BackgroundThis study aimed to identify the healthcare providers’ experience and perspectives toward end-of-life care decisions focusing on end-of-life discussion and physician’s order of life-sustaining treatment documentation in Korea which are major parts of the Life-Sustaining Treatment Act.MethodsA cross-sectional survey was conducted using a questionnaire developed by the authors. A total of 474 subjects—94 attending physicians, 87 resident physicians, and 293 nurses—participated in the survey, and the data analysis was performed in terms of frequency, percentage, mean and standard deviation using the (...) SPSS 24.0 program.ResultsStudy results showed that respondents were aware of terminal illness and physician’s order of life-sustaining treatment in Korea well enough except for some details. Physicians reported uncertainty in terminal state diagnosis and disease trajectory as the most challenging. Study participants regarded factors (related to relationships and communications) on the healthcare providers’ side as the major impediment to end-of-life discussion. Study respondents suggested that simplification of the process and more staff are required to facilitate end-of-life discussion and documentation.ConclusionBased on the study results, adequate education and training for better end-of-life discussion are required for future practice. Also, a simple and clear procedure for completing a physician’s order of life-sustaining treatment in Korea should be prepared and legal and ethical advice would be required. Since the enactment of the Life-Sustaining Treatment Act, several revisions already have been made including disease categories, thus continuous education to update and support clinicians is also called for. (shrink)

Undersøgelser af sammenhængen mellem tysk filosofi og nazismens teorier med særlig vægt på Martin Heidegger (1889-1976).

Heidegger's Crisis shows not only how the Nazis exploited philosophical ideas and used philosophers to gain public acceptance, but also how German philosophers played into the hands of the Nazis. Hans Sluga describes the growth, from World War I onward, of a powerful right-wing movement in German philosophy, in which nationalistic, antisemitic, and antidemocratic ideas flourished.

Dass Edmund Husserl am Problem der Intersubjektivität gescheitert ist, gilt als ausgemacht - und ebenso, welche Konsequenzen daraus zu ziehen sind. Entgegen dem allenthalben pauschal erklärten `Abschied vom Subjekt' spricht aber vieles dafür, dass es in der gegenwärtigen Sozialtheorie eher um eine Reformulierung transzendentaler Subjektivität geht. Diese Interpretationsthese wirft ein neues Licht auf den sozialtheoretischen Diskurs, der im deutschen Sprachraum in den vergangenen dreissig Jahren vom Gegensatz von Jürgen Habermas' und Niklas Luhmanns Theorien bestimmt war: `Diskurs' und `System' erscheinen als (...) gegensätzliche Versuche, `Subjektivität' und `Interität' in ein theoretisch befriedigendes Verhältnis zu setzen. Wenn aber - so die kritische These dieses Buches - weder die Reformulierung von Subjektivität als `Interität' noch die Reformulierung von Subjektivität ohne `Interität' das Problem der Intersubjektivität überzeugend löst, ist dies ein Grund, neuerlich in eine direkte Auseinandersetzung mit Husserls Theorie transzendentaler Subjektivität einzutreten. Dabei stellt sich heraus, dass Husserls vielkritisierter und -skandalisierter Versuch, den Sinn `Anderer' im `Eigenen' zu fundieren, in der transzendentalphänomenologischen Subjekttheorie durch ein umgekehrtes Begründungsverhältnis konterkariert wird. Bei aller Problematik dieser Theorieanlage - welche nur in Gegenwendung zu den Gewohnheiten der Husserl-Interpretation, vor allem aber auch zu Husserls Selbstinterpretation in den Blick kommt - zeigt sich, dass der phänomenologische Begriff des transzendentalen Subjekts seinen Reformulierungen als Diskurs und als System in mancher Hinsicht überlegen ist. (shrink)

