Sophie de Grouchy

This article analyses Adam Smith's and Sophie de Grouchy's accounts of sympathy to show how they arrive at strikingly different views on whether inequality is a threat to, or precondition of, social order. Where many scholars have recently sought to recover Smith's egalitarianism, I instead focus on how his account of sympathy in The Theory of Moral Sentiments naturalises socioeconomic inequalities, while also highlighting the wider inegalitarian implications of his analysis. I demonstrate that Grouchy was alert to these implications and (...) reveal how her own account of sympathy challenges the moral psychology underlying Smith's position on inequality. By reconstructing Grouchy's response to Smith, I illustrate how retrieving the insights of long‐overlooked thinkers can reorient the way we understand key debates in the history of philosophy, since Grouchy was far more concerned than Smith with exposing how economic inequality imperils the prospects of relating to one another as equals. (shrink)

This paper looks at selected reviews of women’s philosophical (and literary) works by Revolutionary author and politician Pierre-Louis Roederer. This study occasions the following remarks. Women’s works, when they raised political radical and sometimes feminist agendas were not only read and reviewed, but considered part of the general Revolutionary effort to relieve social and political inequalities. Secondly Roederer appears, from these reviews, as committed to convincing the French intellectual community that works by women ought to be taken as seriously as (...) works by men, and to combat the prejudices which meant that they often were not. I will highlight in particular his reading of Mary Wollstonecraft’s Maria, or the Wrongs of Woman as both a fictionalized continuation of the philosophical programme of her Vindication of the Rights of Woman, and as a contribution to the philosophy of emotions – for which he compares it to Sophie de Grouchy’s Letters on Sympathy. I will also look at an unpublished draft in which he compares and contrasts Grouchy, Germaine de Staël, Emilie du Chatelet and Suzanne Necker’s writings on love. (shrink)

This book provides a framework for thinking about foundational philosophical questions surrounding machine learning as an approach to artificial intelligence. Specifically, it links recent breakthroughs in deep learning to classical empiricist philosophy of mind. In recent assessments of deep learning's current capabilities and future potential, prominent scientists have cited historical figures from the perennial philosophical debate between nativism and empiricism, which primarily concerns the origins of abstract knowledge. These empiricists were generally faculty psychologists; that is, they argued that the active (...) engagement of general psychological faculties-such as perception, memory, imagination, attention, and empathy-enables rational agents to extract abstract knowledge from sensory experience. This book explains a number of recent attempts to model roles attributed to these faculties in deep neural network based artificial agents by appeal to the faculty psychology of philosophers such as Aristotle, Ibn Sina (Avicenna), John Locke David Hume, William James, and Sophie de Grouchy. It illustrates the utility of this interdisciplinary connection by showing how it can provide benefits to both philosophy and computer science: computer scientists can continue to mine the history of philosophy for ideas and aspirational targets to hit on the way to more robustly rational artificial agents, and philosophers can see how some of the historical empiricists' most ambitious speculations can be realized in specific computational systems. (shrink)

In this article, I consider Grouchy's critique of economic inequality and her proposed solution to what she perceives as this grave social ill. On her view, economic inequality chips away at the bonds of accountability in society and prevents people from seeing one another as moral equals. As a step toward restoring these bonds between people, Grouchy argues that: first, we should expand property ownership, thereby giving each person a stake in the community; second, we should ensure access to education (...) and redirect its aims, to provide people with the necessary tools to reason about the common good. In so doing, Grouchy claims, we can reawaken the sense of accountability that people have to one another in community. (shrink)

This chapter explores the place of remorse in Sophie de Grouchy’s moral theory, as presented in her 1798 work, Letters on Sympathy, which was originally published with her translation of Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. I argue that, for Grouchy, a cultivated sense of remorse weakens our self-conceit by drawing our attention to the ways in which we harm others, even for seemingly justifiable reasons. In so doing, we are led to recognize the equal standing of others, which gives (...) rise to the “sentiment of natural equality.” This “sentiment of natural equality” places a check on our norms and institutions and allows for the potential of moral progress. While Grouchy frames the Letters as a commentary on Smith’s writings, her discussion of remorse, equality, and moral progress shows her to be a bold and original thinker, and one worth taking seriously. (shrink)

