Normative Approaches to Legal Reasoning

Purpose: Illicit financial flows are targeted by the United Nations’ (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). However, these illicit flows are not entirely understood. Furthermore, they can benefit from economic norms, laws, and regulations that lack mechanisms to detect and penalize them. This paper investigates whether a recent test, the embezzler test, can be used to identify regulatory architectures that facilitate illicit financial flows and related financial crimes. -/- Design/methodology/approach: To develop a more advanced version of the embezzler test in terms (...) of definitions and practical implementation methodology. -/- Findings: In this test, the definition of embezzlement can be understood to be the occurrence of illicit financial flows crossing the boundaries of organizations and/or countries. This is a multi-stage test, which intentionally simulates illicit financial flows to observe how well equipped is the regulatory architecture to deal with other financial offences that are related with these flows, such as theft, money laundering, fraud, corruption, market manipulation, and tax evasion. -/- Originality: This is the first explicit test that has been presented to identify norms, laws, and regulations that facilitate illicit financial flows and related financial crimes. -/- Research implications: Future research can employ the version of this test to stress test a large range of economic norms, laws, and regulations. -/- Practical/Social implications: This test’s new version can assist achieve the UN SDGs’ illicit financial flow reduction target. Furthermore, it can be used to study both existing and proposed norms, laws, and regulation. (shrink)

I defend the thesis that legal standards of proof are reducible to thresholds of probability. Many have rejected this thesis because it seems to entail that defendants can be found liable solely on the basis of statistical evidence. I argue that this inference is invalid. I do so by developing a view, called Legal Causalism, that combines Thomson's (1986) causal analysis of evidence with recent work in formal theories of causal inference. On this view, legal standards of proof can be (...) reduced to probabilities, but deriving these probabilities involves more than just statistics. (shrink)

Should we use the same standard of proof to adjudicate guilt for murder and petty theft? Why not tailor the standard of proof to the crime? These relatively neglected questions cut to the heart of central issues in the philosophy of law. This paper scrutinises whether we ought to use the same standard for all criminal cases, in contrast with a flexible approach that uses different standards for different crimes. I reject consequentialist arguments for a radically flexible standard of proof, (...) instead defending a modestly flexible approach on non-consequentialist grounds. The system I defend is one on which we should impose a higher standard of proof for crimes that attract more severe punishments. This proposal, although apparently revisionary, accords with a plausible theory concerning the epistemology of legal judgments and the role they play in society. (shrink)

Although this article uses Obergefell v Hodges (2015) as its frame, it aims to bring out some distinctive features of Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence of dignity more broadly. There are two reasons why such an investigation is important. The first is important to those interested in the legal case. Indeed, in Dobbs v Jackson Women’s Health (2022), the Court now argues that the relevant ‘test’ for determining whether a right is protected under the Due Process Clause is whether the right is (...) found to be ‘deeply rooted’ in the nation’s history and tradition. This article aims to critique this decision, as well as originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation more broadly, and seeks to resurrect and reconstruct Kennedy’s jurisprudence of dignity that has undergirded (sometimes quietly) the expansion of civil rights protections to the LGBTQ+ community. The second reason this investigation is important is of interest to philosophers and legal historians. Dignity is a notoriously elusive concept, and much ink has been spilt trying to sort out the precise nature of its content and its boundaries. This article brings together the many (seemingly disparate) uses of dignity found across cases involving gay rights, abortion, and foreign sovereign immunity, and argues Kennedy effectively weaves these uses together in ways that may sharpen our understanding of dignity in both the philosophical and legal literatures. (shrink)

This paper advocates for a general policy of penal leniency: judges should often sentence offenders to a punishment less severe than initially preferred. The argument’s keystone is the relatively uncontroversial Minimal Invasion Principle (MIP). MIP says that when more than one course of action satisfies a state’s legitimate aim, only the least invasive is permissibly pursued. I contend that MIP applies in two common sentencing situations. In the first, all sentences within a statutorily specified range are equally proportionate. Here MIP (...) applies directly. In the second, judges reasonably believe that one of the sentences within the range is the most proportionate, but can’t identify it with any certainty. In these cases of sentencing uncertainty, judges must be indifferent between their preferred sentence and a softer one, and this indifference triggers MIP. MIP thus frequently mandates some degree of leniency. I conclude with some comments on statistical uncertainty. (shrink)

