According to the deductive-nomological account of ground, a fact A grounds another fact B in case the laws of metaphysics determine the existence of B on the basis of the existence of A. Accounts of grounding of this particular variety have already been developed in the literature. My aim in this paper is to sketch a new version of this account. My preferred account offers two main improvements over existing accounts. First, the present account is able to deal with necessitarian (...) as well as non-necessitarian cases of grounding by acknowledging the existence of two types of metaphysical laws. I will argue that we should assume that metaphysical laws come in the necessitarian as well as in the non-necessitarian varietyclosely paralleling the distinction between strict and non-strict laws in the philosophy of science. The second main improvement of the present account is that this account is able to provide an explanation of why the laws of metaphysics have a direction built into them. I will argue that we should characterize metaphysical laws with the help of Theodore Sider’s (2011) notion of structure, which is a descendent of David Lewis’s (1983) notion of naturalness. According to the account of metaphysical laws developed in this paper, metaphysical laws express in their antecedents either perfectly structural truths or more structural truths than in their consequents. Since on Sider’s account structural features of reality are fundamental features of reality, the account is able to explain as to why the laws of metaphysics take us from the fundamental to the derivative. (shrink)

Epistemic expressivists maintain, to a first approximation, that epistemic assertions express non-cognitive mental states, like endorsements, valuations, or pro-attitudes, rather than cognitive mental states such as beliefs. Proponents of epistemic expressivism include Chrisman, Gibbard, Field, Kappel, and Ridge, among others. In this paper, I argue for an alternative view to epistemic expressivism. The view I seek to advocate is inspired by hybrid expressivist theories about moral judgments, Copp Oxford studies in metaethics, 2009), Finlay, Strandberg ). According to these hybrid views, (...) moral judgments express semantically cognitive or representational states and pragmatically convey the speaker’s non-cognitive mental states via implicatures. I will argue that a particular version of this view can reasonably be extended to epistemic judgments and that it has several advantages over its expressivist and cognitivist competitors. In particular, I will try to show that there exist certain phenomena in the epistemic domain that seem to be best accounted for by expressivist theories of epistemic judgments. However, a version of hybrid expressivism that maintains that epistemic judgments convey the attributor’s non-cognitive mental states via generalized conversational implicatures is able to account for these phenomena just as well without running afoul of the main problems that have been identified for different versions of epistemic expressivism. (shrink)

In recent years, questions about epistemic reasons, norms and goals have seen an upsurge of interest. The present volume brings together eighteen essays by established and upcoming philosophers in the field. The contributions are arranged into four.

In this paper, I defend Moorean Dogmatism against a novel objection raised by Adam Leite. Leite locates the defectiveness of the Moorean reasoning explicitly not in the failure of the Moorean argument to transmit warrant from its premises to its conclusion but rather in the failure of an epistemic agent to satisfy certain epistemic responsibilities that arise in the course of conscious and deliberate reasoning. I will first show that there exist cases of Moorean reasoning that are not put into (...) jeopardy by the considerations that Leite presents. Second, I will argue that certain commitments of Leite’s concerning the notion of warrant are in tension with his verdict that the Moorean reasoning is defective. (shrink)

In this article, I assess the so-called expertise response to the findings of experimental restrictionists.

In this paper I outline and defend a theory of immediate or foundational justification that I call "phenomenal reliabilism". This theory incorporates elements from Huemer’s theory of phenomenal conservatism and Comesaña’s indexical reliabilism. The basic idea of the theory I propose is that certain mental states contribute in a twofold way to the epistemic justification of beliefs, namely due to the way they determine how things seem to a subject and due to the fact that they are actually reliable indicators (...) of the truth of their contents. The first component allows this theory to accommodate internalist intuitions. The second component allows it to foster the connection between justification and truth without being subject to the counterexamples that plague simple or unqualified reliabilist theories. I also try to show that this theory is superior to rival theories that have been proposed in the literature, like Huemer’s theory itself (2001) or a process-reliabilist treatment of foundational justification as in Goldman (2008a). (shrink)

In this paper, I sketch an account of intuitions according to which intuitions are seemings. My paper consists of four sections. I the first section, I give an overview of the conceptions of intuitions that are endorsed in the literature and examine their interrelations. In the second section of the paper, I present an argument in favour of the view that intuitions are seemings. I argue that this view is backed up by certain linguistic data and that there exist linguistic (...) data against rival views, on which intuitions can be reduced to doxastic states or dispositions to doxastic states. In the third section of the paper, I motivate the claim that the content of an intuition is not modal. In the last section of the paper, I discuss whether some intuitions are a priori. I examine an argument due to Alvin Goldman that intuitions do not confer a priori warrant. I argue that Goldmans argument does not establish that intuitive warrant is not a priori. In the remainder of the section, I try to develop a positive view about what characterises an intuition as being apt to confer a priori warrant. I argue that the fact whether an intuition is a priori is a matter of their etiology. (shrink)

In this paper, I sketch an account of intuitions on which intuitions are seemings. My paper consists of four sections. I the first section, I give an overview of the conceptions of intuitions that are endorsed in the recent literature and examine their interrelations. In the second section of the paper, I present an argument in favour of the view that intuitions are seemings. I argue that this view is backed up by linguistic data. In the third section of the (...) paper, I try to motivate the claim that the content of intuitions is not necessarily modal. In the last section of the paper, I discuss whether some intuitions are a priori. I examine an argument due to Alvin Goldman that intuitions do not confer a priori warrant. I try to argue that Goldman's argument does not establish that intuitive warrant is not a priori. In the remainder of the section, I try to develop a positive view. I argue that whether an intuition is a priori is a matter of their etiology. (shrink)

Introduction to Wahrheit, Existenz und Realismus.

