This paper rejects an argument defending the view that the boundary between deception and manipulation is such that some manipulations intended to cause false beliefs count as non-deceptive. On the strongest version of this argument, if a specific behaviour involves compromising the victim’s reasoning, then the behaviour is manipulative but not deceptive, and if it involves exposing the victim to misleading evidence that justifies her false belief, then it is deceptive but not manipulative. This argument has been consistently used as (...) a reason to reject the traditional analysis of human deception, according to which intentionally causing someone to acquire a false belief is sufficient for deception. And because the traditional analysis is also consistent with our most basic intuitions about deception, it does matter whether this argument succeeds. (shrink)

Recently, psychologists have explored moral concepts including obligation, blame, and ability. While little empirical work has studied the relationships among these concepts, philosophers have widely assumed such a relationship in the principle that “ought” implies “can,” which states that if someone ought to do something, then they must be able to do it. The cognitive underpinnings of these concepts are tested in the three experiments reported here. In Experiment 1, most participants judge that an agent ought to keep a promise (...) that he is unable to keep, but only when he is to blame for the inability. Experiment 2 shows that such “ought” judgments correlate with judgments of blame, rather than with judgments of the agent’s ability. Experiment 3 replicates these findings for moral “ought” judgments and finds that they do not hold for nonmoral “ought” judgments, such as what someone ought to do to fulfill their desires. These results together show that folk moral judgments do not conform to a widely assumed philosophical principle that “ought” implies “can.” Instead, judgments of blame play a modulatory role in some judgments of obligation. (shrink)

t. 1. Filosofskai︠a︡ publit︠s︡istika -- t. 2. Chtenii︠a︡ o bogochelovechestve ; Filosofskai︠a︡ publit︠s︡istika.

The first collective monograph on one of Plato’s most intriguing dialogues with interest for readers of ancient philosophy as well as those who study modern theories of language.

The aim of this paper is to offer an overview of the long-lasting friendship between Georges Florovsky and St. Justin Popović, as well as their common project to build an Orthodox theological synthesis on the basis of the patristic tradition. The paper focuses on three periods from Florovsky’s and Popović’s lives, from late 1910 to early 1920, from the late 1920s to late 1930s, and finally into the 1940s. I argue that in the first period both authors developed their theological (...) visions relying on Solovyov and Florensky, on the one hand, and in opposition to the ecclesial nationalism of the Slavophiles and conservative Orthodox hierarchs, on the other hand. Further, I investigate how during the late 1920s and 1930s both authors searched for an Orthodox synthesis mostly in dialogue with their Orthodox predecessors, especially Solovyov, Florensky, and Bulgakov, as well as the modern western philosophical tradition. The focus will shift then to the 1940s, which was characterized by frequent meetings between Florovsky and Popović in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. I argue that in this period the Church Fathers became for both authors the golden standard for Orthodox theology, and the idea of the Neopatristic synthesis developed in full scale. (shrink)

resumo Trata-se de abordar o problema da teoria hegeliana da linguagem a partir do ponto onde pragmática e ontologia se articulam. Isto exige uma reflexão sobre a maneira com que Hegel organiza as dinâmicas da pragmática da linguagem levando em conta os modos de manifestação de uma negação ontológica no interior do campo de experiências lingüísticas da consciência. palavras-chave dialética, negação, linguagem, pragmática, atos de fala, contradição.

Trata-se de abordar o problema da teoria hegeliana da linguagem a partir do ponto onde pragmática e ontologia se articulam. Isto exige uma reflexão sobre a maneira com que Hegel organiza as dinâmicas da pragmática da linguagem levando em conta os modos de manifestação de uma negação ontológica no interior do campo de experiências lingüísticas da consciência.

Trata-se de abordar o problema da teoria hegeliana da linguagem a partir do ponto onde pragmática e ontologia se articulam. Isto exige uma reflexão sobre a maneira com que Hegel organiza as dinâmicas da pragmática da linguagem levando em conta os modos de manifestação de uma negação ontológica no interior do campo de experiências lingüísticas da consciência.

