The causal theory of action is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of action as the "standard story" of human action and agency -- the nearest approximation in the field to a theoretical orthodoxy. This volume brings together leading figures working in action theory today to discuss issues relating to the CTA and its applications, which range from experimental philosophy to moral psychology. Some of the contributors defend the theory while others criticize it; some draw from historical sources (...) while others focus on recent developments; some rely on the tools of analytic philosophy while others cite the latest empirical research on human action. All agree, however, on the centrality of the CTA in the philosophy of action. The contributors first consider metaphysical issues, then reasons-explanations of action, and, finally, new directions for thinking about the CTA. They discuss such topics as the tenability of some alternatives to the CTA; basic causal deviance; the etiology of action ; teleologism and anticausalism; and the compatibility of the CTA with theories of embodied cognition. Two contributors engage in an exchange of views on intentional omissions that stretches over four essays, directly responding to each other in their follow-up essays. As the action -oriented perspective becomes more influential in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science, this volume offers a long-needed debate over foundational issues. Contributors: Fred Adams, Jesús H. Aguilar, John Bishop, Andrei A. Buckareff, Randolph Clarke, Jennifer Hornsby, Alicia Juarrero, Alfred R. Mele, Michael S. Moore, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Josef Perner, Johannes Roessler, David-Hillel Ruben, Carolina Sartorio, Michael Smith, Rowland Stout The hardcover edition does not include a dust jacket. (shrink)

Grit, which is originally conceptualized as passion and perseverance for long-term goals, has been associated with optimal performance. Although previous meta-analytic and systematic reviews summarized how grit relates to performance outcomes, they possess considerable shortcomings, such as (a) absence of summary on the association of grit with well-being outcomes; (b) absence of discussion on social, psychological, and emotional mechanisms linking grit to well-being; and (c) lack of elaboration on how alternative models can resolve fundamental problems in the grit construct. This (...) integrative review provides a comprehensive summary on the link of grit to performance and well-being outcomes. Importantly, it elaborates how alternative models can potentially address flaws in the existing grit theory. Future research directions are discussed on how to move forward the science of grit. (shrink)

In their recent book Radicalizing Enactivism. Basic minds without content, Dan Hutto and Erik Myin make two important criticisms of what they call autopoietic enactivism. These two criticisms are that AE harbours tacit representationalists commitments and that it has too liberal a conception of cognition. Taking the latter claim as its main focus, this paper explores the theoretical underpinnings of AE in order to tease out how it might respond to H&M. In so doing it uncovers some reasons which not (...) only appear to warrant H&M’s initial claims but also seem to point to further uneasy tensions within the AE framework. The paper goes beyond H&M by tracing the roots of these criticisms and apparent tensions to phenomenology and the role it plays in AE’s distinctive conception of strong life-mind continuity. It is highlighted that this phenomenological dimension of AE contains certain unexamined anthropomorphic and anthropogenic leanings which do not sit comfortably within its wider commitment to life-mind continuity. In light of this analysis it is suggested that AE will do well to rethink this role or ultimately run the risk of remaining theoretically unstable. The paper aims to contribute to the ongoing theoretical development of AE by highlighting potential internal tensions within its framework which need to be addressed in order for it to continue to evolve as a coherent paradigm. (shrink)

O mundo das afeições e das emoções ocupa um posto certamente secundário na história da filosofia. Seu caráter difuso e ambíguo não se enquadra no modelo clássico de filosofia inspirado na certeza do conhecimento matemático. De mãos dadas à irrupção da fenomenologia, tratamos de mostrar como se produz uma reabilitação do componente afetivo e corporal da existência humana; a tal afeto, tomamos em conta o significado filosófico que Heidegger e Scheler outorgam respectivamente aos sentimentos da angustia e do amor ao (...) momento de abrir e compreender o mundo. (shrink)

