Cognitive Sciences

世界已经看到了环境灾难的发展，正如气候危机和生物多样性的损失所证实的那样。问题已经超过了无法挽回的地步，这是人类活动后果的体现。在《自然》杂志世界观专栏（第577卷, 295页, 2020年）中，沙阿（Shah）指出，全球环境问题不仅需要自然科学，还需要社会科学和人文科学的共同应对。写于越南科技日，并基于我们在研究、编辑、审阅和帮助年轻学者方面的经验，我们想提出五项原则，可以帮 助发挥人文和社会科学在构建生态盈余文化中的力量。文化对于促进生物多样性保护和气候变化减缓至关重要。.

Ramscar, Yarlett, Dye, Denny, and Thorpe (2010) showed how, consistent with the predictions of error‐driven learning models, the order in which stimuli are presented in training can affect category learning. Specifically, learners exposed to artificial language input where objects preceded their labels learned the discriminating features of categories better than learners exposed to input where labels preceded objects. We sought to replicate this finding in two online experiments employing the same tests used originally: A four pictures test (match a label (...) to one of four pictures) and a four labels test (match a picture to one of four labels). In our study, only findings from the four pictures test were consistent with the original result. Additionally, the effect sizes observed were smaller, and participants over‐generalized high‐frequency category labels more than in the original study. We suggest that although Ramscar, Yarlett, Dye, Denny, and Thorpe (2010) feature‐label order predictions were derived from error‐driven learning, they failed to consider that this mechanism also predicts that performance in any training paradigm must inevitably be influenced by participant prior experience. We consider our findings in light of these factors, and discuss implications for the generalizability and replication of training studies. (shrink)

The notion of sound symbolism receives increasing interest in psycholinguistics. Recent research – including empirical effects of affective phonological iconicity on language processing (Adelman et al., Citation2018; Conrad et al., Citation2022) – suggested language codes affective meaning at a basic phonological level using specific phonemes as sublexical markers of emotion. Here, in a series of 8 rating-experiments, we investigate the sensitivity of language users to assumed affectively-iconic systematic distribution patterns of phonemes across the German vocabulary:After computing sublexical-affective-values (SAV) concerning valence (...) and arousal for the entire German phoneme inventory according to occurrences of syllabic onsets, nuclei and codas in a large-scale affective normative lexical database, we constructed pseudoword material differing in SAV to test for subjective affective impressions.Results support affective iconicity as affective ratings mirrored sound-to-meaning correspondences in the lexical database. Varying SAV of otherwise semantically meaningless pseudowords altered affective impressions: Higher arousal was consistently assigned to pseudowords made of syllabic constituents more often used in high-arousal words – contrasted by less straightforward effects of valence SAV. Further disentangling specific differential effects of the two highly-related affective dimensions valence and arousal, our data clearly suggest arousal, rather than valence, as the relevant dimension driving affective iconicity effects. (shrink)

The target article covers a large amount of ground and offers a provocative perspective. This commentary focuses on (a) assumptions, namely that there are discrete stages in the creative process and that novelty and usefulness are inextricable, (b) hidden variables in the creativity–curiosity relationship, and (c) the difference between an explanation of creativity versus a description of influence on it.

In our target article, we proposed that curiosity and creativity are both manifestations of the same novelty-seeking process. We received 29 commentaries from diverse disciplines that add insights to our initial proposal. These commentaries ultimately expanded and supplemented our model. Here we draw attention to five central practical and theoretical issues that were raised by the commentators: (1) The complex construct of novelty and associated concepts; (2) the underlying subsystems and possible mechanisms; (3) the different pathways and subtypes of curiosity (...) and creativity; (4) creativity and curiosity “in the wild”; (5) the possible link(s) between creativity and curiosity. (shrink)

Curiosity and creativity are expressions of the trade-off between leveraging that with which we are familiar or seeking out novelty. Through the computational lens of reinforcement learning, we describe how formulating the value of information seeking and generation via their complementary effects on planning horizons formally captures a range of solutions to striking this balance.

We extend the work of Ivancovsky et al. by proposing that in addition to novelty seeking, mood regulation goals – including enhancing positive mood and repairing negative mood – motivate both creativity and curiosity. Additionally, we discuss how the effects of mood on state of mind are context-dependent (not fixed), and how such flexibility may impact creativity and curiosity.

Ivancovsky et al.'s Novelty-Seeking Model suggests several mechanisms that might underlie developmental change in creativity and curiosity. We discuss how these implications both do and do not align with extant developmental findings, suggest two further elements that can provide a more complete developmental account, and discuss current methodological barriers to formulating an integrated developmental model of curiosity and creativity.

