Increasing ethical attention and debate is focusing on whether individuals who take part in clinical trials should be given access to post-trial care. However, the main focus of this debate has been upon drug trials undertaken in low-income settings. To broaden this debate, we report findings from interviews with individuals (n = 24) who participated in a clinical trial of a closed-loop system, which is a medical device under development for people with type 1 diabetes that automatically adjusts blood glucose (...) to help keep it within clinically recommended ranges. Individuals were recruited from UK sites and interviewed following trial close-out, at which point the closed-loop had been withdrawn. While individuals were stoical and accepting of the requirement to return the closed-loop, they also conveyed varying degrees of distress. Many described having relaxed diabetes management practices while using the closed-loop and having become deskilled as a consequence, which made reverting back to pre-trial regimens challenging. Participants also described unanticipated consequences arising from using a closed-loop. As well as deskilling, these included experiencing psychological and emotional benefits that could not be sustained after the closed-loop had been withdrawn and participants reevaluating their pre- and post-trial life in light of having used a closed-loop and now perceiving this life much more negatively. Participants also voiced frustrations about experiencing better blood glucose control using a closed-loop and then having to revert to using what they now saw as antiquated and imprecise self-management tools. We use these findings to argue that ethical debates about post-trial provisioning need to be broadened to consider potential psychological and emotional harms, and not just clinical harms, that may result from withdrawal of investigated treatments. We also suggest that individuals may benefit from information about potential nonclinical harms to help make informed decisions about trial participation. (shrink)

It is commonly presupposed that there are no decisive differences between empathy with fictional characters on one hand and empathy with real persons on the other. I distinguish two types of processes of affect recognition "Perceptual Affect Recognition" and "Affective Affect Recognition". The consensus view about empathy with fictional characters has to be challenged if "empathy" refers to the former or the latter process because of the significant differences between the fictional and the non-fictional scenario: firstly, readers as "empathizers" cannot (...) perceive the fictional target person directly but only the literary text. This is especially problematic for Affective State Recognition. Secondly, fictional characters do not exist, at least not in the sense that they are real people or entities with mental states which leads to relevant differences of the accuracy conditions of Affective Affect Recognition in the fictional and the nonfictional scenario. (shrink)

According to an optimistic view, affective empathy is a route to knowledge of what it is like to be in the target person’s state (“phenomenal knowledge”). Roughly, the idea is that the empathizer gains this knowledge by means of empathically experiencing the target’s emotional state. The literature on affective empathy, however, often draws a simplified picture according to which the target feels only a single emotion at a time. Co-occurring emotions (“concurrent emotions”) are rarely considered. This is problematic, because concurring (...) emotions seem to support a sceptical view according to which we cannot gain phenomenal knowledge of the target person’s state by means of affective empathy. The sceptic concludes that attaining the epistemic goal of affective empathy is difficult, in practice often impossible. I accept the sceptic’s premises, but reject the conclusion, because of the argument’s unjustified, hidden premise: that the epistemic goal of affective empathy is phenomenal knowledge. I argue that the epistemic goal of affective empathy is phenomenal understanding, not knowledge. Attention to the under-explored phenomenon of concurring emotions clarifies why this is important. I argue that this is the decisive epistemic progress in everyday cases of phenomenal understanding of another person. (shrink)

Cet article présente et discute la méthodologie de construction d’un corpus plurilingue en diachronie longue (1681-1914). Puisqu’il n’existait pas de corpus alsacien significatif, un important travail de construction d’un corpus significatif a été mené afin de constituer un corpus documentant les contacts linguistiques dans les écrits des locuteurs-scripteurs alsaciens. Cette tâche a présenté un certain nombre de défis méthodologiques causés par le contact des langues, la variation sociolinguistique et diachronique, le manque de sources primaires et de documents numérisés. Parmi ces (...) défis entrent aussi en compte la complexité du contexte historico-politico-sociolinguistique et les rapports entre oralité et scripturalité. (shrink)

Discute-se a interface entre discursos poéticos e proféticos e a área de atuação de seus respectivos especialistas, na Grécia arcaica, a partir de uma análise de certas passagens dos poemas Teogonia e Trabalhos e dias de Hesíodo. O enfoque é a afirmação, na Teogonia , que a consagração do poeta pelas Musas, ou seja, sua união com uma realidade sagrada, lhe permite celebrar o futuro. A afirmação é discutida através da interpretação de passagens em Trabalhos e dias.

This article focuses on unjust credibility deficits in cases of testimony about emotional reactions towards acts of oppression. It argues that the injustice in these cases is not rooted in the hearer’s identity prejudices against the speaker, but the hearer's problematic way of dealing with his simulation of being in the speaker's situation. The simulation is in itself not morally problematic. However, I focus on a case where the hearer either recklessly or negligently fails to consider knowledge about the differences (...) in people’s emotional reactions and comes to believe that his simulated reaction is the only possible reaction, thus believing that the speaker does not report her emotions truthfully.In this case, the ‘epistemic poison’ results from the recklessness or negligence not necessarily from identity prejudice against the speaker. This credibility deficit is unjust, yet its persistent and systematic nature stems from the fact that a hearer who is not from the same marginalized or oppressed group as the speaker will simulate different emotional reactions to those reported by the speaker. Hence, the unjust credibility deficit can be connected to other forms of social injustices suffered by the speaker. (shrink)

