In the interesting and thought-provoking article Grazziano and colleagues argue for their Attention Schema Theory (AST) of consciousness. They present AST as a unification of Global Workspace Theory (GWT), Illusionism, and the Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory. We argue it is a mistake to equate 'subjective experience,' ad related terms, with dualism. They simply denote experience. Also, as presented, AST does not accurately capture the essence of HOT for two reasons. HOT is presented as a version of (...) strong illusionism, which it isn't, and HOT requires that one be aware of one's mental life, and postulates that his consists in a re-representation of what is occurring at at the lower-order levels. However, the authors deny that AST involves re-representing visual stimuli. We close by proposing an alternative unification: GWT and AST provide crucial accounts of how lower-order states are assembled and maintained, but higher-order theory provides the account of subjective experience. (shrink)

Jakob von Uexküll’s problematic is manifested in his paradoxical portraiture of form within the plan of nature: the one a sensual schema and the other a transsensual ideal form. At first sight, Uexküll’s belief in the Platonic and the Reformational notions of the immobile becoming of form seems to be a resignation from the heated debates among his contemporary materialists, vitalists, dynamists, and evolutionists. However, in terms of the Kantian subjective teleology, Uexküll’s appropriation of the ancient philosophy reinstates the (...) invisible, static, but repetitive cycle as his regulating principle in the observation of the activity of animals. This regulating principle distinguishes itself from the rule of resemblance established by the appearances and fossil remains of animals, which is linear, incomplete, and digressive. In the light of Michel Foucault, the transition from the visible to the invisible recoups the study of nature from the living beings (les êtres vivants) to the life itself (la vie), from natural philosophy to biology. My study suggests that we recast Uexküll’s sign theory from his observations on the crux that models and triggers an animal to action in its Umwelt. Bracketing Uexküll’s transcendental configuration of form and image, we still find that schema, in itssensual and functional context, evolves from a reflection of the objects to a summary of their features plus an ignorance of their proper names. Uexküll's erasure of proper names (in different languages) that directs our attention to the presentation in its pure form (Gestalt) not only constitutes an important step in epistemology, but also in a life science that meticulously delves into the genotypes. (shrink)

One sceptical rejoinder to those who claim that sensory perception is cognitively penetrable is to appeal to the involvement of attention. So, while a phenomenon might initially look like one where, say, a perceiver’s beliefs are influencing her visual experience, another interpretation is that because the perceiver believes and desires as she does, she consequently shifts her spatial attention so as to change what she senses visually. But, the sceptic will urge, this is an entirely familiar phenomenon, and it hardly (...) involves some special or theoretically important cognitive effect on sensory perception. Even supposing that the sceptic is correct about cases that are accurately described in this way, the rejoinder oversimplifies the possible roles that attention may play in mediating cognition and perception. This paper aims to identify these different roles, and by emphasis on empirical research on feature-based and object-based attention. What emerges is a plausible and well- evidenced mental schema that describes attention -mediated cognitive penetration. At the very least, the burden of proof is shifted to the sceptic, as he then must show that there are no mental phenomena involving attention in the more nuanced ways described here. One additional benefit of this analysis is that it illuminates various features of attention and its relation to both cognition and phenomenal consciousness. Therefore the analysis should be of interest to a broad range of theorists of the mind, and not just those invested in the cognitive penetration debate. (shrink)

Recently we proposed a theory of consciousness, the attention schema theory, based on findings in cognitive psychology and systems neuroscience. In that theory, consciousness is an internal model o...

This paper spells out the attention schema theory of consciousness in terms of the predictive processing framework. As it stands, the attention schema theory lacks a plausible computational formalization that could be used for developing possible mechanistic models of how it is realized in the brain. The predictive processing framework, on the other hand, fails to provide a plausible explanation of the subjective quality or the phenomenal aspect of conscious experience. The aim of this work is (...) to apply the formal tools of predictive processing to outline a possible model of cognition that details a plausible way in which organisms may acquire or construct the kinds of schemas postulated by the attention schema theory. This is done in terms of Bayesian control models, which tend to favour representing information in a frugal or 'sparse' manner that strips away detail in precisely the way that the attention schema requires. Once integrated, these two accounts can offer a plausible explanation of the supposedly irreducible and mysterious 'feel' of conscious experience, in terms of the frugal manner in which perceptual mechanisms are represented by the attention schema. (shrink)