The claims of some authors to have introduced a new type of explanation in cosmology, based on the anthropic principle, are examined and found wanting. The weak anthropic principle is neither anthropic nor a principle. Either in its direct or in its Bayesian form, it is a mere tautology lacking explanatory force and unable to yield any prediction of previously unknown results. It is a pattern of inference, not of explanation. The strong anthropic principle is a gratuitous speculation with no (...) other support than previous religious commitment or the assumption of an actual infinity of universes, for which there is no the slightest empirical hint. But even assuming so much, it does not work. In particular, the assumption of an infinity of different universes is no guarantee of finding among them one like this one. The loose anthropic way of reasoning does not stand up to the usual methodological standards of empirical science. And it does not signal any anthropocentric turn in contemporary science. (shrink)

In this work, a new intelligent control strategy based on neural networks is proposed to cope with some external disturbances that can affect quadrotor unmanned aerial vehicles dynamics. Specifically, the variation of the system mass during logistic tasks and the influence of the wind are considered. An adaptive neuromass estimator and an adaptive neural disturbance estimator complement the action of a set of PID controllers, stabilizing the UAV and improving the system performance. The control strategy has been extensively tested with (...) different trajectories: linear, helical, circular, and even a lemniscate one. During the experiments, the mass of the UAV is triplicated and winds of 6 and 9 in Beaufort’s scale are introduced. Simulation results show how the online learning of the estimator increases the robustness of the controller, reducing the effects of the changes in the mass and of the wind on the quadrotor. (shrink)

Este artículo muestra que la ética del discurso en versión de la ética cordis contribuye a mantener una actitud crítica de discernimiento ante las tecnologías de la inteligencia artificial. Propone distinguir entre opinión pública y razón pública, para destacar el sentido crítico del uso público de la razón en la línea de Kant, Rawls, Habermas y Cortina. Y afrontar las dificultades para ejercer la razón pública en la era digital: impacto de la inteligencia artificial en la comunicación, hiperconectitividad, datificación, “panóptico (...) digital” y la espiral del silencio, que ponen en peligro el uso de la razón y la intimidad personal. (shrink)

In this paper, an attempt is made to solve various problems posed to current theories of verisimilitude: the problem of linguistic variance; the problem of which are the best scientific methods for getting the most verisimilar theories; and the question of the ontological commitment in scientific theories. As a result of my solution to these problems, and with the help of other considerations of epistemological character, I conclude that the notion of 'Tarskian truth' is dispensable in a rational interpretation of (...) the scientific enterprise. As a logical result, however, falsificationism will be vindicated. (shrink)

A phenomenological model is developed as an alternative to current analyses of the imagination in sport philosophy, heirs to an Enlightenment notion that conceptualizes imaginings as abstract, eidetic, and representational. EC describes how Eidetic and Corporeal Imaginings phenomenologically structure our imaginative undertakings. EIs keep the ‘ideal’ aspect, but CIs—enacted, corporeal, non-representational—are more fundamental and foundational. Sports are particularly suited to express CIs’ muscular imaginings, which result in novel performances. An enactive framework theorizes CIs as non-representational interactions.

We may succed in the fulfilment of our desires but still fail to properly own our practical life, perhaps because we acted as addicts, driven by desires that are alien to our will, or as “wantons,” satisfying the desires that we simply happen to have (Frankfurt, 1988 ). May we equally fail to own the outcomes of our epistemic life? If so, how may we attain epistemic ownership over it? This paper explores the structural parallellism between practical and epistemic rationality, (...) building on Williamson’s ( 2002 ) suggestion that we should commence with successful performances as the foundation for both domains, be it action or knowledge. By highlighting the limitations of higher-order regulative approaches in epistemology, exemplified by Sosa ( 2007, 2011, 2015, 2021 ), the paper introduces a form of teleological epistemic constitutivism inspired by Velleman ( 2000, 2009 ). The proposal is that epistemic ownership is not attained in the mere pursuit of truth or knowledge, but requires furthermore a struggle to understand what we know. (shrink)

According to robust versions of virtue epistemology, the reason why knowledge is incompatible with certain kinds of luck is that justified true beliefs must be achieved by the agent . In a recent set of papers, Pritchard has challenged these sorts of views, advancing different arguments against them. I confront one of them here, which is constructed upon scenarios affected by environmental luck, such as the fake barn cases. My objection to Pritchard differs from those offered until now by Carter (...) , Jarvis or Littlejohn in that it is based on the claim that cognitive performances may not be properly considered as achievements beyond the scope of the agent’s intentional action—an idea that confers more explanatory power on my argument, and contributes to stregthening links between knowledge and agency. (shrink)

