ExtractIn this paper I will put forward a brief argument against abortion rights. The argument concerns itself with the two main ways in which defenders of abortion rights develop their position. The first strategy through which they tend to do this is by arguing against the personhood of the fetus. The second strategy, made famous by Judith Jarvis Thomson, is to argue that, even if the fetus were a person, its right to life would not entail the right to draw (...) upon the resources of the woman in pregnancy, and so the pregnancy can be terminated. My argument will provide reasons to suspect that attacks on fetal personhood are based on a questionable notion of personhood, and that the most common attempts to show that the fetus does not have the right to draw on the resources of the woman in pregnancy also have considerable problems. This will buttress the case for the view that the fetus is a person and that it has the right to draw on the resources of the woman in pregnancy.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.A SHORT ARGUMENT AGAINST ABORTION RIGHTSVolume 12, Issue 34Jack MulderDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1477175613000080Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. A SHORT ARGUMENT AGAINST ABORTION RIGHTSVolume 12, Issue 34Jack MulderDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1477175613000080Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. A SHORT ARGUMENT AGAINST ABORTION RIGHTSVolume 12, Issue 34Jack MulderDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1477175613000080Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is twofold. First, it explores and shows ways in which one important view of racism parallels the Christian doctrine of original sin. Second, it argues that this comparison helps to close the gap between the two main strands of Christian thinking about original sin. Philosophers and theologians are often asked to decide between Augustinian or Irenaean theories of original sin. An epistemology of ignorance, especially as applied in discussions of racism, helps us to see how (...) this dichotomy may be short‐sighted. For virtually no one, in an epistemology of ignorance, matures into being a racist. Nevertheless, as Charles W. Mills famously argues, the epistemology of ignorance he terms the Racial Contract has a historical inception, namely, the period around the beginning of the Transatlantic Slave Trade. I close the article by discussing whether a model of original sin similar to an epistemology of racist ignorance might satisfy the dogmatic constraints of the Catholic tradition. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that racism’s subtle and insidious reach should lead us to prefer an account of religious experience that is capable of reckoning with that reach, an account that, I shall argue, appears in the work of St. John of the Cross. The paper begins with an analysis of race and racism and the way in which the latter can have existential and even spiritual effects. The argument is then applied particularly to white people and the deleterious (...) effects racism has on their intellects, wills, and even memories, not merely inwardly but also as a result of what Charles Mills famously calls an epistemology of ignorance. Notably, intellect, will, and memory are the key sites for union in St. John’s discussion. In the last main section, I discuss how progress in the mystical life can be hindered by racism’s effects even while it is possible for there to be “touches of union” on the way. Another result of this inquiry is that it shows how a widely-used schema, such as St. John’s, will require spiritual aspirants to deal with racism, both in themselves and in the world. (shrink)

Civil Dialogue on Abortion provides a cutting-edge discussion between two philosophy scholars on each side of the abortion debate. Bertha Alvarez Manninen argues for her pro-choice view, but also urges respect for the life of the fetus, while Jack Mulder argues for his pro-life view, but recognizes that for the pro-life movement to be consistent, it must urge society to care more for the vulnerable. Coming together to discuss their views, but also to seek common ground, the two authors show (...) how their differing positions nevertheless rest upon some common convictions. The book helps to provide a way forward for a divide that has only seemed to widen the aisle of public discourse in recent years. This engaging book will prove essential reading for students across multiple disciplines, including applied ethics, medical ethics, and bioethics, but will also be of interest to students of religious studies and women's studies. (shrink)

Placing Kierkegaard in sustained dialogue with the Catholic tradition, Jack Mulder, Jr., does not simply review Catholic reactions to or interpretations of Kierkegaard, but rather provides an extended look into convergences and differences ...

Abstract: In this paper we argue that Robert Kane’s theory of free will cannot accommodate the possibility of a sinless individual who faces morally significant choices because a sinless agent cannot voluntarily accord value to an immoral desire, and we argue that Kane’s theory requires this. Since the Jesus of the historic Christian tradition is held to be sinless, we think Christians should reject Kane’s theory because it seems irreconcilable with historic Christian Christology. We consider two objections to our argument (...) and argue that both fail. (shrink)

This short paper argues that two attempts in this journal to argue for the moral permissibility of homosexual activity do not succeed.

