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Continental Philosophy > Phenomenology > Edmund Husserl > Husserl: Philosophy of Mind > Husserl: The Self
Husserl: The Self
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| Summary | Characteristically for Husserlian phenomenology, whatever we can legitimately say about the self is closely paralleled by an account of the data and workings of self-awareness. On the one hand, Husserl speaks about the self (“the monad”) as the experienced totality of one’s life. Within it, we can abstractively distinguish constitutive levels, all the way down to the pre-egological flow of time-consciousness, quite unlike our ordinary experiences of ourselves. On the other hand, Husserl’s later account of intentional acts involves the idea of an ego-pole, an aspect of intentional experiences, conceived as the opposite of an object-pole. In our intentional lives, the ego-pole is the source and center of performance and activity, including the action of predication. One way in which we can be aware of our selves is by regarding them reflectively, as in phenomenological reflection. However, for Husserl, the primary self-awareness is pre-reflective. In Husserl-scholarship, this pre-reflective self-awareness has been identified with the absolute flow of time-consciousness. |
| Key works | A classic treatment, Held 1966 discusses the “living present” as the original mode of subjective life. Marbach 1974 explores the reasons that led Husserl, in Ideas I, to abandon his earlier view that there is only an empirical self, and to introduce the idea of a pure I. Marbach also discusses this Husserlian notion in relation to ideas in contemporary psychology, as well as Kant’s views. Zahavi 1999 engages with a variety of approaches to self-awareness, drawing attention to the promise of the phenomenological, especially the Husserlian, approach, with an emphasis on the idea of a pre-reflective self-awareness. Carr 1999 investigates subjectivity in the transcendental tradition, especially Kant and Husserl, upholding the idea and the tradition against Heideggerian and other criticisms. With a view to accounting for the possibility of intersubjectivity from the standpoint of Husserl’s transcendental idealism, Mensch 1988 grounds intersubjectivity in a pre-individual “primal subjectivity”. Lotz 2007 studies affectivity and subjectivity, as well as Husserl’s phenomenological method, based on Husserl’s later texts, arguing that Husserl’s views are rooted in a central concern with concrete human activities and experiences. Taguchi 2006 explores the notion of an “original I” (Ur-Ich), considered as a phenomenological topic. |
| Introductions | Bernet et al 1993, Ch. 8, Moran 2005, Ch. 7 |
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- Ego na fenomenologia. Crítica de Sartre ao Ego transcendental de Husserl.Pedro Dias - 2022 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 78 (3):985-1026.This study approach the critique of the transcendental ego in phenomenology in La transcendance de l’Ego, where Sartre confronts the “consistency” of a psychic and psychophysical ego. The research is directed towards understanding how a consciousness that does not have, a priori, any egological structure ends up, as “artificial functionality” and “in interiority”, constituting it as an “object”, to then identify with him, affirming himself as being him, in a sui generis relationship of «identity and indistinction». Therefore, throughout the reflection, (...)
- Subjectivity Viewed as a Process.James Mensch - 2021 - Research in Phenomenology 51 (3):325-350.Husserl, in his late manuscripts, made a number of apparently opposing assertions regarding the subject. These assertions are reconciled once we realize that they apply to the different stages of the genesis of the subject. This means that the subject has to be understood as a process – i.e., as continually proceeding from the living present, which forms its core, to the developed self that each of us is. As such, the subject cannot be identified with any of the particular (...)
- “Noema” and “Noesis” by Information after Husserl’s Phenomenology Interpreted Formally.Vasil Penchev - 2021 - Metaphysics eJournal, SSRN 14 (22):1-19.Along with “epoché” or his “reductions”, Husserl’s “noema” and “noesis”, being neologisms invented by him, are main concepts in phenomenology able to represent its originality. Following the trace of a recent paper (Penchev 2021 July 23), its formal and philosophical approach is extended to both correlative notions, in the present article. They are able to reveal the genesis of the world from consciousness in a transcendental method relevant to Husserl, but furthermore described formally as a process of how subjective temporality (...)
- La noción de ego trascendental en "Ideas I" e "Ideas II".Bence Marosan - 2021 - Investigaciones Fenomenológicas 5:183.“Pero la cuestión que quiero plantear es la siguiente: ¿no es suficiente con tener este yo psíquico y psicofísico? ¿Necesitamos añadirle un yo trascendental, como una estructura de la conciencia absoluta?” Sartre planteó esta cuestión en su célebre ensayo La trascendencia del ego. Ella enuncia la concepción básica de la fenomenología no-egológica, la cual no niega la existencia misma del ego o del sujeto, sino más bien lo concibe como un ser constituido y mundano, como trascendente respecto del ámbito de (...)
