Locke: Political Philosophy

En Ángel e infancia se presenta la tesis según la cual el Ensayo acerca del entendimiento humano del inglés John Locke defiende una visión de la persona que es el resultado de una ruptura imposible de concluir y, por lo tanto, saturada de tensiones con “la lengua materna”, con lo animal, la infancia y las “anomalías” humanas. El Ensayo presenta, dentro de su teoría de la personalidad, una comprensión de “lo femenino” que permite establecer una polaridad: lo personal es el (...) polo en el que se concentran, en contradicción con “lo femenino” o “maternal”, las virtudes necesarias para la vida común. -/- También, en este libro se realiza una detallada explicación de la crítica lockeana del lenguaje teológico, la cual está relacionada con su ruptura con la lengua femenina, con el consecuente abandono de la infancia y la superación de la animalidad. La persona es, según esto, quien rompe con los límites de todo lo que se estima bajo o terrenal y se eleva sobre el polvo sin llegar, eso sí, a ser igual a un ángel. Con todo, Locke reconoce una serie de “debilidades” de la personalidad que permiten concluir que un viviente humano es, con dificultades, solo en ocasiones también una persona. Tal discontinuidad hace que la persona sea episódica, voluble y carente de un fundamento sólido. La vida personal está dañada desde dentro y, pese a ello, la filosofía lockeana considera que solo dentro de una comunidad de personas es posible el placer y la justicia. La asociación básica de la filosofía de la persona es entre responsabilidad (forense) y personalidad, pero, una y otra vez, el Ensayo deja ver, pese a que no sea tal su propósito, el desfondamiento de lo personal. (shrink)

The natural interpretation is that Dorothea’s early impressions of Edward Casaubon, in terms of John Locke, are illusory. But I draw attention to Joseph Raz’s suggestion that it is the status of Locke which is mistaken, though I favour the natural interpretation.

Ordinary private property rights to things like land and money are typically assumed to be permanent. In contrast, intellectual property (IP) rights usually have term limits. Copyrights, patents, and trademarks all expire by default sometime after they’re formed. I argue that ordinary property (OP) should be more like IP. Certain types of private property rights should be subject to term limits, and after expiration the property should enter a tangible public domain. First, I define private property. Second, I argue the (...) purpose of private property rights is to facilitate access to resources, goods, and services. Conceptions of private property which undermine such access are unjustified. Third, I argue that term limits and the public domain help IP rights fulfill their purpose and could do the same for OP rights. Fourth, I consider specific policy proposals which would put term limits into practice. Finally, I raise and counter potential objections. (shrink)

This paper provides an entrance into central discussions regarding Kant’s account of property. The first section shows how Kant engages and transforms important, related proposals from Hobbes and Locke as well as how the ‘libertarian’ and ‘liberal republican’ interpretive traditions differ in their readings on these points. Since Kantian theories for a long time didn’t focus on Kant’s Doctrine of Right but instead followed Rawls’s lead by developing Kantian theories grounded on Kant’s (meta-) ethical writings, the second section focuses on (...) property discussions found in the Rawlsian tradition. The final section shows how important contemporary work in the Kantian tradition goes beyond Rawlsian, libertarian, and liberal republican concerns of distributive justice among free and equal citizens, to include questions central to, for example, the philosophy of care, feminist philosophy, philosophy of race, philosophy of sex and love, and environmental philosophy. (shrink)

Na długo przed rewolucją francuską oraz jej pierworodną Deklaracją Praw Człowieka i Obywatela w europejskiej myśli politycznej członek państwa przedzierzgnięty został z poddanego w obywatela. Ta fundamentalna zmiana w definiowaniu stanowiska jednostki w państwie korespondowała z humanistycznym postrzeganiem rozumu ludzkiego nie tylko jako instrumentu poznawania świata, ale też narzędzia głębokiej refleksji i krytycznej oceny mechanizmów światem rządzących. Siła rozumu kojarzona była przez oświeceniowych filozofów z porządkiem naturalnym, który jawił się przeciwwagą dla społecznych i politycznych realiów absolutnego władztwa monarszego. W XVIII (...) w. we francuskiej i niemieckiej filozofii państwa nastąpił istotny postęp w zakresie kształtowania się idei obywatela pojmowanego w sensie zbliżonym do Arystotelesowskiej istoty państwowej (politikon zoon). Stało się tak jednak w dużej mierze dzięki XVII-wiecznym angielskim reformom wolnościowym. Racjonalistyczne i materialistyczne podwaliny oświeceniowego światopoglądu konstytuowała też, powstała na bazie krytyki pism Thomasa Hobbesa, myśl Johna Locke’a, stymulująca do urządzania życia społecznego zgodnie z zaleceniami umysłu i potrzeb ludzkich, a wbrew bezwzględnym prawom samowładztwa, w tym jego monopolu na rację, który dusił inicjatywę jednostki. (shrink)