In this dissertation, I argue that Kierkegaard's relationship to the mystical tradition is misconstrued in the secondary literature, and that a fuller account of his attitude toward mysticism reveals a more appreciative stance toward it, which in turn reveals a more mystical religious dialectic. To that end, in the first chapter, I give an account of what is taken to be Kierkegaard's anti-mysticism, and then show that the resources in other signed sources, like Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, allow us to (...) see that Kierkegaard dislikes what he calls mysticism, but what he calls mysticism is not what contemporary scholarship believes it to be. Accordingly, Kierkegaard himself could be a mystic on some definitions of that term. ;The three chapters that immediately follow are devoted to explicating Kierkegaard's religious dialectic in such a way as to show that mystical themes pervade the work. In the second chapter, I argue that the nothingness of the self is a necessary condition, according to Kierkegaard, for any wholeness that the self might acquire. Further, in the third chapter, I argue that Kierkegaard's conception of God permits a rich notion of union with God . In the fourth chapter, I explain that Works of Love picks up where the pseudonyms left off, and articulates the union with God where such union is at once loving action, for God is love. ;In the final chapter, I conclude by showing that Kierkegaard has marked structural similarities to mystics such as Eckhart, who is warmly received by the Japanese philosophical tradition, particularly in the writings of its Zen and Pure Land Buddhist representatives. I then go on to show that Kierkegaard's writings are a fruitful source for comparative philosophy of religion, for while Kierkegaardians can also learn from the writings of these Japanese thinkers, Kierkegaard's writings can provide responses to many objections that are commonly leveled against both Kierkegaard's thought in particular and Christian philosophy in general. (shrink)

This chapter traces the main lines of Kierkegaard's debt to, and usage of, the Church Fathers. The most significant points of contact concern issues of the Incarnation, sin, and grace, and where the Fathers exhibit an understanding of the rigor of the Christian life and where Kierkegaard believes they compromise with the world. Kierkegaard's most significant engagement with individual Fathers tends to be with Tertullian and Augustine, though he sees something to admire, and often something to criticize, in most major (...) Fathers. (shrink)

In this paper I consider Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous attack on natural theology with respect to how it lines up with Catholic thought on that topic. I argue that Kierkegaard’s recently shown similarities to accounts of basic beliefs raise an interesting question when a Catholic hybrid of basic beliefs and natural theology, which I develop in the paper, is considered. Kierkegaard does not attack what we might call natural reason, or a natural awareness of God’s existence, only natural theology’s demonstrative capabilities, and (...) his reasons for doing the latter, in our current epistemological climate, are shown to be mistaken. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider how a Kierkegaardian could respond critically to the question of strong theological universalism, i.e., the belief that all individuals must eventually be reconciled to God and experience everlasting happiness. A Kierkegaardian would likely reject what Thomas Talbott has called “conservative theism,” but has the resources to mount a sustained attack on the view that all individuals must experience everlasting happiness. Some have seen that Kierkegaard has some potential in this regard, but a full Kierkegaardian response (...) to strong theological universalism has yet to be given. In this paper, I give such an account. (shrink)

In this paper I defend the view that not only does Fear and Trembling espouse the teleological suspension of the ethical as a radical suspension and even possible violation of otherwise ethical duties, but also that Kierkegaard himself espouses it and carries the belief through his entire authorship. A brief analysis of Religiousness A suggests that Climacus made a dialectical error in Concluding Unscientific Postscript. This error is corrected by Anti-Climacus and Kierkegaard's own journals, and the correction makes possible a (...) full-blooded affirmation of the teleological suspension where Climacus failed. This reaffirmation can explain the shift from Climacus to Anti-Climacus on the topic of hidden inwardness as well as the shift from Climacus to Kierkegaard on the topic of religious suffering. It can also provide a legitimate Kierkegaardian alterative to positing a stage Merold Westphal (and not Kierkegaard) has termed Religiousness C. What we are left with is an uncompromisingly radical religious dialectic that gives every appearance of being exactly what Kierkegaard intended. (shrink)