Ce numéro de ThéoRèmes a pour but d’explorer les rapports entre le pragmatisme et la religion, et plus précisément la croyance religieuse, à travers l’étude de leurs auteurs. Il est difficile de fixer une doctrine pragmatiste parfaitement homogène, mais on donnera un aperçu général de la pensée des principaux philosophes pragmatistes dont il est question ici. Né à la fin du XIXème siècle aux Etats-Unis, le pragmatisme est un courant philosophique profondément humaniste. Du grec pragmata qui d...

Cilj ovog clanka je da pokaze da je Kafkina pripovetka Jazbina reprezentativna za jednu neobicnu intersubjektivnost, kakva moze biti shvacena od strane jednog?minornog? autora, u Delezovom smislu reci. Ta intersubjektivnost ne moze biti misljena u hegelovskim terminima, sto znaci, u smislu borbe za priznanje. Pripovedac zeli tu borbu za priznanje, koja bi ga ucinila delom normalnog drustva, ali pri tom nije u stanju da rizikuje sopstveni zivot kako bi dovrsio taj proces. On onda moze da se posmatra kao hegelovska?zivotinjska svest?, (...) za koju zivot predstavlja najvisu vrednost. Taj stav pred zivotom i dominacijom moze se uporediti sa duhom jevrejstva u Hegelovim ranim spisima. U tom smislu, mozemo reci da kafkijanski pripovedac predstavlja momenat negativnosti u hegelovskoj dijalektici; tacnije, on predstavlja svest koja se zaglavila u ovom procesu, koja je lisena nade da ce taj momenat prekoraciti. U ovom clanku zelimo da istrazimo konsekvence s obzirom na Hegelov politicki sistem. Da li je Hegelova Filozofija prava u stanju da integrise u svoju dijalektiku ovu minornu svest? Ako nije, ta svest bi ostala u senci hegelovske dijalektike i morala bi da pronadje drugi politicki nacin, izvan hegelovskog predstavljanja, da postoji i da se iskaze. (shrink)

Le but de cet article est de réévaluer l’impact du projet philosophique de Jean Wahl sur la philosophie française postmoderne. L’angle choisi consiste à replacer le projet wahlien dans le cadre des deux grands motifs de la philosophie française de la seconde moitié du XXe siècle: le rejet du paradigme dominant de la vision et le rapport ambivalent à l’hégélianisme, cristallisé dans la ????igure de la conscience malheureuse. En suivant ces deux fils conducteurs, l’article retrace le parcours intellectuel de Jean (...) Wahl depuis sa thèse de doctorat sur les philosophies pluralistes angloaméricaines, en passant par sa réception de l’hégélianisme, pour le mettre en relation avec sa période la moins commentée, celle de l’introduction dans le paysage philosophique français des grands noms du roman moderniste américain de l’époque.The goal of this paper is to re-evaluate the impact of Jean Wahl’s philosophical project on French postmodern philosophy. To complete this task, it is necessary to put the Wahlian project into the context of the two major aims of 20th Century French philosophy: the rejection of ocularcentrism and the ambiguous relationship to Hegelianism characterized by the figure of the Unhappy Consciousness. Following these two threads, the article reconstructs Wahl’s intellectual journey from his Ph.D. on American pluralism to his reception of Hegelianism in order to connect them to his less known work, which consists of introducing American modernist writers into the French philosophical landscape. (shrink)

This chapter stages a confrontation between various post-structuralist materialisms of language and German Idealist naturalisms by way of two case studies into J. W. Goethe’s and F. W. J. Schelling’s textual practices and the various models for light and darkness that underpin them.

We propose to analyze well-known cases of "imaginative resistance" from the philosophical literature (Gendler, Walton, Weatherson) as involving the inference that particular content should be attributed to either: (i) a character rather than the narrator or, (ii) an unreliable, irrational, opinionated, and/or morally deviant "first person" narrator who was originally perceived to be a typical impersonal, omniscient, "effaced" narrator. We model the latter type of attribution in terms of two independently motivated linguistic mechanisms: accommodation of a discourse referent (Lewis, Stalnaker, (...) Kamp) and 'cautious' updating as a model of non-cooperative information exchange (Eckardt). (shrink)

A number of philosophical projects require a proper understanding of the modal aspects of agency, or of what I call ‘the agentive modalities.’ I propose a general account of the agentive modalities, one which takes as its primitive the decision-theoretic notion of an option. I relate this account to the standard semantics for ‘can’ and to the viability of some positions in the free will debates.