Every edition of the French translation of Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments published between 1798 and 1981 was accompanied by the Letters on Sympathy: the philosophical text of Smith’s French translator and interlocutor, Sophie de Grouchy (1763–1822). Grouchy declared that she intended to massage the message delivered in TMS for a French audience. Yet there has been little attempt to analyse the political motivations for the changes she made to Smith’s theory. This chapter describes two key critiques that Grouchy (...) made of TMS: her rejection of the impartial spectator and her attack on hierarchy. Based on a redating of the drafting of the Letters to the mid-1780s, it argues that Grouchy focused on these elements due to two parallel contexts: her desire to write an educational treatise for an Académie française competition, and her involvement in an ancien régime legal scandal. After exploring how Grouchy constructed an Epicurean and egalitarian theory which she saw as better suited to these contemporary demands, the chapter concludes by arguing that seeing Grouchy as an “activist commentator” on Smith leads us to re-interpret the reception of his TMS in France. (shrink)

Joan Scott, dans son texte fondateur sur le féminisme dans la Révolution française, a écrit sur la position « paradoxale » dans laquelle la nouvelle définition, exclusivement masculine, de la citoyenneté a placé les femmes qui cherchaient à s’intégrer dans la sphère politique. Selon elle, les femmes étaient contraintes soit de nier leur différence avec les hommes, soit d’affirmer leur féminité et de saper ainsi leur cause. Cet article soutient qu’il existait cependant une troisième manière, tout aussi paradoxale, mais potentiellement (...) plus efficace, pour les femmes politiques de cette période, de défendre leur inclusion dans la sphère politique. Il s’agit du refus de s’engager dans le sujet. Je suggère que, dans certains contextes, un silence presque total sur le sujet des femmes pourrait en soi être un argument politique puissant. S’appuyant sur des études contemporaines sur le genre et le développement, ainsi que sur l’exemple de Sophie de Grouchy (1763-1822), actrice politique pendant la Révolution française et épouse de Condorcet, lui-même défenseur des droits des femmes, cet article interroge l’importance des silences dans l’histoire intellectuelle. En construisant une méthodologie provisoire pour lire ces omissions, je soutiens que cela est essentiel pour l’évolution de l’histoire du féminisme. (shrink)

Telling the story of three overlooked revolutionary thinkers, Liberty in Their Names explores the lives and works of Olympe de Gouges, Sophie de Grouchy and Manon Roland. All three were thinking and writing about political philosophy, especially equality and social justice, before the French Revolution. As they became engaged in its efforts, their political writing became more urgent. At a time when women could neither vote nor speak at the Assembly, they became influential through their writings. Yet instead of Gouges, (...) Grouchy and Roland, we speak of Voltaire, Rousseau and Diderot. -/- Sandrine Bergès examines the lives and writings of these trailblazing women philosophers, and their impact on philosophical thought during the French Revolution. Featuring pictures, a timeline and a bibliography of their works, this book offers exciting new insights into the history of political philosophy and of the French Revolution. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present a comparative analysis and reconstruction of the approach to social, moral, and institutional change in the theories of Adam Smith and Sophie de Grouchy. In their theories moral philosophy is inextricably linked with social thought. I also discuss the role of education and institutions in such a process. I argue that Smith's and de Grouchy's understanding of the roles of sympathy and institutions are strictly connected to the way they perceive the process (...) of social change. Both philosophers considered people as equals and equally capable of sympathizing with others. For both of them, sympathy is a key element in reconstructing how societies change. In my opinion, both these philosophers believe that such a change can be induced: in the case of de Grouchy, this would be done primarily by legislators. In the case of Smith, respected people are capable of initiating change and are subsequently followed by others. (shrink)

Sophie de Grouchy is known to the public for her highly appreciated French translation of the Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) by Adam Smith (1794) and for her publication of the Letters on Sympathy (1798). This article aims to reconstruct Sophie de Grouchy’s criticism of TMS and to show that it is based on a misinterpretation of Smith’s concept of sympathy. In her interpretation, Sophie de Grouchy seems to decontextualise the category of sympathy from the whole of the Scottish thinker’s (...) vision on this topic, adopting an interpretative canon that is strongly influenced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s thought. (shrink)

In Sandrine Bergès’s article ‘Revolution and Republicanism: Women Political Philosophers of Late Eighteenth-Century France and Why They Matter’ [2021], neo-Athenian and neo-Roman principles of republicanism are fused in order to show the idiosyncratic political position of Olympe de Gouges, Marie-Jeanne Phlipon Roland, and Sophie de Grouchy. As Bergès acknowledges, this amalgamation renders possible republican readings of women’s writings which so far have not been regarded as republican. Through my reading of Germaine de Staël and Mary Wollstonecraft, my aim will be (...) to show how Staël and Wollstonecraft embody the principles that Bergès highlights, but also venture into other areas tied to republican thinking that Bergès leaves untouched: religion and progress. Wollstonecraft and Staël both tie Christianity closely to their republicanism, maintaining that a future republican state will come through divine intervention. In this way, I hope to add complexity to Bergès’s project by expanding our knowledge of female republicans. (shrink)