- La indiscreta presencia de sí. La génesis de las habitualidades y el problema de la reflexión en Husserl.Roberto C. F. Menéndez - 2021 - Investigaciones Fenomenológicas 5:193.Este trabajo tiene como objetivo presentar la cuestión de las habitualidades en la fenomenología de Husserl para pensar la génesis de la reflexión en nuestro mundo actual. En un primer momento, y principalmente a partir de libros primero y segundo de las Ideas relativas a una fenomenología pura y una filosofía fenomenológica, se revisarán el concepto de yo en Husserl en dos de sus dimensiones principa-les: el yo como polo idéntico de las vivencias y el yo como substrato de las (...)
- Ego-Splitting and the Transcendental Subject. Kant’s Original Insight and Husserl’s Reappraisal.Marco Cavallaro - 2019 - In Iulian Apostolescu (ed.), The Subject(s) of Phenomenology. Rereading Husserl. Springer. pp. 107-133.In this paper, I contend that there are at least two essential traits that commonly define being an I: self-identity and self-consciousness. I argue that they bear quite an odd relation to each other in the sense that self-consciousness seems to jeopardize self-identity. My main concern is to elucidate this issue within the range of the transcendental philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. In the first section, I shall briefly consider Kant’s own rendition of the problem of the Egosplitting. (...)$99.00 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct download (2 more)Export citation
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Husserl: Self-Awareness
- Ich-jetzt-hier: ein Beitrag zur Theorie des Selbsterlebens.Elke Steckkönig - 2015 - Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber.Alles Bewusstsein ist auch Selbstbewusstsein -- so lautet die Grundthese, der Elke Steckkonig in diesem Buch nachgeht. Doch was ist das fur ein Bewusstsein, wenn das Subjekt sich seiner selbst gewahr wird? Weder Identifikation noch (Selbst-) Reflexion sind geeignete Konzepte, um die gesuchte Form von Selbstbewusstsein als Seiner-selbst-inne-Sein zu analysieren. Die Autorin gelangt zu einer Positivbestimmung des Selbstbewusstseins im subjektiv wertenden Selbsterleben, indem sie sich auf fruhromantische Uberlegungen zum "Selbstgefuhl" sowie auf aktuellere sprachanalytische Uberlegungen beruft und den phanomenalen Aspekt des (...)
- Abstraction and Self-Alienation in Mannheim and Husserl.Iaan Reynolds - 2023 - In Andrej Božič (ed.), Thinking Togetherness: Phenomenology and Sociality. Institute Nova Reijva for the Humanities. pp. 31-44.In this paper, I explore the approaches to methodological abstraction and self-alienation developed respectively in Karl Mannheim’s early sociology of intellectuals and in Edmund Husserl’s late transcendental phenomenology. In Mannheim’s early and experimental works, the resistance to abstraction and alienation is located in a stratum of intellectuals able to meaningfully combine diverse cultural currents in a social process of cultivation (Bildung). In Husserl, to contrast, this resistance is grasped as a constant crisis in the methods of pursuing philosophical truth. While (...)
- Husserl’s Notion of the Pure I.Andrija Jurić - 2023 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 43 (1):75-98.The author analyses the second phase of the development of Husserl’s phenomenological egology and the transition from nonegological to egological phenomenology. Accepting the necessity of the pure I as a phenomenological residue of the transcendental epoché, a non-constituted transcendence in immanence and the source of the evidence of the ‘I am’, it is analysed in its main aspects – such as, among others, the I-pole and I-substrate of habitualities – and in its traits and roles it plays in the stream (...)
- Kinesthesis and Self-Awareness.Gediminas Karoblis - 2023 - In Saulius Geniusas (ed.), Varieties of Self-Awareness: New Perspectives from Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, and Comparative Philosophy. Springer Verlag. pp. 85-99.It is remarkable that the phenomenological tradition always treated Husserl’s concept of kinesthesis as instrumental, and extremely rarely as a primary topic. For this reason, Husserl’s own confusion regarding this concept has not been addressed properly. According to Dorion Cairns, in early July 1932 Husserl reversed his concept of kinesthesis several times. Moreover, Husserl’s accounts provided in the Ding und Raum lectures of 1907 and Ideas II are different in this regard. Husserl’s late manuscripts also provide evidence for his updated (...)