We are witnessing a certain tendency in epistemology to account for the anti-luck intuition in terms of risk. I.e., instead of the traditional anti-luck diagnosis of Gettier cases and fake barn cases, a new anti-risk diagnosis seems to be preferable by many. My goal in this paper is twofold: first, I contribute to motivate that drift; and second, I defend that we ought to partially resist it. An anti-risk diagnosis is valid and preferable for fake barn cases, but we still (...) need an anti-luck diagnosis for classic Gettier cases. The paper thus defends the Solomon-like result that we need both concepts—epistemic luck and epistemic risk—to deal with all the cases where knowledge is undermined. (shrink)

This paper advances new theses about the relationship between luck and risk, using recent work by Duncan Pritchard (2014, 2015, 2016) as its foil. Once Pritchard’s views are introduced in section 1, the rest of the paper completes two different tasks, one critical and one constructive. By focussing on some epistemological cases that Pritchard’s model would fail to identify, section 2 shows that it relies on a difference that is in fact inessential: the one between the occurrence and the non‐occurrence (...) of an event. Section 3 sketches and defends an alternative account of the luck/risk distinction, based on the consideration of situations (instead of events) from different temporal perspectives: luck assessments track a situation’s past, considering it the actual outcome of some previous event, whereas risk assessments look at the situation’s future, regarding it as the initial condition of some unsettled event. (shrink)

We are witnessing a certain tendency in epistemology to account for the anti-luck intuition in terms of risk. I.e., instead of the traditional anti-luck diagnosis of Gettier cases and fake barn cases, a new anti-risk diagnosis seems to be preferable by many. My goal in this paper is twofold: first, I contribute to motivate that drift; and second, I defend that we ought to partially resist it. An anti-risk diagnosis is valid and preferable for fake barn cases, but we still (...) need an anti-luck diagnosis for classic Gettier cases. The paper thus defends the Solomon-like result that we need both concepts—epistemic luck and epistemic risk—to deal with all the cases where knowledge is undermined. (shrink)

According to enactivism all living systems, from single cell organisms to human beings, are ontologically endowed with some form of teleological and sense-making agency. Furthermore, enactivists maintain that: there is no fixed pregiven world and as a consequence all organisms “bring forth” their own unique “worlds” through processes of sense-making. The first half of the paper takes these two ontological claims as its central focus and aims to clarify and make explicit the arguments and motivations underlying them. Our analysis here (...) highlights three distinct but connected problems for enactivism: these arguments do not and cannot guarantee that there is no pregiven world, instead, they end up generating a contradiction whereby a pregiven world seems to in fact be tacitly presupposed by virtue of a reliance on a tacit epistemic perspectivalism which is also inherently representationalist and as a consequence makes it difficult to satisfactorily account for the ontological plurality of worlds. Taking these considerations on board, the second half of the paper then aims to develop a more robust ontologically grounded enactivism. Drawing from biosemiotic enactivism, science and technology studies and anthropology, the paper aims to present an account which both rejects a pregiven world and coherently accounts for how organisms bring forth ontologically multiple worlds. (shrink)

According to enactivism all living systems, from single cell organisms to human beings, are ontologically endowed with some form of teleological and sense-making agency. Furthermore, enactivists maintain that: there is no fixed pregiven world and as a consequence all organisms “bring forth” their own unique “worlds” through processes of sense-making. The first half of the paper takes these two ontological claims as its central focus and aims to clarify and make explicit the arguments and motivations underlying them. Our analysis here (...) highlights three distinct but connected problems for enactivism: these arguments do not and cannot guarantee that there is no pregiven world, instead, they end up generating a contradiction whereby a pregiven world seems to in fact be tacitly presupposed by virtue of a reliance on a tacit epistemic perspectivalism which is also inherently representationalist and as a consequence makes it difficult to satisfactorily account for the ontological plurality of worlds. Taking these considerations on board, the second half of the paper then aims to develop a more robust ontologically grounded enactivism. Drawing from biosemiotic enactivism, science and technology studies and anthropology, the paper aims to present an account which both rejects a pregiven world and coherently accounts for how organisms bring forth ontologically multiple worlds. (shrink)