While social interaction and play in a VR environment are becoming ever more popular, little is known about how social VR games affect users. The purpose of this study was to elucidate the role of several contingent factors in social VR games by modeling the relationships between involvement, well-being, depression, self-esteem, and social connectedness. A conditional process-moderated mediation model of the measured variables was analyzed with 220 pieces of collected data. The result showed that: the direct effect of involvement on (...) well-being was significant, and the index of moderated mediation involving depression, self-esteem, and social connectedness was significant. We conclude that high levels of involvement in social VR games by socially isolated users with low self-esteem can negatively affect their well-being. The findings of this study contribute in several ways to our understanding of the effect of social VR games upon users and provide important practical implications. (shrink)

This chapter investigates the idea of collective epistemic commonality suggested by Charles Taylor's example, and contrasts it with a distributive notion of epistemic commonality. It describes a number of accounts of collective epistemic commonality, and then argues that, contrary to what Taylor suggests, conversation is not constitutive of collective epistemic commonality as such, but rather presupposes basic forms of collective epistemic commonality. Taylor's remarks indicate that understanding the consensus is insufficient as whatever proposition people rationally and openly accept in conversation. (...) It is suggested that joint attitudes are irreducible, relational, and pre-reflective, and that such attitudes are joint, in the respect that the participants are aware of themselves as a ‘we’. Highly inferential beliefs need some form of communication, and are probably really some form of joint commitment. (shrink)

Rethinking politics in a new vocabulary, Hans Sluga challenges the firmly held assumption that there exists a single common good which politics is meant to realize. He argues that politics is not a natural but a historical phenomenon, and not a single thing but a multiplicity of political forms and values only loosely related. He contrasts two traditions in political philosophy: a 'normative theorizing' that extends from Plato to John Rawls and a newer 'diagnostic practice' that emerged with Marx and (...) Nietzsche and has found its three most prominent twentieth-century practitioners in Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt, and Michel Foucault. He then examines the sources of diagnostic political thinking, analyzes its achievements, and offers a critical assessment of its limitations. His important book will be of interest to a wide range of upper-level students and scholars in political philosophy, political theory, and the history of ideas. (shrink)

Voici la traduction du second ouvrage de Hans Vaihinger (1852-1833), dont la première édition date de 1902. Son titre, _Nietzsche philosophe_, est anodin pour le lecteur d’aujourd’hui. Or il pouvait choquer au début du xx e siècle. Nietzsche n’était pas encore reconnu comme un authentique philosophe, c’est-à-dire, à l’époque, comme l’auteur d’un système philosophique. Dès 1879, Alois Riehl lui avait consacré un essai intitulé : _Friedrich Nietzsche. Der Künstler und der Denker. Ein Essay_. En 1902, Rudolf Eisler avait publié un (...) ouvrage sur sa métaphysique et sa théorie de la connaissance : _Nietzsche’s Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik_. À la différence de ces deux auteurs, Vaihinger est le premier à présenter l’ensemble de la pensée de Nietzsche de manière systématique, à partir de son noyau central, montrant ainsi qu’on peut le considérer et l’étudier comme un authentique philosophe. Le néokantisme de Vaihinger se manifeste notamment dans sa critique de la hiérarchie établie par Nietzsche... (shrink)

Felix Kaufmanns Wissenschaftstheorie Hans-Georg Zilian. X KAUFMANN, DIE ÖKONOMEN UND DAS A PRIORI Bei den österreichischen Grenznutzentheoretikern, mit deren Arbeiten sich Kaufmann vor allem auseinandersetzte, ist von ...

