Key works |
Anscombe 1956 contains an early contemporary examination of Aristotle’s problem of future contingents, while MacFarlane 2003 offers a recent and influential solution to the problem based on a context of assessment. Dummett 1964 focuses on an argument concerning the asymmetry between past and future, and contains an argument against fatalism. Belnap 1992 argues for a blend of relativity and indeterminism, and Belnap & Green 1994 argue for an open future as rooted in a branching structure of time without a distinguished ‘actual’ future branch. Barnes & Cameron 2008 aim to show that the open future is compatible with determinism about the laws of nature as well as an unrestricted principle of bivalence. Besson & Hattiangadi 2014 argue that intuition supports the bivalence of future contingents, Todd 2021 argues that future contingents are false, and Briggs & Forbes 2012 argue that future contingents can have truth values. Additionally, Miller 2005 argues that the open future is compatible with time travel. |