Mention of the name of Friedrich Schiller among both critics and defenders of Kant's moral philosophy has most often been with reference to the well known quip:“Gladly I serve my friends, but alas I do it with pleasure.Hence I am plagued with doubt that I am not a virtuous person.““Sure, your only resource is to try to despise them entirely,And then with aversion to do what your duty enjoins you.''This attention, however, has served to obscure the fact that Schiller truly (...) intended his remark as a joke, representing a serious, if understandable, misinterpretation of Kantian morality. Though Schiller's various attempts to articulate a theory of moral motivation include important divergences from Kant's account, they represent a response to a set of problems that arise in the context of Kantian moral theory. As such, they may be of greatest interest to moralists who are working within the Kantian tradition. In this paper, I clarify certain points of Schiller's critique of Kant's account of moral motivation and place them in the context of his broader project of reconciling Kantianism and an ethics of virtue. (shrink)

The status of marijuana as an illegal drug has greatly evolved in recent years. Many countries have decriminalized possession of marijuana for personal use. Others have not decriminalized it but simply “tolerate” it for private personal use. Four countries have passed laws legalizing medical marijuana and one other tolerates the use of marijuana for medical purposes without having legislated a specific right for such possession and use. To date, 17 of the United States and the District of Columbia have also (...) passed laws regarding medical marijuana. However, state medical marijuana laws are at odds with the federal Controlled Substances Act, which prohibits possession of marijuana. This fact, in tandem with employer requirements under the Drug-Free Workplace Act, has created a dilemma for employers who have employees with medical conditions for which medical marijuana has been recommended. Given that 18 additional states currently have medical marijuana legislation pending, medical marijuana in the workplace is an issue which is not going to go away. As a result, it is time to examine the interface between federal and state laws as well as the public policy issues surrounding the lack of rights which medical marijuana patients have in their workplaces. (shrink)

Jean Porter’s excellent study not only offers a clear and expansive picture of Aquinas on justice but also touches on nearly every other topic in Aquinas’s ethics. Of course, Aquinas himself thinks that no topic in philosophy or theology can be understood, or understood well, apart from its connection to multiple others, and Porter’s book is in this respect, as in so many others, deeply Thomistic. In the course of exploring justice—justice as a virtue, justice as a moral ideal, (...) and the special authority carried by the precepts of justice—Porter also reveals Aquinas’s thought on practical reason, moral inconsistency, virtue, eudaimonism, and normativity.“Aquinas gets justice right,” Porter asserts. Unlike most... (shrink)

A long-standing tenet of virtue theory is that moral virtue and knowledge are connected in some important way. Julia Driver attacks the traditional assumption that virtue requires knowledge. I argue that the examples of virtues of ignorance Driver offers are not compelling and that the idea that knowledge is required for virtue has been taken to be foundational for virtue theory for good reason. I propose that we understand modesty as involving three conditions: 1) having (...) genuine accomplishments, 2) being aware of the value of these accomplishments, and 3) having a disposition to refrain from putting forward one's accomplishments. When we understand modesty this way, we can properly identify genuine cases of modesty and see how modesty requires knowledge. Something similar can be said about other alleged virtues of ignorance. With the proposal in place, we have no serious reason to think that moral virtue requires ignorance. Additionally, we have good reasons for thinking that acting virtuously requires having good intentions and that a necessary condition of having a virtue is having knowledge. Although some might take these results to be trivial or obviously true, I think the Julia Driver's challenge should not be dismissed out of hand. Even though there are some reasons for thinking that some situations suggest that knowledge and virtue can be separated from one another, close analysis reveals this impression is only surface deep. (shrink)

Codes of ethics abound in science, but the question of why such codes should be obeyed is rarely asked. Various reasons for obeying a professional code have been proposed, but all are unsatisfactory in that they do not really motivate behavior. This article suggests that the long forgotten virtue of reverence provides both a reason to obey a professional code and motivation to do so. In addition, it discusses the importance of reverence as a cardinal virtue for scientists (...) drawing on the ideas of Paul Woodruff on the role of virtue in community. (shrink)

In “A Virtue Ethics Critique of Ethical Dimensions of Behavioral Economics,” Professor Daryl Koehn criticizes the field of behavioral economics. She argues that behavioral economists ignore many important factors that affect how people make decisions, that their results are derived from experiments where subjects make choices in overly restrictive, artificial, and thin contexts that do not capture the richness of reality, and that the approach brings up psychological motivations that affect behavior in a piecemeal, ad hoc way that does (...) not capture the overall tapestry of the factors that influence the choices that we make. In this comment, I offer responses to many of these criticisms, and note where I think we have common ground. (shrink)

Woiceshyn showed that leaders who exhibit rational egoistic behaviors not only make decisions that lead to organizational success, but that these decisions are also ethical. Woiceshyn’s ethical decision-making model consists of seven fundamental virtues associated with rational egoism: rationality, productiveness, justice, independence, honesty, integrity, and pride. In this paper, we define the rational egoism construct using a virtues-based ethical framework. We compare and contrast the seven virtues under rational egoism with alternative interpretations that arise under altruism, deontology, and teleology in (...) order to further refine the construct. Based on this analysis, we conceptualize rational egoism as a Type II second-order formative model and develop a scale based on the seven underlying virtues. Through the use of partial least squares path modelling, we validate this on a sample of 534 full-time American workers. We then demonstrate that this rational egoism construct has a strong, positive relationship to the transformational leadership construct. Implications for practice are discussed and areas for future study are suggested. (shrink)