Die europäische Diskursethik und die lateinamerikanische Philosophie der Befreiung artikulierten Anfang der 70er Jahre das weitverbreitete Bedürfnis nach grundlegenden gesellschaftlichen Veränderungen. Inzwischen stoßen allerdings diskurstheoretische Vernunftmoralen und neomarxistische Befreiungsphilosophien nicht nur im postmodernen Denken auf tiefe Skepsis. Vor dem Hintergrund wachsender sozialer Ungleichheit in Nord und Süd und der zunehmenden Macht populistischer bzw. fundamentalistischer Strömungen scheint es gegenwärtig jedoch durchaus angebracht zu sein, mögliche Errungenschaften der Diskurs- und Befreiungsethik in einer präzisen und zugleich kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit ihren theoretischen Grundlagen zu (...) rekonstruieren und damit vorschnellen Abschiedsreden nochmals ins Wort zufallen. In einer vorsichtigen, die universalistische Orientierung prinzipiell bewahrenden Rekontextualisierung der Moraltheorien von Karl-Otto Apel und Enrique Dussel werden einerseits Möglichkeiten für gegenseitige Korrekturen und Ergänzungen zwischen Diskurs- und Befreiungsethik, andererseits aber auch Perspektiven für eine interkulturell orientierte Ethik als Fundament einer Kritischen Theorie der globalen sozialen Frage analysiert. (shrink)

Normative arrow update logic (NAUL) is a logic that combines normative temporal logic (NTL) and arrow update logic (AUL). In NAUL, norms are interpreted as arrow updates on labeled transition systems with a CTL-like logic. We show that the satisfiability problem of NAUL is decidable with a tableau method and it is in EXPSPACE.

English summary: [Is the Church spoiling its own future? A German Catholic inquires] Hans-Harald Sedlacek, a catholic non-professional, turns out to be a quite inspiring maverick. He looks for the reasons for the crisis of faith, which the roman-catholic church is presently deploring as well. With sharp-witted arguments he gets to the bottom of the truths of Christian beliefs, he scrutinizes the alleged infallibility and points out the problems of the sexual morals of the Church including the causes for shortage (...) of priests and child abuse. Furthermore ethical and philosophical topics like property and veraciousness are debated in a most interesting way.Clearly and openly he states his reasons for staying in the Catholic Church but also the urgent necessity to strengthen the reformatory movement within the Church. He deplores the missing unity of Christians and full of verve he pleads for a closer confluence. With his book he aims to motivate the doubtful and disappointed of his own Church as well as the searching of other Churches to work together critically for a mutual future of Christianity. German description: Hans-Harald Sedlacek, ein katholischer Laie, erweist sich als ausserst anregender Querdenker. Er fragt nach den Gruenden fuer die Glaubenskrise, die derzeit auch von der romisch-katholischen Amtskirche so sehr beklagt wird. In scharfsinnigen Streitgesprachen geht er christlichen Glaubenswahrheiten auf den Grund, hinterfragt Unfehlbarkeitsansprueche und problematisiert die sexuellen Moralvorstellungen der Kirche samt den Ursachen von Priestermangel und Kindesmissbrauch. Zudem werden ethische und philosophische Themen wie aEigentum und aWahrheitsliebe auf spannende Weise diskutiert. Offen und klar benennt Sedlacek die Gruende fuer sein Verbleiben in der katholischen Kirche, aber auch fuer die dringende Notwendigkeit einer Starkung der innerkirchlichen Reformbewegung. Er beklagt die fehlende Einheit der Christen und pladiert mit Verve fuer ein engeres Zusammenwachsen. Mit seinem Buch will er Zweifelnde und Enttauschte seiner eigenen Kirche ebenso wie Suchende anderer Kirchen zu einer kritischen Mitarbeit an der gemeinsamen Zukunft der Christenheit ermuntern. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the linguistic structure to the extent that it can be understood in relation to linguistic activity. In order to arrive at an adequate, non‐formal concept of structure, the author and his colleagues oriented themselves on Frege's thought as the most plausible starting point. Wittgenstein's considerations is then taken into account, without endangering the systematic and comprehensive character of the picture as painted by Frege. The chapter highlights two central statements with which Wittgenstein contradicts Frege. First is (...) his thesis that there is no justification in the philosophy of language for isolating just one “fundamental relation” for the representation of all truth‐relevant contents. Second is the thesis that it is typical of natural languages that one and the same kind of composition of expressions can have various meanings. (shrink)