Foundations of a Free Society brings together some of the most knowledgeable Ayn Rand scholars and proponents of her philosophy, as well as notable critics, putting them in conversation with other intellectuals who also see themselves as defenders of capitalism and individual liberty. United by the view that there is something importantly right—though perhaps also much wrong—in Rand’s political philosophy, contributors reflect on her views with the hope of furthering our understandings of what sort of society is best and why. (...) The volume provides a robust elaboration and defense of the foundation of Rand’s political philosophy in the principle that force paralyzes and negates the functioning of reason; it offers an in-depth scholarly discussion of Rand’s view on the nature of individual rights and the role of government in defending them; it deals extensively with the similarities and differences between Rand’s thought and the libertarian tradition (to which she is often assimilated) and objections to her positions arising from this tradition; it explores Rand’s relation to the classical liberal tradition, specifically with regard to her defense of freedom of the intellect; and it discusses her views on the free market, with special attention to the relation between these views and those of the Austrian school of economics. (shrink)

An approach to political philosophy: Locke in contexts brings together Professor Tully's most important and innovative statements on Locke in a treatment of the latter's thought that is at once contextual and critical. The essays have been rewritten and expanded for this volume, and each seeks to understand a theme of Locke's political philosophy by interpreting it in light of the complex contexts of early modern European political thought and practice. These historical studies are then used in a variety of (...) ways to gain critical perspectives on the assumptions underlying current debates in political philosophy and the history of political thought. The themes treated include government, toleration, discipline, property, aboriginal rights, individualism, power, labour, self-ownership, community, progress, liberty, participation, and revolution. (shrink)

This thesis is an investigation of the feasibility of a micropolitical analysis as an evaluative scheme for the analysis of property. The limitations of historical and normative frameworks are discussed. The ontological features of power as understood by Filmer and Locke are compared, and these, to a Foucauldian view of power. The Foucauldian view of power is a better tool of analysis since it reveals and explains more features of "property", including the way that a Lockean conception of property and (...) power, as a point of authority, affects the discourse of property itself. Using a personal and an historical example of the private/public distinction, I establish that these are relational terms built up by various rules of inclusion and exclusion, not upon any prior ground. In particular, I highlight how the production of knowledge functions as one of the conduits in or out of domains; that is, the public and the private are domains of expertise or authority on property. Individuals occupy subjectivities available within the discourse of property which position them, or allow them to position others, as having legitimate or illegitimate relations to property. I show how these subjectivities are the central functional feature of the possibility of normativity. That is to say, whether and how forms of property relations can be evaluated depends on the production of forms of judgment which a subject position makes possible, in form and in content. I ask how present subject positions within the domains of tangible and intangible property work to extend or delimit these domains as moral, political or economic ones. The possibilities of judgment and of freedom from judgment as formal strategies of 4 distinct regimes of power are enumerated, offering an evaluative framework. I ask what, in the domain of property, these 4 regimes offer as formal possibilities for freedom, fairness, and equality. Lastly, I explore Deleuze's concepts of the rhizome and the arborescent with a similar view to reading property as a question of one kind of line rather than another. Finally, I generate from this critical cartography, and bearing in mind the examples of pregnancy and potlatch, a number of responsible strategies one could make from the subject positions identified. (shrink)