The key statement made at the outset of Schneewind’s comprehensive investigation of early modern moral philosophy is that “Kant invented the conception of morality as autonomy”. Schneewind supports this strong historical claim by distinguishing sharply between the concept of autonomy and the various notions of moral self-governance found in seventeenth and eighteenth century ethics. Generally speaking, we are morally self-governing when we are equipped, cognitively and emotionally, so as to require neither external sanctioning authority nor external instruction for the regulation (...) of our actions. Yet to base one’s moral theory on this kind of account of selfgovernance does not necessarily make one an advocate of autonomous ethics. We are autonomous only when, in addition to satisfying the requirements of self-governance, we are self-lawgiving. For Kant, we are morally self-governing because we are autonomous. Schneewind argues persuasively that this conception of moral autonomy is simply not present in the history of ethics prior to Kant. The book examines the historical context out of which Kant’s account of morality as autonomy emerged. It thereby brings to light the novelty of the Kantian approach to the question of moral self-governance. Yet it also makes plain the essential continuity of Kant’s theory of virtue and doctrine of right with traditional ethico-theological concerns underlying the systems of seventeenth and eighteenth century moral philosophy. A crucial key to understanding early modern moral philosophy in view of the theory of autonomy is to know exactly Kant’s place in a theoretical terrain determined largely by debates about how God can be kept essential to morality. Thus, Schneewind makes the question of voluntarism versus intellectualism the central guiding theme of his highly detailed analyses of individual ethical theories. In particular, Schneewind’s treatment of the relation between voluntarism and intellectualism allows him to show how late seventeenth century and eighteenth century moralities of self-governance emerged from criticism of the motivational assumptions behind modern natural law theories, the common distinguishing characteristic of which is the endorsement of a morality of obedience requiring external sanctions for the establishment of obligation. (shrink)

BackgroundResearch Ethics Boards, or Institutional Review Boards, protect the safety and welfare of human research participants. These bodies are responsible for providing an independent evaluation of proposed research studies, ultimately ensuring that the research does not proceed unless standards and regulations are met.Main bodyConcurrent with the growing volume of human participant research, the workload and responsibilities of Research Ethics Boards (REBs) have continued to increase. Dissatisfaction with the review process, particularly the time interval from submission to decision, is common within (...) the research community, but there has been little systematic effort to examine REB processes that may contribute to inefficiencies. We offer a model illustrating REB workflow, stakeholders, and accountabilities.ConclusionBetter understanding of the components of the research ethics review will allow performance targets to be set, problems identified, and solutions developed, ultimately improving the process. (shrink)

A system of environmental ethics recently developed by Lawrence Johnson may be used to analyze the moral implications of biological control. According to this system, entities are morally relevant when they possess well-being interests (i.e., functions or processes that can be better or worse in so far as the entity is concerned). In this formulation of ethical analysis, species and ecosystems are morally relevant because they are not simply aggregates of individuals, so their processes, properties, and well-being interests are not (...) reducible to the sum of their individual members. Following Johnson's thesis, species and ecosystems have morally relevant interests in surviving and maintaining themselves as integrated wholes with particular self-identities. This theoretical structure gives rise to a number of ethical criteria that are particularly relevant to biological control, which apply to the ecosystem (the extent to which it is large, native, unique, and integrated) and to the action being considered (the extent to which it is novel, omnipresent, monitored, reversible, and necessary). In these terms, it is evident that not all biological control efforts are ethically defensible. In general terms, natural biological control is most desirable, followed by augmentative strategies, classical approaches, and finally neoclassical biological control. Two specific cases (neoclassical biological control of rangeland grasshoppers and classical biological control of prickly pear cactus) illustrate the ethical concerns. Finally, it can be shown that formalized restrictions of biological control are necessary, given the unique properties of this technology. (shrink)

We are concerned here with how structural properties of language may come to reflect features of the world in which it evolves. As a concrete example, we will consider how a simple term language might evolve to support the principle of indifference over state descriptions in that language. The point is not that one is justified in applying the principle of indifference to state descriptions in natural language. Instead, it is that one should expect a language that has evolved in (...) the context of facilitating successful action to reflect probabilistic features of the world in which it evolved. (shrink)

Ever since its inception, Charles Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection has challenged assumptions about the nature of humankind and human institutions. It did not escape the notice of Darwin, sympathetic allies, or hostile contemporaries that his theory had profound implications for ethics and theology. In this paper I review some current sociobiological hypotheses about the mind that are based on the theory that the human mind is primarily a social tool. Many researchers now believe that both complex human (...) within‐group cooperation and between‐group competition are the anvils that may have shaped the modules of the mind. Given this evolutionary theory of the mind, the Darwinian challenge to theism, ethics, and faith is now being relaunched with a vengeance. However, I suggest that modern physics, evolutionary biology, and cognitive science all seem to fit nicely into the atheistic and phenomenological niche defined by Buddhism. (shrink)

Exercise psychology encompasses the disciplines of psychiatry, clinical and counseling psychology, health promotion, and the movement sciences. This emerging field involves diverse mental health issues, theories, and general information related to physical activity and exercise. Numerous research investigations across the past 20 years have shown both physical and psychological benefits from physical activity and exercise. Exercise psychology offers many opportunities for growth while positively influencing the mental and physical health of individuals, communities, and society. However, the exercise psychology literature has (...) not addressed ethical issues or dilemmas faced by mental health professionals providing exercise psychology services. This initial discussion of ethical issues in exercise psychology is an important step in continuing to move the field forward. Specifically, this article will address the emergence of exercise psychology and current health behaviors and offer an overview of ethics and ethical issues, education/training and professional competency, cultural and ethnic diversity, multiple-role relationships and conflicts of interest, dependency issues, confidentiality and recording keeping, and advertisement and self-promotion. (shrink)