In this article, I present the arguments of three republican women philosophers of eighteenth-century France, focusing especially on two themes: equality (of class, gender, and race) and the family. I argue that these philosophers, Olympe de Gouges, Marie-Jeanne Phlipon Roland, and Sophie de Grouchy, who are interesting and original in their own right, belong to the neo-republican tradition and that re-discovering their texts is an opportunity to reflect on women’s perspectives on the ideas that shaped our current political thought.

While agreeing with Bergès on the importance for philosophy of reading the works of women such as Roland, Gouges, and Grouchy, her account of them as committed to the concept of liberty as non-domination, articulated by Philip Pettit, is questioned. It is argued that their views are more accurately described as involving a commitment to the tradition of positive liberty, that was criticised by Berlin in his famous essay ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’. The republican writings of Catharine Macaulay are shown (...) to be part of the context in which these women wrote, and similarities between her philosophical outlook, which involves a clear commitment to positive liberty, and the positions developed by the French authors are explored. It is argued that, in general, it is methodologically problematic to uncritically apply concepts that were developed by intellectual historians who failed to include works written by women in their histories, in order to understand the philosophical commitments of neglected works by such women. (shrink)

This article offers an analysis of Sophie de Grouchy’s Letters on Sympathy [1798]. The focus is on the republican implications of her views on sympathy, with comparisons to Adam Smith and Mary Wollstonecraft. Critical attention is paid to claims made on de Grouchy’s behalf that her philosophy is republican and that she offers republican arguments for gender and class equality. These claims are made by Sandrine Bergès [2021] in ‘Revolution and Republicanism: Women Political Philosophers of Late Eighteenth-Century France and Why (...) They Matter’ to which this paper is an invited commentary. This paper does not dispute that de Grouchy’s thought is republican but concludes (1) that her Letters are conspicuously silent on women’s citizenship rights and that the gendered conceptual world of republican thought can account for that, and (2) that any commitment to equality of wealth is negated by her definition of property rights. Since gender and class equality would have been a subversion rather than an application of late eighteenth-century republican thought, this makes de Grouchy a more recognisable republican than Wollstonecraft, whose philosophy explicitly included a commitment to equality of wealth and equal citizenship rights for women. (shrink)

This paper explains Sophie de Grouchy’s philosophical debts to Adam Smith. I have three main reasons for this: first, it should explain why eighteenth-century philosophical feminists found Smith, who has—to put it mildly—not been a focus of much recent feminist admiration, a congenial starting point for their own thinking; second, it illuminates De Grouchy’s considerable philosophical originality, especially her important, overlooked contributions to political theory; third, it is designed to remove some unfortunate misconceptions that have found their way into Karin (...) Brown’s ‘Introduction’ to the recent and much-to-be-welcomed translation of Sophie de Grouchy’s Lettres Sur La Sympathie. While Brown claims that there are major ‘differences’ in their programs of ‘social reform’, I argue there are important commonalities between Smith and De Grouchy. In particular, I highlight how they share a common understanding of how human sensibilities are shaped by social institutions and I show that De Grouchy’s path-breaking analysis of negative and positive liberty is grounded in her extension of Smith’s political theory and moral psychology. (shrink)

This paper argues that the republican ideal of non-domination, central in Bergès’s paper, rests on affective conditions that often go unnoticed. In this context, I introduce the notion of affective independence to shed light on the affects akin to the spirit of socio-economic and political independence in between aristocratic pretentiousness and vanity on the one hand and servility towards superiors on the other. In the Letters on Sympathy, Sophie de Grouchy dismisses Adam Smith’s key notion of propriety and thoroughly rejects (...) deferential manners. Her critical gaze cuts even deeper. Anticipating critiques of democratic demagoguery, she reclaims the early modern notion of enthusiasm, linked to religious fanaticism, to account for uncritical admiration towards populist leaders. (shrink)