Although creativity and curiosity can be similarly construed as knowledge-building processes, their underlying motivation is fundamentally different. Specifically, curiosity drives organisms to seek information that reduces uncertainty so that they can make a better prediction about the world. On the contrary, creative processes aim to connect distant pieces of information, maximizing novelty and utility.

The novelty-seeking model suggests that curiosity and creativity originate from novelty processes. However, different types of novelty exist, each with distinctive relationships with memory, which potentially influence curiosity and creativity in distinct ways. We thus propose expanding the NSM model to consider these different novelty types and their specific involvement in creativity.

Curiosity and creativity are manifestations of novelty-seeking mechanisms, closely intertwined and interdependent. This principle aligns seamlessly with the foundational tenets of Langerian mindfulness, which places novelty seeking as a cornerstone. Creativity, curiosity, openness, and flexibility all harmoniously converge in this framework. Spanning over four decades, research in the realm of mindfulness has diligently delved into the intricate interplay among these constructs.

Using art and aesthetics as context, we explore the notion that curiosity and creativity emanate from a single novelty-seeking mechanism and outline support for the idea. However, we also highlight the importance of learning progress tracking in exploratory action and advocate for a nuanced understanding that aligns novelty-seeking with learnability. This, we argue, offers a more comprehensive framework of how curiosity and creativity are related.

Ivancovsky et al. explore the relationship between curiosity and creativity, by suggesting they align through novelty-seeking mechanisms. We argue that a general mechanism linking both capacities together is question-asking: Curiosity drives question-asking that leads to creative problem solving. Yet, current findings from our lab suggest that question complexity relates to creativity, but not necessarily to curiosity, warranting further investigation.

I argue for a more complicated but nonetheless computationally feasible and algorithmically intelligible interplay between exploration and exploitation and for admitting into our conceptual toolkit regimes of exploitative exploration and exploratory exploitation that can enhance the novelty and usefulness of the results of either problemistic or serendipitous search.

The novelty-seeking model (NSM) does not offer a compelling unifying framework for understanding creativity and curiosity. It fails to explain important manifestations and features of curiosity. Moreover, the arguments offered to support a curiosity–creativity link – a shared association with a common core process and various superficial associations between them – are neither convincing nor do they yield useful predictions.

Ivancovsky et al. provide a compelling argument for the role of curiosity in creative thinking. We argue that (a) trait-like curiosity is necessary to engage in creative actions and (b) state-like curiosity might be effectively and strategically induced during interventions. Thus, we posit that curiosity works in an agentic and strategic way in strengthening creativity.

The target article tackles an important and complicated issue of the underlying links between curiosity and creativity. Although thought-provoking, the target article overlooks contemporary theories and research on these constructs. Consequently, the proposed model is inconsistent with prior research in the developmental and educational fields and would benefit from better specification and clarity around key constructs and processes.

The unbridled positivity toward curiosity and creativity may be excessive. Both aid species survival through exploration and advancement. These beneficial effects are well documented. What remains is to understand their optimal levels and contexts for maximal achievement, health, and well-being. Every beneficial element to individuals and groups carries the potential for harm – curiosity and creativity included.

Ivancovsky et al. propose a novelty-seeking model linking curiosity to creativity. This commentary suggests integrating their work with a stage-based creativity model for additional insights. It also encourages readers to address knowledge gaps identified by the authors, including factors that trigger the pursuit of creative solutions. We aim to refine theory and direct future research to clarify the complex curiosity–creativity relationship.

Novelty is neither necessary nor sufficient to link curiosity and creativity as stated in the target article. We point out the article's logical shortcomings, outline preconditions that may link curiosity and creativity, and suggest that curiosity and creativity may be expressions of a common epistemic drive.

We argue that the phases identified in the novelty-seeking model can be clarified by considering an updated version of the optimal-level of arousal model, which incorporates the “arousal” and “mood changing” potentials of stimuli and contexts. Such a model provides valuable insights into what determines one's state of mind, inter-individual differences, and the rewarding effects of curiosity and creativity.

We propose expanding the authors’ shared novelty-seeking basis for creativity and curiosity by emphasizing an underlying computational principle: Minimizing prediction errors (mismatch between predictions and incoming data). Curiosity is tied to the anticipation of minimizing prediction errors through future, novel information, whereas creative AHA moments are connected to the actual minimization of prediction errors through current, novel information.