The question of whether AI systems such as robots can or should be afforded moral agency or patiency is not one amenable either to discovery or simple reasoning, because we as societies constantly reconstruct our artefacts, including our ethical systems. Consequently, the place of AI systems in society is a matter of normative, not descriptive ethics. Here I start from a functionalist assumption, that ethics is the set of behaviour that maintains a society. This assumption allows me to exploit the (...) theoretical biology of sociality and autonomy to explain our moral intuitions. From this grounding I extend to consider possible ethics for maintaining either human- or of artefact-centred societies. I conclude that while constructing AI systems as either moral agents or patients is possible, neither is desirable. In particular, I argue that we are unlikely to construct a coherent ethics in which it it is ethical to afford AI moral subjectivity. We are therefore obliged not to build AI we are obliged to. (shrink)

What effect does witnessing other students cheat have on one's own cheating behavior? What roles do moral attitudes and neutralizing attitudes (justifications for behavior) play when deciding to cheat? The present research proposes a model of academic dishonesty which takes into account each of these variables. Findings from experimental (vignette) and survey methods determined that seeing others cheat increases cheating behavior by causing students to judge the behavior less morally reprehensible, not by making rationalization easier. Witnessing cheating also has unique (...) effects, controlling for other variables. (shrink)

The growth of positive psychology has birthed debate on the nature of what “positive” really means. Conceptualizations of positive attributes vary across psychological perspectives, and it appears these definitional differences stem from standards for “positive” espoused by three normative ethical frameworks: consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. When definitions of “positive” do not align with one of these ethical schools, it appears researchers rely on preference to distinguish positive attributes. In either case, issues arise when researchers do not make their (...) theoretical alignment explicit, leading to value-laden, often subjective criteria being smuggled into science as a description of what is positive. To foster a deeper critical understanding of the different approaches, we examine how these conceptual definitions of positive attributes (mis)align with their ethical traditions or fail to align with an ethical school. (shrink)

We are concerned here with how structural properties of language may come to reflect features of the world in which it evolves. As a concrete example, we will consider how a simple term language might evolve to support the principle of indifference over state descriptions in that language. The point is not that one is justified in applying the principle of indifference to state descriptions in natural language. Instead, it is that one should expect a language that has evolved in (...) the context of facilitating successful action to reflect probabilistic features of the world in which it evolved. (shrink)

A principle aim of this paper is to convince friends and critics of deconstruction that they have overlooked two crucial aspects of Derrida's work, namely, his rearticulation of the concept of experience and his account of the experience of undecidability as an ordeal. This is important because sensitivity to Derrida's emphasis on the ordeal of undecidability and his rearticulation of the concept of experience-a rearticulation that is already under way in his early engagement with Husserl and continued in later work-necessitates (...) a rethinking of what the `experience of undecidability' entails. Rather than signaling a withdrawal from politics or a normatively impotent ethics of `mere openness to the other,' Derrida's account of the experience of undecidability not only points to a fundamental aspect of our basic ethical experience but also leads to a number of ethico-political demands, which I summarize as the demand to maintain an ethos of interruption. (shrink)

If the field of agricultural ethics is to realize its potential and if the agricultural and philosophical communities are to address the impending changes in world food production, there is a need for education in public, governmental, and academic arenas. The development of a symposium on agriculural ethics is an effective method for “raising awareness” of the imminent need for a consolidation of philosophical and agricultural expertise. Based on experience, a series of organizational guidelines and their associated philosophical issues are (...) presented. The initial step is a determination of the purposes of the symposium, which leads to the consideration of the choice of speakers and topics. The best series of speakers will ultimately prove to be ineffectual if the logistics of the symposium are not carefully planned. The scheduling, format, timing and location of the talks are critical. Related to these practical aspects is the organization of promotional efforts. Since one of the goals is, presumably, to enlighten a target audience, effective promotion should be a central concern. Underlying all of these considerations is the budget. How the agricultural ethics symposium at the University of Wyoming addressed these issues is presented, with a critical review of our efforts based on external evaluations. (shrink)

The starting point for discussion in this paper is a case study, namely that of the controversy surrounding the case of withdrawing feeding from Eluana Englaro who had been in a permanent vegetative state (PVS) for seventeen years. I press the case for a recovery of classical prudence or practical wisdom, as understood by Thomas Aquinas, rather than beginning with deontological or utilitarian arguments. I suggest that prudence has relevance not just for specific issues concerned with cases involving PVS, but (...) also addresses wider problems raised by secular end-of-life ethical discourse, with its emphasis on individual choice on the one hand and concerns about the slippery slope towards more liberal legislation on the other hand. Greater attention to the hospice movement is, I suggest, ambiguous in ethical terms. Finally, I argue that one of the strengths of a Thomistic understanding of prudence is its deep connection with the life of grace as that informed by consideration of the work of the Holy Spirit. This incorporates a theological element without falling into the trap of a deontology that can be dismissed by those outside the household of faith, while allowing a Christian witness to persist in such a contested public arena. (shrink)

This essay explores a previously unexplored suggestion for combining consideration of aesthetics with considerations of vice and virtue to justify, not merely claims about nature’s beauty or its preservation, but landscape-transforming conservation projects. Its discussion is not univocal. On the one hand, it suggests that vices associated with humans assisting a creature’s journey to a new landscape make that organism’s presence on that landscape ugly. According to this suggestion, the creature may be regarded as trash, which would be virtuous (...) to remove. On the other hand, it worries that the argument ultimately traces this circle: It is wrong to fail to remove the creature because this failure would be blameworthy; and failure to remove would be blameworthy because wrong. (shrink)