István Hont identified a point in the history of political thought at which republicanism and commercialism became separated. According to Hont, Emmanuel Sieyès proposed that a monarchical republic should be formed. By contrast the Jacobins, in favour of a republic led by the people, rejected not only Sieyès’s political proposal, but also the economic ideology that went with it. Sieyès was in favour of a commercial republic; the Jacobins were not. This was, according to Hont, a defining moment in the (...) history of political thought. In this article, I offer a different analysis of that particular moment in the history of the commercial republic, one that instead of focusing on Sieyès and the Jacobins, looks at the thought of Girondins philosophers Nicolas de Condorcet and Sophie de Grouchy. I argue that their arguments provide sound models for a commercial republic, reconciling late 18th century republican ideals in which virtue was central, with the need for a flourishing and internationally active market economy. (shrink)

Proponents of care ethics tend to reject the ideals of historical republicanism and the enlightenment because they do not take into account the centrality of the roles played by carers or caregivers in society. Furthermore this is irremediable because of enlightenment’s prizing of reason over and above emotions and of independence over relationships. In this paper I argue that such a wholesale rejection is misguided because it is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the ideals of enlightenment and republicanism which (...) did value both the emotions and relationships. I focus on the example of one feminist republican writer of the eighteenth century, Sophie de Grouchy, and argue that her response to Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, the Letters on Sympathy provide a model for a feminist republican social reform. I discuss de Grouchy’s arguments on the relationship between sympathy and morality, and on the kind of social and political reforms which are needed in order to ensure that sympathy can operate freely as a regulator of human interactions. I also show how her claim that sympathy originates in the first human relationships, namely between a child and the woman who feeds them means that in this republican account, mothering is identified as central to the well-functioning of human society. (shrink)

I examine some of the evidence for collaboration between Condorcet and Sophie de Grouchy on the writing of the Sketch of Human Progress, but also uncover the ways in which the publication and reception of that text worked to exclude a woman who was a philosopher in her own right from a work she clearly contributed to. I show that at least one passage that was added in the 1795 edition makes the work philosophically more interesting.

What can a woman from 18th Century in France do to get published? That is a question which women philosophers who were involved in politics in the revolutionary era were obliged to ask themselves. Contributing to political debates might have a beneficial effect on the status of women in the society of the future. But who would want to invest money to promulgate the work of those who could not defend it in the Assembly, because, as women, they were not (...) citizens? I propose three models : that of Madame Roland, who represented herself for many years as the companion and secretary of her husband, and who nonetheless wrote his most important discourses ; that of Sophie de Grouchy, who collaborated with her husband, Condorcet, but was only able to publish her own writing after the revolution ; finally, that of Olympe de Gouges, who paid herself for the printing and distribution of her numerous works. Despite their efforts, these women were put in their place more or less violently by a revolutionary society that did not accept that they could participate in its reforms. (shrink)

This essay examines Grouchy’s translation of the Theory of Moral Sentiments along with her critical commentary on Smith’s moral philosophy: The Letters on Sympathy. In this paper, we analyze these two pieces as a whole and build on Grouchy’s commentary in order to highlight some of her choices of translation. Thus we supplement the existing interpretations of Grouchy’s choices of translation. We show that the self-interested basis of her system of sympathy might explain, at least in part, why she missed (...) the important Smithian distinction between self-love and selfishness. Likewise, we make a connection between her abandonment of Smith’s vocabulary of movements and the absence of an identification process in her own analysis of sympathy. (shrink)

This chapter demonstrates how Sophie de Grouchy (1764–1822) anticipates the famous modern-day distinction between positive and negative liberty in her late eighteenth-century writings. It is argued that, on these grounds, De Grouchy deserves a rightful place in the history of the liberal tradition, a tradition that is typically depicted as the exclusive province of men. To support this claim, this chapter examines De Grouchy’s ideas in comparison with Rousseau’s and Adam Smith’s views on justice and property rights. This sets the (...) context in which De Grouchy introduces her distinction between positive and negative rights, a distinction that maps onto the modern-day divide between negative and positive liberty. It is shown how, in her writings, political issues of rights and justice intersect with moral issues to do with virtue and with the proper education of virtuous citizens who are also free. (shrink)

Motherhood, as it is practiced, constitutes an obstacle to gender equality in political participation. Several options are available as a potential solution to this problem. One is to advice women not to become mothers, or if they do, to devote less time and energy to caring for their children. However this will have negative repercussions for those who need to be cared for, whether children, sick people or the elderly. A second solution is to reject the view that political participation (...) is an important or necessary part of human flourishing, and allow that those who engage in caring activities can live good lives without having a say in how they are ruled. This has negative consequences for the carers who find themselves in a position, if not of direct oppression, of being dominated, and therefore susceptible of being oppressed. The solution I propose, inspired by the writings of Sophie de Grouchy, is that we look for a form of republicanism that regards caring activities as a form of political participation. (shrink)