- Husserlian Shadows in Plato’s Cave: Layers of Contingency and Fictional Variations on Self-Awareness.Claudio Majolino - 2023 - In Saulius Geniusas (ed.), Varieties of Self-Awareness: New Perspectives from Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, and Comparative Philosophy. Springer Verlag. pp. 3-25.By highlighting an often-neglected detail of Plato’s allegory of the cave, this essay puts to the test the conceptual resources of Husserl’s understanding of self-variation and weighs its relevance with respect to the concept of self-awareness. After a methodological introduction, a reminder of the relevant passages of Plato’s Republic, and a survey of the manner in which Husserl articulates self-variation and self-awareness, it shows which of these layers are revealed by the Platonic fiction of the cave and how fictions in (...)
- The Essential Indexical and Self-Consciousness: ‘I’, ‘Now’, and ‘Here’ as Aspects of Self-Consciousness.Andrija Jurić - 2022 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 35 (2):31-52.This paper aims to analyse egocentric indexicals ‘I’, ‘now’, and ‘here’ as different aspects of the same self-conscious or self-referential act emphasising the underlying phenomenological structure of the essential indexical ‘I’. What makes an indexical essential is not its indexicality but the egocentric mental state indicated by its use. Therefore, interpreting them only in the confines of language severely limits the scope of the investigation. First, I will define the pure use of ‘here’, ‘now’, and ‘I’, which will consequently lead (...)
- Modes of Self-Awareness: Perception, Dreams, Memory.Saulius Geniusas - 2022 - Husserl Studies 38 (2):151-170.I contend that the well-established phenomenological distinction between reflective and pre-reflective self-awareness needs to be further supplemented with more refined distinctions between different modes of pre-reflective self-awareness. Here I distinguish between five modes, which we come across in perception, lucid dreams, non-lucid dreams, daydreams, and episodic memory. Building on the basis of a phenomenological description, I argue that perception entails the pre-reflective self-awareness of the perceiving ego; non-lucid dreams implicate the pre-reflective self-awareness of the dreamed ego; in the case of (...)
- A Husserlian Critique of Pannenberg’s Understanding of Subjectivity.Kyung Phil Kim - 2022 - Philosophia Reformata 87 (1):49-70.I argue that Wolfhart Pannenberg’s view of human subjectivity presupposes a metaphysics of eternity that both contracts and expands the human subject. For this purpose, Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology is a useful criterion. Pannenberg rejects substantialist theories of subjectivity that give priority to the agency of the ego over the passivity of the self. Following Friedrich Schleiermacher, Pannenberg thinks self-reflection must be grounded on a symbiotic totality of life, and he views essences, even of subjectivity, as determined by that totality. In (...)
- Self-Consciousness without an “I”: A Critique of Zahavi’s Account of the Minimal Self.Lilian Alweiss - 2022 - Research in Phenomenology 52 (1):84-119.This paper takes Zahavi’s view to task that every conscious experience involves a “minimal sense of self.” Zahavi bases his claim on the observation that experience, even on the pre-reflective level, is not only about the object, but also has a distinctive qualitative aspect which is indicative of the fact that it is for me. It has the quality of what he calls “for-meness” or “mineness.” Against this I argue that there are not two phenomena but only one. On the (...)
- What is Time Like?Mark Sultana - 2021 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 26 (2):329-344.In this paper, which is situated in the broad stream of the confluence between analytic philosophy and phenomenology, I shall attempt to articulate the relation between self-consciousness and time consciousness. I shall show that the primary meaning of time entails a self-conscious being, and that time and change are related, but in an analogous way. Different forms of life—with concomitant different forms of self-consciousness—are qualitatively different in their capability of experiencing the flow of time. In making this claim, I shall (...)
- Being Oneself: Self-Consciousness in Husserl and Henry.Steven DeLay - unknownTaking up phenomenology’s problem of intentionality in the wake of Husserl, Jean-Paul Sartre in the introduction to Being and Nothingness says, «All consciousness, as Husserl has shown, is consciousness of something […] All consciousness is positional in that it transcends itself in order to reach an object, and it exhausts itself in this same positing». Continuing down the page, Sartre notes in turn that intentionality itself is only possible insofar as it is aware of itself. Just as an unconscious intentionality (...)