The scientist's decision of accepting a given proposition is assumed to be dependent on two factors: the scientist's 'private' information about the value of that statement and the proportion of colleagues who also accept it. This interdependence is modelled in an economic fashion, and it is shown that it may lead to multiple equilibria. The main conclusions are that the evolution of scientific knowledge can be path, dependent, that scientific revolutions can be due to very small changes in the empirical (...) evidence, and that not all possible equilibria are necessarily efficient, neither in the economic nor in the epistemic sense. These inefficiencies, however, can be eliminated if scientists can form coalitions. (shrink)

This paper presents a series of meta-analyses of the validity of general mental ability (GMA) for predicting five occupational criteria, including supervisory ratings of job performance, production records, work sample tests, instructor ratings, and grades. The meta-analyses were conducted with a large database of 467 technical reports of the validity of the General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB) which included 630 independent samples. GMA showed to be a consistent predictor of the five criteria, but the magnitude of the operational validity was (...) not the same across the five criteria. Results also showed that job complexity is a moderator of the GMA validity for the performance criteria. We also found that the GMA validity estimates are slightly smaller than the previous ones obtained by Hunter (1983a; Hunter & Hunter, 1984). Finally, we discuss the implications of these findings for the research and practice of personnel selection. (shrink)

Resumo A situação actual intelectual caracteriza-se pelo auge de uma neurofilosofia, baseada nos novos dados das neurociências, que tenta substituir os métodos tradicionais da filosofia pelo método das ciências naturais. A minha intenção é a de mostrar que a filosofia de Zubiri, que também está ligada às ciências naturais, constitui uma fecunda alternativa à neurofilosofia cientificista e reducionista, porque a sua análise está estreitamente ligada à neurobiologia, especialmente através das noções de formalidade e de formalização, que constituem a base de (...) uma nova concepção da inteligência e da realidade. Palavras-chave : cérebro, formalidade, formalização, impressão, inteligência, realidadeCurrent intellectual situation is characterized by the vigour of neurophilosophy, founded in the new data of neurosciences, which try to replace the traditional philosophical methods of philosophy by the method of natural sciences. My aim is to show that Zubiri’s philosophy, which is also connected with the natural sciences, is a successful alternative to the pseudoscientific and reducing neurophilosophy, because his analysis is intrinsically connected with neurobiology, especially through the concepts of formality and formalization, which are the basis for grounding a new conception of intelligence and reality. Keywords : brain, formality, formalization, impression, intelligence, reality. (shrink)

Razões e causas tipificam duas gramáticas ou jogos de linguagem que tendem para a incomensurabilidade. Estas gramáticas instituem uma discriminação qualitativa entre a auto-eficácia de se ser alguém e a eficácia simétrica, impessoal, de se ser algo. As razões podem comportar-se como causas, embora seja profundamente absurdo interpretar razões como causas e vice-versa. Contudo, para que as razões possam assumir tal eficiência causal, é necessário admitir vários postulados: primeiro, uma ontologia monista assegurando a comunicação de eficiência dinâmica entre duas cadeias (...) de fenómenos, ou seja, a série de representações intencionais e a série de movimentos corporais, que implicaría a coexistência entre uma homogeneidade ontológica profunda e uma aparente heterogeneidade superficial; segundo, uma fenomenologia auto-vigilante, capaz de reconhecer a peculiaridade do "Eu sinto" que deve poder acompanhar o "meu agir" e o "meu fazer acontecer", ainda que aceitando a validade de uma incerteza metafísica invencível. A exploração das relacões entre razões e causas ilustrará o modo como a subjectividade emerge sob o signo de um processo unificador - mas instável - de construção de sentido. Reasons and causes typify two language games or grammars tending to incommensurability. These grammars institute a qualitative discrimination between the self-efficacy of being someone and the symmetric, selfless, efficacy of being something. Reasons can behave as causes, although it is fully absurd to interpret reasons as causes and vice-versa. Yet, in order for reasons to possess causal efficacy, one must assume: first, a monist ontology warranting the communication of dynamic efficiency between two chains of phenomena, that is to say, the chain of intentional representations and that of body movements so that a deep ontological homogeneity may coexist with a surface heterogeneity; second, a self-alert phenomenology which recognizes the peculiar "I feel" that must be able to accompany "my acting" and "my making happen", while acknowledging, however, the validity of an invincible metaphysical uncertainty. On exploring the relationships between reasons and causes selfhood emerges here as an unstable but unifying process of meaning-construction. (shrink)