This article contributes to the nascent field of Cognitive Sociolinguistics. In particular, we are interested in how usage-based cognitive linguistics and variationist sociolinguistics may enrich each other. We first discuss some of the ways in which variationist insights have led cognitive linguists such as Gries (e.g. Multifactorial analysis in corpus linguistics: A study of particle placement, Continuum, 2003) and Grondelaers et al. (e.g. National variation in the use of er “there”. Regional and diachronic constraints on cognitive explanations, Mouton de Gruyter, (...) 2008) to pay attention to language-external factors (such as medium, region, and register), thereby greatly enhancing the description and understanding of certain grammatical phenomena. The focus then shifts to cognitive linguistic work (by Hollmann and Siewierska, English Language and Linguistics 11: 407–424, 2007 and Clark and Trousdale, English Language and Linguistics 13: 33–55, 2009) which has implications for sociolinguistic theory. The two usage-based concepts that have proved especially relevant in this connection are frequency effects and schemas. The article explores and illustrates the role of these two factors in relation to linguistic variation by means of a new case study on definite article reduction (DAR) in Lancashire dialect, a variety spoken in the North West of England. A twofold conclusion is drawn: first, a symbiotic relation between cognitive and sociolinguistics seems possible, but second, in order for this relation to be truly mutually beneficial variationists should get involved in the Cognitive Sociolinguistic enterprise much more than is currently the case. (shrink)

A recent paradigm shift in music research has allowed scholars to examine the macro- and micro-processes taking place within musical performance and underlying cognitive processes. Tying in with phenomenological theories of embodied perception and cognition, this paper focuses on bodily musical activity relevant to the acquisition of instrumental musical skills—the process of learning music. Dynamic interaction with musical instruments, accompanied by the interplay of action and passion, involves body image and body schema, whose status oscillates in different phases of (...) the acquisition of instrumental musical skills; this interaction allows humans to direct attention from their bodily states—the proximal—to the quality of musical sounds and a unity of musical experience—the distal. It is thus argued that shaping music by means of playing a musical instrument can be conceived of as an embodied process, of understanding the forms of one’s own experience as related to the musical world that is created by one’s bodily activity. (shrink)

Chalmers (2018) raises three challenges for Michael Graziano's attention schema theory. Our aim in this paper is to bolster Graziano's attention schema theory with some tools and insights from the predictive processing framework, in order to respond to the challenges raised by Chalmers and more generally strengthen the theory. We will first introduce the attention schema theory and the three challenges raised by Chalmers, before outlining our application of predictive processing to the (...) class='Hi'>theory and how it can resolve these challenges, thus offering a solution to the meta-problem. (shrink)

This paper looks at the tragedy of Qiao Feng in Jin Yong’s The Demi-Gods and the Semi-Devils. While it is common practice for Žižekean scholars to examine genre writing and popular culture with Lacanian theory, the martial arts genre has received little attention. In Demi-Gods, Qiao Feng experiences an ‘identity crisis’ at the peak of his career: rumour has it that though he was raised and trained in China, he was born a Khitan. Qiao Feng at first believes it (...) is a just conspiracy, and henceforth is blind-sided by the imaginary relation between his ego and small others. He mis-recognises others’ scheming as ‘the Other of the Other,’ while his supposedly deceased Khitan father occupies the corner of the Other in the schema L to orchestra the manipulation game. However, what Qiao Feng is really under prey is the desire of the father, and of the two fatherlands, one Han-Chinese, one Khitan: his tragedy lies in the split of the national Other, in the impossibility of the ethical imperative Your duty is to be loyal to your country. And yet, it is exactly because of the emptiness in the ethical call that Qiao Feng can start to act as a subject, a subject that is by definition already always split. This paper thus interprets the actions of Jin Yong’s hero according to Lacan’s schema L, and also provides variations of the schema based on the twists and turns of this martial arts tragedy. (shrink)

The inaugural title in the new, Open Access series BSPS Open, The Material Theory of Induction will initiate a new tradition in the analysis of inductive inference. The fundamental burden of a theory of inductive inference is to determine which are the good inductive inferences or relations of inductive support and why it is that they are so. The traditional approach is modeled on that taken in accounts of deductive inference. It seeks universally applicable schemas or rules or (...) a single formal device, such as the probability calculus. After millennia of halting efforts, none of these approaches has been unequivocally successful and debates between approaches persist. The Material Theory of Induction identifies the source of these enduring problems in the assumption taken at the outset: that inductive inference can be accommodated by a single formal account with universal applicability. Instead, it argues that that there is no single, universally applicable formal account. Rather, each domain has an inductive logic native to it. Which that is, and its extent, is determined by the facts prevailing in that domain. Paying close attention to how inductive inference is conducted in science and copiously illustrated with real-world examples, The Material Theory of Induction will initiate a new tradition in the analysis of inductive inference. (shrink)