It appears that in mixed quotations like the following, the quoted expression is used and mentioned at the same time: (1) George says Tony is his ``bestest friend''. Most theories seek to account for this observation by assuming that mixed quotations operate at two levels of content at once. In contradistinction to such two-dimensional theories, we propose that quotation involves just a single level of content. Quotation always produces a change in meaning of the quoted expression, and if the quotation (...) is mixed the shift is, to a first approximation at least, from '...' to ``what x calls '...''', where x is a variable whose value is determined by the context. We argue that quotation is generally context dependent in various ways, and that some of these ways are presuppositional in nature; we present a detailed analysis of the presuppositions in question. (shrink)

I argue that free indirect discourse should be analyzed as a species of direct discourse rather than indirect discourse. More specifically, I argue against the emerging consensus among semanticists, who analyze it in terms of context shifting. Instead, I apply the semantic mechanisms of mixed quotation and unquotation to offer an alternative analysis where free indirect discourse is essentially a quotation of an utterance or thought, but with unquoted tenses and pronouns.

Karttunen observes that a presupposition triggered inside an attitude ascription, can be filtered out by a seemingly inaccessible antecedent under the scope of a preceding belief ascription. This poses a major challenge for presupposition theory and the semantics of attitude ascriptions. I solve the problem by enriching the semantics of attitude ascriptions with some independently argued assumptions on the structure and interpretation of mental states. In particular, I propose a DRT-based representation of mental states with a global belief-layer and a (...) variety of labeled attitude compartments embedded within it. Hence, desires and other non-doxastic attitudes are asymmetrically dependent on beliefs. I integrate these mental state representations into a general semantic account of attitude ascriptions which relies on the parasitic nature of non-doxastic attitudes to solve Karttunen’s puzzle. (shrink)

Understanding how activity in the brain leads to a subjective percept is of great interest to philosophers and neuroscientists alike. In the last years, neurophysiological experiments have approached this problem directly by measuring neural signals in animals as they experience well-defined visual percepts. Stimuli in these studies are often inherently ambiguous, and thus rely upon the subjective report, generally from trained monkeys, to provide a measure of perception. By correlating activity levels in the brain to this report, one can speculate (...) on the role of individual neurons and groups of neurons in the formation and maintenance of a particular percept. However, in order to draw valid conclusions from such experiments, it is critical that the responses accurately and reliably reflect what is perceived. For this reason, a number of behavioural paradigms have been developed to control and evaluate the truthfulness of responses from behaving animals. Here we describe several approaches to optimizing the reliability of a monkey's perceptual report, and argue that their combination provides an invaluable approach in the study of subjective visual perception. (shrink)

We propose to characterize imaginative resistance as the failure or unwillingness of the reader to take a fictional description of a deviant reality at face value. The goal of the paper is to explore how readers deal with such a breakdown of the default Face Value interpretation strategy. We posit two distinct interpretative ‘coping’ strategies which help the reader engage with the resistance-inducing fiction by attributing the offending content to one of the fictional characters. We present novel empirical evidence that (...) shows that actual readers use these strategies and we flesh out the exact workings of these strategies by integrating them into a general formal semantic framework for interpreting fiction. (shrink)

Qu'ils soient en ligne ou hors ligne, les mondes virtuels cristallisent nombre d'espoirs, de craintes, de fantasmes liés à l'innovation technologique, à la gestion et aux formes de l'identité contemporaine, et à l'évolution des médias de communication. Les emplois désordonnés de la notion d'avatar et les projections associées témoignent des paradoxes à l'oeuvre dès lors que l'on tente de comprendre des pratiques et des technologies nouvelles. Mais l'avatar ne représentant qu'une partie du mode opératoire d'une personne dans un monde virtuel, (...) il conviendra, dans une approche systémique, de préciser l'étendue de la présence du sujet dans ces mondes pour mieux informer la notion de données personnelles dans ce contexte spécifique.Comment ces identités et données virtuelles sont-elles gérées, traitées, appréhendées individuellement et collectivement, tant par les internautes que par les acteurs techniques et industriels?Virtual worlds, whether multiplayer online games or three-dimensional virtual worlds like Second Life, crystallize a multitude of hopes, fears and fantasies that are linked with technological innovation, with contemporary forms of identity and their management, and with developments in communication media. Today s unregulated uses of the avatar concept and associated projections reveal the paradoxes that arise when we attempt to understand new practices and technologies. However, the avatar only partially represents the way people function in a digital world, and any systemic study therefore needs to specify the extent of the subject's presence in a virtual world, in order to give a clearer idea of what is personal data in this specific context. How are these virtual identities and items of information managed, treated and individually and collectively apprehended, by Web surfers themselves and by the technical and industrial spheres concerned? (shrink)