Scientific research is reconstructed as a language game along the lines of Robert Brandom's inferentialism. Researchers are assumed to aim at persuading their colleagues of the validity of some claims. The assertions each scientist is allowed or committed to make depend on her previous claims and on the inferential norms of her research community. A classification of the most relevant types of inferential rules governing such a game is offered, and some ways in which this inferentialist approach can be used (...) for assessing scientific knowledge and practices are explored. Some similarities and differences with a game-theoretic analysis are discussed. (shrink)

Se presenta una panorámica de diferentes aspectos éticos vinculados con los procesos de investigación y de publicación académica. Se describen algunas interacciones entre los componentes del sistema de investigación, que pueden influir en conductas inapropiadas de los investigadores al realizar su trabajo y publicar sus resultados. Se destacan los principales valores y conocimientos que deben servir como marco de referencia a los investigadores para trabajar de forma honesta y hacer publicaciones balanceadas, justas y legales, dentro de un estilo académico riguroso (...) y claro. Se destacan algunas de las principales consecuencias del fraude académico y se hace un exhorto para fomentar una cultura de buenas prácticas académicas a los estudiantes durante su formación. (shrink)

An epistemic notion of verisimilitude (as the 'degree in which a theory seems closer to the full truth to a scientific community') is defined in several ways. Application to the structuralist description of theories is carried out by introducing a notion of 'empirical regularity' in structuralist terms. It is argued that these definitions of verisimilitude can be used to give formal reconstructions of scientific methodologies such as falsificationism, conventionalism and normal science.

La idea de que la fenomenología de Husserl representa una suerte de filosofía reflexiva, basada en una metodología que desarrolla la tradición cartesiana, se ha convertido en una creencia ampliamente difundida en la literatura filosófica. Este énfasis puesto por Husserl en la reflexión fue arduamente criticado por Heidegger. Desde entonces resulta frecuente encontrarse con la afirmación de que Husserl y Heidegger desarrollan dos conceptos de fenomenología diferentes, incluso antagónicos. No se trata de seguir alimentando esta discusión historiográfica. Aquí, por una (...) parte, se muestra el complejo proceso de desarrollo de la fenomenología hermenéutica de Heidegger en el transcurso de sus primeras lecciones de Friburgo (1919-1923) y Marburgo (1924-1928) y, por otra, se sopesan algunas de las observaciones críticas de Heidegger a Husserl a la luz de evidencias textuales de la fenomenología husserliana, ignoradas no sólo por Heidegger, sino también por un sorprendente número de reconocidos especialistas en el campo de la filosofía, de las ciencias cognitivas y de la filosofía de la mente. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article analyzes the politics of nostalgia’s history as a fatal disease between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, especially as it was applied to slaves in late eighteenth-century Cuba. I trace nostalgia’s medical history beginning with its inauguration in Swiss medicine in 1688, and then describe the contours of its transformation into a military disease primarily affecting white soldiers in France and the United States. Finally, I translate and analyze key elements of Francisco Barrera y Domingo’s work on nostalgia (...) as experienced by slaves in sugar mills in Havana. I show that Barrera uses his analysis of nostalgia and its treatment to describe the slaves’ harrowing conditions and homesickness. Nevertheless, in denying slaves the ability to return home and in failing to propose the abolition of the slave system in the wake of the Haitian Revolution, I argue, Barrera in fact deploys the diagnosis of nostalgia in order to medicalize and pathologize the slaves’ reactions and resistance to their captivity. Thus, despite his sympathy to the slaves, I conclude that for Barrera, nostalgia functions as a tool to better manage the slaves as laborers and as property. (shrink)