Pecuniary externalities—costs imposed on third parties mediated through the price system—have typically received little philosophical attention. Recently, this has begun to change. In two separate papers, Richard Endörfer (Econ Philos 38, pp. 221–241, 2022) and Hayden Wilkinson (Philos Public Affairs 50: 202–238, 2022) place pecuniary externalities at center stage. Though their arguments differ significantly, both conclude pecuniary externalities are in some sense morally problematic. If the state is not called on to regulate pecuniary externalities, then, at the very least, individuals (...) should be conscious of how their productive and consumptive decisions affect others by changing prices. We disagree. Both arguments fail, in that neither gives us reason to think pecuniary externalities are cause for moral concern. Unless a new argument emerges, pecuniary externalities should be left alone. (shrink)

Richard Rorty is famous, maybe even infamous, for his philosophical nonchalance. His groundbreaking work not only rejects all theories of truth but also dismisses modern epistemology and its preoccupation with knowledge and representation. At the same time, the celebrated pragmatist believed there could be no universally valid answers to moral questions, which led him to a complex view of religion rarely expressed in his writings. In this posthumous publication, Rorty, a strict secularist, finds in the pragmatic thought of John Dewey, (...) John Stuart Mill, William James, and George Santayana, among others, a political imagination shared by religious traditions. His intent is not to promote belief over nonbelief or to blur the distinction between religious and public domains. Rorty seeks only to locate patterns of similarity and difference so an ethics of decency and a politics of solidarity can rise. He particularly responds to Pope Benedict XVI and his campaign against the relativist vision. Whether holding theologians, metaphysicians, or political ideologues to account, Rorty remains steadfast in his opposition to absolute uniformity and its exploitation of political strength. (shrink)

Abstract:The central problems of political philosophy (e.g., legitimate authority, distributive justice) mirror the central problems of business ethics. The question naturally arises: should political theories be applied to problems in business ethics? If a version of egalitarianism is the correct theory of justice for states, for example, does it follow that it is the correct theory of justice for businesses? If states should be democratically governed by their citizens, should businesses be democratically managed by their employees? Most theorists who have (...) considered these questions, including John Rawls inPolitical Liberalism, and Robert Phillips and Joshua Margolis in a 1999 article, have said “no.” They claim that states and businesses are different kinds of entities, and hence require different theories of justice. I challenge this claim. While businesses differ from states, the difference is one of degree, not one of kind. Business ethics has much to learn from political philosophy. (shrink)

Entrepreneurship is a critical need in society, and an entrepreneur's life can be a life wonderfully lived. However, most of the literature examining entrepreneurship takes an overly narrow financial viewpoint when examining entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial success. Our paper surveys the current entrepreneurial literature on what constitutes successful entrepreneurship. We then engage key conceptual ideas within the Catholic social tradition to analyze what we see as an undeveloped notion of success. We then move to construct a richer notion of success through (...) the framework of virtue. (shrink)

In conventional identity politics subjective differences are understood negatively, as gaps to be overcome, as lacks of sameness, as evidence of failed or incomplete unity. In _Alterity Politics _Jeffrey T. Nealon argues instead for a concrete and ethical understanding of community, one that requires response, action, and performance instead of passive resentment and unproductive mourning for a whole that cannot be attained. While discussing the work of others who have refused to thematize difference in terms of the possibility or impossibility (...) of sameness—Levinas, Butler, Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze, Guattari, Zizek, Jameson, Heidegger, Bakhtin—Nealon argues that ethics is constituted as inexorable affirmative response to different identities, not through an inability to understand or totalize the other. _Alterity Politics_ combines this theoretical itinerary with crucial discussions of specific and diverse sites of literary and cultural production—the work of William S. Burroughs, Amiri Baraka, Andy Warhol, Ishmael Reed, Rush Limbaugh, and Vincent Van Gogh—along with analyses of the social formation of subjects as found in identity politics, and in multicultural and whiteness studies. In the process, Nealon takes on a wide variety of issues including white male anger, the ethical questions raised by drug addiction, the nature of literary meaning, and the concept of “becoming-black.” In seeking to build an ethical structure around poststructuralist discourse and to revitalize the applied use of theoretical concepts to notions of performative identity, _Alterity Politics_ marks a decisive intervention in literary theory, cultural studies, twentieth-century philosophy, and performance studies. (shrink)

In this essay I offer an account and defense of conversion in Laudato Si’. While Francis's call to conversion itself is brief, it is a crucial feature of the encyclical, providing a rationale for how individuals might make a radical break from the structural violence of the ecological crisis that deeply compromises moral agency in the Global North. This claim requires a defense because, as Willis Jenkins argues, appeals to conversion in environmental ethics typically assume a coherent moral theological framework, (...) and the scale of environmental problems renders all such frameworks incapable of generating competent calls to conversion. Avoiding such frameworks, Jenkins nonetheless tacitly must appeal to conversion in his own pragmatic approach to environmental problems. But through an engagement with Francis and Jenkins, I argue that conversion is a conceptually unstable concept without something like Francis's normative framework to account for its possibility and for hope to be reasonable. (shrink)