We propose an empirical mode decomposition (EMD-) based method to extract features from the multichannel recordings of local field potential (LFP), collected from the middle temporal (MT) visual cortex in a macaque monkey, for decoding its bistable structure-from-motion (SFM) perception. The feature extraction approach consists of three stages. First, we employ EMD to decompose nonstationary single-trial time series into narrowband components called intrinsic mode functions (IMFs) with time scales dependent on the data. Second, we adopt unsupervised K-means clustering to group (...) the IMFs and residues into several clusters across all trials and channels. Third, we use the supervised common spatial patterns (CSP) approach to design spatial filters for the clustered spatiotemporal signals. We exploit the support vector machine (SVM) classifier on the extracted features to decode the reported perception on a single-trial basis. We demonstrate that the CSP feature of the cluster in the gamma frequency band outperforms the features in other frequency bands and leads to the best decoding performance. We also show that the EMD-based feature extraction can be useful for evoked potential estimation. Our proposed feature extraction approach may have potential for many applications involving nonstationary multivariable time series such as brain-computer interfaces (BCI). (shrink)

This commentary on coderre & katz, wiesenfeld-hallin et al., and dickenson focuses on: (a) the brain as an under-recognized contributor to pain facilitation at the spinal cord; (b) these brain-to-spinal pathways being activated by learning or by body infection/inflammation; and (c) the resultant spinal release of anti-analgesic neuropeptides, activators of the NMDA-NO cascade, and activators of glia.

I provide a novel semantic analysis of proper names and indexicals, combining insights from the competing traditions of referentialism, championed by Kripke and Kaplan, and descriptivism, introduced by Frege and Russell, and more recently resurrected by Geurts and Elbourne, among others. From the referentialist tradition, I borrow the proof that names and indexicals are not synonymous to any definite description but pick their referent from the context directly. From the descriptivist tradition, I take the observation that names, and to some (...) extent indexicals, have uses that are best understood by analogy with anaphora and definite descriptions, that is, following Geurts, in terms of presupposition projection. The hybrid analysis that I propose is couched in Layered Discourse Representation Theory. Proper names and indexicals trigger presuppositions in a dedicated layer, which is semantically interpreted as providing a contextual anchor for the interpretation of the other layers. For the proper resolution of DRSs with layered presuppositions, I add two constraints to van der Sandt's algorithm. The resulting proposal accounts for both the classic philosophical examples and the new linguistic data, preserving a unified account of the preferred rigid interpretation of both names and indexicals, while leaving room for non-referential readings under contextual pressure. (shrink)

We argue that contrastive statements have the same underlying semantics and affect the context in the same way as denials. We substantiate this claim by giving a unified account of the two phenomena that treats contrast as a subtype of denial. This analysis crucially requires a dynamic semantics view of context-dependence with a multi-dimensional representation of information.

This paper deals with the semantics of de dicto , de re and de se belief reports. First, I flesh out in some detail the established, classical theories that assume syntactic distinctions between all three types of reports. I then propose a new, unified analysis, based on two ideas discarded by the classical theory. These are: (i) modeling the de re/de dicto distinction as a difference in scope, and (ii) analyzing de se as merely a special case of relational de (...) re attitudes. The resurrection of these ideas takes place in a dynamic setting. My formalization of the first idea involves a modification of the presupposition-as-anaphora resolution algorithm for DRT. The second involves treating acquaintance relations as second-order presuppositions, to be bound in the context by means of higher-order unification, or accommodated if necessary. The resulting framework requires no syntactic distinctions between different modes of attitude, with the exception of a specific subclass of de se reports characterized by special ‘ de se pronouns’ (i.e. PRO and logophors). These special pronouns are handled in syntax; everything alse is passed on to the pragmatic resolution module as it appears on the surface. The more sophisticated contextual resolution process nonetheless ensures adequate output truth conditions for a variety of classical and novel puzzles. In particular, I compare the new pragmasemantic system to the classical, syntactic analysis with respect to iterated and quantified reports, and monstrously shifted indexicals. (shrink)

Novels like Fight Club or American Psycho are said to be instances of unreliable narration: the first person narrator presents an evidently distorted picture of the fictional world. The film adaptations of these novels are likewise said to involve unreliable narration. I resist this extension of the term ‘unreliable narration’ to film. My argument for this rests on the observation that unreliable narration requires a personal narrator while film typically involves an impersonal narrator. The kind of ambiguous story-telling that we (...) find in literary fiction with unreliable narrators, where for certain descriptions it is unclear whether what we’re told is an accurate account of what’s happening in the story world or not, can instead be achieved by conventionalized filmmaking techniques for reporting the contents of mental states, like the point of view shot, but especially the more ambiguous blended perspective shot. (shrink)

Pure quotation, as in ‘cat’ has three letters, is a linguistic device designed for referring to linguistic expressions. I present a uniform recon struction of the four classic philosophical accounts of the phenomenon: the proper name theory, the description theory, the demonstrative theory, and the disquotational theory. I evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each proposal with respect to fundamental semantic properties like compositionality, productivity, and recursivity.