The attention schema theory explains how a biological, information processing machine can claim to have consciousness, and how, by introspection (by assessing its internal data), it cannot determine that it is a machine whose claims are based on computations. The theory directly addresses Chalmers' meta-problem of consciousness, the problem of why we think we have a difficult-to-explain consciousness in the first place.

This review evaluates pros and cons of the schema theory as a general framework for expressing what Arbib et al. call “systems neuroscience.” We discuss the software/hardware duality of the schema concept and the relative neglect of the mechanical properties of muscles. We propose a computational alternative to the functional decomposition in terms of schemas.

Given the bond between emotion and cognition underlying the broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions, positive and negative emotions have critical roles in cognitive skills. The aim of this review was to probe into the triarchic relationship between L2 learners’ cognition, emotion, and language performance, reflected in the bond between self-efficacy, foreign language anxiety, and speaking skill, in light of the main emerging theories in the field of SLA underpinning this relationship. Moreover, the theoretical foundations, such as learners’ cognitive performances, (...) Bandura’s self-efficacy theory, control-value theory, and positive psychology theory, were explicated in order to justify the relationship between self-efficacy and oral communication skill. Furthermore, the underlying theories such as attentional control theory, complex dynamic system theory, affective filter theory, and cultural schema theory, which relate foreign language anxiety to speaking skill were scrutinized in this review. The review also expounded on the implications and future directions for EFL teachers, material designers, teacher educators, educational policy-makers, and advisors. The ideas can improve their awareness of learner self-efficacy, foreign language anxiety, and oral communication skill in educational contexts. (shrink)

A direct equivalence between neural function and neural structure does not provide a fruitful approach to understanding brain functioning. Arbib et al. describe a new and powerful approach to circumvent this problem, which they call schema theory. However, in examples they fall prey to the tradition of finding such equivalences, not doing schema theory justice.

How has the storage of information shaped human cognition? We bring together current advances in cognitive science, the neurobiology of memory, and archaeology to explore how storage of information affects consciousness. These fields strongly suggest that the increase in storage of information in the environment – which we call exosomatic storage of information – may have led to changes in human consciousness and human neurophysiology over time. To bring these findings together conceptually, we develop what we call a dialectical model (...) of the relationship between storage of information and the development of human consciousness. Using the system of dialectic philosophy, we put forward that (a) environmental changes, consciousness, and neurophysiology develop together, (b) these changes were irreversible, (c) quantitative increases in exosomatic storage of information may have led to qualitative changes in human consciousness and neurophysiology, (d) these changes in turn affected how we see ourselves. Indeed, our capacity to store information exosomatically distinguishes us from other animals, and may be a key attribute of our self-awareness and therefore self-consciousness. Because metaphors are central to human thought and can help structure scientific inquiry, we illustrate our model using a metaphor of drops of silver on the back of a glass, eventually making a mirror—where successive quantitative change leads to an irreversible qualitative development in human consciousness. The dialectic model can offer new insights into the co-evolution of material culture and human beings through its broader philosophical foundations and explanatory power. (shrink)

Journal Name: Cognitive Linguistics Issue: Ahead of print.

Mack and Rock show evidence that no consciousperception occurs without a prior attentiveact. Subjects already executing attention taskstend to neglect visible elements extraneous tothe attentional task, apparently lacking evenbetter-than-chance ``implicit perception,''except in certain cases where the unattendedstimulus is a meaningful word or has uniquepre-tuned salience similar to that ofmeaningful words. This is highly consistentwith ``enactive'' notions that consciousnessrequires selective attention via emotional subcortical and limbic motivationalactivation as it influences anterior attentionmechanisms. Occipital activation withoutconsciousness suggests that motivated search,enacted through the (...) organism's subcorticalmotivational functions, is needed beforevisual stimulation engenders consciousness.This enactive view – that searching for,rather than receiving or processing input isthe basis of consciousness – was slow ingaining acceptance lacking empirical evidenceof this kind, combined with thestimulus-response assumption that brain eventssubserving perceptual consciousness must resultfrom transformation of perceptual input ratherthan from the organism's self-regulatedactivity as manifested through subcorticalactivity. Implicit perception occurring withword priming is ``paradoxical'' according to Mackand Rock, suggesting late selection forattention after extensive unconsciousprocessing, while most trials involvingnonverbal rather than verbal images mightsuggest earlier selection, sinceunattended objects are unseen, apparently evenimplicitly. This paper argues that anteriorand subcortical motivational mechanisms play animportant role in early selection; posteriormechanisms then unconsciously enhance signals;if data survive early gating andcorticothalamic enhancement, then still further anterior-limbic loops motivatedlyactivate ``image schemas'' resonating withposterior nonconscious processing; at thatpoint, consciousness occurs. (shrink)