The volume offers a collection of papers on one of Plato’s most intriguing dialogues. Although not a running commentary, the book covers the majority of difficult questions raised by the dialogue in which the subjects of language and ontology are tied closely together. It shows why Plato’s Cratylus has been highly regarded among readers interested in ancient philosophy and those concerned with modern semantics and theory of language. This collection also presents original views on the position of the dialogue in (...) the whole Plato’s œuvre and in the context of Plato’s contemporaries and successors. (shrink)

Chapters III–IV of De mixtione represent a new beginning of the treatise where the Stoics, the main target of Alexander’s critical assessment of preceding theories of blending, are presented in a more systematic manner than in the first chapters. Closer reading reveals that the context of the Stoic theory which Alexander is reporting is most probably the ontological query into the unity of the cosmos on its different levels in which the challenge is to distinguish blendings from other types of (...) unified objects. This can be done thanks to corresponding common notions, although these notions cannot stand for a firm and detailed grasp of the unified objects in question but are rather the means to make one acknowledge the existence of blending as a special kind of unity (between fusion and juxtaposition). The existence of this kind of unity is then supported by examples of analogical processes in which a result is achieved by the mutual interaction of two bodies upon each other or their mutual help. The conclusion should be that the Stoics’ effort to present a special kind of unity was part of their general account of the unity of the world which however did not include a claim about the blending of the first principles (insofar as cosmic pneuma is not such a principle). (shrink)

The book is a contribution on the early Stoics’ views of action, responsibility and freedom. The central claim, which sets the framework of its three chapters, is that an influential interpretation according to which the Stoics’ concept of responsibility is entirely separate from their concept of freedom (S. Bobzien) is mistaken. The present interpretation does conserve a compatibilist reading but the claim is made that if a person is responsible for an action it is so on the basis of features (...) which make his or her action also (potentially) virtuous and free. Moreover, if responsibility is thought and presented as a kind of paradox, it is the same paradox which is recognizable as a foundaon of virtue and freedom. It is important for this interpretation to see responsibility as based on assent (and not merely on one’s – determined – nature/character) and to see the corresponding compatibilism as a result of a two-sided mental act which is then also to be found in the exercise of virtue. By defending these views, the book offers a unified Stoic theory of action in which psychology (assent) and ethics (virtue and freedom) presuppose similar reflective turns in the soul though on different levels of the soul’s activity. (shrink)

The paper offers an interpretation of Plato’s Necessity in the Timaeus according to which Necessity is an entity which manifests itself in different ways at different stages of the creation of the Universe. The main argument aims to show that Necessity gains at least two different meanings in the course of the creation as described by Plato – that of limiting consequences and that of purposeless motion ; that despite the fact that Necessity is not a self-sustained principle, it has (...) its origin in chōra which is a condition of limiting material spatiality; that the important question what the effects of Necessity in the already created world are should be asked but cannot be easily answered on the basis of what Plato explicitly says. (shrink)

Již letmý pohled na filosofii 20. století, která se snaží promýšlet podstatu lidského jednání, budí dojem, že patří k její metodě vrátit se k antickým teoriím a představit je jako historické východisko, jehož nové uchopení povede k lepšímu porozumění aktuálního problému. Tyto návraty, jak je lze sledovat u Heideggera, Gadamera, Ricoeura nebo Arendtové, směřují – nakolik se jedná o teorii jednání – především k Aristotelovi a jeho základnímu rozlišení mezi poiésis a praxis. Cílem následující stati je představit základ teorie jednání, (...) jež byla dílem prvních stoiků ve 3. stol. př. Kr. V naznačeném kontextu si však taková interpretace může činit větší ambice, než jak by se mohlo na první pohled zdát. Zůstává-li totiž Aristotelés pro novodobou filosofii jednání myslitelem, k němuž je třeba se vrátit a s nímž je třeba se vyrovnat, pak je dobré si uvědomit, že právě ve stoicismu lze vidět první a bezprostřední kritickou reakci na Aristotelovu filosofii. Navíc byl stoicismus naukou, v níž se jednání stalo gravitačním bodem všech ostatních úvah a která proto musela svoje vyrovnání s Aristotelem soustředit do pojmů souvisejících úzce právě s jednáním. Lze ovšem snadno vytušit, jaký byl hlavní důvod, proč zůstal stoicismus stranou pozornosti současných filosofů . Přesný vztah stoické nauky k aristotelismu má totiž stále tendenci se skrývat. Navzdory malé četnosti explicitních konfrontací s Aristotelovými argumenty je aristotelismus ve stoicismu přítomen všude – je v něm přítomen natolik, že snaze odlišit oba systémy občas hrozí sklouznutí do povrchních kategorizací, z nichž lze podezírat doxografickou tradici hellénistické a římské doby, která se snaží o uchopení téhož rozdílu. Přesto stoicismus není peripatetická filosofie a lze oprávněně předpokládat, že nahlédnutí odlišnosti mezi obojím vrhne nové světlo na moderní přístup k Aristotelovi. (shrink)