While some descriptive and normative theories of legislation account for an extensive role of legal interpretation in legislation, others see its legislative role as marginal. Yet in contemporary constitutional democracies, where legislation is limited and guided by constitutional norms, as well as international and supranational law, legal interpretation must play some role in legislation—even if all or most of legislative activity may not be adequately described and evaluated as legal interpretation. In this chapter, I aim to explore some implications of (...) recognizing the role of legal interpretation in legislation—notably, for the conceptualization and significance of legal expertise in the legislative process, as well as for determining the moral duties of legislative representatives. First, I argue that the role of legal interpretation in legislation calls for institutional reforms in legislatures in order to ensure that legal expertise is adequately channeled into the legislative process, including agenda-setting. Second, I argue that interpreting legal norms through legislation implies specific moral duties for legislative representatives, both in their relations to one another and in their relations vis-à-vis their constituents. I show that giving legal interpretation its due in a descriptive and normative account of legislative activity does not imply an elitist understanding of legislation, and it does not compromise our conception of legislatures as loci of political and moral disagreement and democratic representation. (shrink)

A legal fiction is a knowingly false assumption that is given effect in a legal proceeding and that participants are not permitted to disprove. I offer a semantic pretence theory that shows how fiction-involving legal reasoning works.

The case of Alta Fixsler, where a judge ruled that withdrawing life sustaining care was in her best interest rather than transferring her to Israel, as her parents wanted, is the latest in a series of controversial paediatric best interest decisions. Using this case, as well as some other recent cases, I argue that the UK exhibits a high degree of medico-legal paternalism in best interest decisions, even though paternalism seems to be ubiquitously negatively perceived in medical ethics. Firstly, I (...) explain what I mean by medico-legal paternalism and defend my claim that this phenomenon is present in the UK. I then argue that at least philosophically (rather than legally) such a situation is impossible to justify in a secular state and that how we treat paediatric best interest decisions is very different from other areas of medical law. Lastly, I discuss proposals that aim to rectify this situation. (shrink)

(OPEN ACCESS) This paper offers a novel substantive justification for mandatory electoral quotas—e.g., gender or racial quotas—and a new methodological approach to their justification. Substantively, I argue for a political egalitarian account of electoral quotas. Methodologically, based on this account and a political egalitarian grounding of political participatory rights, I offer an alternative to the External Restriction Approach to the justification of electoral quotas. The External Restriction Approach sees electoral quotas as at best justified restrictions on political participatory rights. I (...) argue for the Internal Restriction Approach instead, which can justify electoral quotas by specifying the pro tanto scope of political participatory rights rather than by justifying restrictions on the pro tanto scope of these rights. On this approach, adequately set electoral quotas do not even conflict with and are not balanced against political participatory rights, while electoral quotas—when justified—are pro tanto required rather than merely permitted. (shrink)

Judges decide cases by appeal to rules of general application they deem to be law. If a candidate rule resolves the case and is, ex ante and independently of the judge’s judgment, the law, then the judge has a legal obligation to declare it as such and follow it. That, at any rate, is conventional wisdom. Yet the principle is false – a rule’s being law or the judge’s believing it to be law is neither necessary nor even sufficient for (...) a judge being legally obliged to follow it. The principle’s falsity is especially apparent in so-called hard cases, where the line between legal and non-legal rules is obscure. Moreover, judges have authority to disregard law in hard cases not because moral obligations trump legal obligations. Rather, the law itself circumscribes its own authority. The implications for legal philosophy are significant; for one, a theory of juridical norms can be developed independently of the precise boundaries of legality. (shrink)

All observers of our legal system recognize that criminal statutes can be complex and obscure. But statutory obscurity often takes a particular form that most observers have overlooked: uncertainty about the identity of the wrong a statute aims to punish. It is not uncommon for parties to disagree about the identity of the underlying wrong even as they agree on the statute's elements. Hidden in plain sight, these unexamined disagreements underlie or exacerbate an assortment of familiar disputes—about venue, vagueness, and (...) mens rea; about DUI and statutory rape; about hate crimes, child pornography, and counterterrorism laws; about proportionality in punishment; and about the proper ambit of the criminal law. Each of these disputes may hinge on deeper disagreements about the identity of the wrong a statute aims to punish, and these deeper disagreements can be surprisingly hard to resolve, fueled as they are by the complex inner structure of our penal laws and the discretionary mechanisms of their administration. (shrink)

This paper addresses the phenomenon of judicial greatness by developing a general concept of greatness and applying it to law. Under the view offered in the paper, greatness is connected to theoretical or methodological diversification. When applied to adjudication, this means that great judges are revered because they successfully make a prima facie case for their novel adjudicative methods. This is not a judicial duty but rather a voluntary project. However, once a judge succeeds in making such a prima facie (...) case, he is exempt from other judicial duties. This thesis challenges many theories of judicial duty, which do not allow normative room for supererogatory actions in law. The paper demonstrates these claims by discussing two paradigmatic great judges – Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Holmes. (shrink)