The Novelty-Seeking Model can explain incubation's effect on creativity by assuming an adaptive decision threshold. During an impasse, the threshold for novelty becomes too high and biased to previous neural activity, hindering progress. Incubation “resets” this threshold through attentional decoupling, allowing for spontaneous ideas to emerge from subsequent mind wandering or other activities that attract attention, facilitating progress.

Ivancovsky et al. argue that the neurocognitive mechanisms of creativity and curiosity both rely on the interplay among brain networks. Research to date demonstrates that such inter-network dynamics are further complicated by functional fractionation within networks. Investigating how networks subdivide and reconfigure in service of a task offers insights about the precise anatomy that underpins creative and curious behaviour.

The creativity literature is replete with dualistic constructs, suggesting shared mechanisms but also tempting overinterpretation of their interrelations. An explicit list of relevant concept associations indicates substantial commonality, yet also exposes certain inconsistencies. Dual-process accounts (A and B is relevant) hold promise in resolving discrepancies to the extent that we understand the relative contributions and conditions of A and B.

We extend Ivancovsky et al.'s finding on the association between curiosity and creativity by proposing a sequential causal model assuming that (a) curiosity determines the motivation to seek information and that (b) creativity constitutes a capacity to act on that motivation. This framework assumes that both high levels of curiosity and creativity are necessary for information-seeking behavior.

We link Ivancovsky et al.'s novelty-seeking model (NSM) to computational models of intrinsically motivated behavior and learning. We argue that dissociating different forms of curiosity, creativity, and memory based on the involvement of distinct intrinsic motivations (e.g., surprise and novelty) is essential to empirically test the conceptual claims of the NSM.

By examining the shared neuro-cognitive correlates of curiosity and creativity, we better understand the brain basis of creativity. However, by only examining shared components, important neuro-cognitive correlates are overlooked. Here, we argue that any comprehensive brain model of creativity should consider multiple cognitive processes and, alongside the interplay between brain networks, also the neurochemistry and neural oscillations that underly creativity.

We question the perspective that curiosity and creativity stem from a shared novelty-seeking process. We emphasize that creativity has two distinct dimensions: Novelty and usefulness, each involving separate cognitive processes. These dimensions may not necessarily mutually reinforce each other. We contend that a more comprehensive model that encompasses the full scope of the creativity construct is needed.

Curiosity and creativity are central pillars of human growth and invention. Although they have been studied extensively in isolation, the relationship between them has not yet been established. We propose that both curiosity and creativity emanate from the same mechanism of novelty seeking. We first present a synthesis showing that curiosity and creativity are affected similarly by a number of key cognitive faculties such as memory, cognitive control, attention, and reward. We then review empirical evidence from neuroscience research, indicating that (...) the same brain regions are involved in both curiosity and creativity, focusing on the interplay between three major brain networks: the default mode network, the salience network, and the executive control network. After substantiating the link between curiosity and creativity, we propose a novelty-seeking model (NSM) that underlies them and suggests that the manifestation of the NSM is governed by one's state of mind. (shrink)

We recently reported strong, replicable (i.e., replicated) evidence for lexically mediated compensation for coarticulation (LCfC; Luthra et al., 2021), whereby lexical knowledge influences a prelexical process. Critically, evidence for LCfC provides robust support for interactive models of cognition that include top‐down feedback and is inconsistent with autonomous models that allow only feedforward processing. McQueen, Jesse, and Mitterer (2023) offer five counter‐arguments against our interpretation; we respond to each of those arguments here and conclude that top‐down feedback provides the most parsimonious (...) explanation of extant data. (shrink)

Political polarisation in the United States offers opportunities to explore how beliefs about candidates – that they could save or destroy American society – impact people’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviour. Participants forecast their future emotional responses to the contentious 2020 U.S. presidential election, and reported their actual responses after the election outcome. Stronger beliefs about candidates were associated with forecasts of greater emotion in response to the election, but the strength of this relationship differed based on candidate preference. Trump supporters’ (...) forecast happiness more strongly related to beliefs that their candidate would save society than for Biden supporters. Biden supporters’ forecast anger and fear were more strongly related to beliefs that Trump would destroy society than vice versa. These forecasts mattered: predictions of lower happiness and greater anger if the non-preferred candidate won predicted voting, with Biden supporters voting more than Trump supporters. Generally, participants forecast more emotion than they experienced, but beliefs altered this tendency. Stronger beliefs predicted experiencing more happiness or more anger and fear about the election outcome than had been forecast. These findings have implications for understanding the mechanisms through which political polarisation and rhetoric can influence voting behaviour. (shrink)

