Weak independent decisiveness and the existence of a unique vetoer

Economics Letters 131:59–61 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper is concerned with an aggregation of individual preferences. We introduce the concept of weak independent decisiveness, which is a weakening of Sen’s independent decisiveness. We show that a Paretian social welfare function satisfies weak independent decisiveness if and only if the family of weakly decisive sets forms an ultrafilter.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,168

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence.Susumu Cato - 2018 - Social Choice and Welfare 50:305–328.
Is God diminished if we abscond?Mark Patrick Hederman - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (5):741-749.
Remarks on Suzumura consistent collective choice rules.Susumu Cato - 2013 - Mathematical Social Sciences 65 (1):40–47.
Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters.Walter Bossert & Susumu Cato - 2020 - Journal of Mathematical Economics 87:134–141.
α -Decisiveness In Simple Games.Francesc Carreras - 2004 - Theory and Decision 56 (1-2):77-91.
Weak-operator Continuity and the Existence of Adjoints.Douglas Bridges & Luminita Dediu - 1999 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 45 (2):203-206.
Remarks on a procedural condition for the voting paradox.Susumu Cato - 2019 - Bulletin of Economic Research 71 (3):549–557.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-01-03

Downloads
10 (#1,197,378)

6 months
10 (#274,061)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references