitive psychology (both with pre-linguistic children and animals) in order to design fair experiments that test other minds considering their true abilities. (shrink)

Animals are used in biomedical research to study disease, develop new medicines, and test them for safety. As the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics’ review Normalising the Unthinkable acknowledges, many great strides in medicine have involved animals. However, their contribution has not always been positive. Decades of attempts to develop treatments for diseases including asthma, cancer, stroke, and Alzheimer’s using animals have failed to translate to humans, leaving patients with inadequate treatments or without treatments at all. As Normalising the (...) Unthinkable points out, we have to confront the fact that animal research may have hindered progress, at least in some respects. For example, animal tests have been shown to have very little ability to predict the safety of medicines for human patients. A dramatic illustration of this failing is TGN1412, which almost killed 6 clinical trial volunteers in 2006, after crab-eating macaques showed the drug to be safe, even at massive doses. This failing contributes to adverse drug reactions, which are now one of the world’s leading causes of death, killing hundreds of thousands of people every year and hospitalizing millions. A revolution in science and technology has produced a new generation of more relevant and predictive tools, which could be used to create safer medicines more quickly and at less cost: a win-win situation that should be supported by everyone. The obstacle preventing this from happening is governments’ continued insistence on animal testing. Yet the evidence is clear that reliance on animals as surrogate humans puts patients at risk, can delay medical progress, and can cause effective treatments to be wrongly discarded. There is a compelling case to be made that animal research is an ethical issue for humans as well as for animals. (shrink)

BackgroundThe public and healthcare workers have a high expectation of animal research which they perceive as necessary to predict the safety and efficacy of drugs before testing in clinical trials. However, the expectation is not always realised and there is evidence that the research often fails to stand up to scientific scrutiny and its 'predictive value' is either weak or absent.DiscussionProblems with the use of animals as models of humans arise from a variety of biases and systemic failures (...) including: 1) bias and poor practice in research methodology and data analysis ; 2) lack of transparency in scientific assessment and regulation of the research; 3) long-term denial of weaknesses in cross-species translation; 4) profit-driven motives overriding patient interests; 5) lack of accountability of expenditure on animal research; 6) reductionist-materialism in science which tends to dictate scientific inquiry and control the direction of funding in biomedical research.SummaryBias in animal research needs to be addressed before medical research and healthcare decision-making can be more evidence-based. Research funding may be misdirected on studying 'disease mechanisms' in animals that cannot be replicated outside tightly controlled laboratory conditions, and without sufficient critical evaluation animal research may divert attention away from avenues of research that hold promise for human health. The potential for harm to patients and trial volunteers from reliance on biased animal data1 requires measures to improve its conduct, regulation and analysis. This article draws attention to a few of the many forms of bias in animal research that have come to light in the last decade and offers a strategy incorporating ten recommendations stated at the end of each section on bias. The proposals need development through open debate and subsequent rigorous implementation so that reviewers may determine the value of animal research to human health. The 10Rs + are protected by a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License and therefore may be 'shared, remixed or built on, even commercially, so long as attributed by giving appropriate credit with a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made.’. (shrink)

Animal rights activists all around the world are working to end animal suffering. They campaign for laws to protect animal welfare. They work to stop the use of animals in tests for medicines and cosmetics, factory farming, and the use of fur. Many stop eating meat and using animal products. All agree that animals deserve to be treated with respect and dignity. Could you be one of them? Read this book to find out how to be (...) an animal rights activist"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that many nonhuman animal beings are conscious and have some sense of self. Rather than ask whether they are conscious, I adopt an evolutionary perspective and ask why consciousness and a sense of self evolved—what are they good for? Comparative studies of animal cognition, ethological investigations that explore what it is like to be a certain animal, are useful for answering this question. Charles Darwin argued that the differences in cognitive abilities and (...) emotions among animals are differences in degree rather than differences in kind, and his view cautions against the unyielding claim that humans, and perhaps other great apes and cetaceans, are the only species in which a sense of self-awareness has evolved. I conclude that there are degrees of consciousness and self among animals and that it is likely that no animal has the same highly developed sense of self as that displayed by most humans. Many animals have a sense of “body-ness” or “mine-ness” but not a sense of “I-ness.” Darwin's ideas about evolutionary continuity, together with empirical data (“science sense”) and common sense, will help us learn more about consciousness and self in animals. Answers to challenging questions about animal self-awareness have wide-ranging significance, because they are often used as the litmus test for determining and defending the sorts of treatments to which animals can be morally subjected. (shrink)