This chapter deals with the following questions: What does Michael Dummett demand of a “systematic” theory of meaning, and what understanding of Frege's “level of sense” leads him to conclude that, if Wittgenstein is correct in denying that there is such a level, then no systematic theory of meaning is possible? For Dummett, an understanding of the meaning side of language is not “systematic” if it must hold that a sentence is understood only because it has been previously learned as (...) a whole. To reconstruct how Dummett arrives at Frege's level of “sense” as crucial for a systematic understanding of complexity, we can begin with a hypothetical concrete situation and proceed step by step to rule out what is not meant by “meaning” when we speak of it as being systematically developed. (shrink)

This chapter highlights that what is today perhaps most commonly called a “theory of meaning” (i.e., one where there is a robust sense of “theory” not exemplified in Wittgenstein's work) will in most cases be “pure” in Rorty's sense (i.e., it will have no direct epistemological concerns) and can (in Dummett's sense) only be a modest one, since it does not explain what “being in command of a concept” consists in. It typically treats a logical system of the kind developed (...) by Frege as a point of comparison to shed light on some aspects of natural languages. Aspects of language that might be brought into focus by such a comparison are the “calculus” side of language (the side to which our “algebraic understanding” applies). (shrink)

In this chapter the author discusses some of Wittgenstein's statements, which directly concern the problem of linguistic complexity. The chapter provides a discussion on invented language games of the kind envisaged by Wittgenstein. The chapter explains two negative insights concerning the complexity of content in language. Summarized as claims they are: (1) there is no special realm of sense between “reality” and language, which would be the domain of grammar (or logical grammar); and (2) employing a complex sentence is a (...) complex action in a different sense of complexity than is the action of “singing from the score.” The author discusses the first thesis in talking about Wittgenstein's critical use of the picture of “meaning‐bodies” in conjunction with the discussion of the function of an expression in a sentence. (shrink)

Wittgenstein asks himself how many types of sentences there are, and considers the traditional grammatical answer that there are assertions, questions, and imperatives. In this fictitious language game the assertion takes the form of a complex: a question coupled with a positive answer. This appears plausible when we imagine that the development of this language game began with questions, and assertions found their way into the game only later. Wittgenstein now brings to the fore the previously mentioned fact that despite (...) the situation, we cannot say that in the fictitious language game one makes an assertion by first raising a question and then giving an affirmative answer. Wittgenstein discusses the following thought, in the formulation of which he uses the word “function,” a word that was used above to determine the way in which words are to be grouped into types. (shrink)

Wie kann man ehrlicherweise heute Christ sein und es im Dialog mit anderen Religionen und dem Atheismus vertreten? Es bedarf einer philosophischen Ergründung des Für und Widers des Gottesglaubens sowie eines auch psychologischen, ethischen und politischen Verständnisses von Christusglauben und Kirche. In einer Art phänomenologischer «Wesensschau» und stets korrigierbar wird hier nach der Idee gefahndet, aus der das Christentum in seiner gesamten Geschichte bis heute lebt, und eine entsprechende Erfassung des Wesens der Alternativen gewagt. Man gewinnt für die Auseinandersetzung eine (...) Basis, die Probleme differenzierter zu sehen. (shrink)

The concept of “grammatical sense” could explain semantic complexity without positing a “sense” on the illocutionary level of “communicating something.” In order to assess the aptness of the concept of “grammatical sense” for resolving Dummett's problem, the author offers a rudimentary sketch of a solution based on Wittgenstein's very simple language games. This sketch shows what a systematic treatment of the meaning side of a language would look like once one recognizes the facts of projection and gives up the requirement (...) that forms for forming complexes must always have just one meaning and always lead the hearer to correctly grasp the “thought” expressed by the speaker. The author addresses the question of whether the recognition of projection (syntactic metaphor) and of the other frequent cases of “positive misuse” in natural languages means that our understanding of the meaning side of language is overwhelmingly unsystematic. (shrink)