The view of business ethics that Christopher McMahon calls the “implicit morality of the market” and Joseph Heath calls the “market failures approach” has received a significant amount of recent attention. The idea of this view is that we can derive an ethics for market participants by thinking about the “point” of market activity, and asking what the world would have to be like for this point to be realized. While this view has been much-discussed, it is still not well-understood. (...) This paper seeks to remedy this problem. I begin by showing, against some recent commentators, that McMahon’s view and Heath’s view are fundamentally the same. Second, I clarify the sense of “efficiency” at work in the market failures approach. Finally, I argue that, in its current form, this view has little relevance to the real world of business. I conclude by sketching two ways of modifying it to fit our world. (shrink)

In this case study, I address the procedural ethics of conversation analysis (CA) and the collection of naturally occurring mundane interactions. I draw from the challenges that emerged from the institutional ethics review of the HIV, health and interaction study (the H2I Study), a CA project that sought to identify the practices through which normative assumptions of HIV and other health conditions are produced in conversations. Consistent with CA’s preference for naturally occurring interactions, the H2I Study collected and analysed everyday (...) telephone calls involving people living with HIV. This article offers practical strategies CA researchers might use to navigate two ethical concerns raised about the collection of naturally occurring mundane interactions. The first questions the merits of collecting naturally occurring mundane interactions. For those unfamiliar with CA, the specific advantages of analysing naturally occurring mundane interactions may not be self-evident. This places an evidentiary burden on CA researchers to warrant the collection of this type of data. To address this concern, I suggest demonstrating in ethics applications the analytic value of CA using publicly available interactions. The second concern questions the use of verbal consent necessary for the collection of naturally occurring mundane interactions. Like most CA research, the H2I Study required flexible informed consent protocols appropriate for spontaneous and unpredictable interactions. Drawing from within and outside the CA literature, I offer three rationales for the use of verbal consent. This article is written as a practical resource for conversation analysts seeking approval from their research ethics board (REB) and for REBs who might be unfamiliar with CA research. This article contributes to a small but growing body of literature that documents not only the kinds of challenges CA researchers encounter from institutional ethics review, but the specific procedural ethics they may employ to secure ethics approval. (shrink)

In this article I challenge two common arguments against incest: the genetics argument (that incest is immoral because it might lead to the conception of a genetically deformed child), and the family argument (that incest is immoral because it undermines the family, the emotional center for the individual). These arguments, I contend, commit us to condemning not only incest, but also a wide range ofbehaviors that we currently permit. I thus present the reader with a dilemma: on pain of inconsistency, (...) we must either accept certain forms of incest in order to maintain these other moral judgments, or reject these judgments in order to maintain our condemnation ofincest. The reader is free to decide which alternative is preferable, but I suggest that the former is a much less radical shift in our moral system as a whole. (shrink)

Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics identifies the virtues with the traits the fully virtuous person possesses. Further, it depicts the fully virtuous person as having all the cognitive perfections necessary for possessing practical wisdom. This paper argues that these two theses disqualify faith as trust, as construed on contemporary accounts of faith, as a virtue. For faith’s role as a virtue depends on limitations of its possessor that are incompatible with the psychological profile of the fully virtuous person on (...) the neo-Aristotelian picture. I argue that because of tensions internal to the standard neo-Aristotelian view and the compelling arguments in recent literature that faith is a virtue, the neo-Aristotelian has good reason to revise her account of virtue and picture of the fully virtuous person. (shrink)

Online retailers are using advances in data collection and computing technologies to “personalize” prices, i.e., offer goods for sale to shoppers at their reservation prices, or the highest price they are willing to pay. In this paper, I offer a criticism of this practice. I begin by putting online personalized pricing in context. It is not something entirely new, but rather a kind of price discrimination, a familiar pricing practice. I then offer a fairness-based argument against it. When an online (...) retailer personalizes prices, it competes unfairly for the social surplus created by a transaction. I defend this argument against objections, and offer a simple remedy: online retailers should either disclose that they are personalizing prices, or stop doing so. (shrink)

Tonkens has issued a seemingly impossible challenge, to articulate a comprehensive ethical framework within which artificial moral agents satisfy a Kantian inspired recipe—"rational" and "free"—while also satisfying perceived prerogatives of machine ethicists to facilitate the creation of AMAs that are perfectly and not merely reliably ethical. Challenges for machine ethicists have also been presented by Anthony Beavers and Wendell Wallach. Beavers pushes for the reinvention of traditional ethics to avoid "ethical nihilism" due to the reduction of morality to mechanical causation. (...) Wallach pushes for redoubled efforts toward a comprehensive account of ethics to guide machine ethicists on the issue of artificial moral agency. Options, thus, present themselves: reinterpret traditional ethics in a way that affords a comprehensive account of moral agency inclusive of both artificial and natural agents, or give up on the possibility and “muddle through” regardless. This series of papers pursues the first option, meets Tonkens' "challenge" and pursues Wallach's ends through Beavers’ proposed means, by "landscaping" traditional moral theory in resolution of a comprehensive account of moral agency. This first paper sets out the challenge and establishes the tradition that Kant had inherited from Aristotle, briefly entertains an Aristotelian AMA, fields objections, and ends with unanswered questions. The next paper in this series responds to the challenge in Kantian terms, and argues that a Kantian AMA is not only a possibility for Machine ethics research, but a necessary one. (shrink)

The justice of racial profiling is addressed in the original position first for a society without racism, then for a society marked by racism. In the first case, the practice is argued to be just if carried out respectfully and expeditiously and likely to contribute to effective crime control. Thus it is not intrinsically racist. Addressing the second case, the idea that the harms of racial profiling are modest because expressive is critiqued. The practice is shown to carry the danger (...) of producing rights-violations by increasing the incidence of racist attitudes and practices. It is argued to be just in a society marked by racism if done under special supervision, and only to aid in apprehending dangerous criminals. (shrink)