This paper proposes an argumentation-based procedure for legal interpretation, by reinterpreting the traditional canons of textual interpretation in terms of argumentation schemes, which are then classified, formalized, and represented through argument visualization and evaluation tools. The problem of statutory interpretation is framed as one of weighing contested interpretations as pro and con arguments. The paper builds an interpretation procedure by formulating a set of argumentation schemes that can be used to comparatively evaluate the types of arguments used in cases of (...) contested statutory interpretation in law. A simplified version of the Carneades Argumentation System is applied in a case analysis showing how the procedure works. A logical model for statutory interpretation is finally presented, covering pro-tanto and all-things-considered interpretive conclusions. -/- . (shrink)

Ronald Dworkin once identified the basic question of jurisprudence as: ‘What, in general, is a good reason for a decision by a court of law?’ I argue that, over the course of his career, Dworkin gave an essentially sound answer to this question. In fact, he gave a correct answer to a broader question: ‘What is a good reason for a legal decision, generally?’ For judges, officials of executive and administrative agencies, lawyers, non-governmental organizations, and ordinary subjects acting in the (...) variety of legal contexts, Dworkin identified the proper basis for a legal decision, and its implications for the form of well-conducted legal reasoning. Dworkin's stance on the above questions can be characterised by two theses. I defend his view by substantiating each. The result is agnostic about the viability of other aspects of Dworkin's legal theory, as it focuses on the grounds of proper legal decision-making. Whatever the fate of his other philosophical views, Dworkin's jurisprudence includes a clear-heade... (shrink)

In recent years there has been a revival of interest in civic republicanism. In light of this revival, it is interesting to consider what sort of theory of legal or judicial adjudication such a doctrine—centered on the value of promoting freedom from domination—would recommend. After discussing the importance of such a theory and clarifying its relationship to broader questions of institutional design, it is argued that theories of adjudication should be assessed according to three criteria: first, their contribution to the (...) republican cause of promoting freedom from domination; second, their suitability to the characteristic features of legal systems; and third, their impact on long-run institutional stability. According to these criteria, a republican theory of adjudication would hold that judges and other legal officials should strive in their decisions and interpretations to maintain and enhance the distinctive value of the rule of law. (shrink)

Proportionality is one of the most important adjudicatory tools, in human rights decision-making, primarily employed to balance rights and interests. Despite this there is very little feminist analysis of its use by the courts. This article discusses the doctrine of proportionality and considers its amenability to feminist legal methods. It relies on theories of deliberative democracy to argue that the proportionality test can be applied in a manner that facilitates a more “interactive universalism”, allows for greater participation in decision-making and (...) enables the courts to be more attentive to the disadvantaged. The commonalities between proportionality and feminist theory are examined, and its contribution to developing and reconstituting a more relational and contextual concept of rights is explored. (shrink)

In 1987, apprehension that “unreasonable mistakes of fact” might negative mens rea in sexual assault cases led the Canadian Parliament to enact “reasonable steps” requirements for mistakes of fact with respect to the age of complainants. The role and operation of the “reasonable steps” provisions in ss. 150.1(4) and (5) and, to a lesser extent, s. 273.2 of the Criminal Code, must be reassessed. Mistakes of fact are now largely addressed at common law by jurisprudence that has re-invigorated judicial awareness (...) of the evidentiary requirements for the availability of defences at common law and explicitly defines “honest belief” as a belief that is neither reckless nor willfully blind. As a consequence of these common law developments, the defence of mistake of fact with respect to age is rarely available as a matter of law. Properly used, these common law analytic tools afford minors and under-age sex-workers better legal protection from sexual exploitation than has often been achieved in practice over the last 25 years with the “reasonable steps” requirement under ss. 150.1(4) and (5). -/- Socio-economic inequalities ensure that aboriginal children and youth are disproportionately affected by the non-enforcement, under-enforcement, and selective enforcement of laws enacted to protect minors against sexual assault and participation in sex work. Continued reliance by prosecutors and judges on out-moded jurisprudence in the screening, prosecution, and disposition of these cases in the criminal justice system reinforces existing patterns of inequality and disadvantage and violates basic principles of human rights. (shrink)

Introduction -- Practical reasons and judicial use of force -- Deviating from legal standards -- The legal duties of judges -- The normative classification of legal results -- Reasons to deviate -- Adherence rules -- Obeying adherence rules -- The judicial oath -- Legal duty and political obligation -- Systemic effects -- Agent-relative principles -- Optimal adherence rules -- Guidance rules -- Treating like cases alike -- Implementation -- Theoretical implications -- Conclusion.

