ZUSAMMENFASSUNGDer Umstand, dass mit Hypothesen und Annahmen allein kein Erkenntnisgewinn zu erzielen ist, gilt als Gemeinplatz. Dennoch gründet Alvin Plantinga sowohl die Parität alltäglicher und wissenschaftlicher gegenüber religiösen Überzeugungen als auch seine gesamte religiöse Epistemologie auf ein Konditional, so dass es an der Zeit zu sein scheint, die Bedeutung von Konditionalen in Argumentationen erneut herauszustellen.Plantinga propagiert eine Parität religiöser und säkularer Überzeugungen auf Grundlage seiner Warrant-Theorie, nach der die Erkenntnisvermögen für die Entstehung wahrer Überzeugungen angemessen operieren müssen. Da die Erkenntnisvermögen (...) das funktionale Zentrum sowohl für die Entstehung als auch für die Rechtfertigung religiöser und alltäglicher Überzeugungen darstellen, soll die Parität mit Bezug auf den argumentativen Status der Erkenntnisvermögen erörtert werden. Ausgehend davon, dass die Existenz der Vermögen für den religiösen Erkenntnisbereich eine konditional verfasste Hypothese darstellt, gelangt die Abhandlung durch eine argumentationstheoretische Auseinandersetzung zu dem Ergebnis, dass die konstatierte Parität nicht aufrechterhalten werden kann und damit zusammenhängend der religionsphilosophische Bereich der Warrant-Theorie hinsichtlich wirklichkeitsrelevanter Erkenntnis als unbrauchbar zu beurteilen ist. SUMMARYWith assumptions and hypotheses alone there is almost no knowledge to gain. However, Alvin Plantinga establishes the parity between religious and common propositions as well as his whole religious epistemology on a conditional. Therefore, it seems to be about time to reassess the significance of conditionals and reconsider their constraints in argumentation.Based on his warrant theory, Plantinga propagates parity between common scientific and religious propositions: By virtue of properly functioning cognitive faculties true propositions will be produced. Highlighting the fact, that cognitive faculties constitute the functional centre for the production and justification of both religious and common propositions, this paper will establish to what extent the parity can be maintained if the argumentation theory is applied to the status of the cognitive faculties in Plantinga's warrant theory. The assertion of the existence of cognitive faculties for the production of religious propositions is founded by a conditional expression and hypothesis. By way of a perspective from argumentation theory about conditionals, the paper concludes that on one hand in Plantinga's general warrant theory the parity between common and religious propositions cannot be sustained and on the other hand that the part of the warrant theory which deals with philosophy of religion can be considered as unusable for real knowledge. (shrink)

Platonic Patterns is a reprint collection of many of Holger Thesleff's studies in Plato—spanning from 1967 to 2003. It includes three books, four articles and a new introduction by the author, which sets the general outline of his interpretation of Plato. Whereas much of the scholarship on Plato has tended to operate within the frame of one language and/or a single school of thought, Thesleff constructively combines several discoveries and theories of various scholars with his own research, focusing on (...) how Plato can be understood in his own context. The work represents small but significant breakthroughs in research on Plato from an internationally inclusive standpoint. Having previously been published mainly in Finland by scholarly societies, availability outside the Nordic countries has, up until now, been minimal. Thesleff employs his singular expertise of Greek language and literature to make innovative contributions to the study and interpretation of Plato. He thematically stresses the significance of the less overt elements found in Plato's dialogues, such as Plato's use of humor and his linguistic expression, while taking into account the chronology and/or the intended audience. (shrink)

Drawing on recent work in developmental and comparative psychology, this paper argues that demonstratives function to coordinate the interlocutors' joint focus of attention, which is one of the most basic functions of human communication. The communicative importance of demonstratives is reflected in a number of properties that together characterize them as a particular word class: In contrast to other closed-class expressions, demonstratives are universal, they are generally so old that their roots cannot be traced back to other linguistic items, they (...) are among the earliest words that children learn, and they are closely tied to a particular gesture. Moreover, demonstratives play an important role in the organization of discourse and the diachronic evolution of grammar, which arguably is also motivated by their communicative function to establish joint attention. (shrink)