- Zahavi, Husserl and Heidegger on I, You and We: For-Meness or Ownness?Joshua Soffer - manuscriptZahavi offers a model of ‘I’, You and We consciousness that is grounded in the transcendentality of a minimal pre-reflective self-awareness , which he calls ‘for-meness’. Zahavi’s formulation of transcendental self-belonging as ‘for me-ness’ relies on the notion of a felt non-changing self- identity accompanying all intentional experiences. Zahavi’s treatment of the subject and object poles of experience as, respectively, self-inhering internality and externality, makes of self-awareness an alienating opposition between a purely self-identical felt for-meness and an external object, a (...)
- Selbstgefühl als lebendige Gegenwart. Husserl und Schelling über die ursprüngliche Zeitkonsitution.Yicai Ni - 2020 - Annales de Phénoménologie -Nouvelle Série 19:25-43.Das Problem der zeitlichen Konstitution ist für das Verständnis der genetischen Gründe der Subjektivität ganz wesentlich. Die zeitliche Konstitution selbst geht jedoch bereits über die Grenze des gegenständlichen Bewusstseins in das dunkle Vorbewusstsein hinaus. In den C-Manuskripten (1929-1934) lokalisiert Husserl die zeitliche Konstitution auf eine angemessene Weise im Bereich des Vorbewusstseins, aber seine Argumentation, sie als das anonyme Phänomen der „lebendigen Gegenwart“ zu interpretieren, ist nicht überzeugend genug. In dem vorliegenden Beitrag soll darauf hingewiesen werden, dass Schelling im System des (...)
- Bodily Schemata and Sartre's I and Me: Reflection and Awareness in Movement.Jodie McNeilly - 2016 - Performance Philosophy 2 (1):83-98.Philosophers have faced the problem of self or inner awareness since the self, itself, became something to be known and/or understood. Once dancers ‘let go of the mirror’ they too began to face the problem and limits to bodily awareness, developing specific reflective practices to obtain access to their inner bodily selves. But for the phenomenologist, reflection requires an active process of perception, which problematises our grasping of the so-called hidden, organising structures of movement that are unable to be perceived. (...)
- Intersubjectivity and Self-awareness in Husserl and Patočka.Jakub Čapek - 2019 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 33 (3):512-526.According to some phenomenological accounts of intersubjectivity, self-awareness precedes and makes possible our understanding of others. Consequently, an "egological account of consciousness" is a precondition for a viable theory of intersubjectivity.1 While Edmund Husserl embraces this assumption of the primacy of self-awareness, Jan Patočka seems to elaborate the opposite stance. As Patočka puts it, in the "contact and in the mirror of the other we encounter ourselves, for the first time."2 Is self-awareness a precondition for an intersubjective encounter, or is (...)
- What has Transparency to do with Husserlian Phenomenology?Chad Kidd - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:221-242.This paper critically evaluates Amie Thomasson’s (2003; 2005; 2006) view of the conscious mind and the interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction that it adopts. In Thomasson’s view, the phenomenological method is not an introspectionist method, but rather a “transparent” or “extrospectionist” method for acquiring epistemically privileged self-knowledge. I argue that Thomasson’s reading of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction is correct. But the view of consciousness that she pairs with it—a view of consciousness as “transparent” in the sense that first-order, world-oriented experience is (...)
- On the Border of Self-Appearance. Self-Affection and Reflection in the Remembering in Kant and Husserl.Guillermo Ferrer - 2015 - HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology 4 (2):87-98.
- The Problem of Time and Reflexivity in Husserl.A. Krioukov - 2013 - HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology 2 (2):50-60.
- Embodiment and Self-Awareness – Evans, Cassam and Husserl.Lilian Alweiss - 2018 - Philosophy 93 (1):31-51.In recent years there has been a general attempt – inspired by P. F. Strawson – to naturalise Kant's notion of the transcendental self. The argument being that self-consciousness should refer to neither a kind of noumenal nor mental self but that the self-conscious subject must conceive of itself as an embodied entity, a person among persons that regards itself as an element of the objective order of the world. While Kant does not make room for the notion of an (...)