Frege hat in seinen Schriften zu den philosophischen Grundlagen der Logik eine eigenwillige Konzeption der Wahrheit skizziert, der zufolge das Wahre und das Falsche keine Eigenschaften von Sätzen oder Gedanken sind, sondern Gegenstände, die von Sätzen bezeichnet werden. In dem vorliegenden Sammelband werden zentrale Komponenten dieser Konzeption näher beleuchtet: die Thesen der Undefinierbarkeit der Wahrheit und der Redundanz des Wortes „wahr“, die Auffassung der Wahrheitswerte als Gegenstände, das so genannte slingshot-Argument, die Konzeption der Tatsachen als wahre Gedanken und die Bestimmung (...) der logischen Gesetze als Gesetze des Wahrseins. Mit Beiträgen von Joachim Bromand, Gottfried Gabriel, Martin Grajner, Dirk Greimann, Andreas Kemmerling, Ulrike Kleemeier, Michael Kober, Verena Mayer, Uwe Meixner, Marco Ruffino, Richard Schantz, Hans Sluga und Christian Thiel. (shrink)

What we belief with justification, we generally believe for a reason. But what are epistemic reasons? In this paper, I defend psychologism about epistemic reasons against two important challenges.

Das Thema der apriorischen Rechtfertigung ist ein klassisches philosophisches Thema. Von der Antike bis in die Gegenwart wird ein intensiver Disput darüber geführt, ob man die Existenz nicht-empirischer Formen der Rechtfertigung anerkennen sollte. In diesem Buch wird ein intuitionenbasiertes Modell apriorischer Rechtfertigung entwickelt und verteidigt. Darüber hinaus werden die folgenden Fragen behandelt: Wie sollte man den Begriff der apriorischen Rechtfertigung charakterisieren? Welche Gründe gibt es für die Annahme nicht-empirischer Quellen der Rechtfertigung? Gibt es Alternativen zu intuitionenbasierten Modellen apriorischer Rechtfertigung? Kann (...) man die Wahrheitsförderlichkeit nicht-empirischer Quellen der Rechtfertigung erklären? (shrink)

Dieser Sammelband ist den Themen Wahrheit, Bedeutung und Existenz gewidmet sowie dem Bezug dieser Themen zur Realismus-Antirealismus-Problematik. Die Aufsatze zum Thema Wahrheit behandeln unter anderem, welche Rolle ein realistischer Wahrheitsbegriff fur unsere Erkenntnispraxis spielt und wie man einen realistischen Wahrheitsbegriff genau charakterisieren sollte. In den Beitragen zu dem Thema Bedeutung wird diskutiert, ob sich eine irrtumstheoretische Version des Antirealismus bezuglich der Existenz semantischer Tatsachen aufrechterhalten lasst und welche Variante des Antirealismus Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language vertreten (...) hat. Die Beitrage aus der letzten Themengruppe gehen dem Status moglicher Welten, der Existenz vergangener Objekte und der Frage nach, wieso wir Sachverhalte als existent postulieren sollten, fur deren Existenz eigentlich keine vernunftigen Grunde sprechen.". (shrink)

Dieser Sammelband ist den Themen Wahrheit, Bedeutung und Existenz gewidmet sowie dem Bezug dieser Themen zur Realismus-Antirealismus-Problematik. Die Aufsätze zum Thema Wahrheit behandeln unter anderem, welche Rolle ein realistischer Wahrheitsbegriff für unsere Erkenntnispraxis spielt und wie man einen realistischen Wahrheitsbegriff genau charakterisieren sollte. In den Beiträgen zu dem Thema Bedeutung wird diskutiert, ob sich eine irrtumstheoretische Version des Antirealismus bezüglich der Existenz semantischer Tatsachen aufrechterhalten lässt und welche Variante des Antirealismus Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language vertreten (...) hat. Die Beiträge aus der letzten Themengruppe gehen dem Status möglicher Welten, der Existenz vergangener Objekte und der Frage nach, wieso wir Sachverhalte als existent postulieren sollten, für deren Existenz eigentlich keine vernünftigen Gründe sprechen. (shrink)

Die Erkenntnistheorie zählt zu den wichtigsten Teildisziplinen der theoretischen Philosophie. Seit 2000 hat sich die Disziplin sehr stark entwickelt. In diesem Zeitraum wurden in der Forschungsliteratur viele neue Antworten auf klassische erkenntnistheoretischen Fragen hervorgebracht und auch gänzlich neue Fragen und Probleme behandelt. Das Handbuch liefert einen Überblick über die aktuelle Entwicklung der Disziplin.