We compare the definition of virtue in philosophy with the definition and operationalization of virtue in psychology. We articulate characteristics that virtue is presented as possessing in the perennial western philosophical tradition. Virtues are typically understood as (a) dispositional (b) deep-seated (c) habits (d) that contribute to flourishing and (e) that produce activities with the following three features: they are (f) done well, (g) not done poorly, and (h) in accordance with the right motivation and reason. We (...) form a definition from these characteristics and defend our exclusion of some other characteristics from the definition. Using our definition as a rubric, we evaluate conceptions of virtue in psychology, showing how many fall short at operationalizing at least one component of the philosophical notion of virtue. (shrink)

The fields of positive psychology, cognitive behavioral therapy, mindfulness, and goal-setting have all demonstrated that individuals can modify their beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and behaviors to improve their subjective happiness. But which ethical beliefs affect happiness positively? In comparison to ethical belief systems such as deontology, consequentialism, and altruism, rational egoism appears to be alone in suggesting that an individual’s long-term self-interest and subjective happiness is possible, desirable, and moral. Albeit an important theoretical foundation of the rational egoism philosophy, the relationship (...) between rational egoism and subjective happiness has yet to be investigated empirically. Using (Overall and Gedeon, Business and Professional Ethics. 38:43–78, 2018) 24-item rational egoism scale, we test this relationship on a random sample of 534 full-time American workers using partial least squares structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM). Consistent with rational egoism theory, the main contribution to knowledge of this research is finding a statistically significant relationship between rational egoism and subjective happiness. Implications for practice and areas for future study are suggested. (shrink)

Stakeholder theory focuses on how more value is created if stakeholder relationships are governed by ethical principles such as integrity, respect, fairness, generosity and inclusiveness. However, it has not adequately addressed strategies that stakeholders perceive as harmful to their interests and how this perception can even lead some stakeholders to view the firm’s strategies as unethical. To fill the void, this paper directly addresses strategies that stakeholders perceive as harmful to their interests, or what we refer to as harmful stakeholder (...) strategies. Specifically, it identifies factors associated with stakeholder perceptions of harm that are likely to cause them to consider a strategy unethical, examines the negative implications for firms that pursue such strategies in terms of likely stakeholder responses and damage to stakeholder relationships, and provides theory to help explain how firms are likely to respond to stakeholder claims that a strategy is unethical, based on factors such as the strategic importance of the claim to the firm, how long the strategy has been in use, the costs of remediation, the risk of stakeholder mobilization or new regulation, and whether firms can reasonably rationalize their actions. Assessing harm allows a firm to make a more accurate estimate of the costs of a strategy and can assist managers in allocating resources intended to reduce or remediate harm. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:If an employee is committed to his firm—if he is “attached” or “bound” to it—then his firm may be able to obtain a discount on his labor. This paper asks: Is it wrong for firms to do so? If we understand just or fair pay solely in terms of voluntary agreements between employers and employees, the answer seems to be ‘no.’ Against this, I argue that, in some cases, it is ‘yes.’ In particular, it is wrong for firms to try (...) to obtain discounts on their committed employees’ labor when their employees reasonably expect that they will not try to obtain them. In the process, I probe the limits of exploitation and question the relevance of contribution to fairness in compensation. (shrink)

If there was a new wonder drug on the market that got kids to behave better, improve their grades, feel happier, and avoid risky behaviors, many parents around the world would be willing to empty their bank accounts to acquire it. Amazingly, such a product actually does exist. It’s not regulated by the FDA, it has no ill side-effects, and it’s absolutely free and avail­able to anyone at any time. This miracle cure is gratitude. Over the past decade, science has (...) shown that gratitude is one of the most valuable and important emotions we possess, and it is a virtue that anyone can cultivate. In fact, researchers have developed many different methods people can use to foster an attitude of gratitude, and the science shows that many of them really work. In _Making Grateful Kids, _two of the leading authorities on gratitude among young people, Jeffrey J. Froh and Giacomo Bono, introduce their latest and most compelling research, announce groundbreaking findings, and share real-life stories from adults and youth to show parents, teachers, mentors, and kids themselves how to achieve greater life satisfaction through gratitude. Most importantly perhaps, they expand on this groundbreaking research to offer practical and effec­tive common-sense plans that can be used in day-to-day interactions between kids and adults to enhance success and wellbeing. Their unique, scientifically-based approach for producing grateful youth works whether these kids are very young ele­mentary school students or troubled teenagers. Not only does the purposeful practice of gratitude increase their happiness, but the research indicates that grateful kids also report more self-discipline, fulfilling relationships, and engagement with their schools and communities when compared to their less grateful counterparts. After reading _Making Grateful Kids_, parents, teachers, and anyone who works with youth will be able to connect more mean­ingfully with kids so that all parties can focus on the things that matter most and, in turn, create a more cooperative and thriving society. (shrink)