Saunders Mac Lane has drawn attention many times, particularly in his book Mathematics: Form and Function, to the system of set theory of which the axioms are Extensionality, Null Set, Pairing, Union, Infinity, Power Set, Restricted Separation, Foundation, and Choice, to which system, afforced by the principle, , of Transitive Containment, we shall refer as . His system is naturally related to systems derived from topos-theoretic notions concerning the category of sets, and is, as Mac Lane emphasises, one that (...) is adequate for much of mathematics. In this paper we show that the consistency strength of Mac Lane's system is not increased by adding the axioms of Kripke–Platek set theory and even the Axiom of Constructibility to Mac Lane's axioms; our method requires a close study of Axiom H, which was proposed by Mitchell; we digress to apply these methods to subsystems of Zermelo set theory , and obtain an apparently new proof that is not finitely axiomatisable; we study Friedman's strengthening of , and the Forster–Kaye subsystem of , and use forcing over ill-founded models and forcing to establish independence results concerning and ; we show, again using ill-founded models, that proves the consistency of ; turning to systems that are type-theoretic in spirit or in fact, we show by arguments of Coret and Boffa that proves a weak form of Stratified Collection, and that is a conservative extension of for stratified sentences, from which we deduce that proves a strong stratified version of ; we analyse the known equiconsistency of with the simple theory of types and give Lake's proof that an instance of Mathematical Induction is unprovable in Mac Lane's system; we study a simple set theoretic assertion—namely that there exists an infinite set of infinite sets, no two of which have the same cardinal—and use it to establish the failure of the full schema of Stratified Collection in ; and we determine the point of failure of various other schemata in . The paper closes with some philosophical remarks. (shrink)

In this paper, it is argued that although data mining (DM) is being touted as a solution to many business problems and is basking in the glory of electronic business environments of today, as practiced currently, it reflects a preoccupation with short-run commercial applications and a neglect of the underlying theoretical issues. Although an argument can be made that theoretical precedence is not a necessary prerequisite for practical application or for commercial success, it can also be argued that an exclusive (...) reliance on data-driven and exploratory components of pattern recognition without a corresponding attention to the causal schemas underlying patterns is destined to limit the potential for DM to evolve into a long-term solution to business problems or into an intellectual discipline in its own right. This paper presents an overview of key features and assumptions in DM and examines some of the key practical, philosophical, and foundational issues in DM. (shrink)

Traditional approaches in philosophy of biology focus attention on biological concepts, explanations, and theories, on evidential support and inter-theoretical relations. Newer approaches shift attention from concepts to conceptual practices, from theories to practices of theorizing, and from theoretical reduction to reductive retooling. In this article, I describe the shift from theory-focused to practice-centered philosophy of science and explain how it is leading philosophers to abandon fundamentalist assumptions associated with traditional approaches in philosophy of science and to embrace scientific pluralism. (...) This article comes in three parts, each illustrating the shift from theory-focused to practice-centered epistemology. The first illustration shows how shifting philosophical attention to conceptual practice reveals how molecular biologists succeed in identifying coherent causal strands within systems of bewildering complexity. The second illustration suggests that analyzing how a multiplicity of alternative models function in practice provides an illuminating approach for understanding the nature of theoretical knowledge in evolutionary biology. The third illustration demonstrates how framing reductionism in terms of the reductive retooling of practice offers an informative perspective for understanding why putting DNA at the center of biological research has been incredibly productive throughout much of biology. Each illustration begins by describing how traditional theory-focused philosophical approaches are laden with fundamentalist assumptions and then proceeds to show that shifting attention to practice undermines these assumptions and motivates a philosophy of scientific pluralism. (shrink)