Demystifying Legal Reasoning defends the proposition that there are no special forms of reasoning peculiar to law. Legal decision makers engage in the same modes of reasoning that all actors use in deciding what to do: open-ended moral reasoning, empirical reasoning, and deduction from authoritative rules. This book addresses common law reasoning when prior judicial decisions determine the law, and interpretation of texts. In both areas, the popular view that legal decision makers practise special forms of reasoning is false.

Offers analysis of MacCormick's positivistic account of legal reasoning, partially in response to Dworkin's claim that positivism is inadequate as a theory of law because it cannot account for the nature of legal reasoning. Having analyzed MacCormick's theory and having applied it to some cases, we are now ready to evaluate it. My conclusion is that inmany cases MacCormick's theory can indeed give the judge the kind of concrete guidance he needs when with a hard case. The reason why MacCormick's (...) theory is successful in this regard is that it offers the judge a reasonably firm ranking of the interpretive arguments, and that it is rather easy to understand and apply. The former circumstance is of course important - unless we rank the interpretive arguments, the theory simply will not be able to give the judge any guid ance at all. But the latter circumstance is also cause itmeans that judges will be able to apply the theory even be though they may lack a deep understanding of the relevant field of substantive law. Judges, as is well known, are usually gen eralists, not experts in any particular field. So unlike Ronald Dworkin's subtle and intriguing theory of adjudication,80 MacCormick's theory might actually be applied by real judges in any jurisdiction. This must be considered quite an advantage. To be sure, applying MacCormick's theory to a concrete case is not always easy. But the difficulties we have encountered in applying the theory have been difficulties that would create problems for any theory of legal reasoning. Moreover, with one these difficulties can be handled within the frame work of the theory as it stands. For example, the problem of choosing between a technical and an ordinary version of plain exception which we encountered in the Boxer case, can in most cases be solved by reference to the value that underlies the textual approach, namely predictability. The problem about intentionalist arguments, which we encountered in the case of the Statutory Share, can be solved by simply adding the cate gory of intentionalist arguments toMacCormick's typology of interpretive arguments, or perhaps by placing intentionalist arguments in the category of textual arguments.81 The problem of linguistic indeterminacy, however, which we encountered in theWeber ase, appears to be more or less impossible to solve. If and to the extent that the words that occur in the statute are vague or ambiguous - in their ordinary or in their technical meaning, or in both - the value of the textual approach is clearly reduced. The judge must then proceed to consider systemic and teleological arguments in that order. (shrink)

In the course of that critical study he discusses the work of many of the most influential lawyers and philosophers of the era, including Isaiah Berlin, Richard ...

It can be compatible with justice and the rule of law for a court to impose new legal liabilities retrospectively on a defendant. But judges do not need to distinguish between imposing a new liability, and giving effect to a liability that the defendant had at the time of the events in dispute. The distinction is to be drawn by asking which of the court's reasons for decision the institutions of the legal system had already committed the courts to act (...) upon, before the time of decision. I explain these conclusions through an assessment of the last episode in the debate between H.L.A.Hart and Ronald Dworkin. (shrink)

When faced with a dispute concerning how a given legal provision (whether constitutional or statutory) applies to a particular set of facts, how should a judge proceed? It is commonplace to say that, in the first instance, she should look to the meanings of the words that constitute the provision itself. If she is lucky, then the relevant meanings are clear; and if the facts are not in dispute, then the resolution is obvious. Unfortunately.

Tom Campbell is well known for his distinctive contributions to legal and political philosophy over three decades. In emphasising the moral and political importance of taking a positivist approach to law and rights, he has challenged current academic orthodoxies and made a powerful case for regaining and retaining democratic control over the content and development of human rights. This collection of his essays reaches back to his pioneering work on socialist rights in the 1980s and forward from his seminal book, (...) The Legal Theory of Ethical Positivism (1996). An introductory essay provides an historical overview of Professor Campbell's work and argues for the continuing importance of 'democratic positivism' at a time when it is again becoming clear that courts are ineffective protectors of human rights. (shrink)

Ronald Dworkin’s Freedom’s Law offers a solution to a thorny problem in American constitutional law. He argues that the authority of the American Supreme Court to make the final determination on constitutional questions is consistent with democratic principles. In this paper, I try to show that his solution is unsatisfactory because it permits the possibility of a judicial usurpation of authority that is inconsistent with his characterization of democratic principles. Freedom’s Law is also a bold attempt to offer prescriptions for (...) constitutional democracies generally. By drawing a distinction between two concepts of authority, I object to this effort. I argue that Dworkin’s analysis assumes the operation of a conception of authority that I label the pyramid model. I also introduce a bipolar model of authority and try to show its application to the Canadian constitutional scheme. On this basis, I conclude that his prescriptions are relevant only for a portion of the spectrum of constitutional democracies. (shrink)

