Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to show that the dichotomy between factual and eidetic represents one of the fundamental presuppositions of the Husserlian phenomenology. No authentic understanding of the phenomenological reduction and of its constitutive role for the transcendental phenomenology is possible without a proper understanding of this dichotomy and of its relevance for the transcendental problem. One of the questions I am going to discuss in this paper is the following: Could it be possible that both the dichotomy between fact and essence and that between empirical and eidetic sciences is actually at work in Husserl’s Ideen I as a phenomenologically uninvestigated presupposition of his undertaking? The other matter I am going to address in this paper is the concept of originary givenness and the legitimacy of the knowledge based on it (which is presupposed by the “principle of all principles” which Husserl formulates in Ideen I). I will argue that this concept is a revolutionary idea not only from a philosophical standpoint, but also from a more general scientific one, because it offers a new criteria of knowledge, that of the originary donating intuition.