We examine whether a taxpayer’s decision to choose a taxpayer-favorable (vs. a taxpayer-unfavorable) characterization of income is associated with contextual and individual dimensions of that decision. Using a 2 × 2 factorial experimental design, we manipulate the prevailing social norm on whether there is a general belief that a specific form of income should be characterized as a capital gain (taxed at a lower tax rate and hence taxpayer favorable) or as ordinary income (taxed at a higher tax rate and (...) hence taxpayer unfavorable), and the group affiliation on whether the individual is making a tax characterization decision as a sole proprietor or as a member of a group practice. Moreover, we measure participants’ fairness perception of characterizing the income as capital gains versus ordinary. We study the decisions of 180 graduate business and accounting students from two US business schools to explore these dimensions using a tax-ambiguous income situation. Results indicate that both contextual and individual dimensions impact taxpayer decisions. Specifically, the social norm and fairness perception of characterizing income as capital gains affects the likelihood of choosing such a characterization. Being a sole proprietor or a member of a group practice does not have any significant main effect. However, relative to all other conditions, taxpayers are most likely to characterize income as capital gains when both the social norms are for capital gains characterization and when the taxpayer is a member of a group practice. Results remain largely robust to a variety of alternative explanations. We conclude the paper with a discussion of our findings and their implications for tax policy, enforcement, and research. (shrink)

In this original and compelling book, Jeffrey P. Bishop, a philosopher, ethicist, and physician, argues that something has gone sadly amiss in the care of the dying by contemporary medicine and in our social and political views of death, as shaped by our scientific successes and ongoing debates about euthanasia and the "right to die"--or to live. __The Anticipatory Corpse: Medicine, Power, and the Care of the Dying__, informed by Foucault's genealogy of medicine and power as well as by (...) a thorough grasp of current medical practices and medical ethics, argues that a view of people as machines in motion--people as, in effect, temporarily animated corpses with interchangeable parts--has become epistemologically normative for medicine. The dead body is subtly anticipated in our practices of exercising control over the suffering person, whether through technological mastery in the intensive care unit or through the impersonal, quasi-scientific assessments of psychological and spiritual "medicine." The result is a kind of nihilistic attitude toward the dying, and troubling contradictions and absurdities in our practices. Wide-ranging in its examples, from organ donation rules in the United States, to ICU medicine, to "spiritual surveys," to presidential bioethics commissions attempting to define death, and to high-profile cases such as Terri Schiavo's, __The Anticipatory Corpse__ explores the historical, political, and philosophical underpinnings of our care of the dying and, finally, the possibilities of change. A ground-breaking work in bioethics, this book will provoke thought and argument for all those engaged in medicine, philosophy, theology, and health policy. "With extraordinary philosophical sophistication as well as knowledge of modern medicine, Bishop argues that the body that shapes the work of modern medicine is a dead body. He defends this claim decisively with with urgency. I know of no book that is at once more challenging and informative as __The Anticipatory Corpse. __To say this book is the most important one written in the philosophy of medicine in the last twenty-five years would not do it justice. This book is destined to change the way we think and, hopefully, practice medicine." --_Stanley Hauerwas, Duke Divinity School _ "Jeffrey Bishop carefully builds a detailed, scholarly case that medicine is shaped by its attitudes toward death. Clinicians, ethicists, medical educators, policy makers, and administrators need to understand the fraught relationship between clinical practices and death, and __The Anticipatory Corpse __is an essential text. Bishop's use of the writings of Michel Foucault is especially provocative and significant. This book is the closest we have to a genealogy of death." --_Arthur W. Frank, University of Calgary _ "Jeffrey Bishop has produced a masterful study of how the living body has been placed within medicine's metaphysics of efficient causality and within its commitment to a totalizing control of life and death, which control has only been strengthened by medicine's taking on the mantle of a bio-psycho-socio-spiritual model. This volume's treatment of medicine's care of the dying will surely be recognized as a cardinal text in the philosophy of medicine." --_H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Rice University, Baylor College of Medicine_. (shrink)

Informed consent is the single most important concept for understanding decision-making capacity. There is a steady pull in the clinical world to transform capacity into a technical concept that can be tested objectively, usually by calling for a psychiatric consult. This is a classic example of medicalization. In this article I argue that is a mistake, not just unnecessary but wrong, and explain how to normalize capacity assessment.Returning the locus of capacity assessment to the attending, the primary care doctor, and (...) even to ethics consultation in today's environment will require a substantial effort to undo a strong but illusory impression of capacity assessment. Hospital attorneys as well as clinical ethicists with a sophisticated understanding of health law can be in the vanguard of this reorientation. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas's recent challenge to secular citizens calling for greater inclusivity of religious justifications in the public sphere opens new epistemological debates that could benefit from the rich insights of feminist epistemologists. Despite certain theoretical tensions, there is some common ground between Habermas and recent work in feminist epistemology. Specifically, this article explores the shared interests between Habermas and one feminist theorist in particular, Miranda Fricker. I choose Fricker because her formulation of the epistemological and ethical hybrid virtues of testimonial (...) justice and hermeneutical justice provide efficacious theoretical and practical tools capable of deepening the epistemological basis of Habermas's challenge to secular citizens. After a detailed analysis of Habermas's and Fricker's respective epistemological positions, I argue that Fricker's analysis provides a rich framework for thinking through questions of power, identity, and credibility with respect to religious justifications in the public sphere. In conclusion, this article emphasizes the importance of fostering more robust and just epistemic communities capable of countering the social, political, and ethical injustices of epistemic disauthorization and marginalization. (shrink)