- Self-Consciousness and Otherness: Hegel and Husserl.Saulius Geniušas - 2011 - Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija 16 (3).Countless differences between Hegel and Husserl notwithstanding, there is a common element in both of their accounts of the genesis of otherness. According to both, only if one delves into the interiority of self-consciousness, can one account for the rudimentary appearance of the Other. Following the Hegelian and Husserlian variants of such a strategy, this paper argues that: at the primitive levels of self-consciousness, subjectivity is intersubjective through and through; an irreducible distance separates the Other from the self, due to (...)
- Sartre’s Case for Nonthetic Consciousness: The Ground of the Cartesian Cogito’s Certainty and the Methodological Basis for Phenomenological Ontology.Curtis Sommerlatte - 2017 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 99 (4):405-442.Sartre’s phenomenological view of consciousness gives primacy to the thesis that all consciousness is nonthetically aware of itself, i.e., pre-reflectively aware of itself but not as an object. Few commentators, however, have explained Sartre’s grounds for holding this thesis, despite his view that the thesis’s truth underwrites the certainty of the Cartesian cogito and thereby the method of Sartre’s own phenomenological ontology. I document three lines of support for the thesis, the most promising of which consists in a proof by (...)
- Does Consciousness Necessitate Self-Awareness? Consciousness and Self-Awareness in Sartre's "The Transcendence of the Ego".Daniel R. Rodriguez-Navas - 2015 - In Sofia Miguens, Sofia Magueys & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Pre-reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 225-244.I offer a close reading of the first part of Sartre's The Transcendence of the Ego, arguing that contrary to widely held interpretation, one of Sartre's main goals in that text is to defend the view that consciousness does not necessitate self-awareness, that not all conscious states need be, ipso facto, states of self-awareness. In addition, I explain that this view about the conceptual relationship between consciousness and self-awareness has important methodological implications. One of the standard strategies for accounting for (...)
- Review of Harald Delius, Self-Awareness: A Semantical Inquiry. [REVIEW]Barry Smith - 1985 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46:170-173.The thesis of Delius's book is that statements of self-awareness such as "I am aware that I see a cat" possess what he calls 'Cartesian characteristics' of indubitability or absolute self-evidence. He argues that this is the case in virtue of the fact that such statements are not about anything independent of themselves. The book is described as a 'semantical inquiry', but it is not by any means a contribution to the philosophy of language of the predictable sort. Statements of (...)
- Representation and Regress.Maiya Jordan - 2017 - Husserl Studies 33 (1):19-43.I defend a Husserlian account of self-consciousness against representationalist accounts: higher-order representationalism and self-representationalism. Of these, self-representationalism is the harder to refute since, unlike higher-order representationalism, it does not incur a regress of self-conscious acts. However, it incurs a regress of intentional contents. I consider, and reject, five strategies for avoiding this regress of contents. I conclude that the regress is inherent to self-representationalism. I close by showing how this incoherence obtrudes in what must be the self-representationalist’s account of the (...)
- The Phenomenon of Ego-Splitting in Husserl’s Phenomenology of Pure Phantasy.Marco Cavallaro - 2017 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 48 (2):162-177.Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination embraces a cluster of different theories and approaches regarding the multi-faced phenomenon of imaginative experience. In this paper I consider one aspect that seems to be crucial to the understanding of a particular form of imagination that Husserl names pure phantasy. I argue that the phenomenon of Ego-splitting discloses the best way to elucidate the peculiarity of pure phantasy with respect to other forms of representative acts and to any simple form of act modification. First, I (...)
- M. Steinhoff, Zeitbewusstsein und Selbsterfahrung. Studien zum Verhältnis von Subjektivität und Zeitlichkeit im vorkantischen Empirismus und in den Transzendentalphilosophien Kants und Husserls. [REVIEW]K. B. Beils - 1988 - Kant Studien 79 (3):358.Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- Freedom, Responsibility and Self-Awareness in Husserl.Thomas Nenon - 2011 - Phainomena 76:161-182.e following essay is organized around eighteen theses concerning the relationship between freedom, responsibility and self- awareness that I believe are both correct and consistent with specic doctrines and the overall positions advanced in Husserl’s published writings. e eighteen theses are not meant to represent a deductive argument. Most of them are not unique to Husserl or phenomenological philosophy, but I’m not aware of any other thinker who has hat brought all of them together as does Husserl.