In fundamental rights adjudication, should judges defer to the judgment of other decision makers? How can they defer, without betraying the respect that judges ought to accord those rights? How can they refuse to defer, without betraying the respect that judges ought to accord to other decision makers? I argue that only principles of comity justify deference, and their reach is limited. Comity never forbids the judges to take and to act upon a different view of fundamental rights from that (...) of another decision maker. I elaborate this view by reference to the decision of the House of Lords in Adan and Aitseguer [2001] 1 All ER 593. (shrink)

Rules proliferate; some are kept with a bureaucratic stringency bordering on the absurd, while others are manipulated and ignored in ways that injure our sense of justice. Under what conditions should we make exceptions to rules, and when should they be followed despite particular circumstances? The two dominant models in the literature on rules are the particularist account and that which sees the application of rules as normative. Taking a position that falls between these two extremes, Alan Goldman provides a (...) systematic framework to clarify when we need to follow rules in our moral, legal and prudential decisions, and when we ought not to do so. The book distinguishes among various types of rules; it illuminates concepts such as integrity, self-interest and self-deception; and finally, it provides an account of ordinary moral reasoning without rules. This book will be of great interest to advanced students and professionals working in philosophy, law, decision theory and the social sciences. (shrink)

The adversary professions--law, business, and government, among others--typically claim a moral permission to violate persons in ways that, if not for the professional role, would be morally wrong. Lawyers advance bad ends and deceive, business managers exploit and despoil, public officials enforce unjust laws, and doctors keep confidences that, if disclosed, would prevent harm. Ethics for Adversaries is a philosophical inquiry into arguments that are offered to defend seemingly wrongful actions performed by those who occupy what Montaigne called "necessary offices."Applbaum (...) begins by examining the career of Charles-Henri Sanson, who is appointed executioner of Paris by Louis XVI and serves the punitive needs of the ancien régime for decades. Come the French Revolution, the King's Executioner becomes the king's executioner, and he ministers with professional detachment to each defeated political faction throughout the Terror and its aftermath. By exploring one extraordinary role and the arguments that can be offered in its defense, Applbaum raises unsettling doubts about arguments in defense of less sanguinary professions and their practices.To justify harmful acts, adversaries appeal to arguments about the rules of the game, fair play, consent, the social construction of actions and actors, good outcomes in equilibrium, and the legitimate authority of institutions. Applbaum concludes that these arguments are weaker than supposed and do not morally justify much of the violation that professionals and public officials inflict. Institutions and the roles they create ordinarily cannot mint moral permissions to do what otherwise would be morally prohibited. (shrink)

The main argument of this paper is that there are reasons for judges not only to evaluate the substantive merit of legislation, but to advert to the fact that the place of elected legislatures in our scheme of government gives legislation a standing, an entitlement to consideration, that may go beyond judicial estimates of its intrinsic merit.

"The main argument of this paper is that there are reasons for judges not only to evaluate the substantive merit of legislation, but to advert to the fact that the place of elected legislatures in our scheme of government gives legislation a standing, an entitlement to consideration, that may go beyond judicial estimates of its intrinsic merit." [Is this just a statement of procedural legitimacy?] "To answer the question [of who assigns rights], courts must take a view as to the (...) proper role of courts vis-a-vis legislatures; they must take a view about the allocation of power in our legal/political system. In drawing this line, courts can take one of two approaches. First, they can make decisions solely on the basis of considerations internal to the relevant clauses of the Constitution, perhaps by giving them a moral reading. Second, they can include in their thinking institutional considerations regarding the role of popular decision-making bodies in our governmental structure." Claims that Dworkin advocates the first [which is false], and that we should accept the second, which is advocated by advocates of judicial restraint. It is appropriate for a judge to give weight to the fact that a decision was reached by a legislature. "Specifically, I think it appropriate that courts presume the constitutionality of such laws, understanding that their own role demands that they overturn them if they are not merely different from what the judges might have decided on their own, but are beyond acceptability." Reasons for the presumption of constitutionality: value of compromise, allocation of power ), appropriateness of humility, integrity and community. (shrink)

No community fully achieves the ideal of the rule of law. Puzzles about the content of the ideal seem to make it necessarily unattainable (and, therefore, an incoherent ideal). Legal systems necessarily contain vague laws. They typically allow for change in the law, they typically provide for unreviewable official decisions, and they never regulate every aspect of the life of a community. It may seem that the ideal can never be achieved because of these features of legal practice. But I (...) ask what counts as a ‘deficit’ in the rule of law, and I argue that none of these features of legal practice necessarily amounts to a deficit. I conclude that communities fail to achieve the rule of law only because of official infidelity to law, and the failure of lawmakers to pursue the ideal (or their decision not to pursue it). The rule of law is not necessarily unattainable. (shrink)

The articles in this volume consider at what stage of legal reasoning should a judge or lawyer make specifically moral judgments.