In On the Edge of Anarchy, A. John Simmons simultaneously pursues two distinguishable ends: to defend an interpretation of Locke as a “pure consent” theorist the essence of whose theory is that only actual voluntary individual consent can ground political obligations and authority, and to defend pure consent theory as the best theory of political obligation. Both ends are pursued under the heading of justifying “Lockean” consent theory, and the arguments for them overlap considerably because most of Simmons’s defense of (...) his interpretation of Locke’s theory depends on his arguments that the position he attributes to Locke is, for independent philosophical reasons, the most defensible version of “voluntaristic” theory. Two of the very interesting, and surprising, inferences Simmons defends in this book are that believing ourselves to be naturally free from political obligation implies that most existing states are illegitimate, and that Locke was committed to the view that “political drudgery,” a condition in which all of our rights are alienated to the government, although imprudent, is not morally impermissible. (shrink)

This book represents a major new statement on the issue of property rights. It argues for the justification of some rights of private property while showing why unequal distributions of private property are indefensible. Three features of the book are especially salient: it offers a challenging new pluralist theory of justification; the argument integrates perceptive analyses of the great classical theorists Aristotle, Locke, Hegel and Marx with a discussion of contemporary philosophers such as Nozick and Rawls; and the author moves (...) with assurance among philosophy, law and economics to present a very broad, interdisciplinary study. (shrink)

The philosophical analysis of property is an ever-continuing process since the meaning, function and existence of the institution of private property is not constant but dynamic. This article explores four dominant justificatory theories of private property.

The philosophic justifications of private property reach back to the ancient world. Aristotle regarded secure possessions as necessary for successful social functioning, and Cicero understood government’s function to be the protection of private property. Renaissance and Enlightenment thinkers Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, and John Locke argued vigorously for the importance of private property rights in human life. The work of late twentieth-century analytical philosophers John Rawls and Robert Nozick brought property rights to the fore of philosophical discussion. In the field (...) of global development, private property rights have come under critical re-examination in recent decades. It is increasingly understood that institutions guaranteeing the security of private property are a necessary ingredient for economic growth and social well-being in underdeveloped nations. Institutions are being established in accordance with consequentialist justifications of private property. In this thesis, after defining general moral rights and briefly discussing this current trend in favour of consequentialist understandings of private property, I will examine the two dominant schools of private property justification in philosophy: the consequentialist and the deontological, with an especial focus on consequentialist John Stuart Mill and deontologist John Locke. I end the thesis by examining, and simultaneously arguing for the power and enduring relevance of, the oldest philosophical justification of private property: the eudaimonist school led by Aristotle. (shrink)

What made the United States what it is began long before a shot was fired at a redcoat in Lexington, Massachusetts in 1775. The theories of reading developed by John Locke were the means by which a revolutionary attitude toward authority was disseminated throughout the British colonies in North America.

In Our Only Star and Compass, Peter C. Myers reexamines the role of Locke in liberal political philosophy. Myers considers Locke's philosophy in relation both to contemporary liberalism and to the great works of classical and modern political philosophy.

This article reconstructs the main arguments in John Locke’s first political writings, the highly rhetorical, and often obscure, Two Tracts on Government . The Tracts support the government’s right to impose religious ceremonies on its people, an astonishing fact given Locke’s famous defense of toleration in his later works. The reconstruction of the Tracts developed here allows us to see that rather than a pessimistic view of the prospects for peace under religious diversity, what mainly animates the young Locke is (...) a desire to defend the rule of law against an anarchical conception of religious freedom. The article also argues that the evolution of Locke’s thinking on religious freedom was in large part governed by Locke’s attempt to interpret religious freedom in a way that avoids its having anarchical implications. (shrink)

The article considers the right to property according to John Locke, interpreted in the light of two mutually opposed positions: libertarian and Marxist. The former is represented by the American thinker R. Nozick; his adversary is G. Cohen. The views of I. Berlin and J. Rawls are also considered.The first part concerns the right to property. For Locke this was a basic right, to which he attached the highest value. The second part of the article presents the problem of how (...) private property arises. The third part considers the issue of limitations on the right to property.Locke’s conception of property is a point of reference for libertarian, liberal, and Marxist thinkers. They differ from Locke, however, as regards the justification of property: Locke justifies property on a theological basis. (shrink)