Scientists can choose different claims as interpretations of the results of their research. Scientific rhetoric is understood as the attempt to make those claims most beneficial for the scientists' interests. A rational choice, game-theoretic model is developed to analyze how this choice can be made and to assess it from a normative point of view. The main conclusion is that `social' interests (pursuit of recognition) may conflict with `cognitive' ones when no constraints are put on the choices of the authors (...) of scientific papers, as in an `ideal free speech situation'. Scientific institutions may help to solve this conflict. Lastly, some empirical predictions are offered that can inspire future social research of the refereeing process. (shrink)

In the context of solving large distributed constraint optimization problems, belief-propagation and incomplete inference algorithms are candidates of choice. However, in general, when the problem structure is very cyclic, these solution methods suffer from bad performance, due to non-convergence and many exchanged messages. As to improve performances of the MaxSum inference algorithm when solving cyclic constraint optimization problems, we propose here to take inspiration from the belief-propagation-guided decimation used to solve sparse random graphs. We propose the novel DeciMaxSum method, which (...) is parameterized in terms of policies to decide when to trigger decimation, which variables to decimate and which values to assign to decimated variables. Based on an empirical evaluation on a classical constraint optimization benchmarks, some of these combinations of policies, using periodic decimation, cycle detection-based decimation, parallel and non parallel decimation, random or deterministic variable selection and deterministic or random sampling for value selection, outperform state-of-the-art competitors in many settings. (shrink)

Some peculiarities of the evaluation of theories within scientific research programmes and of the assessing of rival SRPs are described assuming that scientists try to maximise an ‘epistemic utility function’ under economic and institutional constraints. Special attention is given to Lakatos' concepts of ‘empirical progress’ and ‘theoretical progress’. A notion of ‘empirical verisimilitude’ is defended as an appropriate utility function. The neologism ‘methodonomics’ is applied to this kind of studies.

Inflationary cosmology won a large following on the basis of the claim that it solves various problems that beset the standard big bang model. We argue that these problems concern not the empirical adequacy of the standard model but rather the nature of the explanations it offers. Furthermore, inflationary cosmology has not been able to deliver on its proposed solutions without offering models which are increasingly complicated and contrived, which depart more and more from the standard model it was supposed (...) to improve upon, and which sever the connection between cosmology and particle physics that initially made the inflationary paradigm so attractive. Nevertheless, inflationary cosmology remains a promising research program, not least because it offers an explanation of the origin of the density perturbations that seeded the formation of galaxies and other cosmic structures. Tests of this explanation are underway and may settle the issue of whether inflation played an important role in the early universe. (shrink)

A critical interpretation on Zubiri is put forward as an essential element for grasping the current importance of his thought, since this puts his potential contributions to the test and proposes corrections and creative extensions within the contemporary horizon of philosophy, with regard to phenomenology, hermeneutics, neurosciences and emergentism. The book focusses mainly on the evolution of Zubiri’s philosophy, his metaphysics, noology, anthropo- logy and the relationship between science and philosophy, but also on his serious crises. It should be placed (...) in context by associating this with today’s proposals for a new realism, linked to new forms of both ontology and hermeneutics. (shrink)

Resumen Se expone la teoría de los estados funcionales de Putnam y se muestra en qué consiste su neutralidad ontológica. Se consideran las críticas del propio Putnam al funcionalismo y su falta de adecuación empírica para una explicación satisfactoria de la relación entre mente y cuerpo. Luego, se argumenta a favor del funcionalismo gracias a algunas pistas que proporciona el propio Putnam, indicios que retrotraen al monismo ontológico de Davidson. Palabras clave: funcionalismo;neutralidad ontológica; mente cuerpo;monismo ontológico. A Vindication of Functionalism (...) and its Ontological NeutralityI expound Putnam’s functional states theory and show what its ontological neutrality consists in. I ponder the criticisms of Putnam himself to functionalism and its lack of empirical adequacy for a satisfactory explanation of the mind-body relation. Then, I argue for functionalism thanks to some clues provided by Putnam himself, which are hints that take one back to Davidson’s ontological monism. Keywords : Functionalism;Ontological Neutrality;Mind-Body; Ontological Monism. (shrink)