Emotional responses to fiction are part of our experience with art and media. Some of these responses (“fictional emotions”) seem to be directed towards fictional entities—entities that we believe do not exist. Some philosophers argue that fictional emotions differ in nature from other emotional responses. (cf. Walton in J Philos 75(1):5–27, 1978, Mimesis as make-believe, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990, Walton, in: Hjort, Laver (ed.) Emotion and the arts, Oxford University, New York, 1997; Currie in The nature of fiction, Cambridge (...) University Press, Cambridge, 1990; Stecker in Br J Aesthet 51(3):295–308, 2011) The claim is supposed to be supported among others by ‘the argument from action.’ In contrast to genuine emotions, proponents of this argument claim, fictional emotions do not motivate their bearers to act. (cf. Yanal in Paradoxes of emotion and fiction, Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, 1999; Lamarque in Br J Aesthet 21(4):291–304, 1981; Carroll in The philosophy of horror: or, paradoxes of the heart, Routledge, London, 1990; Currie 1990; Walton 1978, 1990; Suits in Pac Philos Q 87(3):369–386, 2006; Friend, in: Kind (ed.) The Routledge handbook of philosophy of imagination, Routledge, New York, 2016) This claim grounds in what may appear to be an obvious fact: that viewers and readers of are not led to act by their fictional emotions. It is certainly true that viewers and readers of fiction do not form intentions to perform actions directed towards fictional entities. In contrast to the proponents of the argument from action, I will argue that the lack of any such intentions can be explained only with reference to intending’s doxastic conditions, conditions that are unsatisfied in the fictional scenario. Decisively, this explanation does not refer to the motivational force of the agent’s emotions; indeed, it doesn’t refer to emotions at all. Thus, the lack of intentions to perform actions directed towards fictional objects provides no support for the claim that fictional emotions are no genuine emotions. (shrink)

One of the reasons why empathy is a topic of enduring interest is the role it can play in understanding others. Empathy can help us to predict each other’s future actions and explain past ones; to...

There is a widespread intuition that readers’ empathy with fictional characters can help to understand certain works of literature. In a nutshell, the argument.

This volume critically discusses the role empathy plays in different processes of understanding. More precisely, it clarifies empathy's role in interpersonal understanding and appreciating works of literature and art. The volume also includes a section on historical theories of empathy's role in understanding. When it comes to understanding other persons, empathy is typically seen as a process that enables the empathizer to recognize a target person's mental states, a process which is in turn seen as "understanding" this person. This volume, (...) however, explores empathy's role in understanding beyond mere mental state recognition. With contributions on processes of interpersonal understanding and understanding of literature and art, it provides readers with an overview over both differences and similarities regarding empathy's epistemic role in two rather different areas. Since important roots of the debate about empathic understanding lie at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, the historical section of the volume focusses specifically on this period. Empathy's Role in Understanding Persons, Literature, and Art will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in the philosophy of mind, epistemology, aesthetics and the history of philosophy, as well as in literary studies and art history. (shrink)

This volume brings together two philosophical research areas that have been subject to increased attention: work regarding the unique character of having an experience and studies on the nature and powers of imagination. -/- The importance of imagination seems to stand in tension with the assumed unique and irreplaceable role of experience in our lives. However, new arguments in various philosophical debates suggest there is a need to examine how both areas of research interrelate and can enrich one another. The (...) chapters in this volume examine whether the traditional accounts of experience and imagination need to be challenged. They are divided into thematic sections that discuss epistemological, ontological, normative, phenomenological, and intersubjective questions related to experience and imagination. (shrink)

Em Suplicantes, uma das mais políticas tragédias de Eurípides, é produzida uma aproximação surpreendente entre o mundo do mito e o do espectador. Embora Teseu, seu protagonista, seja representado como um “rei democrático”, nela não está presente uma cena que possa ser equiparada à experiência da mais típica instituição da democracia ateniense, a deliberação coletiva definidora da assembleia aberta a todos os cidadãos. Todavia, em diferentes momentos do primeiro episódio, chega-se bastante perto. Assim, o objetivo deste texto é discutir como (...) essa tragédia representa formas de deliberação e consenso, para o que se investiga os meandros de dois cenários que levam a uma política de guerra de ataque desenvolvidos no drama, um em Argos, outro, em Atenas. (shrink)

This volume critically discusses the role empathy plays in different processes of understanding. More precisely, it clarifies empathy's role in interpersonal understanding and appreciating works of literature and art. The volume also includes a section on historical theories of empathy's role in understanding. When it comes to understanding other persons, empathy is typically seen as a process that enables the empathizer to recognize a target person's mental states, a process which is in turn seen as "understanding" this person. This volume, (...) however, explores empathy's role in understanding beyond mere mental state recognition. With contributions on processes of interpersonal understanding and understanding of literature and art, it provides readers with an overview over both differences and similarities regarding empathy's epistemic role in two rather different areas. Since important roots of the debate about empathic understanding lie at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, the historical section of the volume focusses specifically on this period. Empathy's Role in Understanding Persons, Literature, and Art will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in the philosophy of mind, epistemology, aesthetics and the history of philosophy, as well as in literary studies and art history. (shrink)

Descartes a bien reconnu que les passions de l’ame manifestent l’union de l’âme et du corps. Mais on peut regretter qu’il ait réduit les passions à des perceptions confuses, et qu’il n’ait pas indiqué qu’elles supposent toutes la force primordiale du désir. C’est le désir qui façonne la matière et l’organise en un corps vivant. Les êtres particuliers sont constitués par le désir en tant qu’il poursuit un but extérieur, et c’est pourquoi leur existence s’écoule dans le temps. Mais chez (...) l’homme, le désir peut s’affranchir de l’immédiate sollicitation des objets, et trouver un accomplissement plus intérieur et plus profond. (shrink)