The right to private property plays an important role in liberal political theory. In this thesis I consider versions of the liberal theory of property developed by Locke, Nozick, and Rawls, arguing that each fails to give an adequate account of the nature and justification of the right to private property. Although Locke establishes a natural right to private property based on the moral value of labor, his theory cannot justify an inviolable right to private property where it is not (...) entailed by the right to self-preservation. Nor does Locke establish the preservation of property claims as a rational choice for the final end of government. ;Nozick modifies Locke's theory of property insofar as he considers the crucial connection to be between property and liberty, rather than property and self-preservation. Nozick's justification of an inviolable right of private property fails because he offers no reason to value the liberty to dispose of goods protected by a system of private property over the liberty to use that is secured in a system of property based on common ownership. ;Rawls also adopts liberty as the primary human good, but argues that an extended right to private property is not required by justice. The right to property is not one of the basic liberties protected by the principles of justice. While I accept this aspect of his theory, I argue that Rawls also fails to give a consistent account of the connection between liberty and property. Given his position on the priority of liberty, Rawls ought to require that any infringement on the ability to exercise the basic liberties due to the institution of private property be prohibited. ;A unique system of property rights cannot be determined solely on the basis of liberty. The liberal conception of person as a rational creature with his own conception of the good does not provide a means for evaluating the liberties that compete in the choice of a property system. In the conclusion, I argue that this is a significant failure for the liberal theory of justice. (shrink)

Locke's contractarian theory of political obligation has been controversial, largely due to his notorious distinction between express and tacit consent. To most political philosophers it is an inconsistent theory, and to most historians it is an inappropriate response to Sir Robert Filmer's criticisms of social contract theory. The aim of this dissertation is to show that Locke's theory of political obligation is much better than generally recognized. ;My argument is based primarily on the recognition that Locke developed a theory of (...) two different types of obligation resting on two different types of consent. I argue that for Locke the obligation incurred by express consent is owed to the commonwealth rather than the civil government. It is a member's contract-based permanent obligation to obey the laws of legitimate government, not to war against his own commonwealth and not to desert his own commonwealth when it is engaged in war, and to erect a new legislature should the current government be dissolved. ;I also argue that for Locke the obligation incurred by tacit consent is owed to the civil government rather than the commonwealth. It is a resident's non-contract-based conditional obligation to obey the laws of legitimate government. I then show that for Locke most women, servants, and visiting aliens are exclusively tacit consenters who are not eligible to become express consenters, and that the justificatory basis of their legal obligations lies in the law of nature. ;I conclude that by constructing his social contract theory on the basis of two different types of obligation, Locke successfully overcame several difficulties which the traditional social contract theories faced. In particular, because he regarded the state of nature and the original contract as purely rational reconstructions, and because of his ingenious view of inheritance as an incentive for future generations to give their express consent to membership in the commonwealth, he was able to respond effectively to Filmer's criticisms. (shrink)

An „Original Acquisition‟ justification of strong private property rights, allegedly first enunciated by John Locke, has in recent decades been increasingly adopted in some circles. These writers purport to demonstrate that as property rights may exist prior to, and provide a justification for, government and other forms of social constraint; they should therefore to the greatest possible extent be immune to the latter‟s interference. Yet many theorists equivocate as to whether the acquisition they write of is only an in-theory possibility, (...) or whether it has occurred historically. Both approaches have benefits necessary for the complete OA justification sought; but crucially, the two are mutually exclusive. By overlooking this problem, OA theorists leave themselves in a precarious position, their work seemingly easily dismissed. However serious attempts to address the problem have resulted in theories that lack much of what is needed for OA to justify a regime of strong property rights. (shrink)

In his Second Treatise of Government, John Locke offers a theory of property. It is widely believed that his theory culminates in what has been called the consent argument, by which Locke justifies the genesis of contemporary inequality from an egalitarian state of nature. And it is believed that he also asserts here the so-called Lockean provisos, namely the fair share limit and the waste limit. However, it has been convincingly objected that Locke's consent argument does not work. This is (...) perhaps the most serious charge facing Locke, since apparently the entire point of his economic philosophy is to justify contemporary inequality of holdings. ;In this dissertation, I shall defend Locke against this particular charge. Specifically, I shall argue that Locke in fact does not assert the consent argument nor does he intend to justify global inequality, as scholars have assumed. In the process, we shall have to renovate our current understanding of the Lockean provisos. (shrink)