The writings of women philosophers have often been neglected in the discipline of virtue ethics. In this historical survey of feminist virtue ethics, Sandrine Berges redresses the balance by focusing on key writings of important women philosophers, including Perictione, Heloise, Christine de Pizan, Mary Wollstonecraft and Sophie de Grouchy. A Feminist Perspective on Virtue Ethics first applies the findings of its historical survey to questions on the ethics of care, gender and the public life, and global justice. In what follows, (...) it is argued that the ethical theorizing of women in the past can and should be brought to bear on current philosophical debates. (shrink)

Political writings of eighteenth-century France have been so far mostly overlooked as a source of republican thought. Philosophers such as Condorcet actively promoted the ideal of republicanism in ways that can shed light on current debates. In this paper, I look at one particular source: Le Republicain, published in the summer 1791, focusing on previously unattributed articles by Condorcet’s wife and collaborator, Sophie de Grouchy. Grouchy, a philosopher in her own right, is beginning to be known for her Letters on (...) Sympathy, a response to Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiment, which she published at the same time as her translation of that text into French. I argue, further, that in the texts, which I attribute to Grouchy, we can find the early development of a commercial republican theory, a belief, which is reflected in her discussion of the ‘cost’ of tyranny. (shrink)

This study of Sophie de Grouchy's translation of Adam Smith's Theory of moral sentiments {Lettres sur la sympathie, 1798) asks whether the Scottish Enlightenment helped to elaborate the Revolutionary notion of fraternité. It analyses the problems Sophie de Grouchy encountered in translating Smith's notion of sympathy in the light of the criticisms she made of Smith's discussion of sympathy in the introduction to her translation, and finally comments on the only occurrence of the word fraternité to be found in the (...) translation. (shrink)

Our modern-day word for sympathy is derived from the classical Greek word for fellow-feeling. Both in the vernacular as well as in the various specialist literatures within philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, economics, and history, "sympathy" and "empathy" are routinely conflated. In practice, they are also used to refer to a large variety of complex, all-too-familiar social phenomena: for example, simultaneous yawning or the giggles. Moreover, sympathy is invoked to address problems associated with social dislocation and political conflict. It is, then, turned (...) into a vehicle toward generating harmony among otherwise isolated individuals and a way for them to fit into a larger whole, be it society and the universe.This volume offers a historical overview of some of the most significant attempts to come to grips with sympathy in Western thought from Plato to experimental economics. The contributors are leading scholars in philosophy, classics, history, economics, comparative literature, and political science. Sympathy is originally developed in Stoic thought. It was also taken up by Plotinus and Galen. There are original contributed chapters on each of these historical moments. Use for the concept was re-discovered in the Renaissance. And the volume has original chapters not just on medical and philosophical Renaissance interest in sympathy, but also on the role of antipathy in Shakespeare and the significance of sympathy in music theory. Inspired by the influence of Spinoza, sympathy plays a central role in the great moral psychologies of, say, Anne Conway, Leibniz, Hume, Adam Smith, and Sophie De Grouchy during the eighteenth century. The volume should offers an introduction to key background concept that is often overlooked in many of the most important philosophies of the early modern period.About a century ago the idea of Einfühlung was developed in theoretical philosophy, then applied in practical philosophy and the newly emerging scientific disciplines of psychology. Moreover, recent economists have rediscovered sympathy in part experimentally and, in part by careful re-reading of the classics of the field. (shrink)

Sophie de Grouchy, marquise de Condorcet, réinterprète la doctrine de la sympathie propre à la tradition moraliste écossaise dans le sens d’une réévaluation de ses origines physiologiques, ce qui affecte profondément ses dimensions morales et sociales. Dans le cadre d’un rousseauisme compassionnel, elle transforme Adam Smith en un républicain sentimentaliste modéré, précurseur des Idéologues. Elle s’emploie pour cela à montrer que la déférence envers le pouvoir établi, surtout la royauté, érigée par Adam Smith en servilité quasi fétichiste envers les puissants (...) et les rois, doit être réexaminée dans le cadre d’une économie affective post-révolutionnaire. Malgré le risque d’un mimétisme affectif enflammé par une rhétorique démagogique, Sophie de Grouchy mise sur la moralisation de l’identification avec la souffrance humaine, et sur sa régulation par des lois et institutions réformées pour tenir compte d’une nature humaine profondément sympathique. L’institutionnalisation de la sympathie morale est censée porter remède aux tragédies dues à la ségrégation sociale. En revanche, Adam Smith souligne à la fois la corruption morale due à l’adulation des puissants, et l’illusion socialement utile d’un imaginaire collectif cultivé par la tragédie classique et peuplé d’idéalisations du statut social. Adam Smith explore en outre d’une façon originale une dimension quasi psychanalytique de l’idéal social du moi qui anticipe la problématisation du culte du chef, là où la marquise se contente de critiquer le meneur de foule. (shrink)