Higher order cognitive processes, including ethical decision making (EDM), are influenced by the experiencing of discrete emotions. Recent research highlights the negative influence one such emotion, anger, has on EDM and its underlying processes. The mechanism, however, by which anger disrupts the EDM has not been investigated. The current study sought to discover whether cognitive appraisals of an emotion-evoking event are the driving mechanisms behind the influence of anger on EDM. One primary (goal obstacle) and one secondary (certainty) appraisal of (...) anger were examined. Study results suggest that appraisals of certainty are the driving mechanism behind the negative relationship between anger and EDM. Certainty appraisals led to less application of EDM-promoting strategies and more unethical social motives. Findings further highlight the value of investigating appraisals of emotional events, given their cognitive nature, for their potential effects on cognitive operations, such as EDM. Future directions and implications are discussed. (shrink)

Epigenetic modifications, such as DNA methylation and post‐translation modifications of histones, have been shown to play an important role in chromatin structure, promoter activity, and cellular reprogramming. Large protein complexes, such as Polycomb and trithorax, often harbor multiple activities which affect histone tail modification. Nevertheless, the mechanisms underlying the deposition of these marks, their propagation during cell replication, and the alteration on their distribution during transformation still require further study. Here we review recent data on those processes in both normal (...) and cancer cells, and we propose that the unscheduled expression of oncogenic transcription factors causes reprogramming of normal cells into cancer stem cells. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose a regularity theory of causation. The theory aims to be reductive and to align with our pre‐theoretic understanding of the causal relation. We show that our theory can account for a wide range of causal scenarios, including isomorphic scenarios, omissions, and scenarios which suggest that causation is not transitive.

Sustainability science seeks to extend scientific investigation into domains characterized by a distinct problem-solving agenda, physical and social complexity, and complex moral and ethical landscapes. In this endeavor it arguably pushes scientific investigation beyond its usual comfort zones, raising fundamental issues about how best to structure such investigation. Philosophers of science have long scrutinized the structure of science and scientific practices, and the conditions under which they operate effectively. We propose a critical engagement between sustainability scientists and philosophers of science (...) with respect to how to engage in scientific activity in these complex domains. We identify specific issues philosophers of science raise concerning current sustainability science and the contributions philosophers can make to resolving them. In conclusion we reflect on the steps philosophers of science could take to advance sustainability science. (shrink)

The desideratum of semantic interoperability has been intensively discussed in medical informatics circles in recent years. Originally, experts assumed that this issue could be sufficiently addressed by insisting simply on the application of shared clinical terminologies or clinical information models. However, the use of the term ‘ontology’ has been steadily increasing more recently. We discuss criteria for distinguishing clinical ontologies from clinical terminologies and information models. Then, we briefly present the role clinical ontologies play in two multicentric research projects. Finally, (...) we discuss the interactions between these different kinds of knowledge representation artifacts and the stakeholders involved in developing interoperational real-world clinical applications. We provide ontology engineering examples from two EU-funded projects. (shrink)

We aim to devise a Ramsey test analysis of actual causation. Our method is to define a strengthened Ramsey test for causal models. Unlike the accounts of Halpern and Pearl ([2005]) and Halpern ([2015]), the resulting analysis deals satisfactorily with both over- determination and conjunctive scenarios.

Most recent accounts of personal autonomy acknowledge that the social environment a person lives in, and the personal relationships she entertains, have some impact on her autonomy. Two kinds of conceptualizing social conditions are traditionally distinguished in this regard: Causally relational accounts hold that certain relationships and social environments play a causal role for the development and on-going exercise of autonomy. Constitutively relational accounts, by contrast, claim that autonomy is at least partly constituted by a person’s social environment or standing. (...) The central aim of this paper is to raise the question how causally and constitutively relational approaches relate to the fact that we exercise our autonomy over time. I argue that once the temporal scope of autonomy is opened up, we need not only to think differently about the social dimension of autonomy. We also need to reconsider the very distinction between causally and constitutively relational accounts, because it is itself a synchronic (and not a diachronic) distinction. (shrink)

In 1783 John Michell published a note entitled ‘On the Means of Discovering the Distance, Magnitude etc. of the Fixed Stars, in Consequence of the Diminution of the Velocity of their Light’, but it was Christian Doppler who in 1842 for the first time formulated the principle : If a source of sound or light is in motion relative to an observer, or an observer in motion relative to a source, the period of the waves received by the observer will (...) be different from the period of the waves emitted by the source. The acoustical Doppler principle was verified in 1845 by Buys-Ballot's experiments and by Ernst Mach ). H. Fizeau proposed to verify the optical Doppler principle by measuring the shift of lines in the spectra of stars . This was carried out by William Huggins , and H. C. Vogel and led to exact results in 1892. The Doppler effect with canal rays was shown by Johannes Stark in 1905. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyse actual causation in terms of production. The latter concept is made precise by a strengthened Ramsey Test semantics of conditionals: \ iff, after suspending judgement about A and C, C is believed in the course of assuming A. This test allows us to verify or falsify that an event brings about another event. Complementing the concept of production by a weak condition of difference-making gives rise to a full-fledged analysis of causation.