A reconsideration of the logical structure of arguments for property rights reveals that Locke's labor theory of original appropriation is more important than has been previously recognized because the justification of property rights must be deontological and of the four possible justifications of property rights-- universal consent, social utility, self-actualization, and Locke's labor theory--only Locke's theory is deontological. So if any justification of property rights exists, it must be based upon Locke's labor theory. Consequently, if Locke's theory fails, property rights (...) fail. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I concur with John Locke's critics, who charge that he first set up natural law to limit the amount of property individuals may own and then found a way to allow people to circumvent those limits. However, Locke's property theory does have some merits. It has generated a large amount of productivity; it is just in the sense that it gives laborers what is due to them; and it is based on a Christian premise that holds, originally, (...) the world is given to all humans. In my dissertation, I will try to combine these elements with Christian love to formulate a Lockean-Christian property theory. ;The outline of my argument is the following: Chapter one points out that there is almost a consensus, even among the socialists, that some kind of private property rights is needed for humans to function adequately. Chapter two reviews the history of church teaching on property rights, arguing that a theory which both affirms and limits property rights can be developed from this tradition. Chapter three discusses the theme of Locke's theory of property. It stresses the importance of his Christian premise and provisos for appropriation. In chapter four, I try to formulate a Lockean-Christian theory of property. I believe even a revised Lockean theory of property that stresses original communism, the labor theory of property, and the Lockean proviso would still be inadequate for the society. For though such a theory gives people what is due to them, and is able to offer a more egalitarian and ecological oriented social policy, it needs the complement of Christian love, which involves sacrificing the individual's rights for the good of others. It concerns not only with whether people get what they deserve, but also whether they receive what they truly need. (shrink)

This dissertation compares two competing theologically informed projects of social reconstruction. I argue that a critical examination of their projects in social reconstructionism reveals the crucial differences and similarities between John Locke and Martin Luther King Jr's relation to modern liberalism. Though John Locke developed a covenant-based social contract theory for seventeenth century Britain, much of its theological content was lost as others adopted it that came under its influence. This was certainly the case in British North America and subsequently, (...) what came to be known as the United States of America, where a non-theological version of Locke's view of civil society became the foundation for a contractual understanding of the Constitution. This dissertation explores not only the epistemological foundations of Locke's primary vision , but it moves beyond this to investigate the historical expression of this social contract in terms of British colonial policy; trace the socio-economistic and racial-ethnic encumbrances of the social contract as it was delocalized and brought to the North America context; examine how the theological project of Martin Luther King, Jr. serves to resituate civil society on theological foundations and by so doing correct the racialization inherent in the Americanized version of the social contract. (shrink)

The theoretical similarity between domestic and international liberalism has yet to be fully understood. This study therefore seeks to compare the classic domestic liberalism of John Locke with the equally classic international liberalism of Woodrow Wilson. Specifically, the study tests the hypothesis that Wilson's policy on the League of Nations represented an international version of Locke's social contract theory. The hypothesis is tested by means of a historico-analytical method that combines textual interpretation with historical reconstruction. ;Overall, the study's results confirm (...) the hypothesis. In particular, they show that the social contract theories of Locke and Wilson both contain the following tenets: the law of nature, which embodies the concept of natural equality, endows all individuals with the natural rights to life, liberty, and property; the state of nature fails in enforcing the law of nature and thus is a state of war; and political society succeeds in enforcing the law of nature and thus is a state of peace. ;The study's conclusion is that although the liberal theories of both Locke and Wilson failed to fully resolve the basic tension between the rights of the individual and the requirements of political society, this tension can nevertheless be resolved by means of Hegel's concept of civil society. (shrink)

This dissertation argues that much of the debate concerning John Locke's influence on the American founding is mired in an insufficient grasp of Locke's own theory of nature and society. It is inadequate to see Locke as defending possessive acquisitiveness and the interests of property, narrowly, or interest-group liberalism, utilitarianism or capitalism, more broadly--as many scholars do. ;Reconsidering Locke's major works as well as recent studies that have explored his contextual setting and historical purposes, I argue that Locke left behind (...) a philosophic world view that is considerably more coherent, comprehensive and complex than is generally conceded. ;For Locke, every individual is created equal and endowed with certain inherent duties which he or she has a responsibility to fulfill--including self-preservation and happiness. And from that "equal creation," there emerges a conception of civil government that is best captured in the principle of "equal protection." Broader than the idea of rendering impartial justice , "equal protection" cedes to government sufficient authority to protect the life, liberty, property and free pursuits of all, yet bars government from awarding special privileges or immunities to any. Against much scholarly opinion this dissertation will argue that, for Locke, government has the power to protect people and their property from invasion, but not to positively promote the welfare of any social classes--"capitalist" or "agrarian," rich or poor. ;Their clear attachment to classical republicanism notwithstanding, the Founders and Framers steadily adapted Locke's moral and philosophic outlook to their own changing circumstances. The challenges they faced during the Founding era , were all challenges posed to Locke's own theory of nature and government--as they understood it. In Jefferson's revolutionary Declaration, in the Constitutional Convention of 1787, in the Federalist and Antifederalist "papers," and in the Jeffersonian opposition during the Federalist Era, classical republicanism and Lockean liberalism could indissolubly blend, though never finally triumph. (shrink)