The experience of a reward appears to enhance memory for recent prior events, adaptively making that information more available to guide future decision-making. Here, we tested whether reward enhances memory for associative item-location information and also whether the effect of reward spreads to other categorically-related but unrewarded items. Participants earned either points (Experiment 1) or money (Experiment 2) through a time-estimation reward task, during which stimuli-location pairings around a 2D-ring were shown followed by either high-value or low-value rewards. All stimuli (...) were then tested for location memory or recognition (yes/no), immediately and after a 24-hour delay. Across both experiments (combined analysis), there was a robust improvement in location memory following high-value rewards, even though evidence supporting this effect was reliable in Experiment 2 but not in Experiment 1. The memory-enhancing effect of reward was observed on both the immediate and delayed location-memory tests. Reward-enhanced memory for both directly rewarded stimuli and categorically related stimuli that were not directly rewarded. No reliable effect of reward value on yes/no recognition-memory performance was observed in either experiment. We hypothesise that reward enhances the consolidation of recent experience and conceptually related memories to make these more available for future decisions. (shrink)

Older adults process emotional speech differently than young adults, relying less on prosody (tone) relative to semantics (words). This study aimed to elucidate the mechanisms underlying these age-related differences via an emotional speech-in-noise test. A sample of 51 young and 47 older adults rated spoken sentences with emotional content on both prosody and semantics, presented on the background of wideband speech-spectrum noise (sensory interference) or on the background of multi-talker babble (sensory/cognitive interference). The presence of wideband noise eliminated age-related differences (...) in semantics but not in prosody when processing emotional speech. Conversely, the presence of babble resulted in the elimination of age-related differences across all measures. The results suggest that both sensory and cognitive-linguistic factors contribute to age-related changes in emotional speech processing. Because real world conditions typically involve noisy background, our results highlight the importance of testing under such conditions. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to point out the diversity in post-Proppian plot analysis—and, more specifically, to argue that within it one can discern two fundamentally different conceptions of narrative structure. These are not merely different theoretical grids superimposed upon the same phenomena, but represent, in fact, two objectively different types of narrative structure. These two types will be referred to as dramatic structure and instrumental structure, and they may be succinctly characterized by the antonyms 'play' and 'work' respectively. (...) It will be argued that there is a basis in Propp for both conceptions of narrative structure and that Bremond and Greimas, in their efforts to 'generalize' Propp, have each only isolated one of two tendencies coexisting in his analytic approach. Our point of departure will be Propp's concept of the basic unit of plot structure, which he terms the function. This is a complex term. Two senses are distinguished, biological and mathematical-logical. (shrink)

My contemplation on the outside world of a person's mindsponge process. Some of the contemplated ideas have been developed into the Ecomindsponge framework, which attempts to explain how humans navigate in the Earth's ecosystem.

The Mindsponge Theory can provide a novel approach to examining the suicidal ideation and behavior from the information-processing perspective.

We review the progress of the Mindsponge concept and the bayesvl R package in scientific research from 2018 to 2021.

I discuss how the Bayesian inference can be utilize to enable the use of Mindsponge Theory/Mindsponge Mechanism in socio-psychological research.

I revisit the ape and the child experiment and try to interpret it through the lens of Mindsponge Theory.

A word often expresses many different morphological functions. Which part of a word contributes to which part of the overall meaning is not always clear, which raises the question as to how such functions are learned. While linguistic studies tacitly assume the co-occurrence of cues and outcomes to suffice in learning these functions (Baer-Henney, Kügler, & van de Vijver, 2015; Baer-Henney & van de Vijver, 2012), error-driven learning suggests that contingency rather than contiguity is crucial (Nixon, 2020; Ramscar, Yarlett, Dye, (...) Denny, & Thorpe, 2010). In error-driven learning, cues gain association strength if they predict a certain outcome, and they lose strength if the outcome is absent. This reduction of association strength is called unlearning. So far, it is unclear if such unlearning has consequences for cue–outcome associations beyond the ones that get reduced. To test for such consequences of unlearning, we taught participants morphophonological patterns in an artificial language learning experiment. In one block, the cues to two morphological outcomes—plural and diminutive—co-occurred within the same word forms. In another block, a single cue to only one of these two outcomes was presented in a different set of word forms. We wanted to find out, if participants unlearn this cue's association with the outcome that is not predicted by the cue alone, and if this allows the absent cue to be associated with the absent outcome. Our results show that if unlearning was possible, participants learned that the absent cue predicts the absent outcome better than if no unlearning was possible. This effect was stronger if the unlearned cue was more salient. This shows that unlearning takes place even if no alternative cues to an absent outcome are provided, which highlights that learners take both positive and negative evidence into account—as predicted by domain general error-driven learning. (shrink)