Key ethical challenges for healthcare workers arising from the COVID-19 pandemic are identified: isolation and social distancing, duty of care and fair access to treatment. The paper argues for a relational approach to ethics which includes solidarity, relational autonomy, duty, equity, trust and reciprocity as core values. The needs of the poor and socially disadvantaged are highlighted. Relational autonomy and solidarity are explored in relation to isolation and social distancing. Reciprocity is discussed with reference to healthcare workers’ duty of care (...) and its limits. Priority setting and access to treatment raise ethical issues of utility and equity. Difficult ethical dilemmas around triage, do not resuscitate decisions, and withholding and withdrawing treatment are discussed in the light of recently published guidelines. The paper concludes with the hope for a wider discussion of relational ethics and a glimpse of a future after the pandemic has subsided. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide an interpretation of the latitude of wide duties by analyzing Kant’s reinterpretation of Horace’s adage insani sapiens nomen habeat; aequus iniqui - ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam (the wise man has the name of being a fool, the just man of being iniquitous, if he seeks virtue beyond what is sufficient”, MS VI: 404n., 409 and 433n) and his criticism of Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean. In support of my interpretation I (...) also analyze Kant’s distinction between lying and reticence in his correspondence with Maria von Herbert and between openheartedness and reticence in the Religion. I argue that since there is no upper limit to the extent we may realize moral ends it may be morally permissible to take one’s prudential considerations into account when deciding how to comply with wide duties. In contrast, the deliberate disregard of one’s permissible prudential interests may reflect what Kant calls a fantastic conception of virtue, according to which agents vainly believe that they can completely achieve virtue in this life. I call attention to the fact that for Kant the wise (sapiens) is also a prudens, a person who does not think fantastically in matters of virtue and consequently does not attempt to “maximize virtue” at the expense of one’s permissible prudential interests as a finite being. (shrink)

The first ethics casebook that integrates clinical ethics (medical, nursing, and dental) and research ethics with public health and informatics. The book opens with five chapters on ethics, the development of interprofessional ethics, and brief instructional materials for students on how to analyze ethical cases and for teachers on how to teach ethics. In today's rapidly evolving healthcare system, the cases in this book are far more realistic than previous efforts that isolate the decision-making process by professions as if each (...) is not embedded in a larger context that involves healthcare teams, hospital policies, and technology. The central claim of this book is that ethics is an important common ground for all of the health professions. Furthermore, when we recognize that our professions converge upon a common goal we will find less conflict and more pleasure in working together. (shrink)

When a reasonable agent deliberates about what to do, she entertains only a limited range of possible courses of action. A theory of practical reasoning must therefore include an account of deliberative attention: an account that both explains the patterns of deliberative attention that reasonable agents typically display and allows us to see why these patterns of deliberative attention are reasonable. I offer such an account, built around two, central claims. A reasonable agent who cares about some end is disposed (...) to exclude courses of action which she believes to be incompatible with that end from the range of possibilities that she will entertain as options in practical deliberation. As I shall put it, an agent’s cares establish deliberative boundaries for her practical thought. The stability of a deliberative boundary varies with the depth of the care that explains it. These two claims motivate the Boundary-Driven Model of the path that a reasonable agent’s deliberative attention will take in temporally extended deliberation. If we locate the model within a maximizing conception of practical rationality, then boundary-driven deliberation, of the sort that the model describes, can be understood and justified instrumentally, as a heuristic device. But if we suppose that there is no single index of value that successful practical choice maximizes, then boundary-driven deliberation is partly constitutive of reasonableness in practical thought. It allows an agent facing plural and incommensurable values to frame her deliberative problems narrowly enough that, in conjunction with deliberative devices which are not part of the model but which are compatible with it, she may be able to reach a non-arbitrary decision – and so give a determinate, verdictive sense to the phrase “the best course of action available to me” in cases in which a determinate meaning for this phrase would otherwise be lacking. (shrink)

While Aristotle is often lauded, especially by virtue ethicists, for his focus on and insight into virtue, a central aspect of his conception of virtue—the doctrine of the mean—is often derided as false if not indeed absurd. The reason for this disparity in reaction to Aristotle is that the doctrine of the mean has been severely misinterpreted as stating that there are a variety of parameters in which one must achieve a mean. Such a doctrine is false, (...) but it is not Aristotle’s. In this paper, the author gives a more accurate account of the doctrine of the mean than has heretofore been given. According to this account, the doctrine simply states that virtue disposes one to feel one’s passions with an appropriate intensity. The author closes by considering Hursthouse’s famous criticisms of the doctrine of the mean, and he shows that they fail to be reasons for rejecting the doctrine. (shrink)

The discipline of religious ethics consists in critical reflection on religious varieties of ethical discourse, but to study a variety of ethical discourse, we must look at particular examples of it. Which examples should we be look- ing at? What varieties or traditions shall we take them to represent? In answering these questions, scholars reveal much about their normative commitments. When "religious ethics" replaced "theological ethics" as a cur- ricular rubric in some schools, many ethicists attempted to present their work (...) as value neutral, but it is better to admit that commitments matter and are unavoidable. The new traditionalists make no secret of their nor- mative commitments, which imply an indictment of modern ethical dis- course as a whole. Their candor is commendable, but their indictment can be challenged. Debunkers of modernity have trouble accounting for their own position. Their samples of modern ethical discourse are not repre- sentative. Many democratic voices evidently remain unacknowledged and unexplained. (shrink)

A commentary on a case of a man who is left a “high quad” (ventilator dependant as well as quadriplegic) after an accident discusses the following: • The right of patients who sustain catastrophic injuries to choose to discontinue life-sustaining treatment• The role of capacity assessment in treatment decisions and in ethics consultations• The role of advance directives (ADs) for such patients if they lack capacity• Whether a do-not-resuscitate or do-not-attempt-resuscitation order should be seen as “a medical order” or an (...) advance directive• Some hints about what might be intended when a patient refers to the criterion of having a “meaningful life.”. (shrink)