American criminal law reflects the absence of any general duty of Good Samaritanism. Nonetheless, there are some circumstances in which it imposes affirmative duties to aid others. In those circumstances, however, the duty to aid is canceled whenever aiding subjects the actor to a certain level of risk or sacrifice, a level that can be less than the risk or sacrifice faced by the beneficiary if not aided. In this article, I demonstrate that this approach to limiting affirmative duties to (...) aid encounters the same problem of moral arbitrariness as does a moral catastrophe override of deontological side-constraints. (shrink)

The most glamorous and even glorious moments in a legal system come when a high court recognizes an abstract principle involving, for example, human liberty or equality. Indeed, Americans, and not a few non-Americans, have been greatly stirred--and divided--by the opinions of the Supreme Court, especially in the area of race relations, where the Court has tried to revolutionize American society. But these stirring decisions are aberrations, says Cass R. Sunstein, and perhaps thankfully so. In Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, (...) Sunstein, one of America's best known commentators on our legal system, offers a bold, new thesis about how the law should work in America, arguing that the courts best enable people to live together, despite their diversity, by resolving particular cases without taking sides in broader, more abstract conflicts. Sunstein offers a close analysis of the way the law can mediate disputes in a diverse society, examining how the law works in practical terms, and showing that, to arrive at workable, practical solutions, judges must avoid broad, abstract reasoning. Why? For one thing, critics and adversaries who would never agree on fundamental ideals are often willing to accept the concrete details of a particular decision. Likewise, a plea bargain for someone caught exceeding the speed limit need not--indeed, must not--delve into sweeping issues of government regulation and personal liberty. Thus judges purposely limit the scope of their decisions to avoid reopening large-scale controversies. Sunstein calls such actions incompletely theorized agreements. In identifying them as the core feature of legal reasoning--and as a central part of constitutional thinking in America, South Africa, and Eastern Europe-- he takes issue with advocates of comprehensive theories and systemization, from Robert Bork to Jeremy Bentham, the father of utilitarianism, and Ronald Dworkin, who defends an ambitious role for courts in the elaboration of rights. Equally important, Sunstein goes on to argue that it is the living practice of the nation's citizens that truly makes law. For example, he cites Griswold v. Connecticut, a groundbreaking case in which the Supreme Court struck down Connecticut's restrictions on the use of contraceptives by married couples--a law that was no longer enforced by prosecutors. In overturning the legislation, the Court invoked the abstract right of privacy; the author asserts that the justices should have appealed to the narrower principle that citizens need not comply with laws that lack real enforcement. By avoiding large-scale issues and values, such a decision could have led to a different outcome in Bowers v. Hardwick, the decision that upheld Georgia's rarely prosecuted ban on sodomy. And by pointing to the need for flexibility over time and circumstances, Sunstein offers a novel understanding of the old ideal of the rule of law. Legal reasoning can seem impenetrable, mysterious, baroque. This book helps dissolve the mystery. Whether discussing the interpretation of the Constitution or the spell cast by the revolutionary Warren Court, Cass Sunstein writes with grace and power, offering a striking and original vision of the role of the law in a diverse society. In his flexible, practical approach to legal reasoning, he moves the debate over fundamental values and principles out of the courts and back to its rightful place in a democratic state: the legislatures elected by the people. (shrink)