This article examines the excitement that Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments generated in France during the French Revolution, focusing particularly on the writings of political theorists, participants and commentators such as the abbé Sieyès, Pierre-Louis Rœderer, the Marquis de Condorcet and Sophie de Grouchy Condorcet, who were dismayed at their political opponents’ use of Rousseau, and looked to Smith for an understanding of the passions that was compatible with democratic sovereignty and representative government. In the political context of the (...) early 1790s, clarifying the concept of natural sociability, which Rousseau had rejected, but Smith and Helvétius, in different ways, each regarded as indispensible to a society dependent on advanced division of labour, became a central concern in the public lectures delivered by Pierre-Louis Rœderer as the Terror took hold. ☆ My thanks to Emma Rothschild, Michael Sonenscher, Brian Young and other participants in the History of Political Thought Seminar, Oxford, and The Hexagonal Forum, Cambridge, where earlier versions of this paper were presented and helpfully discussed. I’m also grateful for comments on an earlier draft from Carolina Armenteros, Clare Jackson, Duncan Kelly, Michael Sonenscher and Richard Whatmore. (shrink)

In 1798, Sophie de Grouchy, the marquise de Condorcet, published a translation of the seventh edition of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments (1792), along with a series of eight “letters” on the subject of sympathy. These letters are, in fact, substantial essays that allow us to discern how she read Smith. Intellectual historians have a tendency to privilege an author's intent, and to read the Theory of Moral Sentiments in order to determine what Smith actually meant, and how meaning (...) was constructed in the context of a particular intellectual environment. As long ago as 1978, literary theorists such as Wolfgang Iser suggested that a reader's response is at least as interesting a question as an author's intent (Iser 1978). And Sophie de Grouchy is no ordinary reader. Her translation of, and commentary on, Smith's work allow us to see how a theory constructed in the intellectual context of the Scottish Enlightenment would be received by a different intellectual community. While de Grouchy shared much of the background that informed Smith's work, she could not write a commentary on sympathy during the Terror without taking into account recent French political experience and debate. And, I argue, her reading was not merely idiosyncratic, but rather representative of a particular group of intellectuals seized with the problem of adapting Enlightenment theory to the political reality of the Republic. -/- . (shrink)

Sophie Grouchy de Condorcet translated Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments into French and added eight letters on the subject of moral sympathy which she attached to the second volume of her translation. The translation and letters were published in Paris in 1798. The letters contain criticism of Smith as well as Mme Condorcet's own views of moral and political philosophy. ;In order to present Mme Condorcet's originality in comparison to her contemporaries, after a general introduction in Chapter One, I (...) provide the French background in Chapter Two. I present the three Enlightenment thinkers: Condillac, Helvetius and Cabanis who influenced Mme Condorcet in their sensationalistic philosophy and their ideas on progress. In Chapter Three I present Adam Smith's theory of sympathy as a basis for moral judgment. Chapter Four contains Mme Condorcet's theory of moral sympathy. She traces the origin of sympathy to our first sensations of pleasure and pain. Sensations of pleasure and pain are first felt at the hands of our caretakers, hence sympathy, Mme Condorcet claims, "begins in the crib". As pain is a recollectable phenomenon, sympathy means feeling pain upon seeing another person suffer. Mme Condorcet is able to explain the nature and scope of sympathy in a way that Hume or Smith did not. ;In Chapter Five I present Mme Condorcet's views regarding the role of reason and sentiments in moral theory. Instead of the usual dichotomy between these two faculties, Mme Condorcet argues that both are essential to the formation of a moral agent. Morality originates in non-reflective moral feelings and is sustained and developed through rational understanding. Chapter Six contains her theory of progress in which Mme Condorcet analyzes the sources of injustice and crime in society and she argues that injustice and crime stem from unfair social institutions and legislation. Mme Condorcet, as opposed to Smith, claims that economic inequalities will always lead to oppression of the poor by the wealthy. She advocates redistribution of wealth. Development of sympathy would contribute to the alleviation of social injustices. (shrink)