Hegel: Philosophy of Nature

I provide a metaphysically realist interpretation of Hegel’sPhilosophy of Nature—one that allows us to make sense of one of the more puzzling references to nature in hisScience of Logic. I do so by affording William Maker’s under-appreciated account of Hegel’s realism more of the attention and scrutiny it deserves—not least because it involves a distinctively simple and elegant account of the famously obscure move from logic to nature in Hegel’s system. Though I point out its limitations, I claim that Maker’s (...) arguments can be revised in order to recover more of the rigour and complexity of Hegel’s metaphysics. (shrink)

Philosophy of history is the conceptual and technical study of the relation which exists between philosophy and history. This paper tries to analyze and examine the nature of philosophy of history, its methodology and ideal development. In this I have tried to set the limits of knowledge to know the special account of Hegel’s idealistic view about philosophy of history. In this paper I have also used the philosophical methodology and philosophy inquiry, quest and hypothesis to discuss the Hegel’s idealistic (...) concept of philosophy of history. It also examines and demonstrates the views of other idealist philosophers like, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. It also shows the how history of mathematics is a complementary of idealism as most of philosophers who were idealists are also great mathematicians. In this paper we are investigation the epistemological approach, logical and metaphysical approach to study the nature of history, meaning of history and structure of history. (shrink)

Against current non-metaphysical interpretations, I argue that Naturphilosophie is central to Hegel’s philosophy. This is so for three reasons. First, it was crucial to Hegel’s program to create a holistic culture. Second, Naturphilosophie is pivotal to absolute idealism, Hegel’s characteristic philosophical doctrine. Third, the idea of organic development, so central to Naturphilosophie, is pervasive throughout Hegel’s system. This idea is essential to Hegel’s concepts of spirit, dialectic, and identity-in-difference. Finally, I take issue with the neo-Kantian critique of Hegel’s Naturphilosophie on (...) the grounds that it fails to appreciate the underlying motive behind Hegel’s system: the attempt to resolve the aporia of Kant’s epistemology.Author Keywords: Naturphilosophie; Absolute idealism; Organicism; Alienation; Subjective idealism; Dualism. (shrink)

RésuméCet article étudie lafaçon dont Hegel élabore sa conception des rapports entre la pensée et la nature dans la Phénoménologie de l'esprit. L'examen montre que 1) Hegel étend le concept de raison pour y inclure i'indépendance de la nature à l'endroit de la pensée rationnelle, 2) cette indépendance se révèle dans le donné contingent de l'empiricité, 3) le concept étendu de raison détermine et justifie les présuppositions de la logique hégélienne, et 4) ce même concept limite le rôle de la (...) logique dans la philosophie hégélienne prise comme un tout, de telle manière que la philosophie y dépend de la science empirique en quelque chose d'essentiel pour sa connaissance de la vérité. En étayant ces thèses, l'article analyse la procédure de preuve utilisée par Hegel, expose le rôle qu'y joue la contradiction, et discute les explications phénoménologiques qu'il propose de la perception, de l'entendement, du stoïcisme, de l'idéalisme, de la biologie, du monde moral kantien, de la religion révélée, et du savoir absolu. (shrink)

My presentation begins with Kant's philosophical project, which played a key role in understanding German Idealism, and then considers in detail the philosophical approaches developed by Schelling and Hegel.

Building on the views of Kant and early nineteenth century life scientists, Hegel develops a view of systems that is a clear precursor to the developments in Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s general system theory, as well as the thinking of the ecologically minded system thinkers that built upon the foundation Bertalanffy laid. Hegel describes systems as organic wholes in which the parts respectively serve as means and ends. Further, in the Encyclopedia version of the logic Hegel notes that such systems are (...) comprised of three processes: gestalt, the process of assimilation, and regeneration. In Hegel’s texts, he describes both natural and social systems as organic wholes with such systematic processes. In this paper, these processes and systems are described and it is argued that Hegel quite consistently applies views developed in the logic when describing systems. The paper shows how this parallels later developments in systems theory and goes on to show some distinctions between Hegel’s view of systems and that of later ecologically minded system thinkers. (shrink)