Although Bartlett's schema theory has been highly influential in modern cognitive psychology, it has often been misunderstood. This paper discusses Bartlett's schema theory along with modern schema theories, argues that the problems in the interpretation of Bartlett's writing arise because his theory is fundamentally different from modern schema theories, shows that Bartlett's theory, but not modern schema theories, can be explained in terms of the brain's constructive and self-regulatory processes, and discusses (...) such a brain-based theory of learning and remembering in the context of recent developments in biofunctional cognition. (shrink)

Looking at Thomas Kuhn's work from a cognitive science perspective helps to articulate and to legitimize, to some degree, his rejection of traditional views of concepts, categorization, theory structure, and rule-based problem solving. Whereas my colleagues focus on the later Kuhn of the MIT years, I study the early Kuhn as an anticipation of case-based reasoning and schema theory. These recent developments in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence may point toward a more computational version of Kuhn's ideas, (...) but they also expose ambiguities in his work, notably in his understanding of exemplars. (shrink)

This commentary concludes that Bartlett took a functional approach to psychological theory. He hypothesized that schemata are active, holistic, unconscious, and show emergent properties. He provided no mechanism for going from episodic instances to a holistic schema or for the long-term retention of information in memory. Modern schema theories reject Bartlett's holism and interpret his hypothesis that schemata are active in terms of the active nature of top-down processes in memory and perception. Modern schema theories use (...) the construct of instantiation to account for memory of specific schema-related information and also postulate unconscious, generic memory structures to account for the impact of old knowledge on human cognitive processing. (shrink)

The epistemic paradox of 'belief instability' has recently received notable attention from many philosophers. Understanding this paradox is very important because belief is a central notion of psychologically motivated semantic theories in philosophy, linguistics, and cognitive science, and this paradox poses serious problems for these theories. In this dissertation I criticize previous proposals and offer a new proposal, which I call a 'revision theory of belief'. ;My revision theory of belief is in many respects an application of Gupta's (...) and Belnap's revision theory of truth, which is proposed to deal with the Liar paradox. They argue that truth is a circular notion because Tarski biconditionals provide circular, partial definitions of truth. And this circularity of truth is the source of the Liar paradox. I offer a similar proposal for handling the paradox of belief instability. In particular, I argue that our notion of belief involved in the paradox of belief instability is circular, and that is why this paradox arises. ;If the notion of belief involved in the paradox is circular, we have to employ a hypothetical evaluation of the belief predicate, and if we do so through a revision process, we can avoid the contradiction which seems to be generated by some paradoxical belief sentences. But it is not easy to show that our notion of belief is circular. Especially, there is nothing like Tarski biconditionals in the case of belief. Nonetheless, I show in this dissertation that there is a certain schema, which I call the B-schema, whose instances can be taken as circular, partial definitions of a notion of belief, and it is that notion of belief which is involved in the paradox of belief instability. In this dissertation I also show that the revision approach can be extended for handling the Knower paradox. I argue that the Knower paradox arises because our notion of knowledge involved in the paradox is circular. (shrink)

Contemporary cognitive science clearly tells us that attention is modulated for speech and action. While these forms of goal-directed attention are very well researched in psychology, they have not been sufficiently studied by epistemologists. In this book, Abrol Fairweather and Carlos Montemayor develop and defend a theory of epistemic achievements that requires the manifestation of cognitive agency. They examine empirical work on the psychology of attention and assertion, and use it to ground a normative theory of epistemic achievements (...) and virtues. The resulting study is the first sustained naturalized virtue epistemology, and will be of interest to readers in epistemology, cognitive science, and beyond. (shrink)

This article presents theories of attention that attempt to derive their answer to the question of what attention is from their answers to the question of what it is for some activity to be done attentively. Such theories provide a distinctive account of the difficulties that are faced by the attempt to locate processes in the brain by which the phenomena of attention can be explained. Their account does not share the pessimism of theories suggesting that the concept of attention (...) is defective. Instead it reconstrues the explanatory relationship between attention and the processes that constitute it, in a way that is illustrated here by considering the relationship between attention and the processes that are identified by the biased competition theory. After considering some of the ways in which an adverbialist approach might be developed, the article concludes by suggesting some possible solutions to a problem concerning distraction, by which prominent adverbialist theories of attention have been dogged. (shrink)