What is the main philosophical gain for a reader of the Cratylus? Led by this question, the author claims that the non-conventialist theory of names developed in the dialogue’s first part is not entirely nullified by the acceptance of conventionalism in the dialogue’s second part. Against some older and some more recent readings, he argues that a core of the non-conventialist theory remains valid in Plato’s view and, together with Plato’s professed conventionalism, represents a complex position on the relation between (...) names and nominata – this is the main outcome of the dialogue (and is also consonant with much of what Plato says in other dialogues). For this reason the paper points out several important distinctions that are made in the first part of the dialogue, notably the introduction of forms of names as a third kind of thing distinct from both names and nominata. It is argued that the forms of names manifest a rational structure behind names, which, in its turn, is the basis for Plato’s semantics and comes forth behind the etymologies and the principle of resemblance as they are successively introduced. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe psychological and philosophical literature exploring the role of social influence in moral judgments suggests that conformity in moral judgments is common and, in many cases, seems to b...

U vremenu novog definisanja srpskog nacionalnog identiteta od odlucujuceg je znacaja uspostavljanje kopce izmedju kriticki vrednovane tradicije s jedne i zahteva vremena globalizacije, s druge strane. Produktivnu vezu izmedju starog i novog mogu ce je ostvariti ukoliko Srbija izgradi demokratske i nekompromitovane i nekorumpirane drzavne institucije preko kojih bi se obrazovala racionalna svest o vlastitoj posebnosti, kao i vrednostima spoljnog sveta. Glavna odgovornost u tom osetljivom procesu samo definisanja je na politickim elitama i ideoloskim projektima koje oni otvoreno ili prikriveno (...) proteziraju, a koji se na najprozirniji nacin ogledaju u medijima (javnom mnjenju) i institucijama obrazovanja. (shrink)

The paper aims to analyze the early ecumenical views of Amfilohije Radović with reference to the influence exerted on him by his spiritual father Justin Popović. This investigation is important because Radović’s ecumenical engagement is often a matter of controversy, which results in conflicting views. Sources for studying Radović’s early ecumenical views are: his correspondence with Justin Popović on ecumenism, his engagement in editing and publishing Popović’s book _Orthodox Church and Ecumenism_, and finally, his article written as a report from (...) an inter-Orthodox conference held in September 1972 in Thessalonica. In addition to Radović’s similarity with Popović's views, the paper also aims to show their differences, i.e. their different interpretations of the same phenomena. (shrink)

Focusing on three historical examples of a different understanding of Christian identity, the paper seeks to address the role of contemporary concepts of sex and gender in the creation of Christian identity. In the first case study, focused on the literary representations of the Christian martyrdom from the second and third centuries, special emphasis is placed on the demand for the?manly? or?masculine? way of witnessing faith. The second historical example relates to the creation of a wider ascetic movement in the (...) fourth-century Asia Minor, and its specific focus is on Macrina the Younger. In her Vita, Gregory of Nyssa distinguishes between Macrina?s gender identity based on her virginity on the one hand, and her social role as a widow, and?mother? and?father? of her monastic community on the other. Finally, the focus is shifted towards Dionysius the Areopagite and Maximus the Confessor, whose teachings about ecstasy, as a way to transcend oneself in the movement towards the loved one, provide the basis for establishing a theology of marriage and creating a Christian identity based not on sexual or gender roles, but on the uniqueness of human nature. (shrink)