In this chapter the author looks at how Wittgenstein applies his method of creating simple language games to discuss fundamental questions in the Philosophical Investigations and its preliminary works. Wittgenstein seems to think that numerals can be learned alone, demonstratively, without further linguistic context. He altogether ignores Frege's preferred interpretation “that the content of a statement of number is an assertion about a concept,” which, for Wittgenstein, would mean, among other things, that numerals can only be learned and used in (...) conjunction with other words. The chapter highlights that a simple language game becomes expanded through the introduction of expressions of the category of proper names with a consideration of the Philosophical Investigations, which at first glance appears to have something to say about the interplay of proper names and concept terms in the building of a sentence. (shrink)

This introductory chapter investigates the significance of Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language for a theory of meaning. The authors claim that there is a systematic network of insights to be found in his later philosophy that is of epistemological relevance and that no philosophical treatment of language should neglect. The central claims include that we have to acknowledge that in Wittgenstein we find a diachronic perspective. What appears to be unsystematic in his approach loses much of this appearance as soon (...) as we see that the network he unfolds is the result of ever more complex activities proceeding in time. The second point is that, in these unfolding linguistic activities, processes of projection play a central role. Such processes are only possible in time since they presuppose that certain means of expression are already in place which is then used in an “unorthodox” way, as in the case of metaphor. (shrink)

This chapter analyzes how Wittgenstein explicitly addresses the possibility of distinguishing between word types, and not only in the form of presentation of examples. Wittgenstein might be using the terms “kind of word” and “part of speech” in a quite unusual way. The author focuses on just one language, thus no longer being concerned with the possibility of developing diverse new languages without limit. It is not surprising that in the natural languages very many more word types than did “the (...) logicians,” above all Frege, Russell, and the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, particularly if one does not limit one's interest in language to the expression of a “judgeable content.”. Wittgenstein hints that the classification of words or sentences by their ways of usage on one hand and by their belonging to different types on the other, is a result of two different standpoints on the classification of elements of language. (shrink)

This chapter looks for a new understanding of the picture of a “projection”; and indeed the example of river names suggests a new way of speaking of projections. The considerations Wittgenstein discusses here indicate that the imagination (projection) is intertwined with calculation and that this should be considered a characteristic feature of natural languages: agreement about the success of the ongoing shared activities demands at every step the ability to project, to transfer – it demands creative imagination. Theoretically, an insight (...) into the workings of our language is all too often denied us because it is blocked by traditional pictures and prejudices. That is why philosophy plays such a decisive, critical role in its apparently quite conservative “mere description”: because it must point out how to distinguish those cases in which language “works properly” from those in which it leads us astray by “going on holiday”. (shrink)

This chapter provides an overview of those of Frege's basic contributions to a theory of meaning that are most important for an understanding of Wittgenstein's later thought. It shows that Frege was aware of the problem of how, when constructing complex expressions out of their components, to avoid coming up with a list of names rather than a sentence. This led him to his strategy of not building a sentence out of its component parts, but of getting at the parts (...) by breaking up a whole. Wittgenstein, despite his own “synthetic” approach, did not encounter this problem, because he followed Frege's late insight to its logical conclusion, namely that the sense of an expression consists in its use as a sign. (shrink)

Wittgenstein is apparently contending that it is simply linguistic habit that gives us the impression that the question “who or what…?” fits the subject expression of the sentence. The logical conclusions in this chapter show that the strong reading of the proposed thesis developed here of a purely sound‐oriented character of the grammar of a single language (in this case, English) cannot be entirely right, and might not even be what Wittgenstein intended, because he only spoke of the sound as (...) one characteristic of the concept of a sentence. The author seeks a twofold understanding of the grammatical: on the one hand it should grasp sentences as whole units (not aggregates of the “singing from the score” type); on the other hand it should help us better understand the motivation for Wittgenstein's thesis that the grammatical concept of a sentence is oriented by (among other things) sound. (shrink)