- The Problem of Self-Constitution For Idealism and Phenomenology.Errol E. Harris - 1977 - Idealistic Studies 7 (1):1-27.Following kant, idealists establish the transcendental unity of the subject as the prior condition of experience of objects. this is necessarily all-inclusive and the finite self becomes one of its phenomena, which cannot be identified with the transcendental ego, nor yet be wholly divorced from it. this is the basis of kant's paralogism of reason. t h green, f h bradley and edmund husserl are all victims of this paralogism, each in his own way. green fails to avoid it by (...)
- Immanence, Self-Experience, and Transcendence in Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, and Karl Jaspers.Dermot Moran - 2008 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2):265-291.Phenomenology, understood as a philosophy of immanence, has had an ambiguous, uneasy relationship with transcendence, with the wholly other, with the numinous. If phenomenology restricts its evidence to givenness and to what has phenomenality, what becomes of that which is withheld or cannot in principle come to givenness? In this paper I examine attempts to acknowledge the transcendent in the writings of two phenomenologists, Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein (who attempted to fuse phenomenology with Neo-Thomism), and also consider the influence (...)
- The interactive Now: A second-person approach to time-consciousness.Stephen Langfur - 2016 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 47 (2):156-182.Husserl offers insight into the constituting of the self-aware ego through time-consciousness. Yet his account does not satisfactorily explain how this ego can experience itself as presently acting. Furthermore, although he acknowledges that the Now is not a knife-edge present, he does not show what determines its duration. These shortfalls and others are overcome through a change of starting point. Citing empirical evidence, I take it as a basic given that when a caregiver frontally engages an infant of two months (...)
- Das „Problem“ der Habituskonstitution und die Spätlehre des Ich in der genetischen Phänomenologie E. Husserls.Marco Cavallaro - 2016 - Husserl Studies 32 (3):237-261.Der vorliegende Aufsatz behandelt zwei Bereiche, deren Zusammenhang in der aktuellen Husserlforschung zu Unrecht in Vergessenheit geraten zu sein scheint: Zum einen konturiere ich den Habitusbegriff und das damit verbundene Problem der Habituskonstitution im Spätwerk E. Husserls. Zum anderen dient das Ergebnis dieser ersten Untersuchung dann als Grundlage für die Frage nach dem Wesen des Ich in der genetischen Phänomenologie. Die Untersuchung besteht aus drei Teilen: Zuerst stelle ich, um die Bedeutung des Begriffs „Habitus“ zu klären, Ingardens Interpretationsalternativen der Habituskonstitution (...)
- Kant’s and Husserl’s agentive and proprietary accounts of cognitive phenomenology.Julia Jansen - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):161-172.In this paper, I draw from Kantian and Husserlian reflections on the self-awareness of thinking for a contribution to the cognitive phenomenology debate. In particular, I draw from Kant’s conceptions of inner sense and apperception, and from Husserl’s notions of lived experience and self-awareness for an inquiry into the nature of our awareness of our own cognitive activity. With particular consideration of activities of attention, I develop what I take to be Kant’s and Husserl’s “agentive” and “proprietary” accounts. These, I (...)
- Intencionalidad, pasividad y autoconciencia en la fenomenología de Husserl.Francesco de Nigris - 2015 - Ideas Y Valores 64 (157):215-250.A pesar de los matices y variaciones de significado, el concepto husserliano de intencionalidad no deja de estar al servicio de la idea clásica de la verdad como adaequatio, finalmente adaptada al orden monádico de la conciencia trascendental. Veremos, sin embargo, que en los análisis de Husserl sobre la conciencia interna del tiempo se manifiesta toda la dificultad para interpretar intencionalmente la esfera pasiva de la conciencia, peligrando la peculiar vocación a la verdad de la misma intencionalidad. Intentaremos, mediante las (...)
- Intentionality and Normativity.Maxime Doyon - 2016 - Philosophy Today 60 (1):207-221.The paper is organized around two ideas that come out in Steve Crowell’s Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger and that I discuss critically in turn. The first concerns the reach of Crowell’s claim according to which the connection between intentionality, meaning and normativity is necessary in all forms of intentional experience. I make my point by considering the case of imagining experiences, which are—I argue—meaningful, intentional, but not necessarily normative in any relevant sense. The second question is about (...)