Rad nastoji da predstavi filozofsku argumentaciju u prilog hriscanskoj ideji stvaranja sveta izlozenu u delu autora iz VII veka Maksima Ispovednika. Maksim Ispovednik je svoje ucenje o stvaranju razvio prativsi filozofske argumente svojih hriscanskih prethodnika, pre svih Grigorija Niskog, Nemesija Emeskog i Dionisija Areopagita. Srz Maksimove argumentcije slicna je ucenju o stvaranju sveta aleksandrijskog filozofa Jovana Filopona, ali njegovo ucenje obogaceno je i idejama pomenutih hriscanskih autora koje on dodatno razvija. Neke od ideja koje cine strukturu Maksimove filozofije stvaranja jesu: (...) petostruka podela bica, koja se vrhuni u podeli na stvorenu i nestvorenu prirodu, zatim pokret stvorenih bica prema Bogu koji je jedini istinski cilj njihovog kretanja, predvecno postojanje sveta u logosima kao izrazima Bozanske volje, Bozje promisljanje ne samo opstih nacela vec i individualnih bica i obozenje celokupne tvorevine kao prvenstvene svrhe stvaranja. Maksim svoje ideje vesto oblikuje koristeci se podjednako aristotelovskim, stoickim i neoplatonistickim filozofskim vokabularom. (shrink)

The phenomenon of the paradoxes of the largest remainders methods has been studied by numerous authors. Nevertheless, the examples presented in their studies do not deal with the case where a party’s possible additional votes can directly lead to a loss in the party’s number of representatives. This paradox, which can be called the no-show apportionment paradox, has not previously been mentioned in the literature. It is based on the assumption that a voter’s favourite party may lose a seat if (...) the voter votes honestly but get more seats if he or she abstains. The article gives simple examples illustrating the no-show paradox in a party-list proportional representation electoral system using the quota method of apportionment. In these situations it would be better for the party if some of their voters abstained, otherwise it would lose one or more seats. (shrink)

Appearing here in English for the first time, Vladimir Jankélévitch's _Henri Bergson_ is one of the two great commentaries written on Henri Bergson. Gilles Deleuze's _Bergsonism_ renewed interest in the great French philosopher but failed to consider Bergson's experiential and religious perspectives. Here Jankélévitch covers all aspects of Bergson's thought, emphasizing the concepts of time and duration, memory, evolution, simplicity, love, and joy. A friend of Bergson's, Jankélévitch first published this book in 1931 and revised it in 1959 to treat (...) Bergson's later works. This unabridged translation of the 1959 edition includes an editor's introduction, which contextualizes and outlines Jankélévitch's reading of Bergson, additional essays on Bergson by Jankélévitch, and Bergson's letters to Jankélévitch. (shrink)

This article defends the view that liars need not intend to deceive. I present common objections to this view in detail and then propose a case of a liar who can lie but who cannot deceive in any relevant sense. I then modify this case to get a situation in which this person lies intending to tell his hearer the truth and he does this by way of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to tell the truth by lying. (...) This case, and further cases that I develop from it, demonstrate that lying without the intention to deceive is possible. (shrink)

We conducted two experiments to determine whether common folk think that so-called _tell-tale sign_ bald-faced lies are intended to deceive—since they have not been tested before. These lies involve tell-tale signs (e.g. blushing) that show that the speaker is lying. Our study was designed to avoid problems earlier studies raise (these studies focus on a kind of bald-faced lie in which supposedly everyone knows that what the speaker says is false). Our main hypothesis was that the participants will think that (...) the protagonists from our examples lied without intending to deceive, and the results of our surveys confirmed this hypothesis: most of our participants rated tell-tale sign lies as lies not intended to deceive. Therefore, our analysis suggests that common folk think that some lies are not intended to deceive. (shrink)