In 1801 Hegel charged that, on Kant’s analysis, forces are ‘either purely ideal, in which case they are not forces, or else they are transcendent’. I argue that this objection, which Hegel did not spell out, reveals an important and fundamental line of internal criticism of Kant’s Critical philosophy. I show that Kant’s basic forces of attraction and repulsion, which constitute matter, are merely ideal because Kant’s arguments for them are circular and beg the question, and they have no determinate (...) connection to any of the basic forces of Newtonian physics. Hence they are mere Gedankendinge. I argue further, that real physical forces transcend Kant’s analysis by showing that his proof of Newton’s law of inertia is unsound. I then show that this apparently specific disagreement underlies the enormous philosophical shift from Kant’s anti-naturalist transcendental idealism to Hegel’s naturalistic use of regressive, quasi-transcendental arguments. (shrink)

I discuss this collection of essays on Hegel and the sciences while stressing the interest of Hegel's philosophy of nature in the light of later non-mainstream developments in the life-sciences and medicine. I compare then the chapters dedicated to Hegel's logic with recent literature on para-consistent logic and re-interpretations of Hegel's own logic.

While neither Hegel nor Marx can be called “ecologists” in any strict sense of the term, they both present views of the human-nature relationship which offer important insights for contemporary debates in philosophical ecology. Further, while Marx and Engels began a tradition of sharply distinguishing their own views of nature from those of Hegel, careful examination reveals a substantial commonality of sentiment. The essay compares Hegel and Marx (and Engels) in terms of their basic conceptions of nature, their critiques of (...) Romanitic nature-worship, their notions of how a meaningful unity with nature requires the act of socially transforming nature, their respective calls for a new science of nature, and their attitudes towards technology. I argue that we can uncover a largely shared humanistic orientation toward nature, and I situate this view within contemporary debates about the anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric foundation of ecological thinking. (shrink)

Some of Catherine Malabou’s recent work has developed her conception of plasticity (originally deployed in a reading of Hegelian Aufhebung ) in relation to neuroscience. This development clarifies and advances her attempt to bring contemporary theory into dialogue with the natural sciences, while indirectly indicating her engagement with the French tradition in philosophy of science and philosophy of medicine, especially the work of Georges Canguilhem. I argue that we can see her development of plasticity as an answer to some specific (...) shortcomings in Canguilhem’s conception of organic or biological normativity as advanced in The Normal and the Pathological . Such a view of plasticity shows its potential to provide the basis for a powerful critical engagement with contemporary conceptions of selfhood, self-transformation, subjectivation, and the general theory of norms. (shrink)

To formulate a philosophy of time is not easy, even though it would seem to be the basic requirement for any philosophy which attempts to comprehend the world of nature or of history. The problem is briefly posed: Can the conceptual framework of philosophical thought do justice to the dynamic character of time?The purpose of this paper is not to provide a definitive answer to this question. Its aim is more limited. By discussing carefully the way in which Hegel's philosophy (...) related conceptual thought to time, it hopes to provide new perspectives on this vexing philosophical problem. (shrink)

This is a much-needed reissue of the standard English translation of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, originally published in 1970. The Philosophy of Nature is the second part of Hegel's Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, all of which is now available in English from OUP (Part I being his Logic, Part III being his Philosophy of Mind). Hegel's aim in this work is to interpret the varied phenomena of Nature from the standpoint of a dialectical logic. Those who still think of (...) Hegel as a merely a priori philosopher will here find abundant evidence that he was keenly interested in and very well informed about empirical science. The Philosophy of Nature is integral to his philosophical system and deserves the most serious attention. Students and scholars of Hegel and the history of European philosophy will welcome the availability of this important text, which also includes a translation of Hegel's Zusatze or lecture notes. (shrink)

This project retraces activations of Kierkegaard in the development of polit­ical theology. It suggests alternative modes of states of exception than those attributed to him by Schmitt, Taubes and Agamben. Several Kierkegaardian themes open themselves to 'something like pure potential' in Agamben, namely: living death, animality, criminality, auto-constitution, modification, liturgy, love and certain articulations of improbabilities. Attention is drawn to a modal ontology and auto-constitution at work in Kierkegaard's writings, as well as a complicated and indissociable operation between killing and (...) letting-live in legalist exceptionalism, comparable to similar functions found in Foucault regarding the biopowers and necropolitics of territorial and governmental apparatuses. It closes in consideration of Kierkegaard's critique of enumeration, large numbers, and statistical probability alongside contemporary tele-technoscientific social controls via the online datafication of people by surveillance or platform capitalisms. After Kierkegaard, such apparatuses are perhaps suspect as calculated to tranquilize humanity into more docile subhumans as it fools folk into becoming part of its numbers. (*Accompanying file includes only front matter, abstract, and endnotes*). (shrink)