The epistemic paradox of 'belief instability' has recently received notable attention from many philosophers. Understanding this paradox is very important because belief is a central notion of psychologically motivated semantic theories in philosophy, linguistics, and cognitive science, and this paradox poses serious problems for these theories. In this dissertation I criticize previous proposals and offer a new proposal, which I call a 'revision theory of belief'. -/- My revision theory of belief is in many respects an application of (...) Gupta's and Belnap's revision theory of truth, which is proposed to deal with the Liar paradox. They argue that truth is a circular notion because Tarski biconditionals provide circular, partial definitions of truth. And this circularity of truth is the source of the Liar paradox. I offer a similar proposal for handling the paradox of belief instability. In particular, I argue that our notion of belief involved in the paradox of belief instability is circular, and that is why this paradox arises. -/- If the notion of belief involved in the paradox is circular, we have to employ a hypothetical evaluation of the belief predicate, and if we do so through a revision process, we can avoid the contradiction which seems to be generated by some paradoxical belief sentences. But it is not easy to show that our notion of belief is circular. Especially, there is nothing like Tarski biconditionals in the case of belief. Nonetheless, I show in this dissertation that there is a certain schema, which I call the B-schema, whose instances can be taken as circular, partial definitions of a notion of belief, and it is that notion of belief which is involved in the paradox of belief instability. In this dissertation I also show that the revision approach can be extended for handling the Knower paradox. I argue that the Knower paradox arises because our notion of knowledge involved in the paradox is circular. (shrink)

This paper sketches an account that explains the elusive subjective quality of 'enduring substantiality' of the phenomenal self. It integrates a recent predictive processing account of the self by Chris Letheby and Philip Gerrans with key ideas of Michael Graziano's attention schema theory of consciousness. Similarly to the attention schema theory, the present account posits an internal model of ongoing attentional processing that supports attentional control. In terms of predictive processing, it is a dynamic (...) model of precision estimates that represents the salience of features, objects, and internal and external processes. The apparent substantiality of the self is then explained by a structural feature of this salience model: it binds different dimensions of salience by representations of higher-order dimensions of salience. The result of this salience binding is a phenomenally transparent 'salience object', which is represented as a cause of widespread changes in precision estimates, and results in a form of epistemic self-control. Phenomenologically, this goes along with the experience of the self as an attentional agent, and in this way creates the origin of our consciously experienced first-person perspective: I attend, I am. (shrink)

Preceding research in cognitive linguistics has advanced the claim that evaluative components form an integral part of image schemas (cf. Krzeszowski 1993, 1997; Cienki 1997: 3–6). This so-called “plus–minus” (or “axiological”) parameter has primarily been discussed with regard to opposing dimensions within a range of image-schematic contexts. In the paired particles in–out, up–down, and on–off, for instance, the meaning of which is based on the image-schematic notions of CONTAINMENT, VERTICALITY, and CONTACT, respectively, the second elements are assumed to carry negative (...) default evaluations. Additionally, the Axiological Invariance Principle (Krzeszowski 1997) claims that these evaluative components are generally retained in metaphorical extensions. This study applies the plus–minus hypothesis in image-schema theory to the analysis of semantically highly redundant verb-particle constructions in English. The hypotheses derived from this application are tested against the real usage of such constructions as documented in the British National Corpus and the Collins Online. Though the presentation of a full-blown alternative to the plus–minus assumption is beyond the scope of this empirical investigation, an important implication of this study is that the isolated, “primitive” (noncompound) image schemas traditionally dealt with in cognitive linguistic research should not be considered as the locus of evaluative defaults. It is suggested instead that axiological components are dimensions of richer, contextualized cognitive models, in which image schemas appear as complex superimpositions, i.e., image-schema groupings or compounds. (shrink)

This article examines how cultural schema theory has been employed to explore some aspects of Aboriginal English oral discourse. The merit of this approach lies in the explanatory tools provided by cultural schema theory in accounting for those features of oral discourse in Aboriginal English which are distinctive and which often impair its lucidity to non-Aboriginal speakers. In particular, we have focused on the exploration of recurrent semantic and formal patterning across a large body of narratives, (...) evidence of speakers' use of indigenous schemas in associative responses as well as in processing oral narrative, and schema maintenance in discourse in non-traditional settings and in the context of non-traditional subjects. (shrink)

Clahsen's experimental data from generalization, frequency, and priming fail to support and even conflict with those aspects of his dual-route account that distinguish it from schema theories.