A number of puzzles about propositional attitudes in semantics and philosophy revolve around apparent referential dependencies between different attitudes within a single agent’s mental state. In a series of papers, Hans Kamp offers a general framework for describing such interconnected attitude complexes, building on DRT and dynamic semantics. I demonstrate that Kamp’s proposal cannot deal with referential dependencies between semantically conflicting attitudes, such as those in Ninan’s puzzle about de re imagination. To solve the problem I propose to replace Kamp’s (...) treatment of attitudes as context change potentials with a two-dimensional analysis. (shrink)

The Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services have recently launched themselves as the UN-sanctioned instrument for conserving nature. They seek to establish themselves as the authority in this field alongside the well-known Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in climate science. Quickly following or even before recent publication of their conceptual framework in two biology journals, they were already underway building upon it. This headlong push, we believe, is ill advised. We show how the framework is unsound as a foundation (...) for further work—in a number of ways and perhaps even by its authors’ own lights. It is therefore urgent that the IPBES thoroughly and thoughtfully reconsider their framework before too much effort is wasted. (shrink)

Linguistics and philosophy have provided distinct views on the nature of reference to individuals in language. In philosophy, in particular in the tradition of direct reference, the distinction is between reference and description. In linguistics, in particular in the tradition of generative grammar, the distinction is between pronouns and R-expressions. I argue for a third conception, grounded in dynamic semantics, in which the main watershed is between definites, which trigger presuppositions that want to be bound, and indefinites, which set up (...) new discourse referents. On this view, proper names, indexicals, and definite descriptions are all analyzed as presupposition triggers. (shrink)

This paper contributes to two debates: (i) the debate about whether or not ancient Greek has Free Indirect Discourse (FID), and (ii) the debate about how we should analyze FID semantically. We do this by showing that there is a distinction between FID and what we call Unembedded Indirect Discourse (UID). The semantic analysis that we develop for the latter shows that the two phenomena, though superficially similar, are semantically fundamentally different. We conclude that UID would have been more deserving (...) of the title ‘free indirect discourse’ than the more quotative and direct discourse-like narrative technique that is now confusingly called so. 1. (shrink)

Moutoussis, K., A. Maier, S. Zeki and N. K. Logothetis: Seeing invisible motion: responses of area V5 neurons in the awake-behaving macaque. Soc. for Neurosci. Abstr. 390.11, 1.

Corporate social responsibility is widely established by companies that aim to contribute to society and minimize their negative impact on the environment. In CSR research, employees’ reactions to CSR have extensively been researched. Social identity theory is often used as a theoretical background to explain the relationship between CSR and employee-related outcomes, but until now, a sound empirical examination is lacking, and causality remains unclear. CSR can unfold its effect mainly because of three theoretically important aspects of CSR initiatives, which (...) increase identification, i.e., distinctiveness, prestige, and salience of the out-group. This study examines how far identification can explain the effect of CSR on employees. In an experimental vignette study, CSR was manipulated in three degrees to examine its effects on job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and organizational citizenship behavior. In the vignettes, information on distinctiveness, prestige, and salience of the out-group were presented. Regression analyses showed that CSR significantly predicted commitment and job satisfaction, but not OCB. We found mediation effects of CSR on commitment, job satisfaction, and OCB through identification, but the effect of CSR on identification explained only little variance which indicates additional underlying mechanisms. The applicability of social identity theory for explaining CSR is discussed. Moreover, we discuss further explaining mechanisms. (shrink)

The information conveyed by any utterance is a motley ensemble. Utterances carry content about the world as it is according to the speaker, but also about speakers’ attitudes, the way they speak, what has been said before, and so on. There are many kinds of information that are conveyed by way of language, and differences in kind correlate with differences in status. Presupposed information exhibits a distinctive projection behaviour; conversational implicatures are cancellable in a way that asserted information is not; (...) a pronoun’s gender may help to determine a referent, but is otherwise truth-conditionally inert; and so on. (shrink)