It is fair to say that Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's philosophy of mathematics and his interpretation of the calculus in particular have not been popular topics of conversation since the early part of the twentieth century. Changes in mathematics in the late nineteenth century, the new set-theoretical approach to understanding its foundations, and the rise of a sympathetic philosophical logic have all conspired to give prior philosophies of mathematics (including Hegel's) the untimely appearance of naïveté. The common view was expressed (...) by Bertrand Russell: -/- The great [mathematicians] of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were so much impressed by the results of their new methods that they did not trouble to examine their foundations. Although their arguments were fallacious, a special Providence saw to it that their conclusions were more or less true. Hegel fastened upon the obscurities in the foundations of mathematics, turned them into dialectical contradictions, and resolved them by nonsensical syntheses. . . .The resulting puzzles [of mathematics] were all cleared up during the nineteenth century, not by heroic philosophical doctrines such as that of Kant or that of Hegel, but by patient attention to detail (1956, 368–69). (shrink)

We attribute three major insights to Hegel: first, an understanding of the real numbers as the paradigmatic kind of number ; second, a recognition that a quantitative relation has three elements, which is embedded in his conception of measure; and third, a recognition of the phenomenon of divergence of measures such as in second-order or continuous phase transitions in which correlation length diverges. For ease of exposition, we will refer to these three insights as the R First Theory, Tripartite Relations, (...) and Divergence of Measures. Given the constraints of space, we emphasize the first and the third in this paper. (shrink)

This essay explores Hegel’s treatment of Carl Friedrich Gauss’s mathematical discoveries as examples of “Analytic Cognition.” Unfortunately, Hegel’s main point has been virtually lost due to an editorial blunder tracing back almost a century, an error that has been perpetuated in many subsequent editions and translations.The paper accordingly has three sections. In the first, I expose the mistake and trace its pervasive influence in multiple languages and editions of the Wissenschaft der Logik. In the second section, I undertake to explain (...) the mathematical significance of Gauss’s discoveries. In the third section, I take a look at the deeper implications of Hegel’s treatment of Gauss’s work as a window onto the nature and limitations of analytic cognition. In conclusion, I seek to explain how the linear method embodied in deductive reason leads by its own inner principle, according to Hegel, to its dialectical Aufhebung (sublation). The result is a kind of deliberately circular reasoning that he describes as “the Absolute Idea.”. (shrink)

There is at present no intelligible account of what the statements of pure mathematics are about. The philosophy of mathematics is in a mess! Marvin J. Greenberg.

This paper argues that Hegel has much to say to modern mathematical philosophy, although the Hegelian perspective needs to be substantially developed to incorporate within it the extensive advances in post-Hegelian mathematics and its logic. Key to that perspective is the self-referential character of the fundamental concepts of philosophy. The Hegelian approach provides a framework for answering the philosophical problems, discussed by Kurt Gödel in his paper on Bertrand Russell, which arise out of the existence in mathematics of self-referential, non-constructive (...) concepts (such as class). (shrink)

This is a version of a book chapter included in a mss on Hegel and the Absolute. It deals with metaphysical issues in Big Bang cosmology (the Big Crunch, the Big Chill, the anthropic principle, singularities...) from a Hegelian point of view. If human consciousness is an undeniable feature of the universe, then can we not say that the universe possesses or has possessed consciousness and therefore is or has been conscious? Similarly, Hegel's Absolute knows itself through the self-knowing agency (...) of human thought. And so should we not attribute to the universe the same divine existence that Hegel's Encyclopedia evokes, in its last paragraph where he refers to Aristotle's self-contemplating, self-enjoying god? (shrink)

This article focuses on debates on philosophical knowledge, mathematics, and the empirical sciences by analyzing the positions on cosmological and astronomical knowledge, around 1800, of three German authors: Herder, Schelling, and Hegel. I show the mutual interdependence of Schelling’s and Hegel’s Naturphilosophie and Herder’s Ideen, and I then demonstrate that the latter’s position during the last years of his life was a reaction to Schelling’s and Hegel’s speculative philosophy. While Herder seems to ignore the works of the Naturphilosophen in his (...) journal Adrastea, in fact he participated in a very lively debate that included Schelling’s Weltseele and Hegel’s Dissertatio de Orbitis Planetarum. (shrink)

On Thursday evening, August 30, 1989, in the Combination Room of Trinity College, Cambridge University, Michael Petry of Erasmus University, Rotterdam, opened the conference he had organized on “Hegel and Newtonianism.” Under the sponsorship of the Istituo per gli Studi Filosofici of Naples, Petry invited more than 40 scholars from Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada to discuss the relation between eighteenth century Newtonian science and Hegel’s philosophy of nature.