Ohne den Verleger Hermann Niemeyer hätte es keine DVjs gegeben. Am Beispiel dieser Zeitschrift untersucht der Beitrag auf der Grundlage unveröffentlichter Korrespondenzen, unter welchen historischen Bedingungen und Konstellationen eine funktionierende Infrastruktur für wissenschaftliches Publizieren im Deutschland der 1920er und 1930er Jahre geschaffen und unterhalten wurde.

This paper offers a review of research on demonstratives from an interdisciplinary perspective. In particular, we consider the role of demonstratives in current research on language universals, language evolution, language acquisition, multimodal communication, signed language, language and perception, language in interaction, spatial imagery, and discourse processing. Traditionally, demonstratives are analyzed as a particular class of spatial deictics. Yet, a number of recent studies have argued that space is largely irrelevant to deixis and that demonstratives are primarily used for social and (...) interactive purposes. Synthesizing findings in the literature, we conclude that demonstratives are a very special class of linguistic items that are foundational to both spatial and social aspects of language and cognition. (shrink)

People who work and live in a certain moral practice usually possess a specific form of moral wisdom. If we manage to incorporate their moral intuitions in ethical reasoning, we can arrive at judgements and theories that grasp a moral experience that generally cannot be found outside the said practice. To achieve this goal, we need a legitimate way to balance moral intuitions, ethical principles and general theories. In the present contribution, we describe a version of the model of Reflective (...) Equilibrium, which we call the Normative-Empirical Reflective Equilibrium . RE provides a framework for ethical thinking that includes both moral experience and normative theory.After an outline of the model, we focus on the role of empirical research and illustrate how empirical data on moral intuitions can add to the comprehensiveness of the set of moral beliefs in NE-RE. Subsequently, we describe how coherence among the elements of an NE-RE can be understood and measured. Finally, we address an important question for any method of moral reasoning: what is the status of the outcome of the reasoning process? This is a matter of justification. We argue for a so-called good reasoning-justified outcome strategy in NE-RE. This strategy is built on a reasoning process in which the reason-giving force of each element is tested and weighed. The thinker has to work towards a coherent view in which only the elements with sufficient justificatory power are retained. If the thinker decides that the elements fit together into a coherent view, a reflective equilibrium is reached. NE-RE is an attempt to describe a model for moral reasoning that can profit from the moral wisdom present among experienced agents through the use of empirical research. (shrink)

A recurrent issue in the vast amount of literature on reasoning models in ethics is the role and nature of moral intuitions. In this paper, we start from the view that people who work and live in a certain moral practice usually possess specific moral wisdom. If we manage to incorporate their moral intuitions in ethical reasoning, we can arrive at judgements and (modest) theories that grasp a moral experience that generally cannot be found outside the practice. Reflective equilibrium (RE) (...) provides a framework for balancing moral intuitions, ethical principles and general theories. Nevertheless, persisting problems associated with the use of intuitions need to be addressed. One is the objection that moral intuitions lack the credibility necessary to guide moral reasoning. Ethicists have tried to solve this problem by formulating criteria to separate the “bad” intuitions from the “good” ones at the beginning of the reasoning process. We call this the credible input-justified outcome strategy. An example is the appeal to the common morality by Beauchamp and Childress. We think this approach is unsuccessful. As an alternative, we outline the good reasoning-justified outcome strategy. It connects to a variant of RE in which intuitions from different sources are incorporated. We argue that the elements of RE have different levels of justificatory power at the start of reasoning. In our strategy, each element can gain or lose justificatory power when it is tested in a reasoning process that meets several criteria. (shrink)

This chapter explores Gottlob Frege's contribution to logic. Frege has been called the greatest logician since Aristotle, but he failed to gain influence on the mathematical community of his time and the depth and pioneering character of his work was acknowledged only after the collapse of his logicist program due to the Zermelo–Russell antinomy in 1902. Frege, by proving his theorem χ without recourse to Wertverläufe, exhibited an inconsistency (or at least an incoherence) in the traditional notion of the extension (...) of a concept. He prompted our awareness of a situation the future analyses of which will hopefully not only deepen our systematic control of the interplay of concepts and their extensions but also improve our understanding of the historical development of the notion of “extension of a concept” and its historiographical assessment. (shrink)