This study examines Locke's theory of power in the state of nature, in the family, and in civil society. ;The introductory first chapter highlights the themes of natural law, natural right, individual freedom, private property, power and authority, which run through Locke's political theory, particularly as articulated in his Two Treatises of Government. ;The second chapter focuses on the state of nature where no one had or exercised any authority over another, and where life and property were always insecure. Locke (...) emphasized that the state of nature which was governed by the law of nature was not a state of war, yet each individual could defend his or her own person and property even to the point of killing an assailant. ;The third chapter examines how authority is exercised in the family. Locke rebuts Filmer's authoritarian conception of parental authority, seeing it as a temporary trust that went only with nonage. It is significant that he acknowledged the coequality of spouses and their co-responsibility for the rearing of the child. His discussion on slavery raises questions both of his consistency and of his intentions. ;The executive as an aspect of government sovereignty is discussed in chapter four. Locke had subordinated the executive to the legislative, but that raises the question: how could the executive be subordinate to the legislative and yet have the power to summon or dismiss it and, in some cases, dispense with its services in the exercise of the power of prerogative? ;Chapters five and six show how legislative power arises from the people's consent as determined by the majority, and how political power is ultimately that of the people. The government's power arises from an act of trust by the people who have the power to sustain it or dismiss it, if necessary by force, should it betray its trust. ;The concluding chapter seven lauds Locke the great philosopher, social scientist and educator who believed in human equality, championed democracy, and advocated toleration. It is wary of Locke the rationalist, whose basic tendency might be atheistic, and the individualist, whose motivation might be self-interest, to the exclusion of the common good. (shrink)

The existence of a commonly held civil theology or public orthodoxy is a precondition of a viable and well-functioning political order. In the English nation-state, prior to the seventeenth century, such an authoritative civil theology was supplied by an established church. The English wars of Religion, however, demonstrated that an increasingly fragmented Christianity was no longer capable of fulfilling this role. Faced with intractable religious divisions, toleration was adopted as a prudential device to secure peace. This expedient, however, left England (...) without a viable civil theology. A careful study of the work of John Locke indicates that Lockean liberalism originated in an attempt to address the complex of political and epistemological problems posed by the religious wars, and to formulate a new civil theology for English society. At the heart of Locke's program was his doctrine of toleration. ;In his Letters on toleration, Locke argues that toleration is a defining principle of rightly constituted political order. Locke's doctrine of toleration is rooted in his restricted understanding of the goals of politics, which, in turn, is a function of his understanding of the nature and epistemological status of religious truth. A close examination of the limits Locke places on toleration, furthermore, reveals that the effect of this doctrine is to elevate Locke's own political creed to the status of a new civil theology, the acceptance of which has profound consequences for the community's spiritual life. The privileged position conferred on his own political creed by Locke is a manifestation of what he believes to be its superior epistemological status relative to the doctrines of the churches. ;The Lockean settlement proved to be unstable. The epistemology of Locke's Essay, rather than supporting Locke's natural theology and natural law teaching, issued logically in value noncognitivism. The result was the modern pluralist state: a regime whose public order is grounded in the eschewal of all "value judgements." When seen in the light of its origins, it becomes clear that the claims of the modern pluralist state cannot be uncritically accepted: the pluralist state is not truly neutral, and a pluralist society is not, as it professes, a society without a civil theology. A pluralist regime has merely replaced the orthodoxy of Locke's political creed with a new orthodoxy of public agnosticism. (shrink)