The most glamorous and even glorious moments in a legal system come when a high court recognizes an abstract principle involving, for example, human liberty or equality. Indeed, Americans, and not a few non-Americans, have been greatly stirred--and divided--by the opinions of the Supreme Court, especially in the area of race relations, where the Court has tried to revolutionize American society. But these stirring decisions are aberrations, says Cass R. Sunstein, and perhaps thankfully so. In Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, (...) Sunstein, one of America's best known commentators on our legal system, offers a bold, new thesis about how the law should work in America, arguing that the courts best enable people to live together, despite their diversity, by resolving particular cases without taking sides in broader, more abstract conflicts. Sunstein offers a close analysis of the way the law can mediate disputes in a diverse society, examining how the law works in practical terms, and showing that, to arrive at workable, practical solutions, judges must avoid broad, abstract reasoning. Why? For one thing, critics and adversaries who would never agree on fundamental ideals are often willing to accept the concrete details of a particular decision. Likewise, a plea bargain for someone caught exceeding the speed limit need not--indeed, must not--delve into sweeping issues of government regulation and personal liberty. Thus judges purposely limit the scope of their decisions to avoid reopening large-scale controversies. Sunstein calls such actions incompletely theorized agreements. In identifying them as the core feature of legal reasoning--and as a central part of constitutional thinking in America, South Africa, and Eastern Europe-- he takes issue with advocates of comprehensive theories and systemization, from Robert Bork to Jeremy Bentham, the father of utilitarianism, and Ronald Dworkin, who defends an ambitious role for courts in the elaboration of rights. Equally important, Sunstein goes on to argue that it is the living practice of the nation's citizens that truly makes law. For example, he cites Griswold v. Connecticut, a groundbreaking case in which the Supreme Court struck down Connecticut's restrictions on the use of contraceptives by married couples--a law that was no longer enforced by prosecutors. In overturning the legislation, the Court invoked the abstract right of privacy; the author asserts that the justices should have appealed to the narrower principle that citizens need not comply with laws that lack real enforcement. By avoiding large-scale issues and values, such a decision could have led to a different outcome in Bowers v. Hardwick, the decision that upheld Georgia's rarely prosecuted ban on sodomy. And by pointing to the need for flexibility over time and circumstances, Sunstein offers a novel understanding of the old ideal of the rule of law. Legal reasoning can seem impenetrable, mysterious, baroque. This book helps dissolve the mystery. Whether discussing the interpretation of the Constitution or the spell cast by the revolutionary Warren Court, Cass Sunstein writes with grace and power, offering a striking and original vision of the role of the law in a diverse society. In his flexible, practical approach to legal reasoning, he moves the debate over fundamental values and principles out of the courts and back to its rightful place in a democratic state: the legislatures elected by the people. (shrink)

In his paper "Role Obligations," Michael Hardimon defends an account of the nature and justification of institutional obligations that he takes to be clearly superior to the "standard" voluntarist view. Hardimon argues that this standard view presents a "misleading and distorted" picture of role obligations (and of morality generally); and in its best form he claims this view still "leaves out" of its understanding of even contractual role obligations an "absolutely vital factor". I argue against Hardimon that a related version (...) of this "standard view" of institutional obligations is "standard" for a very good reason - namely, that it is true. (shrink)

Throughout, the book is unified by Posner's distinctive stance, which is pragmatist in philosophy, economic in methodology, and liberal (in the sense of John ...

Argues that role obligations are not marginal, "that they are central to morality and should be taken seriously." "A 'role obligation' is a moral requirement, which attaches to an institutional role, whose content is fixed by the function of the role, and whose normative force flows from the role." Rejects what he calls the doctrine of perfect adequacy which holds that role obligations are both comprehensive and transparent. Although this may have been plausible at earlier times, it is clearly implausible (...) now. It is the implausibility of this doctrine which has led theorists to accept the standard view: which holds that role obligations that are noncontractual are extremely problematic. Once we reject the doctrine of perfect adequacy, however, we can see the significance of role obligations more clearly. [The content of role obligations, Hardimon admits, is indeterminate in the sense that it is subject to constructive interpretation. This suggests, however, that the obligations are not the source of their normative power, rather it is their justifying value which explains why some role requirements are obligatory. This is confirmed by the rest of the article.] One thing that should lead us to question the notion that we do not have obligations of this sort by considering what it would be like to have no noncontractual role obligations. [This, however, does not establish that the force of role obligations flows from the obligations themselves.] One objection to NCR obligations is that they may require acting in accordance with an unjust institution. However, the solution here is the same as with contractual obligations: unjust institutions and contracts do not bind. Moves on to identity. "What I am assuming is that most of us do at least tacitly conceive of ourselves as family members and citizens, that these self-understandings are central to our own general self-conception, and that we can, through reflection come to recognize that we do in fact conceive of ourselves in these ways. If this is correct, then abandoning the idea that we have noncontractual role obligations would require radical revision of our self-conception, for we cannot give up the idea of nonctractual role obligation without also ceasing to conceive of ourselves as family members and citizens. What, after all, would it mean to say that we conceive of ourselves as family members but regard oursleves as having no familial obligations whatsoever?...The upshot of the last two paragraphs is that the cost of abandoning our conception of ourselves as family members and citizens would be enormous." [The moral significance of identity is unclear here - is the only normative element loss of identity with rejection of role obligations? What of the case when one's identity is caught up in a role which requires one to act immorally in other ways?] If impressment is our concern, it shouldn't be, for role obligations are not like impressment - one is born into them, not impressed [how does this make a difference?]. Role must be reflectively acceptable to produce genuine obligations. "Determining whether a given social role is reflectively acceptable involves stepping back from that role in thought and asking whether it is a role people ought to occupy and play. Determining that a given social role is reflectively acceptable involves judging that it is meaningful, rational, or good." [Hence, some independent value is going to do all the work for role obligations - the normative force of a role does not flow from the role itself.] Concerning voluntary roles - even if we agree that voluntary acceptance is essential, this omits important elements of role identification. "The key component of the idea of identifying with a role is that of conceiving of oneself as someone for whom the norms, that is, the evaluative standards associated with a role, its rights, duties, virtues, ideals, and supererogations, have reason-giving force. Here is the idea. If you identify with a role, its norms will function for you as reasons. If you are a judge who identifies with the role of judge, the fact that this is something judges do will give you a reason for doing it." [Clearly a non-sequiter - conceiving of oneself as having a reason does not give oneself a reason for doing - there must actually be a reason for doing something. Moreover, the content of the role may be in question - and here we are to engage in constructive interpretation, which is just to say that we are to identify some underlying value and this will serve to justify and determine the content of the role. Refers to usage of "look, its your job" as basis for substantiating claims about the normative force of identity. "But here a basic point of similarity emerges between contractual and noncontractual role obligations. People can and do identify with their noncontractual roles and not just with their contractual roles. And when they do, assuming that the appropriate background moral conditions are in place, the fact taht they occupy these roles will provide them with reasons for carrying out the tasks of their noncontractual roles...The basic form of motivation provided by identification with contractual and noncontractual role obligations is the same.". (shrink)