This paper examines the Hegelian moment of the for-another in its negative relation to the other moment of particularity: the for-itself. I identify the dissolving, fluidifying action of the for-another by examining figures within the Philosophy of Nature, particularly comets and moons, but also Hegel’s physics of light and sound. The dissolution of the lunar for-itself at the hands of the cometary for-another illustrates how the dynamic relation between the two moments of particularity participates in the presentation of essence, within (...) the Hegelian syllogism, i.e. as mediating between the universal and the singular. The dynamic action of cometary negativity occurs throughout the Philosophy of Nature and therefore should be pivotal to how the work is read. (shrink)

Although Hegel's absolute idealism is often presented as a solipsistically self-grounding, the Realphilosophie offers us an another image of Hegel which not only challenges standard interpretations, but more importantly gives us valuable resources to rethink living being. The zero-level determinacy of nature as “the idea in its otherness” has two consequences. Firstly, the starting point of any philosophy of nature must be a realism, insofar as nature's material constitution shows itself as unthought-like. Secondly, if idealism is to be viable, it (...) must prove itself to be a result of nature's immanent auto-development. Taking as my guide the category of “trembling” (Erzittern) and exploring its intimate connection with the emergent ideality of bodies producing sound, the chemical process and the voice of animals, I aim to show how the Realphilosophie is a reconstruction of the painful odyssey of the material genesis of the autopoietic self-referentiality of the concept as it is paradoxically begotten, by immaculate conception, in the pure extimacy of nature. The dialectics of nature is not a naturephilosophical theory of material being as implicit, self-unfolding productivity which necessarily leads to life via an intrinsic teleology, but rather an account of the contingent material emergence of unpredictable kinds of ontological determinacies from within the immanent field of mechanical nature. Only a naturalized idealism/idealized naturalism is capable of arguing for the ontological irreducibility of living being while simulta eously articulating its dependence upon different scientific domains which form its ontogenetic ground. It avoids both eliminative materialism and naïve vitalism. (shrink)

The "inverted world" and "dialectic of life" sections of G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit are analyzed in terms of Immanuel Kant's theory of teleological judgment as set forth in his Critique of Judgment. ;It is argued that the "inverted world" is an appropriation of Kant's speculations in the third Critique concerning the teleological unification of the laws of nature. The resultant concept of "infinity" is then analyzed as it develops in the "dialectic of life" as an appropriation of (...) Kant's teleological judgment of living organisms. From this analysis, a general dialectical logic of parts and wholes is developed in which Hegel is seen to advance this logic beyond Kant's description of it. ;The dialectical logic of life thus developed is then reflected back upon the Kantian system and its project of systematic unity, which for Kant is cast in explicitly organic terms. A review of the history of eighteenth century embryology reveals the extent to which Kant was engaged in the problems of organic form and how it influenced his systematic thinking. It is argued that Hegel's subsequent appropriation of this organic form, albeit modified, nevertheless leads Hegel to a metaphysical position concerning the closure and unity of his system. ;Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment is then analyzed and seen to instantiate a similar logic of parts and wholes, and it is argued that because aesthetic judgment is by definition indeterminate and nonpurposive, that it presents a model of a nonteleological dialectics of parts and wholes. ;The possibility of such an aesthetic dialectic is then explored in the domain of contemporary biology, where it is found that the problems of self-organization, emergence and nonlinearity, while intractible from a formal axiomatics point of view, are quite amenable to a dialectical logic of parts and wholes. ;Such a logic is vital to understanding the relations between higher levels of organization as they emerge from and effect and are effected by the lower levels of organization. Only a dialectical logic is capable of grasping the relations of culture to biology, and within culture, the relations of its various institutions or parts. (shrink)