- La dramatique de la personne ou l'ipséité comme paradoxe.Emmanuel Housset - 2007 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 81 (2):215.Le terme de « personne » est devenu aujourd’hui très abstrait, y compris dans le personnalisme, et il est nécessaire de lui redonner le statut d’un vrai concept. Une telle tâche est rendue possible par la méthode de la phénoménologie qui seule peut être attentive à l’identité propre de la personne par rapport à l’identité de la chose. Contre le concept juridique de personne et contre les pensées de l’identité personnelle issues de Locke, Husserl permet de montrer en quoi l’identité (...)
- Brentano or Husserl? Intentionality, Consciousness, and Self-consciousness in Contemporary Phenomenology of Mind.Federico Boccaccini - 2015 - Archivio Di Filosofia (3):189-202.
- Nerve/Nurses of the Cosmic Doctor: Wang Yang-ming on Self-Awareness as World-Awareness.Joshua M. Hall - 2016 - Asian Philosophy 26 (2):149-165.In Philip J. Ivanhoe’s introduction to his Readings from the Lu-Wang School of Neo-Confucianism, he argues convincingly that the Ming-era Neo-Confucian philosopher Wang Yang-ming (1472–1529) was much more influenced by Buddhism (especially Zen’s Platform Sutra) than has generally been recognized. In light of this influence, and the centrality of questions of selfhood in Buddhism, in this article I will explore the theme of selfhood in Wang’s Neo-Confucianism. Put as a mantra, for Wang “self-awareness is world-awareness.” My central image for this (...)
- How is a Phenomenological Reflection-Model of Self-Consciousness Possible? A Husserlian Response to E. Tugendhat’s Semantic Approach to Self-Consciousness.Wei Zhang - 2016 - Husserl Studies 32 (1):47-66.The problem of self-consciousness has been an essential one for philosophy since the onset of modernity. Both E. Tugendhat and the Heidelberg School represented by D. Henrich have reflected critically upon the traditional theory of self-consciousness, and both have revealed the circular dilemma of the “reflection-model” adopted by the traditional theory. In order to avoid the dilemma, they both proposed substitute formulas, each of which has its advantages and disadvantages. Husserl also paid particular attention to the traditional theory of self-consciousness (...)
- Peter R. Costello: Layers in Husserl’s Phenomenology. On Meaning and Intersubjectivity: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2012, 240 pp., US-$60 , ISBN 9781442644625. [REVIEW]Joona Taipale - 2015 - Husserl Studies 31 (2):169-173.Around the 1920s, Husserl increasingly began to integrate temporality into his phenomenological analyses. As a consequence, many topics that he had thus far considered in terms of a static structure were re-introduced as involving inner dialectics, a multi-layered depth-dimension to be unveiled by further studies. Establishing a novel, genetic-phenomenological approach motivated certain important shifts of focus in his account of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. For one, whereas Husserl had earlier discussed the experiencing subject as a self-identical pole, introducing temporality into the (...)
- Selbsttäuschung und Selbsterkenntnis: Zu Heideggers Transformation der Phänomenologie Husserls.Barbara Merker - 1988 - Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Intentionality, Time, and Self-Identity: Husserl's Theory of Time and the Problem of Personal Identity.Se-Gweon An - 1990 - Dissertation, Southern Illinois University at CarbondaleIn this dissertation I raise three questions: What is Husserl's theory of time?; Can we develop a particular thesis of self-identity and, if so, what would it look like?; How does the thesis work in relation to the problems that are to be solved? ;In chapter II, I give an exposition of Husserl's view on time with the purpose of establishing a framework that will play a decisive role in the formation of a thesis of self-identity. Husserl defines time as (...)Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- Barbara Merker, Selbsttäuschung und Selbsterkenntnis. Zu Heideggers Transformation der Phänomenologie Husserls. [REVIEW]Christoph Jamme - 1990 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 97 (1):203.Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- Phenomenology and the Dialectic: A Study of Pre-Reflexive Consciousness in the Phenomenological Theories of Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty.Richard Timothy Murphy - 1963 - Dissertation, Fordham UniversityRemove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- Review of Dan Zahavi's Subjectivity and Selfhood. [REVIEW]Greg Janzen - 2007 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 13.In Subjectivity and Selfhood Dan Zahavi presents the fruits of his thinking on a nexus of issues regarding the experiential structure of consciousness and its relation to selfhood. The central theme of the book is that the “notion of self is crucial for a proper understanding of consciousness, and consequently it is indispensable to a variety of disciplines such as philosophy of mind, social philosophy, psychiatry, developmental psychology, and cognitive neuroscience”. Proceeding, as in his previously published work, on the assumption (...)
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