Compares formalism and instrumentalism and evaluates their general claims. “Part of what is meant by formalism is this: The law provides sufficient basis for deciding any case that arises. There are no “gaps” within the law, and there is but one sound legal decision for each case.” The formalist also holds that law is traceable to an authoritative source. “…sound legal decisions can be justified as the conclusions of valid deductive syllogisms. Because law is believed to be complete and univocal, (...) all cases that arise can in principle be decided in this way. This is the formalistic model for legal justifications.” Moderate instrumentalism also accepts the notion that the law has sources and that past political events can determine what the law is for the future. However, they also maintain that the law has gaps. “Moderate instrumentalists and positivists alike embrace a source-based conception of the law as well as a formalistic model for legal justification; partly because of this combination, they reject the formalistic notion that law is complete and univocal. Instrumentalists, like positivists, emphasize that because the interpretation of authoritative legal texts and their application to cases are often controversial, reasonable arguments are often possible on both sides of a legal issue. Since there are no hard and fast rules for adjudicating such disputes, positivists conclude that law in such cases is indeterminate – not yet fully formed, needing judicial legislation. Instrumentalists most likely have a similar view of the law. They assume that law is determinate on an issue at a given time only if its identification and application are, roughly speaking, mechanical.” [Must keep in mind the distinction between determinate and conclusive.] “The instrumentalists make the decisive assumption that law is not determinate if it is controversial, for law is thought to be gappy and indeterminate only when reasonable legal arguments are possible on both sides of a legal question…This reasoning exposes a more fundamental assumption of formalism, instrumentalism, and positivism: Nondeductive reasoning is incapable of adequately establishing any conclusion.” This, though, is a radical thesis given that all scientific hypotheses are unproven deductively. [But it might be a claim restricted to legal reasoning. Moreover, it seems legitimate to wonder whether legal reasoning is really comparable to offering scientific hypotheses.] We should, however, reject the mechanistic model of legal and judicial reasoning that assumes a given major premise captured in authoritative legal texts that deductively produces conclusions in a situation to which a law applies. Take a law that requires some activity to be “economically efficient” but fails to specify economic efficiency. The text assumes that there is such a thing as economic efficiency, that some activities are so efficient and others not, that some judgments about economic efficiency are true and others false, and that the criteria of efficiency are determinable in principle. “[I]f there really are reasons for preferring one conception of economic efficiency to others in a given context, the assumption of the law in question would be true; if the court correctly identifies and applies that conception, it is simply carrying out its legal mandate. It would be faithful to the text, but it would not be limited to the four corners of the text and its literal implications.” Thus, a judge may employ non-mechanical reasoning in arriving at the meaning of legal requirements such as economic efficiency. Moral reasons are constitutive of the law. A judge must, in deciding the appropriate conc ption of economic efficiency, offer reasons for preferring that conception in the given context. (shrink)