Although Hegel's absolute idealism is often presented as a solipsistically self-grounding, the Realphilosophie offers us an another image of Hegel which not only challenges standard interpretations, but more importantly gives us valuable resources to rethink living being. The zero-level determinacy of nature as “the idea in its otherness” has two consequences. Firstly, the starting point of any philosophy of nature must be a realism, insofar as nature's material constitution shows itself as unthought-like. Secondly, if idealism is to be viable, it (...) must prove itself to be a result of nature's immanent auto-development. Taking as my guide the category of “trembling” (Erzittern) and exploring its intimate connection with the emergent ideality of bodies producing sound, the chemical process and the voice of animals, I aim to show how the Realphilosophie is a reconstruction of the painful odyssey of the material genesis of the autopoietic self-referentiality of the concept as it is paradoxically begotten, by immaculate conception, in the pure extimacy of nature. The dialectics of nature is not a naturephilosophical theory of material being as implicit, self-unfolding productivity which necessarily leads to life via an intrinsic teleology, but rather an account of the contingent material emergence of unpredictable kinds of ontological determinacies from within the immanent field of mechanical nature. Only a naturalized idealism/idealized naturalism is capable of arguing for the ontological irreducibility of living being while simulta eously articulating its dependence upon different scientific domains which form its ontogenetic ground. It avoids both eliminative materialism and naïve vitalism. (shrink)

Seele kommt zweifellos schon ‚höheren‘ Tieren zu, die als solche über phänomenale Wahrnehmung verfügen. Als aufschlussreich erweist sich der kontrastierende Vergleich von Tier und Roboter: Was hat das Tier, was der Roboter nicht hat? Schlüsselfunktion kommt hier Hegels Deutung zu, die als eine Phänomenologie der ‚animalischen Seele‘ angesprochen werden kann. Sein Diktum ‚Nur ein Lebendiges fühlt Mangel‘ verweist auf das alles Organische durchwaltende Prinzip Selbsterhaltung als Grund des Seelischen: Alles, was das Tier wahrnimmt, hat dadurch existentiellen Sinn, Selbsterhaltungs-Sinn. Zugleich wird (...) deutlich, dass die Roboter-Wahrneh- mung nicht zur Sinn-Konstitution befähigt, sondern durch Sinn-Demenz charakterisiert ist. Konkret-systemtheoretisch wird die Sinnbezogenheit des Tiersubjekts hier als Emergenzphänomen desjenigen Systems gedeutet, das durch die Kooperative von Wahrnehmung, Bewertung und Verhalten (Perc-Eval-Act-System) konstituiert wird. In dieser emergentistischen Perspektive gibt es so gleichsam den Dualismus des ‚bloß Physischen‘ und des Ideell-Seelischen, der im Hinblick auf die insgesamt physische Basis zugleich ein Monismus ist. (shrink)

Some recent interpretations of his philosophy of mind argue that Hegel endorses one or both of a pair of Aristotelian ideas about human reason: first, that our responsiveness to reasons is a capacity we acquire through the development of our second nature; second, that our rationality is not merely one more capacity alongside those capacities we appear to share with nonrational animals but rather transforms the latter qualitatively. In this paper I argue, through an interpretation of Hegel’s discussion of gestation (...) and childbirth, that he endorses these ideas only in a negatively united form in which both the naturalism of the first and the rationalism of the second are sublated. The result is a uniquely Hegelian understanding of our rational animality. (shrink)

The original intention of my first article was to direct attention to the philosophical aspects of the theory of evolution. I think this is the most significant contribution we can make to this subject. Because we are dealing with Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature it may not be possible to deal with issues from a purely philosophical perspective since Nature necessarily implies that scientific evidences and arguments must be considered. Hegel’s philosophy and the rational necessity in the development of the Concept (...) guided him at every step in his interpretation of the broader stokes of Nature. The scientific evidences and laws established by scientists certainly help to formulate and serve to test such conceptual development. But ultimately it is in the Concept that completeness and consistency must be maintained. As Hegel recognizes, "the forms of nature cannot be brought into an absolute system…" (§ 370 add.) I would like to see Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature given a chance. His opposition to evolution is not unfounded even though it may go against the majority view. In this endeavor to understand what he has presented we may find an alternative to the creationist and evolutionist arguments that will satisfy both. (shrink)

Hegel clearly established himself against the concept of a Darwinian-type of evolution, i.e. evolution in the objective sense. We have to be mindful that for Hegel the Concept is the Reality of which Nature is the Appearance. So actual movement occurs in the Concept and is only reflected in Nature. For this reason we could not expect Hegel to ever agree with Darwin's theory. It is not that the evidence and theory were not existing during Hegel's time. He was well (...) aware of the existence of this type of thinking throughout history up until his own time. His disagreement is not based upon religious considerations, or considerations of State or politics. It is based upon the Concept as he explains in the Philosophy of Nature. -/- Just as one would not expect to be able to explain the movement of an image in a mirror on the basis of the molecules of the mirror, so too the apprearance of Spirit in Nature can never be decribed on the basis of purely natural considerations. Some indication of Spirit's nature can be found by empirical observation, and corroborated by the same. However, Nature, as thouroughly implicit Reason, i.e. as other than explicit Reason, has its moment of independence from Spirit, but it is not completely determined in that moment. Rather it is ultimately inseparable from Spirit (just as the North pole of a magnet is inseparable from its South pole), and certainly has no intrinsic movement independent of it. (shrink)

There is a broad consensus in the literature that in the section on ‘The Genus’ in theScience of Logic, Hegel argues that any living being must exist among other instances of its kind, with which it reproduces to create future generations, and out of which it was itself produced. This view is not only hard to motivate philosophically, it also seems to contradict many things Hegel says elsewhere in his system about the details of living nature, especially concerning the reality (...) of spontaneous generation. After an examination of the secondary literature on ‘The Genus’, I offer an alternative view of this section, which I call ‘the Modal Reading’. The Modal Reading sees the language of pluralities in ‘The Genus’ as really Hegel's peculiar way of articulating certain modal features of thoughts about the living: to grasp a living individual as living, we need to distinguish not only between this individual and its environment, but also between the things this individual actually does and other possibilities which it does not actualize. The Modal Reading has a logical motivation insofar as it articulates what is needed to think of a living being as living, but it also avoids saddling Hegel with the problematic entailments he is usually read as taking on in this section. A further upshot of the Modal Reading is that approaching Hegel in this way provides us with a way to see Hegel as defending a non-nominalistic alternative to essentialist accounts of living kinds. Finding a way to read ‘The Genus’ which coheres with Hegel's views elsewhere in his system thus shows Hegel to have been an especially subtle and penetrating thinker, with continuing relevance for the philosophy of biology. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that Hegel’s system includes no ontology of nature, either in any traditional sense, or in any specifically Hegelian sense, of “ontology.” What Hegel provides instead is a philosophy of nature in which specifically natural activities generate specifically natural differences and identities out of themselves. I make my case first by considering the meaning of “ontology” Hegel inherited from Wolff and Kant. I show that Hegel rejected this sense of ontology for his own philosophy, in part (...) because of his recognition of the success of the Kantian critical project in making traditional ontology impossible. I then argue that although Hegel sometimes characterizes his own Objective Logic in ontological terms, he also restricts that characterization in a way that makes it inapplicable to his treatment of apparently natural categories in the Logic itself, and to his Philosophy of Nature. Against this anti-ontological background I examine a small portion of Hegel’s concrete treatment of natural phenomena and kinds: his discussion of the nervous system in higher-order animals. Through its self-formation and the contribution of its nervous-system activity to its overall life, the animal does not implement differences, identities, or logical structures borrowed from elsewhere, but itself produces the differences and identities through which it is constituted. The self-determination Hegel articulates in his study of the nervous system gives us a good example of his typically “on-the-ground” approach, which is strikingly different from the “top-down” approach more common in the ontological tradition. (shrink)

The first part of the final section of Hegel's Science of Logic, the section on "The Idea", is titled "Life". Logic being the science of thought for Hegel, this section presents Hegel's account of the form of thought peculiar to thinking about living beings as living. Hegel's full account of this form of thought holds that a living being is (1) a functionally organized totality of members (2) that maintains itself in and through its environment (3) in the manner of (...) some particular species. I develop Hegel's account in critical conversation with Kant's more limited principle, in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, for judging about internally purposive "natural ends" as beings in which every part is both means and end to every other. I argue that Hegel's view rationally develops from attempting to think through Kant's principle, retaining what is valuable in Kant's insights without treating the life sciences with skepticism. (shrink)